RAPID READOUT AND REPORTING OF IMAGERY FOR WARNING AND INDICATIONS INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79B01709A002200100009-9
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
2
Document Creation Date:
December 14, 2016
Document Release Date:
January 3, 2003
Sequence Number:
9
Case Number:
Publication Date:
July 25, 1969
Content Type:
MF
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
CIA-RDP79B01709A002200100009-9.pdf | 119.28 KB |
Body:
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Approved For Relea 3 RDP79B0l709A0022001
25 July 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, COMIREX
Rapid Readout and Reporting of Imagery
for Warning and Indications Intelligence
Purposes
REFERENCES: A. Memorandum to Holders of USIB-D-28.1/8,
14 July 69, Special Limited Distribution
B. USIB-D-28.1/8, 26 June 69, Special
Limited Distribution
indications purposes 25X1
1. As reported in the above references the Strategic Warni
Working Group (SWWG) in its assessment of [::: 25X1
pinpointed a requirement for a rapid readout of each overhead
reconnaissance mission oriented to warning and indications intelligence
needs. Also required in company with such a readout is the reporting
of the results as soon as possible by electrical messages at high
precedence. It is anticipated that these initial readouts by photo
interpreters- -caveated, if warranted, as to the preliminary nature of
the reporting- -would be in advance of the preparation of briefing boards
and/or other types of more deliberate reporting now practiced. In our
view the requested reporting would represent inputs for warning and
2. This electrical reporting of initial readouts should be made
through presentj.nnels addressed to the following:
a. National Indications Center
b. DIA/ ISIC
c. CIA Operations Center
A suitable message identifier (code word) could be made a part of the
address. If this proposed procedure proves to be of value, other
addressees such as NSA and State may be added later.
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TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2003/27 : ?1A-F
Copy No. /
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Approved For Releasey2Pc fO5/
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3. To be effective the type of reporting envisaged would have
to be selective and avoid indiscriminate tabulation of mission results
against the comprehensive list of COMIREX targets involved in the
particular mission being reported upon. Desired here is the dynamic
recognition and reporting of new developments and/or changes in
posture as well as deviations from previously observed practices in
the target countries.
4. These reporting criteria, which are only examples, should
be applied to target categories in the USSR and, in a few instances,
other nations. They should include:
a. Nuclear power ballistic missile submarine bases;
b. Long range aviation heavy bomber home bases;
c. Naval aviation heavy bomber home bases as well
as the Olenagorsk staging base;
d. Tank and motorized rifle units garrison areas in
the East European Communist nations as well as in such Soviet
military districts as Baltic, Carpathian, Odessa, North
Caucasus, Transcaucasus, Turkestan and Far East;
e. Transloading yards including: Chop, Kaliningrad,
Rava Russkaya, Chernyakhovsk, Brest Tsentralnyy and the
Chinese Communist yards of Manchouli and Erlien on the Soviet
border as well as the Pinghsiang yard adjacent to North Vietnam;
f. Representative port areas as follows: Haiphong in
North Vietnam; and in the USSR, Nikolayev on the Black Sea
and Vladivostok in the Far East;
g. Airborne transport bases including the following:
Vitebsk NE, Pskov, Kirovabad, Fergana, Tartu, and Zavitinsk
NE.
5. In accordance with your suggestions, a review will be made
of recent an attempt to identify practical examples of items
which meet indications/ warning criteria and would benefit from
accelerated and selective dissemination. The result of this review
will be forwarded to you and your evaluation would be appreciated. It
is anticipated that mutually beneficial adjustments in criteria, target
areas and alerting procedures can be accomplished after some
experience with the requested reporting. These target areas have been
postulated in accordance with present overhead reconnaissance capa-
bilities and are not the same as those which might be recommended for
systems with improved frequency of coverage and reporting capability.
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cc: DDCI
Chairman
Strategic Warning orking Group
D eved For Relea bO //, IA-RDE
0009-9
No.
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