THE OCI ROLE IN SUPPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL TRIP, 17 OCTOBER - 2 NOVEMBER 1966
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79B01737A000100010002-8
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
9
Document Creation Date:
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date:
November 8, 2000
Sequence Number:
2
Case Number:
Publication Date:
November 21, 1966
Content Type:
MF
File:
Attachment | Size |
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Body:
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Current Intelligence
SUBJECT : The OCI Role in Support of the Presidential
Trip, 17 October - 2 November 1966
25X1A
1. The Director of Current Intelligence on 10 October
established a Presidential Trip Task Force in OCI (OCI Notice
No. 50-81) to be responsible for all intelligence production
in su ort of President Johnson's Far Eastern Trip. 25X1A
was named chief of this task force, which
was to remain in being until the President departed South
Korea for the United States on 2 November 1966. The complete
roster of task force personnel, all but two of whom were drawn
from the Far East Area, is attached as Appendix A.
2. Prior to the President's departure on 17 October,
:members of the task force prepared current situation memoranda
on the countries to be visited--New Zealand, Australia,
Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, and South Korea. These were
designed to present in concise form the salient political and
economic facts and problems of each country and were coordinated
with ONE and ORR.
3. Task force personnel also coordinated the drafts of
SNIE's prepared by ONE on security conditions in the various
countries to be visited and attended Board meetings on these
:estimates.
4. With the publication of the SNIE's, OCI assumed
responsibility for current reporting on security conditions,
with particular attention to pending developments that could
endanger or otherwise adversely affect the President or his
party. Security memoranda, coordinated with ONE and the
clandestine services, were published on a pre-departure
schedule of 11, 14 and 16 October.
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Mir.
25X1A
25X1A
25X1A
25X1A
other DDI and clandestine services components fo
I. IA U r"theWrapid
servicing of the Presidential party.
G. At 0800 on 17 October, the task force began round--
the-clock operations with its headquarters in the Situation
.Room of the Operations Center. The majority were assigned to
the 0800-1630 shift, in anticipation, subsequently proved
correct, that because of time differences between Washington
and the field the bulk of our work would occur them.. One
person was assigned to each of the 1630-2400 and 2400-0800
shifts. This also helped to conserve our assets, making
available more area experts for calls at night to satisfy any
requests from the field.
7. The task force began daily publication of security
IIIpMnrnntJa nn 7 7 n.. ...i,...
25X1A
25X1A
The memoranda were later published in hard
'
cove
8. Another daily cable assembled by the task force was
the Presidential Trip Sitrep. This was designed to cover any
Manila Conference-oriented material and any developments
related to the trip, such as reactions from world capitals.
The handling procedure for the sitreps was essentially the
same as that of the security memoranda. However, these were
coordinated only with ONE.
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9. The Central Intelligence Bulletin, the daily Vietnam
situation report, the Daily Brief, and the weekly Vietnam
25X1A report
25X1A were used exten-
sively
25X1A
10. Spot analyses of important developments--a Chinese
Communist nuclear test,
25X1A and a rebellion in Laos--were prepared
25X1A
11. Liaison with the DDP task force, which was also
operating. on a 24-hour basis, and with ONE went extremely
smoothly, aided both by the proximity of their offices and
their consistently cooperative attitudes.
12. In Appendix B can be found some additional comments
and observations on the functioning of the task force which
could be of some use to future exercises.
Chief, Orient Division
25X6
25X1A
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ROOMii: Situation Room, Operations Center, 7 F 27 (enter 7 F 33)
EXTENSIONS: B -- 5737 and 5738
25X1A 25X1A
R -- 1883 and 9301
OTHER OFFICE EXTENSION
HOME PHONE
B-5244;
R-9456
M
B-7454;
R-9340
B-7564;
R-9106
B-7565;
R-9106
B-7565;
R-9106
B-7565;
R-9106
B-7565;
R-9106
B-7507;
R-1362
B-6068;
R-1362
B-6068;
R-1362
B-6068;
R-1362
B-6068;
R-1362
B-5642;
R-1417
NOTE: The roster of those Indochina Division persons on
call for night duty will also be maintained in the
Situation Room.
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CONFIDENTIAL
brAc~ w3Ain tea l 'Pv i rTsclr T.'nr.^.? ~?~,c 4 0..
17 October 0800-1630 1600-2400 2400-0800
25X1A
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CONFIDENTIAL
19 October
20 October
21 October
22 October
23 October
24 October
A$B,C,D,E,F,G,I ,
I,J,K,L
do.
do.
C, E (Area Rep), K
do.
A,B,C,D,J,F,I,J,
26 October
27 October
28 October
29 October
30 October
31 October
do.
K,L
A, B, C, D, E, F I, J,
K, L, N
do.
do. & G
A,B,C,D,E,F,G,I
J,K,L,N
B, F, J & Area Rep
A,B,C,D,E,F,H,I
J, K) L,N
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1. The writer, having been associated with three OCI
task forces during the last two years, would like to
emphasize the importance of organizational planning to the
smooth functioning of the force once under way. In the case
of the Presidential Task Force, this was made easier by the
fact that there was approximately a two week notice of the
impending trip; when one is plunged suddenly into a crisis
situation, the shaking down period is obviously more painful.
2. The roster of this task force comprised primarily
the SEA and JKT Branches, most of whose personnel had a
direct interest in and knowledge of the countries to be
visited. At the outset it was impossible to foresee precisely
the workload that would be entailed, but the Office was
prepared to expand the roster as needed. In assigning
personnel to the various shifts an attempt was made, as noted
earlier, to ensure that the area experts, particularly those
on the countries involved, would be on hand during the daytime
hours, and would also be available for calls at night. At
least two persons staffed the Situation Room during the day
to scan incoming material, prepare outgoing cables, and
answer the telephone. In general it was found advisable to
draw at least one of these persons from the country currently
being visited. Day-to-day arrangements for these assignments
were made with a view also to keeping the analysts' regular
offices properly staffed and normal tasks accomplished. The
arrangement of materials on clipboards and. the maintenance of
a log and a complete file of publications enabled other task
force members to bring themselves up-to-date quickly after
absences from the room.
3.. Flexibility-of assignment to duties within a task
force also has an educational aspect. Considerable benefits
can accrue from an analyst's exposure to the production
techniques for varying publications and to the intricacies of
the Operations Center. The task force chief himself has the
obligation not only of supervising and coordinating all
activities but also of stepping in where necessary to
facilitate production. The former responsibility can
usually be carried out best if he does not become too
entangled in any one project.
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4. Timing is of over-riding importance to a task force
such as this. The product is only as good as its timely
receipt. We found it most helpful to have a chart posted on
the wall detailing the Presidential party's arrival and
departure times in terms of Washington time, and to have
another table showing the necessary filing times for each
25X1A da 's products
25X1A
5. A final point, obvious though it may be, should be
made. This is that the efficiency of a task force is increased
to a great degree by its location within the Operations Center,
where full advantage can be taken of the machinery and distri-
bution system of the Center and the presence of the CSDO there,
and of the proximity of the D/OCI, DD/OCI and their staffs.
No one arrangement results in such a saving of time in the
production and dissemination processes.
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