REACTION TO VARIOUS US COURSES OF ACTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B01737A001800130002-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 19, 2004
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: May 23, 1967
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
Reaction to Various US Courses of Action
Secret
9
23 May 1967
No. 0646/67
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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REACTIONS TO VARIOUS US COURSES OF ACTION
In the following section we consider Communist
reactions to an increase in US troop levels by about
200,000, an intensification of the bombing program
against military, industrial, and transportation tar-
gets, and a similar bombing program plus the effective
interdiction of North Vietnamese harbors. We also
consider the effect on Communist policy of leveling
off of US troop commitments, and a reduction in the
bombing.
Reactions to Expanded US Military Efforts
1. There is ample evidence that over recent
months the North Vietnamese have preferred to continue
the war, even with the likely prospect of its in-
tensification, rather than to end it by negotiation
or otherwise. They must have calculated that their
refusal to move toward negotiations during the Tet
period would subject them to an expansion of the US
bombing program and possibly other forms of escalation.
Moreover, their own military efforts in South Vietnam,
especially in the northern provinces, must have been
taken with the realization that the ground war would
intensify and perhaps invite new US counteraction.
Finally, the North Vietnamese in the past several
months have apparently discussed with both the USSR
and China additional and perhaps new forms of assist-
ance.
2. While Hanoi may have been unsure as to the
ways or the degree that the US would intensify the
war, it appears to be taking measures to cope with
heightened military pressures. For one thing, there
has been a sharp increase in shipping to North Vietnam
thus far in 1967. The North Vietnamese are almost
certainly planning to strengthen their air defense
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with Soviet assistance in the expectation of ever
increasing bombing attacks. And the transport of
supplies through Laos suggests they believe the
ground war will expand, at least during the next
rainy season.
3. It may be that Hanoi's intransigence and
posture of determination cloaks a final effort to
gain a more favorable military position preparatory
to negotiations. But it would be more prudent to
assume that Hanoi does not expect any sudden and
dramatic turn of the battle in its favor. Rather
it appears to expect that a prolonged struggle will
be necessary, and to believe that it can sustain
such a struggle in the South and bear up under in-
tensified bombing in the North with Chinese and
Soviet assistance.
Course A: The US announces and begins to
implement an increase of US forces
of about 200,000.
4. The US action might dispel certain notions
that Hanoi has entertained about a weakening of US
resolve. Even though some increases may be antici-
pated by the Communists, Hanoi's political-military
calculations have rested greatly on a belief that
domestic political pressures and international com-
mitments would limit the US' ability to add to its
forces in Vietnam. Moreover, Communist military
plans now aim at stretching US and ARVN forces to the
point where the Communists can both deliver a major
setback to the Revolutionary Development program and
score an important local victory over US forces.
Finally, the idea of a war of attrition, as the Com-
munists define it, implies a progressive weakening
of US and ARVN forces over time, or at least the
achievement of a stalemate which would heighten
pressures on the US to negotiate on more favorable
terms.
5. Since Hanoi almost certainly believes that
the military and political outcome of the war will
be decided primarily by developments in South Vietnam,
it has been willing to absorb considerable bomb dam-
age as long as the ability to continue the war in the
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South was unimpaired. Accordingly, the North Viet-
namese would recognize that a large increase in US
forces was more of a threat to their objectives than
increased bombing. They would probably see the
possibility that the US could have sufficient forces
to deal with local situations, such as the DMZ area,
as well as add significantly to the protection of
secured areas.
6. Nevertheless, the effect, not the fact, of
the US buildup would basically determine Hanoi's
reaction. Hanoi would have to be persuaded that the
additional troops would decisively turn the battle
in the South against them. The North Vietnamese
might believe that the US action could be countered
by a relatively small increase in their own main
forces. They might believe that if the fighting
continued for another year at a new and higher level,
the situation would then be even more politically
frustrating for the US and might generate increased
domestic pressure to end the war, especially in a
Presidential election year.
7. On the other hand, there are certain trends
which are already unfavorable to the Communists:
they are suffering heavy losses, recruitment in South
Vietnam is increasingly difficult and there are
accumulating signs of deterioration and declining
morale in the Viet Cong military-political infra-
structure. At some point, North Vietnam, if
it wished to continue the war, would have to rely
heavily on infiltrated North Vietnamese. These
soldiers cannot take over effectively the local
political/guerrilla role of the VC; they are best
suited for combat in regular unit formations and
they require a considerable logistic support system.
If they could be contained in the uplands away from
the main centers of population, they could not do
much to halt the further deterioration of the VC
apparatus in the lowlands and the Communists would
be in danger of losing their political base in the
South. They would then have to recognize that their
prospects for success either militarily or by polit-
ical means were continuously declining.
8. Moscow and Peking. So long as Hanoi did
not alter its basic policy toward the war, the US
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buildup would probably not occasion any significant
change in Soviet or Chinese policies. North Vietnam
would probably receive some heavier weaponry for use
by the Communist forces in the South. Beyond this,
the Soviets might at some point during the buildup
counsel Hanoi to seek an end to the continuing es-
calation, but we strongly doubt that they would be
willing to apply any significant pressure on Hanoi
to this end. Peking, however, would continue to urge
unyielding military resistance.
Course B: The US continues the war on about
the present scale of effort,
increasing forces in South Vietnam
by no more than a division or so.
9. Hanoi. The North Vietnamese leaders would
be reliever as it gradually became apparent that
US strength was leveling off. They would probably
interpret it as confirmation of their recent estimate
that the US policy is constrained by internal polit-
ical factors and foreign commitments. Even though
the war is not going well for the Communists, they
would probably believe that US reluctance to commit
a larger number of new troops gave them an excellent
chance to persist in their present strategy and out-
last the US in the war of attrition. Hanoi might
also calculate that it would win a "decisive" battle
under these conditions. We are not saying, however,
that maintaining US forces at present levels insures
Hanoi's ability to prolong the war for another two
years. Again, much depends on the operational situa-
tion in South Vietnam.
10. Moscow and Peking. There would be little
reason for either Moscow or Peking to react to a
leveling off of US troop deployments. The Chinese
would be encouraged in their belief that the US
could not fight a protracted war. The USSR might
be somewhat relieved that the US had not embarked
on a further escalation, but would have no special
incentive to bring greater pressure on Hanoi for
negotiations.
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Course C. The US intensifies bombing of
military, industrial, and trans-
portation targets, except near
the Chinese border. It does not
attack population centers, seek
to close ports, or attack dikes
or airfields other than those
already struck.
11. As far as Hanoi is concerned, this program
is well under way. Moreover, the bombing is not
the most significant aspect of the war for Hanoi.
Short of a major invasion or nuclear attack, there
is probably no level of air or naval action against
North Vietnam which Hanoi has determined in advance
would be so intolerable that the war had to be
stopped. And it probably also calculates that as
the US increases air action and a toll is inevitably
taken of the civilian population, various political
pressures on the US to desist will mount.
12. We cannot say what precise counteractions
the Communists may take as this program is developed.
There is not necessarily a close relationship between
a given level of bombing and Hanoi's strategy and
tactics or Peking and Moscow's responses. Material
from captured documents suggests that long-range
military planning in South Vietnam proceeds without
much reference to US bombing of North Vietnam. More-
over, those Chinese and Soviet reactions which are
visible, e.g., the provision of men and equipment,
often come before or in an early phase of new US
bombing programs. In our view all three Communist
Parties react less to strikes against specific targets
than to the intensification of bombing in general.
13. Though we recognize that morale and na-
tional will are not susceptible to exact measurement,
this bombing program is not likely to be the decisive
element in breaking the will of North Vietnam. Nor
would it alone be likely to force North Vietnam to
change its attitude toward negotiations. Probably
the critical factors for Hanoi would still be its
view of the war's prospects in the South and its
judgment as to whether international and domestic
pressures on the US would increase significantly in
these circumstances.
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14. The intensified bombing program would
cause North Vietnam to seek and obtain an ever
growing level of assistance from China and from the
USSR. The net result would probably be an expansion
of Chinese troop presence, probably including the
introduction of combat infantry at some of the bases
apparently being prepared for Chinese use. Incidents
involving Chinese air space would be almost certain
to occur. There would be a good chance that the
USSR would at some point provide -- for the defense
of North Vietnam -- some new weapons systems with
additional range and firepower. We would not ex-
clude the surfacing of some Soviet military person-
nel in a "volunteer" role. Such increased Chinese
and Soviet support would probably reinforce North
Vietnam's determination to persevere.
Course D: A similar bombing program including
the effective interdiction of North
Vietnamese harbors.
15. The most important additional effect of
this course would be to pose a direct challenge to
the USSR. The Soviets would have three broad
options: they could attempt to counter US inter-
diction by their own naval forces, bring pressure
on the US in some other area (say, Berlin), or
accept the necessity of relying primarily on rail
transport across China to support Hanoi. They prob-
ably would regard the first option as not militarily
feasible and much too hazardous in any case. The
second might seem somewhat more attractive, but
still highly risky and uncertain. The third seems
by all odds the most likely. But the USSR would
also want to take some vigorous diplomatic action
to condemn the US in the UN, to raise international
alarms, and to convince the US that relations with
the USSR were coming to a dangerous pass.
16. A principal political effect would be
to place China in a commanding position. Peking
would not only control the remaining lines of sup-
ply, but its influence in Hanoi would almost cer-
tainly increase at the expense of the USSR. The
main thrust of China's growing leverage and influ-
ence would be directed toward persuading Hanoi to
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continue the fight. To this end the Chinese would
still have to permit Soviet supplies to pass through,
and would themselves have to make it clearer to Hanoi
what military actions China would take to support
the regime if the bombing and mining seriously weak-
ened economic and political controls throughout North
Vietnam.
17. It is conceivable that as a result of in-
tensive bombing and the interdiction of the harbors,
the situation in North Vietnam would slowly deteriorate
to the point that Hanoi felt it necessary to change
its policies. We cannot estimate in advance how much
Hanoi might be willing to absorb, though we think it
unlikely that the bombing and mining program would
create such pressures that Hanoi would choose to ne-
gotiate or otherwise terminate the war. In any case,
the critical factors would be Hanoi's view of Commu-
nist prospects in the South and its assessment of
world reaction to the new escalation signaled by the
mining.
Effects of Certain Courses or Combinations
18. It is possible that one of the above courses
of increased military pressures or a combination of
them would persuade Hanoi that its military and polit-
ical situation as a whole and in particular the pros-
pects for success in the war in the South were dete-
riorating seriously. At this juncture, the attitudes
of their allies might become critical for the North
Vietnamese. The Chinese would no doubt urge them to
carry on, perhaps by returning to guerrilla war in
the South. We think it unlikely that the Chinese
would offer, or the Vietnamese accept, open interven-
tion by Chinese forces in South Vietnam. We think
there would be a good chance that at this phase the
Soviets would strongly urge Hanoi to move toward a
political settlement, although we do not think the
Soviets would apply any sort of sanction to compel
Hanoi. As for how Hanoi would respond to the advice
it might receive from its allies at this point,
we think no responsible judgment is now possible; our
inclination is to believe that Hanoi might take both,
i.e., negotiate and try to keep a guerrilla action
going in the South.
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19. On the other hand, Hanoi could as well go
in another direction. In the past we have estimated
that a number of responses which the North Vietnamese
might make were unlikely because they would raise
the chances of further and more damaging US retalia-
tion. At some point, however, these restraints might
be abandoned, if the North Vietnamese felt that the
US was determined to destroy North Vietnam. Thus,
Hanoi might try to attack carriers and other naval
ships, increase military pressures and their own role
in northern Laos and perhaps northeast Thailand, step
up assassinations and urban terrorism in South Vietnam
and perhaps even begin attacking US bases with weapons
from sites in North Vietnam. The purpose of such
actions might be not so much to affect the military
situation as to precipitate more favorable terms for
a negotiation.
Effects of Restricting US Bombing to Southern North
Vietnam
20. Communist reaction to this move would
depend to a great extent on the timing and on what
other US actions accompanied or followed it. In
certain circumstances it occurred, Hanoi and Peking
would probably attribute the shift in bombing policy
to international opinion and to domestic US criti-
cism, and thus see it as confirming their view that
the US would not persist in a long struggle. This
interpretation might be dispelled if the US could
make it clear that the bombing was being redirected
in an effort to raise the cost of moving men and
supplies into South Vietnam. But it would be even
a more effective move if the reduction occurred
after the US had indicated an intention to increase
its force in South Vietnam and perhaps to take other
actions to block or reduce North Vietnamese infil-
tration through Laos.
21. In this latter case, Hanoi's reaction might
then depend on the diplomatic moves which the US
undertook and especially the formula being offered
for negotiations. We cannot say whether Hanoi would
in fact be prepared to move toward negotiations. At
a minimumhhowever, they would have to recognize
that the redirection of the bombing program would
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probably reduce criticism and pressures in the US
and abroad, thus strengthening the chances that the
US could and would persist for a long time. If the
moves occurred after the US buildup of additional
forces began, the North Vietnamese might interpret
the move as a US attempt to allow Hanoi a way out
of the military impasse and to move toward negotia-
tions. In that case, the formula then being offered
for negotiations would largely determine Hanoi's
response.
22. The Soviets would probably be more dis-
posed than Hanoi to view the US move as an effort
to bring about a settlement, and far less likely to
consider it a mark of failing US resolve. Accordingly,
they would probably advise Hanoi to probe the US
position, looking toward possible negotiations. How-
ever, the USSR would not be likely to put much pres-
sure on Hanoi to respond.
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