OVERHEAD PHOTOGRAPHIC RECONNAISSANCE OF CUBA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B01709A001500030032-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2012
• Sequence Number: 32
• Publication Date: December 21, 1999
• Content Type: MF

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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP79B01709A001500030032-8
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MEMORANDUM FOR:
SUBJECT
30 July 1974
Director of Central Intelligence
Overhead Photographic Reconnaissance
of Cuba
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I. Following your instructions from the 27 June USIS meeting,
COMIFtEX coordinated the further review of the use of SR-71 versus
U-2R aircraft for reconnaissance of Cuba. The review resolved all
issues except political.
a. Political Factors: You asked the State Department to
? reevaluate its position on the political acceptability of switching
from U-2 to SR-7I aircraft. On 26 July, Under Secretary of
State Sisco reaffirmed the position of the Department that on
political grounds the U-2R is preferable to the SR-71 because
? it maintains continuity with past practices. He is concerned
that a change could be interpreted as a political signal and
believes it is preferable not to present new factors to the
Cubans at this time. He is said to be aware of the cost
and operational factors involved in the choice of aircraft.
WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES ?
AND METHODS INVOLVED ' / I I ? - 25X1
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c. Other Considerations: Individual SR-71 flights
are more costly than U-2R flights, but this is offset because
minimum SR-71 flight activity and tanker support must be
maintained for training even in the absence of operational
missions. The USAF and JRC also report that the sonic boom
of SR-71 missions probably would not be a problem. Although
the noise would be evident in relatively quiet rural areas, the
Cubans regularly operate supersonic aircraft and the SR-71
sonic boom probably would not be noted as unusual or iden-
tified as foreign by the local populace.
d. Standby Alert: There is agreement that a 96-hour
alert status for aircraft missions is adequate for response to
special situations of the types occurring over the past several
years.
2. To resolve the political question, the State Department
has recommended that the option of using the SR-71 be reviewed by
Dr. Kissinger is his capacity as Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs. Attached is a proposed memorandum for your signa-
ture advising Dr. Kissinger of the USIB review of the Cuba require-
ments and asking for his decision concerning the use of the SR-71.
3. Revisions to the USIB Memorandum detailing the Cuba
requirements will be made after a decision has been reached on the
choice of aircraft.
lioland S. iniow
Chairman, COMIREX
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Concurrence page for "Overhead Photographic Reconnaissance of Cuba,"
dated 30 July 1974, SECRET/SENSITIVE
Concur
uty Directni- 'or Intelligence
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 :.CIA-RDP79B01709A001500030032-8
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP79B01709A001500030032-8
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20.505
Aacutive Re.gistrg
3 1 JUL 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
SUBJECT Overhead Photographic Reconnaissance of Cuba
1. A decision is required on whether SR-71 aircraft may be
used in place of U-2's for airborne photographic reconnaissance of
Cuba. Background on this question is outlined below including the
differences of view among organizations. The decision options are
presented for consideration in paragraph 3.
1.2.L.cisc round
2. The USIB has recently completed an extensive review and
approved some major changes to the standing national requirements for
overhead photographic reconnaissance of Cuba. These changes, as
noted below, affect previous arrangements of relatively long standing.
a. In the future it is planned to utilize photographic
satellite systems rather than manned aircraft as the primary
source of reconnaissance photography of the island. This
chan e was implemented
b. The requirement for complete coverage of Cuba
has been reduced to a frequency of Once every four months.
c. A manned aircraft reconnaissance presence
over Cuba will be maintained, but at a sharply reduced
level--one mission each three to four months to assure,
for political purposes, a continuing U.S. overflight
presence.
SEI4SITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
. WARNING NOTICE
AND METHODS INVOLVED
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d. The capability for manned aircraft flights
over the island to meet unpredictable time-sensitive
intelligence needs will be maintained, but on a 96-
hour alert status rather than the costly 24-hour alert
status maintained in the past. This change will reduce
overall costs and the immediate alert status will be
modified whenever a special situation develops.
Decision Options
3. The major question for your consideration and decision
involves the aircraft system to be used for c. and d. above--that is,
whether to continue with the U-2R which has been employed since
1962, or to replace it with the SR-71. As you know, both aircraft
provide comparable photography.
a. Under Secretary of State Sisco has reaffirmed the
position of the Department that on political grounds the U-2R
is preferable to the SR-71 because it maintains continuity with
past practices. He is concerned that a change could be inter-
preted as a political signal and believes it is preferable not
to present new factors to the Cubans at this time.
b. The argument for switchin the SR-71 is both
economic and o erational.
The SR-71 is relatively invulner-
able to Cuban air defenses, it can be occasionally tasked for
these missions rather than being dedicated to them, and
therefore is preferred for the new requirement of flying.
only three to four missions a year.
SECRET
MBA
W. E. Colby
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