OVERHEAD IMAGERY RECONNAISSANCE OF NORTH VIETNAM DURING A TRUCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B01709A002300040007-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 24, 2004
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: October 17, 1968
• Content Type: MF

TOP SECRET Enclosure
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17 October 1968
Limited Distribution
MEMORANDUM FOR: United States Intelligence Board
SUBJECT: Overhead Imagery Reconnaissance
of North Vietnam During a Truce
REFERENCES: a.
USIB-D-46. 4/ 15 (COMIREX-D- 25. 3/3.),..
7 May 1,968, and Memorandum-for Holders
thereof', 10 May 1968, X in}sited Distribution
b. USIB-D.46.4/19 (COMIREX-D-
25,; 3/5), 19 July 1968, Limited
Distribution
c, USIB-D-64.6/43, 16 August 1968,
Limited Distribution
1. Attached is a revision of the national requirements for
imagery reconnaissance of North Vietnam during a truce, prepared by
COMIREX in May 1968 and approved by the Board on 10 May (reference a).
The revision was proposed by DIA, after coordination with the JCS, and
has been approved by COMIREX.
2. The Chairman, COMIREX, notes that the principal difference
between the original paper and the revision is the omission of the require-
ment for near daily coverage of specific indicator targets. Paragraph 5 a.
is revised to specify the need to maintain coverage of Route Package I and
the DMZ, as opposed to selected indicator targets and the DMZ. The
Chairman, COMIREX, considers the Board should be aware of this change
as, if at some future date it is necessary to cover indicator targets not
contiguous to the DMZ, it could have a marked affect on the level of
reconnaissance, as summarized by COMIREX in July 1968 in its analysis
of systems available for reconnaissance during a truce (reference b).
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3. In submitting the attached revision, COMIREX is aware
of the 16 August charge laid on CCPC by the Board (reference c) and the
preliminary efforts of the CCPC to provide a comprehensive intelligence
plan for the Vietnam theater under either a total bombing halt or a general
cease fire. It is recognized that different conditions under a bombing halt
or cease fire could result in a need for COMIREX to provide an entirely new
statement of requirements for those aspects of overhead reconnaissance
within its responsibility; and it is possible that, after the Board has studied
the CCPC paper, a further revision may be in order.
4. It is recommended that the attached revision to the May 1968
requirements be forwarded to the Board for consideration.
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Chairman
Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation
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d. Coverage of indicator targets in South China
will continue to be accomplished primarily by satellite means.
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. 4. The extent and frequency of airborne imagery reconnaissance
directed against North Vietnam during a "cease fire" or truce period must
be consistent with the detection of five major categories of activity;
a. Logistical support to, and build-up of communist
forces throughout North Vietnam..
b. Deployment of infiltration forces toward South Vietnam.
c. Introduction into North Vietnam of new offensive
weapons or other advanced systems.
d. Third party involvement.
e. Compliance with specified provisions of any truce 25X1 D
agreement.
5. lit
is essential tha airborne imagery reconnaissance be conducted over North
Vietnam as follows:
a. It is necessary to maintain coverage of
Route Package 1 and the DMZ, as often as weather and operational
factors permit, during the initial period of a truce until we are
confident of North Vietnam's probable military posture as well
as during any subsequent period in which other sources indicate
the possibility of significant change in that military posture.
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SUBJECT: Overhead Imagery Reconnaissance of North
Vietnam During a Truce
D
1. This memorandam addresses the national requirements for
imagery reconnaissance over North Vietnam during a truce. Specifically,
the purpose of this memorandum is to recommend to USIB a statement of
the intelligence requirements upon which the level and mix of U. S. recon-
naissance required during a truce would be determined.
2. While certain political guarantees might be offered or truce
commissions designated as a means of policing the truce, past experience
has indicated. that overhead imagery reconnaissance is an important means
of detecting non-compliance with truce provisions. In the event the U. S.
and North Vietnam enter into a truce agreement, U. S. reconnaissance
must be maintained at a level sufficient to detect any significant attempt
on the part of the North Vietnamese to take advantage of the truce to
introduce new or improved capabilities, redeploy forces, or prepare for
a surprise offensive. Such actions need to be identified soon enough to
permit 'necessary and timely counteraction, whether political or military,
to be taken.
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3. In developing this memorandum, COMIREX has accepted: the
following assumptions as the minimum necessary to complement the level
of overhead reconnaissance of North Vietnam regarded as essential to police
the truce:
a. Reconnaissance coverage will continue over
Laos as at present.
b. No restrictions will be placed on aerial or
surface reconnaissance conducted on or over international
waters adjacent to North Vietnam.
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b, For the same reasons, it is necessary to
maintain at least weekly coverage of selected highways,
railways and border areas of the Panhandle south of 20?
north.
c. It is also necessary to obtain weekly coverage
of selected high priority railyards and ports in the northern
segment of North Vietnam which could give preoperational
evidence of the introduction of surface-to-surface missiles
or other weapons into North Vietnam.
d. For the remainder of North Vietnam, at least
twice monthly coverage of military and logistical targets to
support intelligence assessments of the nature and extent of
any build-up in other areas of North Vietnam.
e. Monthly coverage of selected Air Defense
Facilities.
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L Coverage obtained in meeting the preceding
requirements should be programmed to meet current area
coverage requirements needed to sear.ch for the introduction
of new weapons into North Vietnam.
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6. Based on past experience, weather poses the most difficult
problem in the orderly acquisition of photography of North Vietnam. It 25X1 D
has a particularly serious impact upon satellite coverage and, to a lesser
and varied degree, upon manned and drone reconnaissa].cc cevr~raae 2.q
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over the Hanoi area, for example, is possible only two days in June,
low altitude reconnaissance is possible on. 20 days in June. Similar
anomalies between high and low altitude cloud patterns are found for the
Panhandle area and the northwest mountainous region. The average number
of days each month which are suitable for high and low altitude reconnaissance
over North Vietnam are shown in Annex A.
7. A comparison of these requirements with the expected days
of suitable weather shown in Annex A indicates that we will almost certainly
not be able to meet them in all areas for all periods of the year by high-
altitude reconnaissance alone;. During periods of worst climatology, there-
fore, we should retain the capability to conduct reconnaissance below cloud
level or be prepared to accept the weather degradation to the adequacy of
our imagery reconnaissance.
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Annex A
Average number of days each month suitable for high and low altitude photography*
Lao Kay
High
Jan
4.0
Feb
4.0
Mar
7.0
Apr
10.0
May
6.o
. Jun
3.o
Jul
2.0
Aug
3.0
Sep
5. 0
(NTW mountains)
Low.
66.0
5. 0
9.0
11.0
12.0
9.0
9.0
14.0
14.0
Hanoi
High
5.3
3.5
3.8
3.6
2.8
2.0
1.9
1.8
4,0
Low
8. 5
4.0
4.7
9.7
15.1
20.1
21. 3
18.7
19.5
Dong Hai
High
5.0
6.0
7. 0
10.0
5.0
3.0
4.0
4.0
4.0
Low
8. 0
8.0
11. 0
17.0
20.0
20.0
21. 0
19.0
14.0
V inh_
High
4.0
3.0
4.0
7.0
6. 0
3. 0
4.0
3.0
2.0
Low
6. 0
8.0
4.0
11.0
18.0
17.0
16.0
15.0
8.0
*Low Altitude: Less than 3/10 cloud cover at 3, 000 feet
*High Altitude: Less than 3/10 overall cloud cover
Oct Nov De
6.o 8.0 10.
18.0 12.0 1.3.
9.1 5.0 9.
20.5 15.5 15.,
7.0 7.0 5.
15.0 11.0 10.~
3.0 2.0 5,,
9.0 6.0 13.1
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