SAMPLE CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING FOR WEEK OF 23-30 NOVEMBER (INFORMATION AS OF 0900 30 NOV)

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B01737A000700050002-1
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• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 6, 2000
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: BRIEF

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SAMPLE CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING FOR
WEEK OF 23-30 NOVEMBER
(INFORMATION AS OF 0900 30 NOV)
GENERAL ROUNDUP
Introduction
I. Mr. Chairman, the two main events of the past
week were the coup in Greece on Sunday, and the
apparent breaking-off of the Arab-Israeli talks
yesterday.
A. Elsewhere, the government of South Korea is
faced with growing student protests, as well
as incursions. by the North Korean Navy into
its territorial waters.
B. In Argentina, the illness of President Peron
has raised new doubts about his ability to
govern.
C. I propose to cover these matters as briefly
as possible and then have my colleague,
Dr. Angus MacWheelbase, give you a somewhat
more detailed assessment of the situation
in Indochina. Either of us will, of course,
be glad to try to answer any questions you
may have.
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The Coup in Greece
II. The bloodless coup in Athens early last Sunday
is not likely to cause any significant change in
Greece's basic attitude toward the United States.
A. The leading members of the new regime have
long been considered pro-American, are com-
mitted to NATO, and realize they need Ameri-
can diplomatic and--possibly--economic support.
III. The country is quiet. The coup leaders seem to
have full backing from the armed forces and are
reportedly purging any doubtful elements.
A. All public services, private enterprises and
educational institutions--except universities--
are again operating normally. In a bid for
popular support, the new government is re-
leasing most of the students arrested during
the recent demonstrations.
B. All curfews were also quickly lifted; troops
and tanks were withdrawn from Athens within
a few days.
C. Most Greeks are glad that Papadopoulos is
gone, but this euphoria will probably soon
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give way to a wait-and-see attitude.
IV. The moving force behind the coup was Brigadier
General Dimitrios Ioannidis (E-O-Knee-Dees), chief
of military police. He apparently picked the
new President, Prime Minister, and Cabinet, few
of whom are prominent or even well-known.
A. Most.are civilians. These civilians serve
as window-dressing, and also negate one of
the criticisms the purist group had of the
Papadopoulos regime--that inclusion of the
military in the government led to corruption
of the revolution.
V. Ioannidis has long been high on the list of po-
tential challengers to Papadopoulos, who ran the
risk of a coup at every step of his campaign to-
ward a personally guided democracy. Ioannidis'
control of the police network put him in a posi-
tion to make or break any coup. Sunday morning
he chose. to make one.
A. Ioannidis and certain other revolutionary of-
ficers who helped Papadopoulos to power had
come to have two basic fears about him.
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1. They thought he was more interested in
self-aggrandizement than in the purist
goals of the revolution.
2. Secondly, they feared his policy of lib-
eralization and democratization would
place the revolution in the hands of its
pre-1967 political enemies and reintro-
duce leftist-inspired political chaos.
3. The corruption of some of Papadopoulos's
appointees and the recent student-worker
demonstrations appear to have confirmed
these fears.
B. Ioannidis is a staunch, puritanical nation-
alist. with definite views about what the con-
tent of Greek politics, culture, social life,
and morals should be.
VI. In a radio-TV address on Wednesday, the new prime
minister promised that his government would draft
a new constitution and lead the country to demo-
cratic rule.
A. He held out little hope for any early moves
in this direction, however, and any elections
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are likely to be a long way off.
B. The regime will likely focus its efforts on
consolidating its power, and factionalism and
a power struggle could develop.
C. Furthermore, the new "junta" will have to
face the same problems that badgered Papa-
dopoulos--freedom, order, economic stability,
and growth. It certainly has no better peo-
ple with which to do this, and may take a
simplistic military approach that will lead
to polarization, violence--and repression.
1. The present worsening economic crisis
and popular discontent will furnish a
quick test of how--and where--the regime
will move.
VII. Given its commitment to NATO and the need for
American support, no drastic revisions of the
homeporting agreement are likely.
A. There may be some tendency, however, to de-
mand a lower profile by the US Navy, as well
as some stickiness on various minor aspects
of the agreement. Such actions would be
aimed at public opinion, since open anti-
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Americanism became apparent during the latest
disturbances.
B. Also, the new leaders are probably irritated
at American pressures in behalf of liberali-
zation and democratization, and may become
difficult in matters of secondary importance
between the two countries.
The Arab-Israeli Talks
VIII. As for the Middle East, Mr. Chairman, the Egyp-
tian-Israeli disengagement talks at Kilometer 101
were "broken off" yesterday. They had apparently
been at an impasse for some time. The Egyptians
say Israel is merely stalling movement toward
any withdrawal, and the UN negotiators on the
scene have come to agree with Cairo.
IX. Nevertheless, some progress had been made.
A. Israel first demanded that each party with-
draw to opposite sides of the Canal. This
would amount to a return to the pre-war sit-
uation, with the addition of UN patrols a
few miles deep on each bank.
1. The Israelis have now backed o:Ef sig-
nificantly from this position, and are
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concentrating on defining their own with-
drawal--with conditions.
B. Egypt, also began with a wide-ranging pro-
posal that Israeli forces withdraw deep into
Sinai, well beyond the passes and well beyond
Sharm ash-Shaykh.
1. Egypt, too, has considerably lowered
its sights for this first round of dis-
engagement.
X. There are still significant differences, however.
A. Egypt wants Israeli forces withdrawn east
of the strategic Sinai passes; Israel wants
to retain the passes, with only a 10-15 kilo-
meter withdrawal east of the Canal,.
1. This appears to be the least serious
aspect of the deadlock. Each side has
indicated some flexibility on the depth
of withdrawal, and agreement could be
reached if more serious obstacles were
removed.
B. Egypt wants to position three infantry divi-
sions--with tanks--on the east bank, and has
a complex formula for separating the main
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forces of each side by a series of zones.
Beyond the main Egyptian force, for instance,
areas would be designated for lightly armed
Egyptian forces, then a UN force, and then
a lightly armed Israeli force--all to be po-
sitioned west of the main Israeli force.
Israel, on the other hand, apparently is
calling for the complete removal of the
Egyptian Army from the east bank, leaving
only "policing" forces in the area Egypt
would control.
1. Again, the two sides are not irrecon-
cilably separated on this issue. The
Egyptians have indicated a willingness
to consider a further thinning of their
forces to accommodate Israeli require-
ments.
C. Finally, the basic and most serious disagree-
ments center not so much on substance as on
different perceptions of the need for, and
the timing of, tangible movement toward dis-
engagement.
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1. Israel would clearly prefer to postpone
for as long as possible any moves toward
withdrawal--both for reasons of domestic
politics and simply because of the irrev-
ocable pattern even the first step,
let alone succeeding ones, would create.
2. Egypt, by contrast, takes the view that
it is incumbent on the Israelis to under-
take some actual moves toward separating
forces in advance of the peace conference,
rather than simply to talk about withdrawal.
The apparent tendency of Israel's military
negotiator to make off-the-cuff proposals
of a fairly forthcoming nature--which Tel
Aviv does not back up--has confirmed the
Egyptian belief that the Israelis are
merely delaying.
XI. The two sides are thus not far apart on substan-
tive issues, and probably not far apart on their
realization that an Israeli withdrawal is in the
cards. Their divergent views on the urgency of
that withdrawal are the crux of the problem, and
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could deadlock the cease-fire talks and, ultimately
threaten the cease-fire itself.
A. Both the Arabs and the Israelis are at maxi-
mum readiness to renew fighting.
B. The Israelis clearly fear that another Egyp-
tian attack is not far off. They claim that
the armored concentrations poised against
Israel's west bank salient remain in place,
the Egyptian losses have been effectively made
up, and that large amounts of arms and equip-
ment have been moved to the Suez front.
C. We agree with the facts of this Israeli as-
sessment, but believe that much of the Egyp-
tian activity may, in turn, be a precaution
against possible Israeli attack.
D. In any case, renewed military activity would
not promise any easy success for either side.
1. The high state of readiness makes a pre-
emptive attack almost impossible, and
would give the defenders a distinct ad-
vantage.
2. A renewal of the fighting under these
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circumstances would produce high casual-
ties on both sides,
The Arab Summit
XII. Let me mention the Arab summit conference that
ended on Wednesday. It was a fairly predictable
and pro forma performance, but did air serious
differences between Jordan and the fedayeen over
the question of representation of the Palestinians
in future negotiations.
XIII. Sadat had laid the groundwork for the conference
well before it got under way, in an effort to
steer it along a moderate course,
A. He then set out to gain a vote of confidence
in his decision to negotiate a peace with
Israel, as well as a show of Arab solidarity
and firmness in the face of those negotia-
tions. He largely succeeded.
B. The Egyptians believe they have the majority,
and the important majority, of the Arabs be-
hind them for negotiations. At the same time,
public statements by Sadat and Asad warned
Israel that the danger of war is not over
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until there is an acceptable peace.
XIV. There was serious disagreement over Jordan's
differences with the fedayeen.
A. King Husayn stayed away to keep from con-
fronting Yasir Arafat directly on the issue
of fedayeen representation at the peace con-
ference. The King sent a proxy, however,
to say that Jordan would not attend. the
peace conference if Arafat's Palestine Lib-
eration Organization were named the "sole le-
gitimate" representative of the Palestine
people.
B. At the conference, however, Arafat backed
away from any plans he may have had, for
announcing the formation of a Palestinian
government-in-exile, and for demanding the
establishment of an independent Palestinian
state on Jordan's West Bank.
C. Fedayeen silence on these issues may have
eased Husayn's dilemma considerably.
1. Husayn's claim to sovereignty over the
West Bank was not disputed, and he has
no shadow government to compete with.
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2. Moreover, although the summit did accord
the PLO the role of sole negotiator for
Palestine, Arafat himself admitted in
a newspaper interview yesterday that he
has to be invited to the peace conference
before he can represent anything. An
invitation simply may never arrive.
The Oil Situation
XV. Sadat also extracted a firm but tempered state-
ment from the conference concerning the use of
oil as a weapon. He undoubtedly coordinated
this move with King Faysal.
A. The heads of state agreed to put Portugal,
South Africa, and Rhodesia on the total em-
bargo list, along with the charter members,
the US and Holland.
B. At. the same time, they announced that recent
pro-Arab positions adopted by Japan and the
Philippines would exempt them from the 5 per-
cent cutbacks scheduled for December. The
European Economic Community had previously
been exempted.
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C. Countries not classed as "friendly" to the
Arabs--but not actively supporting Israel--
such as Canada, West Germany, and Italy,
get whatever Arab oil is left after deliv-
eries to the "friendly" countries. This
share is steadily shrinking.
D. The Arab states are relatively invulnerable
to short-term economic countermeasures.
Only about 10 percent of their imports came
from the United States, and 60 percent from
elsewhere in the industrialized West. Other
sources are available for their small essen-
tial needs.
1. Grain needs, for instance, could easily
be met by the USSR, Latin America, New
Zealand, and Australia.
2. The-major Arab petroleum producers depend
on the United States, Western Europe, and
Japan for 80 percent of their machinery
and equipment imports, but could probably
get essentials from other countries.
3. Even if Arab assets were frozen, some
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$4.5 billion per year from oil exports
to countries other than the US, Western
Europe, and Japan would still be avail-
able.
Korea
XVI. In South Korea, student unrest has the government
concerned, and its countermeasures so far have
not been effective.
A. On Wednesday, for instance, students at a
major women's university tried to march
through the streets, but were dispersed by
police using tear gas. Later, some 3,000
of the students staged a sitdown strike at
the university.
B. The next day, there were clashes between po-
lice and students at three major universities,
but no serious confrontations.
C. The government should be able to cope with
the situation so long as the security forces
do not make matters worse by heavy-handed
tactics.
XVII. Incursions into South Korean territorial waters
this week by North Korean naval vessels have
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created a more serious problem.
A. The trouble began about a month ago, when
North Korean naval units started crossing
the so called Northern Limit Line--which you
can see on this map.
1. This line was unilaterally established
by the US in 1964, to prevent South
Korean ships from intruding into North
Korean waters.
2. The line has no legal or official basis,
but North Korea has generally refrained
from sending its naval forces south of
the line.
B. During the last month, however, crossings of
the line have become increasingly frequent.
On Wednesday matters came to a head when at
least four North Korean gunboats not only
crossed the line, but penetrated waters con-
tiguous to islands under jurisdiction of the
United Nations Command, just south. of the line.
C. This action nearly resulted in a clash when
the gunboats were challenged by South Korean
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naval units that had orders to fire if the
North Koreans did not leave the area which
Seoul claims as territorial waters.
1. Aircraft on both sides were scrambled,
but flew only defensive patrols.
D. Pyongyang must be aware that it is risking a
serious military incident by this activity.
It may even be seeking one that could be
blamed on Seoul.
E. Wednesday's incursion was near Sochong-do
island--one of five island groups You see on
this map just south of the Northern Limit Line.
1. As I have saidthese islands are formally
under UN control, according to the 1953
armistice. Seoul, however, maintains a
military presence on them. North Korea--
anticipating that the UN command will be
dissolved in the next year or so--may
wish to demonstrate its ability to con-
trol these islands, or at least challenge
the legitimacy of the South Korean mili-
tary presence.
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Argentina
XVIII. Let me conclude this brief wrapup of the week's
developments with a glance at the prospects for
Argentina following President Peron's illness.
A. His "heart attack" on November 21 was actually
a congestive heart failure, not an out and
out cardiac attack.
B. His doctors have been publicly optimistic
regarding his chances for recovery-
25X1 C
2. Furthermore, Peron had been far from well
and working a reduced schedule even be-
fore the November "attack."
C. This latest setback will, at the least, cur-
tail his personal "diplomatic offensive,"
which was to have included a trip to the US
in early December. Many--especially the
military--believe his activity may be much
more restricted, and they have come to have
new doubts about his ability to govern the
country.
25X1 C
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XIX. Under the constitution, Peron's wife--who is vice
president--would succeed him if he dies or is in-
capacitated for an extended period.
A. She has been performing diplomatic duties,
and, during his convalescence, has had some
limited executive authority.
1. She has shown few political talents, how-
ever, and has little support within the
Peronist movement.
B. She would need the backing of the military
in order to govern--and, according to a re-
port just received, the military leaders have
decided to support her if she does, in fact,
become president.
1. They are said to have agreed that there
are no acceptable alternatives, and they
believe they can control her.
2. Furthermore, since her succession would
be constitutional, new elections--which
the officers fear would bring a leftist
to power--would not be necessary.
C. The left wing of the Peronist coalition and
various revolutionary groups would not tolerate
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this arrangement for long, however, and a vio-
lent struggle for power could well result.
1. The military leaders know that the armed
forces' popularity hit rock bottom under
past military governments, and they do
not want to intervene openly in politics.
2. Extensive disorders or bloodshed, however,
could lead the military to see themselves
as the only guarantors of security and
political stability.
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SAMPLE CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING FOR
WEEK OF 23-30 NOVEMBER
(INFORMATION AS OF 0900 30 NOV)
INDOCHINA
1. Mr. Chairman, the Middle East crisis has probably
drawn your attention away from developments in
other areas of the world where US interests are
involved. One of these is Indochina, where fight-
ing is. continuing in both South Vietnam and Cam-
bodia. Furthermore, the political situation in
Phnom Penh is fragile, to say the least.
A. This morning I would like to review for you
the status of military activity in these coun-
tries, the prospects for an escalation of
hostilities, and--very briefly--the political
situation in the Cambodian capital.
Vietnam
II. The dry season--which is also the best fighting
season--has begun in most of South Vietnam. Con-
sequently, the intelligence community's attention
is focused on the question of Hanoi's intentions
between now and the beginning of the rains late
next spring.
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A. There is an honest difference of opinion within
the intelligence community on this question,
and I will discuss the pros and cons in due
time.
S. Analysts have generally agreed, however, that---
whatever the longer term possibilities--we
should expect a sharp expansion in military
activity in South Vietnam between now and the
end of this year.
III. The fighting has, in fact, already become heavier
in many parts of South Vietnam. The most signifi-
cant action has been in western Military Region
2, and the provinces north of Saigon.
A. In MR-2, one ARVN division is being moved
south from the highlands to Quang Duc Prov-
ince, where the government recently lost
three outposts.
1. Saigon's efforts have already had some
success; Dak Song, one of the three posts,
was retaken on 28 November.
2. The North Vietnamese are well dug in,
however, and any further government ad-
vances are likely to be hard won.
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3. To fill the gap in the highlands caused
by this move, Saigon plans to bring an-
other regiment up from Binh Dinh Province.
a. This shift obviously involves a gam-
ble that Communist forces will be un-
able to capitalize on the reduced
ARVN presence in Binh Dinh. The odds
probably favor the government, as the
Communists have been fairly quiet in
this area for some time.
B. North of Saigon, government commanders are
expecting new Communist attacks, but they
are also planning aggressive spoiling opera-
tions of their own.
1. Isolated provincial capitals in north-
ern MR-3 or southern MR-2 are believed
to be the most likely targets for Com-
munist attacks.
2. In fact, two North Vietnamese infantry
regiments have recently been detected
near the Phuoc Long provincial capital,
which is now dependent on air resupply.
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3. On the government side, South Vietnamese
aircraft have been striking hard at Com-
munist base areas near the Cambodian bor-
der. Preparations for more extensive
ground actions are also underway.
4. The Communists seem generally aware of
the government's plans. Viet Cong offi-
cials in Tay Ninh Province, for instance,
were warned early this month to expect
large-scale operations in late. November
or early December. They were told these
would begin with air strikes against Com-
munist base areas.
C. Other parts of the country have also seen in-
creased fighting in the last few weeks.
1. There have been a number of incidents in
the delta, where the Communists are strug-
gling for better access to the rice harvest.
2. Action has also stepped up in northern
South Vietnam--particularly in southern
MR-1--as the heavy floods of the past
couple of weeks have receded.
IV. None of this activity, however, gives much addi-
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tional insight into the larger question of Commu-
nist intentions in the first part of next year.
A. The Communists have--as this chart shows--more
troops and far more firepower in the South
than they had at the beginning of the 1972
offensive. Even so, they still need a sub-
stantial supply of infiltrators to flesh out
some units and establish reserve pools,
1.
25X1 D
B. There has been a spate of reports from South
Vietnam that predict an offensive early next
year, although most of our better sources are
still silent on the question.
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C. Thus, although there probably will be a fur-
ther increase in the kind of military give-
and-take that we have seen in the past few
weeks, it is still an open question whether
Hanoi is planning major offensive action
later in the dry season.
V. Let me review the pros and cons of this question
since, as I mentioned at the outset, it is one
on which the intelligence community has not been
able to agree. (The "intelligence community,"
by the way, consists of CIA, DIA, the State De-
partment's Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
the intelligence arms of the various services,
the Atomic Energy Commission, NSA, the FBI, and
the Treasury Department.)
A. This time the question is more difficult to
grapple with because the factors involved
are very different--and more complicated?
than those in previous dry seasons.
1. As a result of the Paris accords, direct
US military involvement in the war is at
an end.
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2. in addition, the Communists for the first
time have a firm grip on extensive stretches
of South Vietnamese territory.
a. Much of.what they hold is thinly popu-
lated and economically marginal, but
it does give them a reasonably secure
base for either military or political
action.
b. Moreover--as I have already pointed
out--they are steadily strengthening
that base. As a result, we estimate
that by the end of the present dry
season the military balance, which
presently favors Saigon by a narrow
margin, may shift in Hanoi's favor.
B. At the same time, some trends that began ear-
lier have continued.
1. The most notable of these is the steadily
increasing solidity of the Thieu govern-
ment's position.
a. Thieu may not be broadly popular in
a Western sense, but the effective-
ness of his government's writ is un-
deniable.
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b.. Moreover, popular or not, he has
achieved a broad measure of respect,
and his regime is widely regarded as
far preferable to a Communist one.
C. Another factor entering into Hanoi's calcu-
lations--and one less easy for us to cali-
brate--is its relations with its patrons in
Moscow and Peking.
1. The North Vietnamese probably would not
have signed the Paris agreement.without
Soviet and Chinese prodding, and both
capitals have made it clear that they
do not favor military adventures by Hanoi
that might jeopardize their relations
with the US.
2. The difficult question is the extent to
which their pressure has inhibited Hanoi's
plans for this dry season.
VI. This is the context in which Hanoi views its
options during the current dry season: a mili-
tary position that is strong and growing stronger,
a political position that is highly unsatisfactory
and likely to remain so, and a big-power milieu
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that differs significantly from what Hanoi has
faced in earlier years.
A. We assume that Hanoi's intention to gain con-
trol over the South, by military force if
necessary, remains unchanged.
B. Given this intention and the situation con-
fronting the North Vietnamese in the South,
another offensive is likely at some point;
the only question is when.
C. Weighing these factors, some analysts think
major military action is likely next spring.
1. They point to the massive Communist ma-
teriel buildup and to the fact that there
are now more Communist troops in South
Vietnam than there were at the beginning
of the 1972 offensive.
2. They believe Hanoi may now regard the
possibility of US military involvement
as fairly small.
3. And finally, they estimate that Hanoi
thinks its chances of political success
will decline over time and it must exer-
cise its military option sooner rather
than later.
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D. Other analysts believe an offensive will be
postponed to another dry season.
1. These analysts think a number of inhibi-
tions are still operating on Hanoi--in-
cluding a residual fear of US bombing
and uncertainties about Chinese and So-
viet support.
2. They believe the North Vietnamese will
be inclined to keep working at improving
their military position inside South Viet-
nam, and also that they will not give up
so early on the effort to strengthen
their political apparatus in the South.
3. Finally, these analysts point to the con-
tinuing absence of the classical indica-
tors of an offensive--notably large-scale
troop infiltration to South Vietnam.
VII. About the only place in the Vietnam picture where
practically nothing seems to be going on is Paris.
A. The Communists are still making occasional
efforts to ally themselves with potential
"third-force" leaders, but they do not seem
to be trying very hard.
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B. And neither Saigon nor the Communists give
any sign that they expect anything from the
formal talks between them.
C. In the meantime, we expect that, at a mimi-
mum, the present increased level of fighting
will continue through the rest of the year.
It may not reach the point of a major offen-
sive, but it will, at times, be sharp and
bloody--especially in the northern part of
South Vietnam.
D. Hanoi may believe that US and Soviet preoc-
cupation with the Middle East, and the US
domestic situation, present an opportunity
for mounting even heavier attacks than it
was already planning.
Cambodia
VIII, As for Cambodia, Mr. Chairman, the intelligence
community has just made an assessment of the
prospects for military action and political sta-
bility through the current dry season--that is,
through May of next year.
A. We believe that the Khmer Communists are
likely to follow a strategy which calls for
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the interdiction of Phnom Penh's key lines of
communication, attacks against the city's out-
lying defenses, and attacks elsewhere. The
goal of this strangulation strategy is to
create pressures, physical and psychological,
that will lead to the collapse or capitula-
tion of the present government.
1. A direct all-out assault on Phnom Penh
this dry season has some appeal to the
KC, and might occur later in the dry sea-
son.
B. We also believe--although it is a very close
call--that the Lon Nol government will sur-
vive the coming round of military action.
The major factors will be the relative stay-
ing power of the insurgents and Phnom Penh
and the availability of support from their
prime allies--Hanoi and Washington.
C. Prospects for a negotiated settlement do
not appear good until the insurgents have
made an effort to win it all militarily this
dry season. But only the Khmer Communists are
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adamantly opposed to negotiations.
1. Sihanouk, Peking, Hanoi, and Moscow appar-
ently all prefer a negotiated settlement,
as do some elements in Phnom Penh.
2. Thus, the Khmer Communists might be more
willing to consider a negotiated settle-
ment if they fail to topple the Lon Nol
government this dry season.
IX. During this week, the Khmer Communists appeared
determined to press their dry season strategy
by choking off Phnom Penh's major supply arteries.
They were doing this despite late and heavy rains
that have made military operations particularly
difficult.
A. The Communists are still interdicting the
two remaining overland routes to the capital.
1. Route 4, connecting Phnom Penh with the
seaport at Kompong Sam, has been cut
since November 11. Government clearing
operations are making little headway.
2. Route 5, leading to the rice-producing
northwest, has been closed since Septem-
ber 6, and the government does not plan
-33-
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to try to reopen it until early next year.
3. This leaves the Mekong River as Phnom
Penh's primary lifeline. The Communists
are increasing their attacks on resupply
convoys along the river, although the con-
tinuing high water is hampering their
efforts. A 13-ship government supply
convoy, for instance, was ambushed on
the river early this week--but only one
small vessel was lost.
B. In the immediate Phnom Penh area, flooded
terrain is serving to curb military activity
by both sides.
X. The political situation in Phnom Penh is relatively
tranquil at the moment.
A. Prime Minister In Tam probably will try again
to resign, once the Khmer representation is-
sue at the UN is resolved.
1. Debate on the issue opens next week, and
the latest tally indicates Phnom Penh is
likely to lose its seat to Sihanouk if a
vote is taken.
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B. The effectiveness of the government, however,
is still undermined by bureaucratic ineffi-
ciency, corruption, and Lon Nol's unwilling-
ness to delegate much real authority--even
to the other members of the High Political
Council or the prime minister.
1. As a result of these tensions, another
government crisis could burst out with
little or no warning.
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