JOINT SOVIET-AMERICAN RECONNAISSANCE TO MONITOR MIDDLE EAST CEASE-FIRE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B01709A001400050034-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 26, 2002
• Sequence Number: 34
• Publication Date: October 24, 1973
• Content Type: NOTES

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NRO REVIEW COMPLETED
SUBJECT: Joint Soviet-American Reconnaissance to
Monitor Middle East Cease-Fire
1. This memorandum was written in response to a request
from Don Steininger following a discussion which took place at the
DCI's morning meeting on 23 October concerning Soviet reconnaissance
activity which had occurred the previous day over the Suez Canal area.
The DCI discussion centered on the question of Soviet reconnaissance
activities and the relationship of these activities to US reconnaissance
of the same area. The Director asked to have a paper prepared for his
background prior to a WSAG meeting scheduled for 1700 on the 23rd.
2. Steininger called me to outline the topic and asked for a
background paper. This memorandum was provided to the DCI in the
late afternoon. It was reviewed by Don Steininger and Ed Proctor but
received no additional dissemination.
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SUBJECT: Joint Soviet-American Reconnaissance to
Monitor Middle East Cease-Fire
. 1. This memorandum outlines considerations involved and steps
that would be required to implement a proposal to monitor a Middle East
cease-fire arrangement by means of internationally sponsored joint
Soviet-American reconnaissance of the affected areas. The discussion
below focuses only on technical-operational elements of such an arrange-
ment; it does not evaluate political feasibility or related factors.
2. The example, below, is presented as a point of departure to
illustrate the range of factors involved in a joint reconnaissance arrangement.
The example is based on the premise of a program having broad international
involvement under UN auspices. There are alternative and intermediate
arrangements which could also be presented. For illustrative purposes,
the following assumptions were used:
a. The US and the USSR would announce
their joint intention to perform photo reconnaissance
of the Middle East cease-fire areas under UN auspices;
b. The "fact of" such reconnaissance and
the products and information derived therefrom would
be made available on an unrestricted basis to all relevant
parties, including the belligerents;
c . An agreement would exist, containing
explicit provisions to be monitored.
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Reconnaissance Platforms and Operational Coordination
3. The US could perform the required reconnaissance with
either SR-71 or U-2 aircraft; the USSR could use the MIG-25 Foxbat
(high-altitude, supersonic) or Mandrake (high-altitude, subsonic)
reconnaissance aircraft, or even the reconnaissance version of the
Bear, turboprop long-range bomber. We have relatively little firm
data on the reconnaissance capabilities of the camera systems or
mission profiles of the Soviet aircraft.
a. It would be necessary to coordinate
flight dates and routes through some joint coordinative
mechanism either bilaterally or jointly through the UN.
Except for the long-range Bear, Soviet aircraft
probably would need to be based in the UAR or Syria.
US aircraft could fly from various bases but could
operate most efficiently from forward bases.
b. The USSR undoubtedly knows much more
about the characteristics and capabilities of the camera
systems on the US aircraft than the US knows about
Soviet cameras and capabilities. The net intelligence
gain or losses to either side through exposure of its
technical reconnaissance capabilities, therefore, probably
nets out to the benefit of the US. Much of the US technical
camera system data has been adapted in the open NASA
lunar exploration programs and is widely available.
c . Aside from coordinating dates and general
flight routes, there would need to be little additional
operational interaction or exposure. Both parties
would be able to operate independently. We do not
know how far to either side of the flight path useful
Soviet photography would extend--this could affect
flight planning if the effective swath of Soviet systems
is considerably narrower than for US aircraft.
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Film Processing, and Dissemination
4. Duplicate positives of the relevant film could be processed
unilaterally by each side and either exchanged or delivered for joint
review under UN auspices. Mission film indices relating the aircraft
track to frame numbers and necessary data would have to be provided.
Some technical data concerning the camera systems would need to be
exchanged in order to perform photogrammetric functions such as
mensuration, etc. These would not neet to be extensive.
a. If film is exchanged, then requirements
would be established to deliver agreed duplicate
positives to identified recipients (US, USSR, UAR,
Israel, UN, etc.) together with necessary index
materials at times and places specified by agreement.
Under this option, each party would be made
responsible to read out the photography and identify
any questionable information or activity to a joint body,
equivalent to a consultative commission.
b. If film were disseminated primarily to
a UN-sponsored photo-interpretative unit, it would
maximize the international involvement but be a
complicated and difficult unit to establish, manage,
support, etc.
Control and Handling of Derived Information and Related Data
5. After establishing a reference baseline which catalogued
the relevant installations, dispositions, etc., each new increment of
photography must be reviewed systematically and used to update or
modify the base.
a. Arrangements would need to be made
to maintain and update a common data base, including
one which could be jointly maintained under UN auspices.
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b . It would be necessary to develop and
coordinate common terminology, criteria, and
interpretations to be placed on provisions of any
agreement.
c . Ground rules would need to be developed
concerning the releasability and public dissemination
of information or film (prints). This would include
the delineation of the procedures by which information
derived from photography would be made available to
such ground observers as may be established or such
other instrumentalities for policing the cease-fire.
Problem Areas
6. While there are many aspects to a joint monitoring arrangement
which could be worked out bilaterally, there are some aspects which would
have to be agreed in detail for such a program to be effective:
a . The photography would regularly
contain tactical intelligence data of value to the
belligerents themselves which potentially could
be used to the disadvantage of either side in
limited operations. The Arabs and Israelis would
therefore need to agree to the passage and handling
of such information.
b. Careful joint planning would be
required in starting up, continuing and providing
for the phase-down or termination of such a joint
reconnaissance program.
c . Careful agreements would need to be
reached on the geographic limitations of reconnaissance
as well as the activities which require monitoring--for
example, questions involving rear activities and
build-ups, re-supply, movement or changes in the
disposition of rear or supporting elements, etc.
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