RECOMMENDATIONS (6)(A) AND (6)(B) OF THE 11 JULY 1966 REPORT OF THE (Sanitized) COMMITTEE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B01709A002000050026-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 16, 2001
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: August 15, 1966
• Content Type: MF

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TALENT-KEYHOLE
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15 August 1966
MEMORANDUM FOR: Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance
Recommendations (6)(a) and 6)(b) of the
11 July 1966 Report of the NSAM 156 Committee
The attached draft report is sent to you for COMOR consideration
at its meeting at 1430, Tuesday, 16 August.
25X1A
Executive Secretary
Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance
Attachment,
Subject Paper
Copies 2, 3
4
6, 7, 8
9, 10
11, 12
13,14,15,16
17, 18
19,20,21
State TCO
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DIA T CO
OACSI TCO
ONI TCO
AFNIN T CO
NSA T CO
NRO TCO
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DRAFT
13 August 1966
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, United States Intelligence Board
SUBJECT: Recommendations (6)(a) and (6)(b) of the
11 July 1966 Report of the NSAM 156 Committee
1. COMOR, meeting as an ad hoc group for the purpose of
studying recommendations (6)(a) and (6)(b) of the NSAM 156 Committee's
report, has recognized that the intelligence community is facing a rapidly
evolving situation in which it must continue to conduct the necessary
reconnaissance in support of priority national intelligence requirements.
This new situation is created in part by the following:
a. The successful execution over a period of
approximately six years of a satellite reconnaissance
program that has resulted in repetitive coverage of the
entire Sino-Soviet bloc and in at least one-time coverage
of over ten and a half million square miles of the earth's
surface outside of the Sino-Soviet bloc. The impact of a
program of this size is felt far beyond the confines of the
intelligence community.
b. The implementation of a large-scale attack
on the problem of establishing a highly accurate world-
wide geodetic net which has resulted in coverage of most
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of the earth's surface by ARGON photography and other
applicable photography taken by the index camera systems
of reconnaissance vehicles.
c. The successful acquisition of spectacular
photography of large portions of the earth's surface by
the NASA GEMINI program operating on a completely
unclassified basis.
d. Publication of other unclassified photography
of the earth, moon, and Mars as a result of unclassified
programs conducted by the United States and the Soviet Union.
e. A considerable increase in interest on the part
of other Government departments and agencies, and on the
part of the United States scientific community, in the contri-
butions that can be made to scientific and technical problems
by the use of earth sensing devices carried in satellite platforms.
This interest has led to and has been encouraged by unclassified
discussion by NASA of some of the applications that might be
considered in a NASA-operated program.
f. The growing awareness that the Soviets are con-
ducting a successful satellite reconnaissance program.
The publication of numerous articles in scientific
and technical journals, and in the public press, describing or
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purporting to describe various aspects of the United
States satellite reconnaissance program.
2. Against this background the intelligence community
has operated a security system which appears to have been succesful
in preventing the Soviet Union from adequately assessing the successes
achieved by the United States reconnaissance program. The intelligence
community has also developed an elaborate set of procedures which has
made it possible to use the information obtained by satellite reconnais-
sance for a wide range of purposes without undue security risk. In view
of our success in achieving widespread use of our reconnaissance products
while at the same time maintaining essential security, we are reluctant
to recommend steps that would increase the security risk to our national
reconnaissance program without having a very clear idea of the benefits
to be obtained by such an increased risk.
3. Both the State Department representatives and the NASA
representatives consulted by COMOR have stated that they would derive
considerable benefit in the conduct of their business if they could discuss
the fact of reconnaissance at SECRET or TOP SECRET level. It is clear,
however, that all of NASA managerial problems in this regard could not
be met unless the fact of reconnaissance could be discussed on an
unclassified basis. State Department representatives also point out that
there is a risk to both the U.S. political position and to the security of the
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U. S. reconnaissance program as a result of inadvertent error on the
part of personnel who are not aware of the fact of our reconnaissance
program. The Department's representatives feel that if the necessary
U. S. officials could be informed of the fact of reconnaissance on a
SECRET or TOP SECRET basis, they would be prevented from making
these inadvertent mistakes. The State Department's position is supported
to some extent by the practice of TALENT Security Officers who warn
uncleared intelligence personnel who may have engaged in dangerous
speculation concerning the U. S. program. The warning amounts to
tacit confirmation of the fact of the existence of a U. S. reconnaissance
program.
4. At the present time the Department of State (less ACDA
r3
and AID) has a total of-I%U personnel who are cleared for-or
25X1A
TALENT-KEYHOLE information and thus have some knowledge of the
U. S. satellite reconnaissance program. NASA has a total of i&9 cleared
for these same categories. Since the admission of the fact of U.S. recon-
naissance at the SECRET or TOP SECRET level is an action that cannot
be reversed, we believe that it would be advisable for the State Department
and NASA to see if the internal managerial problems causing them to favor
the release of this information could not be handled instead by granting an
increased number of T-KH clearances to key personnel in their departments.
If after an adequate practical test this approach does not solve the problem,
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we believe that the intelligence community should consider authorizing
TALENT Control Officers to brief selected personnel at the TOP SECRET
level concerning the fact of U.S. reconnaissance. A briefing statement
which might be considered for use at that time is attached as Tab A.
Downgrading to SECRET or declassification were also considered but
rejected.
5. Recommendation (6)(b) concerns the use of T-KH photography
by NASA and asks that the problem be examined in terms of the selective
removal of appropriate photography from codeword control or alternatively
clearance of an increased number of NASA personnel in order that they
may use the photography under existing codeword controls. In our exam-
ination of this problem we have concluded that it is too early to decide the
optimum manner for NASA to exploit KH photography. We have concluded
instead that the problem should be approached on a step-by-step basis and
that the nature of the final step should be determined at a later date on the
basis of experience acquired in the completion of the intervening steps.
We can foresee at least the following at this time:
a. Clearance of a panel of personnel, selected
by NASA, representing all of the various disciplines of
interest to NASA. This panel to be thoroughly briefed in
the material now under codeword control and on the various
exploitation efforts currently being employed by cleared personnel.
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b. If after Step No. 1, NASA and the intelligence
community conclude it to be desirable, Step No. 2 would be
the establishment of a TALENT-KEYHOLE center at NASA
headquarters and possibly at the NASA Manned Spacecraft
Center at Houston. This would permit NASA to receive its
own copy of reconnaissance materials collected within the
KEYHOLE system and would enable them to request the
clearance of additional numbers of personnel to study the
products and to become thoroughly familiar with both the
products and exploitation procedures under codeword control
to determine if further exploitation by NASA is desirable or
feasible.
c. Step No. 3, the exact nature of which cannot
be determined at this time, would be developed on the basis
of experience required under Steps 1 and 2 above and might
include the development of procedures for the sanitization
decontrol, downgrading, or declassification of certain types
of KEYHOLE material. The actual sanitization or down-
grading to be accomplished by NASA within the TALENT-
KEYHOLE centers established under Step No. 2 above as
approved by the DCI.
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6. Recommendation. It is recommended that:
a. To meet the recommendation in NSAM 156,
18 (6)(a),the Department of State and NASA select an in-
creased number of key personnel for clearance in the
TALENT-KEYHOLE System to see if the risk of uninformed
discussion can be controlled by this means.
b. COMOR review the situation at the end of six
months to determine whether the problem has been solved or
whether there should be a briefing of additional persons at
the TOP SECRET level.
C. To meet the recommendation in NSAM 156,
18 (6)(b), NASA be invited to select a panel representing
those scientific and technical disciplines of interest to NASA
to be cleared for access to TALENT-KEYHOLE information
in order that they may study current TALENT-KEYHOLE
materials at NPIC and exploitation procedures used by NPIC,
the Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy community, etc. , and
make recommendations to NASA concerning the desirability
of more substantive NASA participation in the TALENT-
KEYHOLE program.
Chairman
Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance
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TOP SECRET
Text of briefing statement to be considered for use
at the TOP SECRET classification.
a. The United States is conducting a
program of overhead reconnaissance which the President
hasordered be protected on a covert basis.
b. The information being collected from this
program is essential to national security and the United
States Intelligence Board (USIB) is charged with the
responsibility for insuring that there is no revelation
of this capability sufficient to invite interdiction by the
USSR.
co At this time it is the opinion of the USIB
that, at a minimum, the quality of the product and the
quantity of the information that has been and can be
collected be given maximum protection.
d. Having recognized that there is a broad
need for the information derived from reconnaissance,
procedures which have been established to make it
possible to use this information in a variety of manuals,
maps, charts, and. similar material without revealing its
true source, This material is by and large classified
TOP SECRET
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SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL but is not permitted
to be made available to other nations or individuals
outside of the United States Government except by
specific authority.
e. Your are being acquainted with the
fact of satellite reconnaissance so that you may
appreciate the risks to national security connected
with speculation about the program and to urge that
you identify to us any need that your organization
may have for the results of reconnaissance in order
that every reasonable effort may be made to sanitize
the product and release to you information at a clas-
sification where it may be most useful.
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