COMIREX MAPPING, CHARTING AND GEODESY WORKING GROUP MINUTES OF MEETING HELD IN ROOM 1D918 PENTAGON 1500, 7 JANUARY 1969

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B01709A000500010028-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 4, 2004
• Sequence Number: 28
• Publication Date: January 7, 1969
• Content Type: MIN

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Referral review completed by NIMA 3/2/01
NRO REVIEW COMPLETED
COM'IREX MAPPING, CHARTING AND GEODESY WORKING GROUP
Minutes of Meeting Held in ,Room 1D91$
Pentagon
1500, 7 January 1969
PRESIDING
Purpose of E~leeting - General
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1. Chairman, indicated that the meeting was called on
short notice to iscuss NRO actions on placing the Doppler on the KH-4B
system.. He pointed out that there were critical timing considerations
involved and that action had been expedited in handlin this subject in
COMIREX and LTSIB. Final action in"the..USIB had in itself resulted in
"permissive" direction to the NRO to proceed with adding the Doppler to
the KH-4B. Informal information had been received from NRO-that steps
were being taken to add the Doppler to four KH-4B missions beginnia~.g in.
March 1970 rather than five KH-4B miss-ions beginning in the summer of
1969. The sole purpose of the meeting was for the Iv'~t0 tc set forth facts
bearin? on this-'action, asked that. careful handling be given
to be stated by encompassing both TK and
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systems as of March 1970 and that a follow-up message be sent, The
follow-up message was sent on 6 January 1969. The scheduling for the
four KH-4B missions was March, May, July a:nd Se tember 1970 with a fund-
ing commitment of Q At the same time a a he 2 5X1A
Doppler beacon to be added to all 2 5X1 D
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NRO Actions on Addin the Doppler Beacon to the KEI-4B System
2,a, In response to the Chairman's request, .referred
to a meeting with Don 24 December at which time approved
four Doppler beacon systems beginning in March 1970. This change from
five Doppler beacon systems beginning in the summer 1969 was made after
considering information collected by his staff. 0 asked that 2 5X1A
the West Coast NRO.office be contacted orally to proceed with the four
b, indicated the basis for the March 1970 date
for the initia' KH- B system included cons:Lde.rations involving the word-
ing of the USI$ approval whereby USIB agreed that steps should be taken.
He referred to this language as a fall--out of position that 2 5X1A
the USIB not commit itself as approving authority en accuracy criteria
related to military operational needs are the justification for the col-
lection program in concern. ~ had asked his staff to look into
the military operational requirement which res~~lted in the collection
of several letters and documents which stressed the improved Minuteman
system. Examination of these papers caused and his staff to
question the statement in the USIB-COMIREX
ocumentation on the accura
and the timing of the requirement.
CEF' was the lowest number noted in the Air
range (DIA documentation was based upon a
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c.
check of the June 1970 IOC date revealthe improved G&G was not
extremely critical as of that date, acted on the basis of this
investigation and made the decision to proceed with four systems in
March 1970.
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c. 0 asked what was the .basis of concludin four systems
instead of five, regardless of the slippage date.- in- 2 5X1A
dicated that no one could say haw many miss-ions would be needed in 2 5X1A
support of the ?total requirement and that part of the requirement would.
need to be fulfilled, in any event Funds to initiate 2 5X1 D
the program in the summer of 1969 were a so a problem.
indicated that there was no suitable KH.-4 system. between the summer of
1969 and March 1970 that could be used as a carrier of the Doppler. beacon..
The October-November 1970 KH-4B system would not have a DISK as now
programmed. i
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indicated that ~, 25X1A
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d. Oraised a question as to whether the documentation
furnished NRO was the same documents as received in DIA,
indicated the documents were principally those grogram and accuracy
documents normally developed in the Air Force system command.- While
these documents did not appear to substantiate the criticality of the
IOC date, they do show a need for improved G&G data. Accordingly, the
NitO was taking action to add the Doppler beacon to the KH-4B, the only
difference being. one less vehicle and starting in March 1970 instead of
summer 1969. He mentioned that there were a number of very tight timing
actions that would be critical factors in placing the Doppler on the
KH-4B for a next summer mission and. time was rapidly running out on
being able to meet this date. He mentioned that funding caas not the
primary factor in NRO clioosing to start in March 1970, .There were
underlying considerations affecting this action which related to the
general troubles and problems that have recently been experienced with
the KEi-4 system (problems involving UTB-film, batteries and other tech-
nical problems); while adding the Doppler in itself did not loom as a
great problem, it still was an additional factor that could cause things
to go wrong. He further pointed out that there was a major transition
going on with respect to key personnel moving from the KH-4
This in itself meant that less experienced personnel were having to
accept responsibility for the remaining KH-4B systems.
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e. indicated that DIA-was primarily concerned in
obtaining the exp ana ion by the NRO; however, there were two areas of '
concerxi. First, the delay from summer.19b9 to March 1970 and, secondly
the procedure in handling MC&G military operational requirements. He
was not prepared to discuss these views further at this time, but it was
clear that DIA would take immediate steps to contact Air Force concerning
requirement and timing considerations,
f. indicated that explanation relating 2 5X1A
to the requirements (informal information had previously reached his
agency) was raising questions in CIA as to whether the requirement was. ?
valid.
g, Q led discussion about new procedures that may need
to be developed- to handle military operational requirements and what
steps might be taken. Following questioning of the requirement, it was
concluded that it may be desirable to have another Working Group Meeting;
but, on the other hand, it may be appropriate to discuss the matter next
at the COMIREX level,
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i. of NPIC indicated that he had recently staffed a
paper in NP w is concluded that the lower inclination which had pre-
viously been considered for the KH-AFB in the short arc solution last
summer was not a significant problem in intelligence exploitation. How-
ever, official COMIREX review was not completed.
COMIREX MC&G Working Group
N L, US
Chairman
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