CAPABILITY OF THE U-2 TO ACQUIRE INFORMATION ON THE SITUATION IN INDONESIA

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79B01709A001700020044-5
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
2
Document Creation Date: 
December 21, 2016
Document Release Date: 
August 4, 2006
Sequence Number: 
44
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
July 25, 1962
Content Type: 
MF
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP79B01709A001700020044-5.pdf76.88 KB
Body: 
HANDLE VY proved For Rele ON `L ` STEM ONLY ~se 2006/08/09T RAP 9A e_17.000 0441 ,5- E daVaT' . referring to Proj a . ` 25 July 1962 MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence VIA: Deputy Director (Research)' ~j SUBJECT: Capability of the U-2 to Acquire Information on the Situation In Indonesia 1. It is understood that at the last Special Group meeting Mr. Gilpatric inquired as to the kind of information the U-2 would be able to acquire on Indonesia in connection with the current difficulty over West New Guinea (West Iria). 2. For your information 29 U-2 missions were conducted over Indonesia between 29 March and 7 June 1958. From that experience as well as our more recent experience in a country of comparable latitude, climate, and terrain, namely North Vietnam, the same type of information can be obtained. Specifically, it is possible to identify numbers and types of naval vessels, port facilities, airfields, along with construction under way and equipment, numbers and types of aircraft, military barracks, military vehicles, POL storage, road and railroads, along with the amount and character of railroad transport. In some cases in North Vietnam we have been able to detect trails in mountainous terrain. It is rather unlikely that the same would be possible in the jungles of Indonesia. with appropriate report. report its findings and maintain continuing review of the situation 3. On Thursday of this week the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance will consider the requirements for Indonesia, information from all sources available on the Indonesian situation, and whether gaps in information can be collected by these other sources, or whether U-2 reconnaissance is justified. If so, COMOR will recommend for your consideration, and that of the NRO, and the Special Group, the use of the U-2. In any event, COMOR will F6L 7es Q. Reber Copy j _of 9 Chief Special Requirements Staff, OSA nr! T MORUCIDIF of Approved For Release 2 0 RaP79B01709A001700020044-5 I~--- ie I lmalle Excluded tro@ auad do~+ajraOTIS ded4slficall1n Approved For Release 2006/08/09: CIA-RDP79B01709A001700020044-5 C/SRS/OSA/DDR:JQReber:bs Copy 1--DCI 2--DDCI 3--DDI 4--DDR 5--AD/OS. 6--OSI/TCO 7--Intel /OSA 8--C/SRS 9--C/SRS/OSA/DDR Approved For Release 2006/08/09: CIA-RDP79B0l709A001700020044-5