INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS FOR AERIAL PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE RELEVANT TO THE CURRENT AND IMPENDING INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B01709A003500030025-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 22, 2004
• Sequence Number: 25
• Publication Date: September 19, 1961
• Content Type: MF

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COMOR -D-47/ 3
D R A F T
19 September 1961
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MEMORANDUM FOR: United States Intelligence Board
SUBJECTS Intelligence Requirements for
Aerial Photo Reconnaissance
Relevant to the Current and Im-
pending International Situation
to The Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance has
recently reviewed the critical needs of United States intelligence which
should be satisfied in order to provide the intelligence support for
anticipated policy decisions which will face the United States Govern-
ment during the current international crisis o
2. The COMO
ecommends that U-2 photography
looked most critically at the targets which it recommends and the
Justification which it submits a
be obtained on certain highest priority targets (See Attachment A).
The COMOR has recognized in making its recommendation for over-
flight at this time that it is a matter of grave risk and has accordingly
NGA Reyriew Completed.
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3. The COMOR has also taken into account the needs of
policymakers for intelligence which will be directly related to the
Berlin situation,
These targets relate to the following assumptions
and the intelligence needs confronting us under the assumed conditions:
ae Assuming no near-term settlement of the
Berlin crisis. our knowledge of the military situation in
East Germany needs to be completed and brought up to data.
b. In the event that access to Berlin is closed
to the Allies. it is essential to determine the status of
Soviet and satellite forces adjacent to Berlin, elsewhere
in East Germany. and possibly in certain European satellite
countries. Effective determination of the status of these
forces would probably require periodic overflights.
C. Depending on the course of the Berlin crisis
after access routes are closed, periodic coverage may be
required of those targets capable of attacking Allied Forces
in Europe as well as those capable f attacks
es Q. Rebe
Chairman
on Overhead Reconnaissance
Attachment: Justifications for U-2 Operations Against USSR
Copy 2--State TCO b--OM TCO
3--OSD i t 7, 8, 9--AFCIN TCO
4--JCS_TCO_ _ 10,11--NSA TCO
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Justifications for U-2 Operations Against USSR
Policymakers of the United States Government will
require the firmest possible knowledge of the Soviet military power
position during the critical period of international tension.
It is recommended
that U-2 photography be obtained of certain highest priority targets
at the earliest feasible opportunity to answer these questions e
2. ICBM: The most important intelligence problem is
that of the operational deployment of the ICBM. We believe that the
Soviet Union can now fire operationally against targets in the United
States only its first generation ICBM.
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3. Also through satellite photography we have established
the existence of sites a :::]which appear to be
designed for the deployment of a second generation Soviet ICBM. The
photography, however, is not adequate to establish whether or not
these sites might be adaptable for use by the first generation missile.
We are left in the position of not having established firmly the exist-
ence of any operational launch site for the only Soviet ICBM we believe
to be ready for operational use against the United States at this time.
Therefore? it is recommended that priority targets on this question
of operational deployment of the ICBM be
0
in that order, It should be noted also that coverage of the latter
two sites would undoubtedly provide valuable information on the opera-
tional status of the new second generation missile system as well as
technical details on the system itself.
4. There are other locations which we suspect for ICBM
deployment, However. the evidence on which our suspicion to based
is insufficient to warrant the employment of the U-Z at this time.
5. MRBM and IRBM We have identified)
1ndi
viduall launchers for MRBM or IRBM, though we cannot distinguish
from the photography whether these launchers are for 700 1100, or
2.000 mile range.
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6. We have proposed a selection of each type of launcher
from four geographic areas from which CORONA Operations could
select, depending upon operational feasibility, (N. B. Members are
requested to propose these items. )
7. Anti-Ballistic Missiles: We cannot obtain from present
or immediately prospective satellite photography the answers to de-
tailed technical questions concerning the nature and expected opera-
tional date of the Soviet anti-ballistic missile program. We have
examined whether photography of the quality of the U-2 will provide
the answers to our technical questions and are Persuaded that this
is no. Such information, we anticipate, will likely be highly critical
in regard to policy questions. within the year. Although on the basis.
of our present evidence. it is. not likely that the Soviet Union will
have an operational anti-ballistic missile system within the immediate
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future. the approximate date by which they acquire such an operational
system would likely have an important bearing on the relative strategic
power of the U. S. and the Soviet Union, The planning of our courses
of action during the next year might be strongly affected by the date
at which we expect the Soviet Union to acquire an operational anti-
ballistic missile system. Our priority targets
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9,
Submarine: The technical characteristics, size, and
operational readiness of the Soviet submarine launched missile forces
will have an important bearing on the military power position of the
Soviet Union during the forthcoming crisis. These submarine forces
pose a serious threat to the continental U. S. and its allies. Available
intelligence confirms the existence of Soviet guided missile, ballistic
missile. and nuclear powered submarines. U-2 photography of bases
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where these forces are known to be deployed could give us photography
which would provide the detailed information on the technical cbarac-
teristics. It would also establish the -number of such- submarines in
port at that time.
In the northern sector.
a flight along the Kola Peninsula facing the Barents Sea could provide
such answers on that portion of the Soviet submarine fleet. The
situation in the Far East is of quite a different order of difficulty be-
cause we wodd have to cover four ports. namely, Petropavlovsk.
Sovetskaya Gavan, Vladivostok, and Vladimir, only the latter two
being proximate to one another. High resolution photography can
provide the characteristics from which offensive capability may be
estimated.
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II? A number of new Soviet fighters and bombers were dis-
played at the recent air show in Moscow. Targets would almost cer-
tainly provide photography of soma of the key airfields at which these
planes might be deployed. Photography of these would aid in deter-
mining whether or not these planes are being produced in sufficient
number to indicate an operational role,
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