CAPABILITY OF THE U-2 TO ACQUIRE INFORMATION ON THE SITUATION IN INDONESIA
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79B01709A001700020044-5
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
2
Document Creation Date:
December 21, 2016
Document Release Date:
August 4, 2006
Sequence Number:
44
Case Number:
Publication Date:
July 25, 1962
Content Type:
MF
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
CIA-RDP79B01709A001700020044-5.pdf | 76.88 KB |
Body:
HANDLE VY
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25 July 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: Deputy Director (Research)' ~j
SUBJECT: Capability of the U-2 to Acquire
Information on the Situation
In Indonesia
1. It is understood that at the last Special Group
meeting Mr. Gilpatric inquired as to the kind of information the
U-2 would be able to acquire on Indonesia in connection with the
current difficulty over West New Guinea (West Iria).
2. For your information 29 U-2 missions were
conducted over Indonesia between 29 March and 7 June 1958. From
that experience as well as our more recent experience in a country
of comparable latitude, climate, and terrain, namely North Vietnam,
the same type of information can be obtained. Specifically, it is
possible to identify numbers and types of naval vessels, port
facilities, airfields, along with construction under way and
equipment, numbers and types of aircraft, military barracks,
military vehicles, POL storage, road and railroads, along with
the amount and character of railroad transport. In some cases
in North Vietnam we have been able to detect trails in mountainous
terrain. It is rather unlikely that the same would be possible in
the jungles of Indonesia.
with appropriate report.
report its findings and maintain continuing review of the situation
3. On Thursday of this week the Committee on Overhead
Reconnaissance will consider the requirements for Indonesia,
information from all sources available on the Indonesian situation,
and whether gaps in information can be collected by these other
sources, or whether U-2 reconnaissance is justified. If so, COMOR
will recommend for your consideration, and that of the NRO, and
the Special Group, the use of the U-2. In any event, COMOR will
F6L 7es Q. Reber
Copy j _of 9 Chief
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Approved For Release 2006/08/09: CIA-RDP79B0l709A001700020044-5