PROCEDURES FOR DECONTROL AND DOWNGRADING OF T-KH MATERIALS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B01709A002000050015-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 14, 2005
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: February 21, 1967
• Content Type: MF

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21 February 1967
MEMORANDUM FOR: SaAd Hoc Group on Security Handling tellite Reconnaissance Materials of
SUBJECT: Procedures for Decontrol and
Downgrading of T-KH Materials
1. The Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group has requested that the
conseration. you will em oanduYn epresentingottleethat
attached papers be forwarded oveinyour
this presentation plans for a c g m This in turn will be
consensus of the Group to go forward to the Board.
accompanied by tabs: Tab Arto costs; representing
aall ndtTabaCtprese presenting the by
the Group; Tab B being pertinent
opinions of the security advisers to the Ad Hoc Group.
2. While the Chairman intends to provide sufficient time for
careful study of the attached material, it must also be noted that the
various actions
ntive pertinent
Board is pressing for conclusion h
.
ggestionso ed ga d rng
t
b
a
s
e u
av
It is requested that members who I .. 1- .P?-riwrnrrd these to
the language in the paper ]l?`-t. C%11 -:6Monday, -27 FebruarY? It should then be
office prior to close of business .
Fmembers ebruary and for the Group
possible to circulate substantial changes
week of all
to meet again prior to the end of
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Executive Secretary,
Ad Hoc Group, COMOR
Attachment: Draft Report
Copies 1, 2 State TCO fo r Baraz
3,4 DIA TCO for
5, 6 NPIC for
7, 8 ORR TCO for
9 NRO TCO for
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MEMORANDUM FOR: United States Intelligence Board
SUBJECT: Procedures for Decontrol and
Downgrading of T-KH Materials
1. On 7 July 1966 the Director of Central. Intelligence
appointed. an, ad hoe group to study the problems involved in decontrol
and downgrading of T-KH material. The ad hoc group was not
charged to make recommendations for or against decontrol and
downgrading but was charged to determine how such measures might
be accomplished if a policy decision were made by appropriate
officials to accomplish decontrol or downgrading. In pursuing its
work, however, the ad hoc group has inevitably had to consider the
way in which various decontrol measures for T-KH material might
benefit the intelligence community or increase the security risk to
sensitive information. These various points are discussed in context
in Tab A.
2. Our principal conclusions follow:
a. The critical point requiring policy decision.
before the implementation of any decontrol or downgrading
measures is the willingness of the United States Government
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to reveal the existence of a classified satellite
reconnaissance program at the SECRET level. If the
Government is not willing to make this decision, there
is relatively little that can be done to increase the
utility of TALENT-KEYHOLE material other than by
changes in sanitization procedures. The increased
gain to be expected from such measures, however, is
likely to be fairly small and must be measured against
the costs inherent in sanitization.
b. There are such serious administrative,
technical, and security problems involved in the blanket
downgrading or decontrol of portions of the material now
in the T-KH compartment, the KH-4 photography, for
example, that we do not feel that such a course would be
advisable. These problems are discussed at greater
length in Tabs A, B, and C.
c. The intelligence community is not faced
with a completely black or white situation. If the United
States Government is willing to reveal the existence of a
classified satellite reconnaissance program at the SECRET
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level, a series of measures could be considered which
would greatly enhance the utility of TALENT-KEYHOLE
material but which would not reveal sensitive technical
information or critical factors concerning the magnitude and
success of the program. These measures would result in
some increased security risk but this increase could be
kept fairly small and the most sensitive aspects of the
material now protected by the TALENT-KEYHOLE
compartment would continue to be protected. Such measures
could include:
(1)
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of KH-5 (DAFF) photography and photography
obtained by the
of the KH-4
(2)
to permit photography from the
systems.
Changes in sanitization procedures
be used in production of photo interpretation reports,
and more liberally employed in maps, area studies,
and other products. Such products would be at the
SECRET level, while the photography would itself
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be retained within the TALENT-KEYHOLE system.
Special guidance concerning the content, format,
and wording of these products would have to be
promulgated if this course is adopted.
(3)
pieces of TALENT-KEYHOLE photography in the
production of briefing and illustrative materials
for use at the SECRET level in accordance with
procedures which would prevent the reconstruction
of the technical characteristics and full operational
capability of the camera system by which it was
obtained.
(4) Release of newly collected KH-4
photography at the SECRET level after the point in
time at which we estimate that the Russians and
Chinese Communists fully appreciate the resolution
and operational achievements within the capability of
that system (we estimate that that point is still several
years in the future).
3. We recommend that if a decision is made to
decontrol or downgrade some part of the material now protected by
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the TALENT-KEYHOLE compartment, it be done in accordance with
the conclusions outlined above. The factors bearing on those
conclusions are discussed in greater detail in Tab A.
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Tab A
Discussion of Problems Involved in
Decontrol and Downgrading of T-KH Materials
1. The Ad Hoc Committee has received a series of briefings
pertinent to problems involved in decontrol and downgrading of the
material, now in or designated to be included in the T-KH security
compartment. After considerable study and discussion, we have
summarized our views under the following headings:
Advantages of Decontrol and Downgrading in Certain Fields
2. Satellite photography is inherently an efficient and
relatively inexpensive source of information for the production of
maps and the conduct of a wide variety of studies which relate to the
physical environment of the world. The U. S. Army Corps of
Engineers has been conducting studies in the TALENT-KEYHOLE
compartment and has concluded that if it were possible to downgrade
substantial quantities of satellite photography
would be possible to undertake studies of the earth's environment on
a much broader scale, The National Aeronautics and Space
Administration has come to the same conclusion and is considering
a large scale program for the acquisition of satellite photography on
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Tab A
an unclassified basis to be used for such studies. Other government
agencies such as the Departments of Interior and Agriculture are
also interested in applying photography to their problems on a large
scale.
3. The principal point to be made at this juncture is that
as our capability to photograph the earth develops, an ever-increasing
number of users of photography will be found. Such offices as that of
the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers have made extensive use of T-KH
photography to produce sanitized maps and charts at the SECRET and
CONFIDENTIAL levels, outside of the T-KH compartment. As
indicated by the interest of other agencies of the U. S. Government in
the Gemini photography collected by NASA on an unclassified basis,
there are many other studies of the earth to which photography will be
a major contributor.
4. In view of the growing interest in the use of satellite
photography in a wide range of studies of the earth, there would appear
to be many advantages to the U. S. Government in cost and over-all
efficiency if suitable ways could be found for exploiting for these
purposes the large quantities of photography that have already been
collected and the additional photography that will be collected under
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Tab A
the National Reconnaissance Program in future years. Even though
it is relatively efficient, the collection of photography of the entire
world is a tremendous job. For several years the intelligence
community has been working on a program of KH-4 coverage of the
Sino-Soviet bloc and approximately 25 million square miles outside
of the Sino-Soviet bloc for use in the production of sanitized maps
and charts. In spite of the effort devoted to this program,
approximately nine million square miles have not yet been covered.
If satisfactory ways could be found to use photography collected
under this mapping program at a lower classification, it might
reduce the need for the development of unclassified satellite photographic
systems to collect duplicate photography.
Public Knowledge of Satellite Photographic Capabilities
5. The NRO has agreements with NASA designed to protect
the technology involved in achieving the higher resolutions already
obtained under the National Reconnaissance Program. On the basis of
the photography already acquired by NASA in the Gemini program,
however, and the photography NASA is likely to acquire on an
unclassified basis in the Apollo program, the possibility of conducting
a large scale photographic program from orbiting satellites will be
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common knowledge. Any qualified scientist or technician in the
United States or abroad should be able to extrapolate from this
knowledge to deduce that it is possible to acquire better quality
photography than that which has been made public. On the other
hand, they would still be unable to deduce the full extent of ,the
solution to technical problems involving resolution and would not
be able to deduce the operational effectiveness and thus the
capability of the National Reconnaissance Program as a whole.
As will be mentioned later, these facts could be deduced only
from access to the photography itself.
The Physical Problem of Decontrol
6. The problem of decontrol and downgrading of previously
acquired photography now in the TALENT-KEYHOLE compartment is
large and complex. Over two million feet of original satellite
photographic film has been collected and many duplicates have been
made. In the normal course of events, each frame of photography
released from a compartment would have to be reclassified. This
process is costly in terms of time, money, and administration. Some
of the actual costs involved are discussed in Tab B.
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Tab A
7. There are a number of alternative approaches, each
with advantages and disadvantages. Decision as to which route to
follow will be aided by a more detailed examination of the community
problems that need to be solved:
Abolition of the TALENT-KEYHOLE
compartment would not necessitate removal of the old
classification and putting on a new classification until the
photography was actually used in the production of reports,
illustrations, briefing materials, etc. The great majority
of the photography already collected would probably have
lost its usefulness for the majority of these purposes and
the volume requiring physical reclassification, therefore,
would probably be small. This would reduce the cost of
reclassification considerably.
b. Decontrol and downgrading of a large volume
of photography, with other photography remaining within the
protection of a security compartment, presents a problem
that is likely to be both more complex and more expensive.
The reclassification could be carried out in one of two ways:
(1)
First, the TALENT-KEYHOLE
compartment would be abolished and the photography
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needed for the purposes outlined above (7a) would
be reclassified as needed. This would mean.,
however, that a new compartment would have to
be established to furnish protection to the material
that is deemed to be too sensitive to be downgraded.
This would involve a physical reclassification of the
photography requiring protection to identify it with
the new compartment.
(2) The second method of handling the
need for decontrol and downgrading of a large
volume of photography would be to retain the TALENT-
KEYHOLE compartment for the information which
continued to need special security protection and to
reclassify the material that had been selected for
release. This would involve a physical reclassification
of the photography to be downgraded.
C. If it is decided that at some specific date new
photography of a given type would receive a lower classification
and be handled outside of the TALENT-KEYHOLE system, this
would permit photography acquired prior to that date to be left
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Tab A
in the TALENT-KEYHOLE system. The problem of
wholesale reclassification of previously acquired photography
would be avoided, but a new problem arises. Photographic
analysis of new photography will not be meaningful unless
reference is made to old photography. It would be necessary,
therefore, to reclassify the old photography used for
comparative purposes whenever such an occasion arose.
d. Yet another alternative available would be to
retain the actual satellite photography, past and future, in
the TALENT-KEYHOLE compartment but to authorize the
publication of photographic interpretation reports based on
this photography at a lower classification. Through a
revision of the Sanitization Manual, it should be possible to
use selected photography for illustrative purposes without
revealing technical characteristics of the satellite reconnaissance
system which still require protection.
Security Implications of Release
8. The principal security factor inherent in release of the
results of photographic reconnaissance from T-KH is that essentially
the United States Government is admitting officially, at the ultimate
13
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classification decided upon, that the United States is conducting a
satellite reconnaissance program over the Soviet bloc and Communist
China. It seems clear to us that there would be little point in
releasing information derived from the TALENT-KEYHOLE system
unless the classification of the release were at least SECRET or
below (TOP SECRET controls are usually as difficult as or more
difficult to follow than T-KH controls). Otherwise, there would be
too small a gain in the increased utility of the material. Responsible
security officers have advised us in the strongest terms /Tab Cl that
the SECRET classification will provide relatively little true security
as compared to the T-KH compartment. If a decision is made to
admit officially at the SECRET level that the United States is conducting
a satellite reconnaissance program, the decision should be made with
this fact in mind.
9. As a practical matter, however, the existence of a
United States satellite reconnaissance program is already known to
the Soviet Union and is either known or widely suspected by a great
many informed people throughout the world. It seems to us that at
this point the main role that security should play with regard to the
satellite reconnaissance program is to protect the security of certain
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technical matters and to prevent public confirmation of the program.
We feel that one of the chief dangers of public confirmation would be
the possibility that it would cause the Soviet Union or others to
undertake a political campaign which might inhibit our use of the
program or stimuLste target countries to take other measures which
would reduce the value of the photography. We also belie-,v~e that
there is a danger that if the information were handled at the SECRET
level, there might in some circumstances be such a rash of leaks
to the press about the successes of the program that the Soviets or
others might become convinced that the leaks were part of an
officially inspired campaign and that this in turn might have the same
effect as official confirmation.
10. The foregoing discussion pertains particularly to
satellite photography of the Soviet bloc, Communist China, and. a few
might be sensitive about the
security implications of our program. A large number of photographs
of other portions of the world taken in the course of the Gemini
program have already been released on an unclassified basis without
adverse reaction. It is possible that if the satellite photography were
of a larger scale more sensitivity might be aroused, but there are
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NRO
probably large areas of the world for which we could use satellite
photography at the SECRET level or even on an unclassified basis without
creating an adverse reaction. The manner in which the photography was
released and the nature of the accompanying publicity, if any, would
probably have an important bearing on the acquiescence of the countries
involved.
Technological Security Factors
security systems, insofar as they pertain to photographic satellite
reconnaissance, has been to protect operational details which could
permit identification and sizing of the reconnaissance programs.
Certain pieces of technical information are still believed to be unique
to the United States. In this latter category, the main technological
factors which contribute to the success of the U. S, program, 0
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Representatives of the NRO reported to us that they
believe that the Soviet Union could make important deductions
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concerning both of these points if a single frame of full-format"
photography were to fall into their hands or if they were to obtain a
mosaic constructed of large pieces of the photography. A mosaic
made up of many small pieces, while not precluding damaging
deductions, would complicate the problem of making those deductions.
In this context those who briefed us concerning the Soviet satellite
reconnaissance system were careful to point out that the one critical
Rationale for Protection Based on Study of Soviet Reconnaissance Program
12, It has been argued that since the Soviet Union is
conducting its own satellite reconnaissance program with both a
"."Full -format photography includes the original negative, duplicate
positives and duplicate negatives, contact prints, and any other
reproductions which would reveal the actual format, scale, resolution,
and other characteristics of the camera system acquiring the
photography.
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search and a high resolution pointing system, it must be sufficiently
aware of our capabilities in satellite reconnaissance to reduce the
need to maintain the security compartment to protect the details
concerning results of the U. S. reconnaissance program. This
rationalization has been examined in the context of our knowledge of
the Soviet reconnaissance program and the following deductions
appear to us to dictate caution in imputing too much knowledge to
the Soviets:
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(4) The Soviet system is operated primarily
against targets in the United States and countries around
the periphery of the Soviet Union, including Communist
China. So far there is no evidence that the Soviet
reconnaissance program is being used for geodetic
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Conclusions
14. On the basis of the considerations outlined above, we
conclude that:
a. There is relatively little that can be done to
increase the utility of satellite photography unless the U. S.
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Government is willing to reveal officially at the SECRET level
that it is conducting a satellite reconnaissance program. On
the other hand, if this fact can be revealed at the SECRET
level, a number of measures can be adopted which would
increase the utility of the photography but which would continue
to protect technical information and the operational success of
the program.
b. The photographic product of the main cameras
would reveal technical information of value to the Soviet Union
if it were to fall into Soviet hands.
C. The photographic product of the main cameras,
especially those producing high resolution photography, should
have maximum protection on two scores:
(1)
Possession of photography would permit
the Soviets to evaluate our capabilities and take
countermeasures.
(2) In addition to the Soviet Union there are
other countrie 1which might make
political capital out of the possession of photography or
the fact that the United States appeared to flaunt its ability
in this field.
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d. There are large areas of the world for which
we could use satellite photography at the SECRET level or
even on an unclassified basis without creating an adverse
reaction.
e. If the United States Government is willing to
admit at the SECRET level that it is engaged in a satellite
reconnaissance program, it should be possible to authorize
the production of photo interpretation reports at the SECRET
level; however,
(1)
Photography from the primary
cameras would not be released; and
(2)
The reports would not reveal critical
technical information concerning the reconnaissance
system that collected the photography.
(3)
It should be possible to release
photography collected by the KH-5 (DAFF) system and
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If photo interpretation reports based on photography
are released at the SECRET level and if the photographic product
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is made available at the same level,
wide use could be made of information and photography that
is now closely held.
g. There would be both a decrease and an increase
in security risk if the fact of overhead reconnaissance is
classified SECRET. In our estimation, however, if the
course of action outlined in e above is followed, this risk
could be minimized. Recognition of the fact that satellite
photography makes a major contribution to all-source reports
will increase the confidence factor. Furthermore, if
photography from the secondary cameras is made available
for appropriate use by the U. S. Government, it will not only
serve as a useful backup to intelligence but will. reduce
speculation as to the existence of a satellite photo capability.
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Factors Affecting the Cost of Downgrading T-KH Material
1. The material currently contained in the TALENT-
KEYHOLE compartment consists of the following:
a. Approximately two million feet of original
full-format photography. Nearly all of this original
photography has been reproduced in the form of duplicate
positives and duplicate negatives. Standard distribution of
full-format photography within the intelligence community
involves as many as 38 duplicates of a given mission.
b. Selected photography of sketches and other
materials used for illustrative purposes.
c. Approximately photo
interpretation reports which have been reproduced in as
many as copies.
d. Approximately intelligence
reports produced by intelligence analysts, based in whole
or in part on the material contained in the photo interpretation
reports. These reports have been reproduced in as many as
copies.
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e, A large but unknown quantity of drafts,
memoranda, and other correspondence including at least
some TALENT-KEYHOLE information.
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reclassifying KH-4 photography held by other organizations, we would
expect them to be roughly comparable to the DIA figures. The
organizations that would have downgrading problems of a comparable
scale would include NPIC, CIA, Army, Navy, and Air Force Intelligence,
and the Strategic Air Command.
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 4. The problem of downgrading published intelligence
derived from TALENT-KEYHOLE photography is a far more complex
operation than the downgrading of the actual photography. Most
T-KH reports issued by the intelligence community were prepared for
utilization at the TOP SECRET codeword level only. Accordingly,
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these documents are a composite of data from different
0
types of TALENT-KEYHOLE photography or include some
intelligence from non-T-KH sources. The point to be made is that
these data in many instances cannot be identified in the final published'
reports and the passing of time has completely obscured the true origin
of much data.
5. In view of the foregoing, decontrol of T-KH reports
would have to be accomplished on a selective case-by-case basis.
As a minimum, mission-oriented reports such as the OAKs, Mission
Review Reports, etc. , would require careful editing and rewrite to
remove data not subject to decontrol and then subsequent republication.
Detailed intelligence reports and studies would, in addition, require
a thorough review by an analyst/interpreter team to ensure detection
and deletion of any data not meeting the planned classification/handling
control level of the decontrolled report. It is suspected that in many
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instances it would prove more economical to recompile these complex
T-KH reports from the photography rather than to engage in such a
painstaking review by analyst/ interpreters.
6. In summary, decontrol of T-KH photography is a
mechanical process which can be accomplished by relatively low-grade
technicians. Decontrol of T-KH reports is a costly complex problem
requiring high use of editors, analysts, and photo interpreters in
addition to the republication costs.
7. The great majority of the illustrative material and the
miscellaneous correspondence would probably not have to be reclassified
to the extent that it would have to be recreated, but it would involve
processes something on the order of those required for the republishing
of intelligence reports.
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Comments of Security Officers on SECRET vs. T-KH
I. Presented below are background data related to the effect,
in terms of security, of decontrol of any non-source sanitized satellite
reconnaissance photography or intelligence reports from TALENT-
KEYHOLE to the level of SECRET classification. This background data
is provided in three sections as follows:
A Comparison of Security Protection Provided Under SECRET
Classification and Under TALENT-KEYHOLE Controls
2. Special security indoctrination related specifically to the
subject matter is afforded under T-KH, which stresses the prohibition
against official confirmation under national policy (a unique security
instruction). No such special security indoctrination is provided for
under SECRET classification security procedures. It has beed suggested
that this deficiency could be corrected by some administrative instruction
such as a NSAM published at the SECRET security level.
3. T-KH involves a centralized "must-know" approval
authority with subsequent accounting to higher authority. "Must-know"
review for access to specific information classified SECRET is on a
more generalized basis.. if in reality at all existent.
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4. Personnel security review is far superior for T-KH
access than for SECRET access-
a, Investigative scope requirements for T-KH
access exceed EO 10865 requirements for TOP SECRET.
SECRET access requires only national agency checks. There
are numerous instances of individuals approved SECRET
based upon NACs whose clearance was reconsidered following
receipt of a background investigation initiated under action for
a higher clearance level.
b. Factors related to the possibility of the
individual's being subjected to duress are stressed to a far
greater degree under T-KH than for a SECRET security
clearance,
c. Under T-KH, personnel security review and
approval is the responsibility of SIOs. For SECRET security
access it is the responsibility of a wide variety of elements,
few of whom are competent to assess the relative sensitivity
of the information.
d. For SECRET access denial of a security
clearance involves a process of judicial review which, due to
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U. S. Supreme Court rulings, most favors the rights of the
individual rather than the Governments need for security.
Under current T-KH procedures, the advantage is still with
the Government and in cases of doubt, the calculation of
security risk is most heavily weighed in its favor.
e. There are no known instances of leaks through
T-KH personnel. There are numerous reported instances of
leaks through personnel possessing SECRET security
clearances.
5. Physical security measures are more stringent under
T-KH. It is believed significant that in almost all. reported Soviet
interrogations of U. S. personnel, questioning by the interrogators
included physical security.
6. Delivery and accountability procedures are superior
from a security standpoint under T-KH. For example, registered
mail may be used for SECRET information.
7. TALENT-KEYHOLE security procedures are uniformly
applied because management of security is directly responsive to the
offices of the DCI. Under SECRET security classification, security
procedures may vary in accordance with departmental regulations.
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The Effect of Decontrol Upon the Covert NRP Organization
8. The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and the
National Reconnaissance Program (NRP) involve essentially a covert
organization, the existence of which is not confirmed in documentation
which is not subject to either BYEMAN or TALENT security controls.
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One effect of decontrol of any satellite photography or
intelligence reportings, therefore, would be a gradual surfacing of the
32
now covert NRO and the NRP and of many of the sensitive NRP
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Governmental and industrial facilities, thereby increasing the risk of
penetration of the program by foreign intelligence organizations.
The Matter of Irresponsible Speculation Related to
U. S. Satellite Reconnaissance Activities
11. There has been considerable reporting in the U. S.
press related to U. S. satellite reconnaissance. These reportings
have usually presented this subject in a manner which implies official
confirmation. These reportings are undesirable, therefore, in that
they provide the sort of provocation that national policy related to
satellite reconnaissance was designed to prevent, and to a degree they
are disturbing to security discipline.
12. It has been suggested that publication of NRP-acquired
non-source sanitized photography and intelligence under SECRET
security classification would permit publication at a comparable security
level of the confirmed fact of U. S. satellite reconnaissance along with
the national policy prohibitions related thereto, resulting, hopefully, in
some curtailment of irresponsible speculation related to the subject.
This suggestion concludes that the officially confirmed fact of U. S.
satellite reconnaissance can best be protected by affording it a lesser
degree of security. Also inherent in this suggestion is the implication
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that most of the U. S. press articles related to satellite reconnaissance
result from individuals in or associated in some manner with the U. S.
Government and who possess a SECRET security clearance. It also
implies that the national policy prohibitions related to satellite
reconnaissance are not in some manner being communicated to personnel
not possessing either BYEMAN or TALENT clearances. The conclusion
and both implications need to be examined in light of the following:
a. Security analyses of such reportings reflect
consistent accuracy with respect to two subjects:
(1)
The fact of U. S. photographic satellite
(2)
Attribution of specific reported
intelligence to the photographic satellite source, either
in whole or in part.
Conversely, they reflect almost universal inaccuracy with respect
to specific technology and operational modus operandi, and the
articles consistently confuse the missions of DoD space programs.
b. These security analyses have failed to confirm
implications contained in such reportings that the fact of
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satellite reconnaissance and the attribution of reported
intelligence to the satellite source was supplied by U. S.
Government officials.
C. These security analyses have generally
concluded that the reportings result from a level of educated
press presumption, provoked in most instances by a U. S.
announcement related to specific intelligence, the letting of
a "white" DoD space program contract, U. S. reportings to
the U. N. Space Registry, etc. In addition there is considerable
documented evidence available to the press related to U. S.
intention and ability to conduct satellite reconnaissance which
was generated during the SAMOS and pre-SAMOS time period.
NASA space photography obtained from Project Gemini has
added to the bank of information now available to the press.
d. Whereas there have been numerous studies,
proposals, etc. , prepared by individuals not possessing either
BYEMAN or TALENT clearances (security is not intended to
create a monopoly on good ideas), the author has in most
instances had the foresight (prompted by we know not what) to
affix some level of security classification. Company
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proprietary protection was also frequently applied when the
study or proposal emanated from U. S. Government contractors.
There is no known instance wherein these resulted in press
publication and in most instances the problem was easily brought
under control.
e. DoD Directive 5200. 13 (classified SECRET)
provides that association of payload or mission with specific
DOD space programs should be handled under the most strict
security procedures and that all public releases would require
prior approval of the Assistant Secretary of Defense/Public
Affairs (OSD/PA). This directive was promulgated (although
it of course does not say so) to ensure the appropriate
implementation of national policy related to satellite
reconnaissance. A "drop off" included in the OSD/PA review,
is the NRO Staff, which reviews proposed releases not only for
their security content but also in light of the speculative
reporting related to satellite reconnaissance such releases
might provoke. In cases of serious concern related to security,
the advice of the Director of Security/CIA is also sought. In
addition, all U. S. intelligence organizations and agencies
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possess internal directives precluding unapproved comment to
the press on any subject.
13. In conclusion, whereas the current level of U. S. press
reporting related to U. S. satellite reconnaissance is undoubtedly
prejudicial to U. S. interests, there appears to be currently no basis
upon which to conclude that the decontrol of the fact of satellite
reconnaissance and certain NRP satellite photography from T-KH to
a level of SECRET security classification will in any way alleviate this
situation. Instead it is possible, if not probable, that U. S. press
reportings related to this subject will become more factual.
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