INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS FOR AERIAL PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE RELEVANT TO THE CURRENT AND IMPENDING INTERNATIONAL SITUATION.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B01709A003500030026-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2004
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: September 1, 1961
• Content Type: MF

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a~Ya>KA*'11~~13~3.Cva : Girl: Urui d i. atea jr.teuigence Board
to the Current and
ttv.:ivag international Situations
,~ rust 3
i a. co:.:.4tnce W3,-" the decision of the U. S 1? 73 on Eaiu
the Comas-:tee on C verhea+d Reconnaissance has reviewed the
c ?i is g needs of United States intelligence which should be satisfied in
order to aarovide the intelligence support for anticipated policy decisions
-i,ish will face c_te United States Government during the curve it inter-
.Miot crisis,,
"' he GOM.OR believes that the timely acquisition of high
resoiutior photojrapny is essential to answer these critical intelligence
n.c.ede and recorr -needs that U-4 photography be obtained on certain
uaighest priority targets a outlined in the attached paper, in -nakirg
1.,i reconunen a1.vn, the OMOR recognizes that overflight at
t A_s time is a matter of grave risk and has accordingly looked.
st criiically z:t the targets which it recommends and the juctifica.tion
The CO UR has also taken into account the needs of policy-
w:a kern for irate, >igence which will be directly related to the erlin
it:uation,, It ha., prepared and submitted directly to G f Ope..ations
.j, 3ist of targets or contingency planning These targets relate to
the following asrumptionE and the intelligence needs confronting us
sunder the ass n ~d conditions:
NRO review(s) completed.
-bolo Reconnaissance
i-ateiiigence Requirements for
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a, _=' ?suming -.o near-term settlement of the
cxik; our knc .;;ledge of the military situation in
ti 'a s. - i~,~eds w.: be completed and brought up to dal--t.
e ex eri t that access to i eriyin is closed
a aatus 01
e
4 t' .~.i,~it it is es., Yntial to determine F.h
?CSS'.'bL *?.`2L ,`_~1?te forces adjacent to Berlin, elsewhere
ire East Ger,.any, anti possibly in certain European satellite
countries, Effective determination of the status of these
forces would probably require periodic overflights,
cO Depending on the course of the Berlin crisis
after access routes are closed, periodic coverage may be
required of --hose targets capable of attacking Allied Forces
in Europe a?= well as those capable of attacking the U o So
a 3es O Reber
Chairman
Commfivtee on Overhead ReconnaissanCa
Attachment:
Justification for U-2 Photography
Over the USSR
Distribution:
Copy 2- State CO
3-- OSD TCO
4-- ,ICS T CO
5--- OACSI. TCO
6- - ONI
7, 8n 9 - AFCIN TCO
10, 11 - NSA TCO
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I :ST1FICA 'ION FOR U-2 PHOTOGRAPHY
3 ER THE USSR
., Peiicvxn.cers of the United States Government will require the
firmest possible knowledge of the Soviet military posture and F torte of
.&.ier. during the current period of international tension. In this connec-
{ nn, the most critical intelligence problem concerns present soviet
ICBM capabilities,
Satellite photography has Identified deployed ICBM complexes
in the USSR. However, ttxere are a number of critical missile and
related military questions which cannot be answered with eateilite photog-
raphy of present quality. Photography obtained by the U-2? being of
greater interpretability, will contribute to the solution of these problems.
In addition, the U-Z can be operated in optimum weather conditions against'
specific highest priority targets as opposed to the non-selectivity of
coverage of the current satellite systems.
3. Targets other than ICBM complexes are also important in
determining the USSR's military posture and state of alerts but we believe
U-Z coverage of them, while of very high priority? is of somewhat less
~urgency.
4n We are not recommending the employment of the U-Z for general
search because satellite photography is more appropriate for this purpose.
5, ICBM: A most critical problem relating to the ICBM concerns
its deployment and operational status -- specifically, for exa4nple, whether
sites are operational or under construction,, salvo capability, the extent
of hardening, the type of guidance, the nature of support and missile
handling facilities, the refire capability, We have acquired coverage of
the Plesetek area with satellite photography on four occasions; in each
of these the area. was partially obscured by clouds? Nonetheless,,
through the openings it was possible to discern that at Piesetek there are
extensive highly secure complexes,, defended by SAM sites, . "rom this
photography we cannot confirm that this installation is an ICBM complex,
However,, from this photography and collateral information,, we strongly
suspect that this is a first generation ICBM complex, as distinct from
our current conclusion bearing upon the second generation ICBM complexes
discussed below. The attached photographs of Plesetsk demonstrate the
effect of cloud cover and the difficulties involved in definitive interpre-
tation of satellite photography,
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-OP SECRET
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TUP SECRET
=;TIFICATION FOR U-2 PHOTOGRAPHY
;.:DYER THE USSR
i., Poiicvms{. cers of the United States Government will require the
firmest possible knowledge of the Soviet military posture and state of
alert during the c: trrent period of international tension. in this connec-
t=,on, the most critical intelligence problem concerns present oviet
.CBM cavabilitiee-.
Satellite photography has identified deployed ICBM complexes
in the USSR. However, were are a number of critical rnissile and
related military questions which cannot be answered with satellite photog-
raphy of present quality. Photography obtained by the U-2? being of
greater interpretability, will contribute to the solution of these problems.
In addition, the U--2 can be operated in optimum weather conditions against'
specific highest priority targets as opposed to the non-selectivity of
coverage of the current satellite systems.
3. Targets other than ICBM complexes are also important in
determining the USSR?s military posture and state of alert, but we believe
U-2 coverage of them, while of very high priority, is of somewhat less
urgency.
4 We are not recommending the employment of the U-2 for general
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i
search because satellite photography is more appropriate for this purpose.
5, ICBM: A most critical problem relating to the ICBM concerns
its deployment and opera-~;ional status -- specifically, for exarnples whether
sites are operational or tinder construction,, salvo capability, the extent
of hardening, the type of guidance, the nature of support and missile
handling facilities, the refire capability. We have acquired coverage of
the Plesetak area with satellite photography on four occasions; in each
of these the area was partially obscured by clouds? Nonetheless,
through the openings it was possible to discern that at lyAesetsk there are
extensive highly secure complexes, defended by SAM sites. From this
photography we cannot confirm that this installation is an ICBM complex.
However, from this photography and collateral information, we strongly
suspect that this is a firet generation ICBM complex, as distinct from
our current conclusion bearing upon the second generation ICBM complexes
discussed below. The attached photographs of Plesetsk demonstrate the
effect of cloud cover and the difficulties involved in definitive interpre-
tation of satellite photography.
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6. We ha.,.,_ tlso loct a t w b sa~ellite i hotogr tphy four d ployec
ICBM complexes Yur
-- which we be .ve to be '.-)tend td for the s1:!cond g-.:ne. o-i.on It ,BMP.,
However, we d,- .got hav.~ ~uffic i~_at info ,..*rr:. t ion to deter mine t xeir
operational read ;_ess c ether r at gencra._o12 1 BiI;> are 'reing
deployed on there The qi dity ia.iiu resolution of sateUit:.> photograph,.
which we have f3+ c .1ricd, "'i whit we ant*k ;.J.'` ttt". in he n,xt ?i7 month
will be securev.- does not rrr3*,' ccufficivnvr v -1';oto is terpret:.a
tion to answer t4 ese qutiv :oraa~
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7., These f _*ations c . t be z ns wered by photo ,r4p'hh,r with the L; --Z
resolution Additionally, the U-2
photo system provides stcreoo an important advantage not available in
the current sate&.lite photo systems, An appreciation of the difference
between U-2 and satellite photography as relevant to these qucatioaa may
be gained from examination of the Exhibit ofTyuratam and Kapustin Yar
attached. The technical data displayed on the accompanying drawings
cannot be obtair::d from satellite photography. Such technical data are
required on the '.CBM complexes in order to determine the operational
status and the n.r.,ture of the threat. The U-2 is the only controlled vehicle
with a chance of survival which has the photographic capability of
providing this photography.
8. It is recommended that U-2 coverage be obtained on the following
highest priority targets in the order listed: Plesetakp Yuryaa Yoskor-ola.
Verkhnaya Salda, and Kostroma.
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TOP SECRET
INTRODUCTION TO EXHIBITS
Detailed technical analysing similar to that obtained by the U?2
(and illustrated in the attached exhibit) is not possible with current
satellite photography.
Satellite photography permits the readout of gross data such as
the existence of deployed ICBM sites, However,, even with maximum
enlargement, or use of transparencies, the scale and resolution of
satellite photography precludes detailed analysis required for technical
data,
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Copy 1- -DD(P) TCO
12--OCI TCO
13--OSI TCO
14- -ORR TCO
15--DIR NPIC
16--TSO CIA
1?--C/DMD/NPIC
18--DDP TCO
19--Intel Staff/DPD
20--SO /DPD
21 - 34 --C/SRS/DPD/DDP
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