THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ROLE IN THE ORIGIN DIRECTION AND SUPPORT OF THE WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B01737A001800230001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 84
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 20, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 8, 1999
• Content Type: REPORT

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THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ROLE IN TKB ORIGIN,
DIRECTION, AND SUPPORT OF THE WAR
IN SOUTH VIETNAM
ARMY review(s) completed.
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PREFACE
SUMMARY
I. HANOI'S ROLE IN THE ORIGIN OF THE PRESENT WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM
The Origin of the Present War
Hanoi and the Viet .Minh
Party Leaders and Apparatus in the South
The Geneva Agreements and After
Party Actions
Hanoi's Initial Post War Policy in the South
Concern Among Communists in the South
Hanoi Changes Policy in the South
The 1960 Party Congress in Hanoi
II. HANOI'S ROLE IN THE CONTROL AND DIRECTION OF THE PRESENT WAR
IN !SOUTH VIETNAM
Control and Direction of the War After 1960
The National Liberation Front
The People's Revolutionary Party (PRP)
The Organization of the Control Lines from Hanoi
Regional and Local PRP Organization
The Overt Viet Cong Leadership
Officers From the North
Continuing Directives From the North
III. HANOI'S ROLE IN THE SUPPORT OF THE PRESENT WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM
Early Support Activities 1959-1963
The Establishment of Land and Sea Infiltration Routes
Training For Infiltration
The Infiltration of Men and Supplies
The Expansion of Hanoi's Support 1964-1965
Infiltration: A Shift in Emphasis
Hanoi's Support as a Mainstay 1966-1967
Laos: Backbone of the Logistics Effort
The Impact of Infiltration of the Force Structure
The Arsenal As a Measure of Dependence on Hanoi
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This study sets forth the evidence as reflected primarily in
captured Vietnamese Communist documents and in the interrogations
of Communist defectors and prisoners of war showing the extent and
depth of Hanoi's role in originating, directing, and supporting the
present conflict in South Vietnam.
During the past two years, the number of enemy documents captured
by allied forces in the course of operations against Communist
headquarters and bases in South Vietnam has greatly increased. The
number of prisoners and defectors from Viet Cong and North Vietnamese
Army (NVA) units has also grown substantially and the resulting
interrogations have provided considerable information substantiating
and supplementing that in the documents.
With the use ofithese sources; it is nownossible to reconstruct
the North Vietnamese role in the war with great-err detail. Hanoi's
strategy between the 1954 Geneva Agreements and the 1959 decision to
launch a. full-scale military effort against the Saigon government, for
example, can be depicted reasonably well., even though the evidence --
based primarily on captured documents, the public statements of
Vietnamese Communist leaders, and reports from the U.S. mission in
Saigon -- is still indirect and fragmentary.
The evidence of Hanoi's control and direction of the war after
1960 is more direct since it is now based not only on a substantial
number of captured enemy documents, but also on the statements of
numerous prisoners and defectors. In so far as Hanoi's physical
support of the war in the form of men and material infiltrated to
South Vietnam, the evidence for the period from 1960 to 1963 is now
very substantial and makes an incontrovertible intelligence case.
The evidence has mounted to massive proportions for the years after
1963, as Hanoi poured men and arms into the South. We believe the
case for these years is so strong as to be unassailable,Ceven among
the general public-7
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SUMMARY
It is clear, as described in the first sections of this study,
that Hanoi's role in the current war has its roots in the Viet Minh
fight against the French..
The end of the war against France brought a shift in the tactics
ordered by Hanoi in South Vietnam, but occasioned no change in the
degree of North Vietnamese control of the insurgent apparatus or in
the aim of the Communist Party to complete the "unfinished revolution"
in the South. Certain key Communist leaders and aevera~. thou sand
cadre were left behind to form the nucleus for the renewal of the
"struggle." Directives from the North initially ordered the stay-
behinds to use "political" action, i.e., everything short of 'armed
action, to guarantee the carrying out of the countrywide elections
envisaged under the Geneva. Agreements.
Hanoi's policy in 1955, was probably dictatedy belief that
it was following the one easiest and least costly road to gain control
of the South. The [viability of thosouthern government of Ngo Dinh
Diem apnea exceedingly precarious Even if it should survive,
Hanoi had everything to gain in going ahead with the proposed
national elections. After extensive purges, Hanoi's own organs
of control were strong enough to ensure that the overwhelming
majority of the people in the North, who numbered some three million
more than the populace in the South, would vote as dictated by the
Communists. In Ho Chi Minh, moreover, Hanoi had a national hero
who would, probably have gained more votes in South Vietnam than any
rival candidate.
The government of Ngo Dinh Diem, however, demonstrated
considerable resurgence and refused to comply with Hanoi's demands
for elections, basing its refusal in part on the evidence that the
North Vietnamese would not allow proper international supervision
of the voting in the North. While opposing the elections, Diem was
able to bring some order out of the postwar chaos in the South and .'
assert the authority of his own government. His efforts to extend
his writ were frequently heavy-handed and in time contributed
to growing discontent in both rural and urban areas.
25X1
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During this early period, however, some of the Communist Party
leaders in the South began to fear that Hanoi's policy of political
opposition to Diem was doomed to failure. By the end of 1955,
these southern leaders, including Le Duan, estimated that their
position was declining vis-a-vis the government. (Diem's efforts
to break up the Party apparatus in the South
were having considerable success
Le Duan and his followers subsequently set forth the thesis
that "heavy military pressure" should be brought to bear against
Diem. Hanoi apparently agreed, however, only to a small-scale
increase in armed harassment and Le Duan continued to push for the
inauguration of a full military campaign against Diem. Although
the strategy debate continued for the next two years, half measures-
toflboth LaJ#nilitary and political- ature, were being applied by the
Communistsagainst Diem.
In early 1959, at a Central Committee meeting in Hanoi, the
initiation of an allout military and political campaign to bring
Diem down was finally authorized by the Party leaders. It is worth
noting that, at the time this decision was made, there were
relatively; few American military personnel in South Vietnam. It
was not until 1961 that the U.S.[changed its basic policy ancO
sent a significant number of advisors to assist the South Vietnamese
Army. By that time, Hanoi's decision to open a full-scale military
effort in the South was nearly two years old, and the Diem government
was in dire need of outs:l.de assistance as a result of Viet Cong
military pressure 'aided and directed from North Vietnam:
Hanoi's Role in the Control and Direction of the War
The first major political move by Hanoi in support of the
developing insurgency was the establishment of the National Front
for the Liberation of South Vietnam -- a decision probably taken
at the Central Committee meeting in early 1959. Although the
public birth of this organization was apparently two years in the
making, as Hanoi probably waited for the insurgency to buildup
ackgrounJ m::.mentum in the South, it was a very logical step for
the North Vietnamese who have persistently operated behind the
facade of front movements in Indochina starting with the old Viet
Minh league during and after World War II.
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Hanoi apparently hoped to use the NFLSV as a cover for all facets
of Viet Cong activity in South Vietnam, military as well as political,
and to support its claim that the insurgency was an indigenous
phenomenon. Shortly after the Front was formed, it announced that all
insurgent forces had been organized into a "Liberation Army" under the
NFLSV. Behind the scene, nevertheless, Front activities were tightly
controlled by the Communists. Several documents have been captured
which describe in considerable detail the role of the party in
organizing, training, and indoctrinating the LAF. Other documents
describe the party control of the political appendages of the Front.
The overt leadership of this organization, moreover, is demonstrably
a collection of men with long histories of association with Communist
causes and,organs in North and South Vietnam.
In the effort, probably, to give the Communists an open and
explicable voice in the NFLSV, Hanoi created an ostensibly independent
Communist party in the South in 1962 -- the People's Revolutionary
Party (PRP). However, captured documents and the testimony of prisoners
have confirmed that the PRA' is nothing more than a cover name for the
Lao Dong or Communist Party apparatus in the South. There is evidence
in captured' documents, too, that Hanoi took considerable pains to
conceal the role of the Northern party authorities in the South,
warning against the revelation of any material connecting Hanoi with
the insurgent operations.
The influx of rank and file North Vietnamese soldiers during the
last three years has been accompanied by a heavy input of North Vietnamese
officers at all command echelons in Viet Cong regular units. Prisoners
and documents strongly suggest that at least one-third of all officers
at the battalion level or above in Viet Cong regular units north of
Saigon are infiltrators from North Vietnam. Similar sources have
revealed that the overall insurgent apparatus is new controlled at
the top level by high North Vietnamese military officers, including
politburo member Nguyen Chi Thanh, and senior generals Tran Van Tra,
and Tran Do. It is probable also
Hoang Van Thai and Chu Huy North Vietnamese generals
the South. man are also directing military operations in
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,A series of documents captured during the past year has
provided evidence confirming that the central committee and
the politburo in Hanoi still het down the strategic and the
overall tactical guidelines for the war upon which the detailed
directives and instructions to the rank and file are based.
These documents show that the strategy used by the insurgents in
the South during much of 1966, at least, was based on the resolution
adopted at the secret 12th conclave of the Hanoi central committee
held in late 1965.
Hanoi's Role in the Support of the War
Even before the Party Central Committee meeting in 1959,
Hanoi had begun to lay the groundwork for logistical support of
the military insurgency in the South. A supply route through the
Laotian panhandle to feed manpower South was organized beginning
in 1958. This operation was expanded in 1959, and an extensive
seaborne infiltration apparatus was also set up. Active preparations
for the training of large numbers of infiltrators to take cadre and
command positions in Viet Cong units also began in the North
during this period. These men were drawn primarily from the physically
fit southerners who had been regrouped to the North after service
with the Viet Minh. Many of them had remained in active military
service in the North, receiving extensive and disciplined training.
By 1961, the infiltration operation from the North had moved
into high gear. The entry of over 8,600 mem into the South by the
end of the year has subsequently been confirmed by the statements of
several prisoners or defectors from each infiltrating group and by
the notations of captured Communist documents. There is persuasive,
but less substantial information, indicating the entry of over 2,200
more men during this period. This input formed an important component
of the Communist regular military force structure in South Vietnam
which was estimated at that time at around 25,000 men.
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Study 0:, interrogation reports show that the vast majority
of the infiltrators were well-trained officers or senior non-
commissioned officers and that they took leading positions within
the insurgent military structure. At least 50 percent of them
probably were members of the Communist Party.
In the early years through 1963, the Viet Con forces e ui
themselves largely through the capture of weapons from ARVN uunitscd
and outposts and from caches of old French and U.S. weapons left behind
when the Viet Minh regrouped North. By 1961, however, evidence of
Hanoi's support showed up on the battlefields in the South in the
form of factory re-worked French rifles. They had been refitted to
handle the Communist 7.62 round of ammunition. This was followed in
1962-1963 by the appearance of Chinese Communist submachineguns and
carbines,~which had been channeled to the insurgents largely through
North Vietnam.
The infiltration of at l
t
eas
10,000 men from the North between
1962 and January 1964 has been confirmed by rigorous military standards ;
Evidence is a?vailab..e indicating that at leaf 10,000 others probably
came south during this period. The total eneeg regular force strength
in the South by early 1964 ranged between 30?nd 40,000. Thus, the
infiltrators continued to constitute a major share of the Communist
military strength.' This was only the beginning, however, because
Hanoi, sensing victory,C__ha ] authorized a major stepup in assistance
1'to the South.
Ethnic North Vietnamese soldiers, followed by organic North
Vietnamese army units bean to move South during 1964 in substantial
numbers. The North Vietnamese decision to inaugurate support of the southern war effort, it should benoted,awas tajum
ken
and partially implemented well prior to the appearance of US combat
troops in South Vietnam in February 1965.
The overall effect of the introduction of North Vietnamese
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11. _14A t
regulars during 196- and 1965 was an increase of 12 regiments
or 32 maneuver battalions in the combined Viet Cong - North
Vietnamese force structure in the south. This force structure
expanded from 29 battalions in 196+ to 98 battalions in 1965-
northern battalions numbered 32. In the first six months of 1965,
this influx of northern units enabled the Communist forces to
force the South Vietnamese Army to commit the last of its general
reserve of fighting forces to static defense postionsaj.and to.-]
y stablishmore extensive Communist control throughout many areas
of northern South Vietman.
now estimated to be using these roads to ferry supplies south.
The situation in South Vietnam presently is developing in a
direction which tends to make the insurgent war effort more and
more dependent on North Vietnamese aid. A survey of the population
available to the enemy in Communist-controlled areas and in areas
under no particular control in South Vietnam indicates that sufficient
draft age males are available to supply an average of some 7,000 men
Panhandle had extended the original roadnet to about 700 mil.es,vN
crossing the border into South Vietnam. Hundreds of trucks are
By late 1965, Hanoi's input of manpower and material was
so extensive and important to the war effort in the south that
Hanoi, inia secret Central Committe resolution could state, "...
that the North Vietnamese main forces are the organic mobile
forces of South Vietnam," i.e., the backbone of the insurgent war
effort in the south. Infiltration continued during 1966, and
the direct violation of the Demilitarized Zone by entire North
Vietnamese combat units was initiated. The ratio of infiltrators
to indigenous personnel continued to increase, despite heavy casualties
and the expansion of the southern units. 0Modr.rn infantry assault,-```
weapons and-mortars now make up U-e major portion of the. Communist.
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a month to the Communist military. Captured prisoners
and documents, however, indicate that recruitment goals are not
being met from within the south and that northerners are being
relied on'more and more to provide replacements for Viet Cong
units as well as complete combat elements.
The Viet Cong, moreover, are dependent on Hanoi for all
of the modern arms and munitions that are becoming standard
--jequi.pment in Communist -V-err I ar -4 t _ ---- ,- .
~~ - ~? ~a~~, ulluu conzlnuation of the present levels of
combat or an increase in the intensity of combat would be
predicated almost entirely upon Hanoi's willingness to supply
manpower and materiel.
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II. CONTROL AND DIRECTION OF TND WAR AFTER 1960
Hanoi's support of the insurgency in the South expanded rapidly
after 1960. The North was not only the external base for direct
military and. logistic support to the developing conflict as described
in Chapter III, but was also the fountainhead for the expanded
political apparatus of the Viet Cong, namely, the People's Revolu-
tionary Party (PRP) -- the southern subsidiary of the Lao Dong Party -
and the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSV).
Me Front was established by the Vietnamese Communists and has remained
tightly ;controlled by the Communist Party, initially under the tradi-
tional party apparatus in the South, and, later under the cover of the
PRP. The chronological process in the establishment of the Front and
the PRP,,! together with their interlocking links, is described below.
The National Liberation Front
In his speech to the 1960 Party Congress, Le Duan declared that
"we" must "help create" "a broad national united front" in South
Vietnam with the "worker-peasant alliance" - - i.e., the Communist
Party --"as its basis."58 Other speeches and documents at the
Congress imply that Hanoi was, at the time, already issuing orders
behind the scene for the Front's formation. Such phrases as "This
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Front must rally..."; "The Front must carry out..." were used in
discussing the impending organization.
We now have reason to believe that the decision to launch a
new front organization had been made in Hanoi well before the
Party Congress, and that Le Duan's statement and others on the
Front at the Congress were probably designed mainly to prepare the
rank and file of the party and the populace for the new structure.
A prisoner of war, for example, has recounted a lecture given in
North Vietnam by General Nguyen Van Vinh, chief of the party
"Reunification Committee," in which Vinh stated that the 15th Resolu-
tion of the Party's Second Central Committee adopted in early 1959
had included a directive to "organize a National Liberation Front
under the leadership of the Central Office" with the mission of
conducting a "political struggle backed by an armed struggle . "59
Other Communist prisoners have also testified that the "Party" esta-
.blished the National Liberation Front.6O
The formation of the NFLSV was a logical step for Hanoi, since
the, Communists in Indochina have persistently operated under the
cover of a large "front" movement. While resisting the Japanese
during World War II, He and his comrades functioned behind the
facade of the old Viet Minh league. In 1946, they formed the Lien
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Viet, or Vietnam United Front, to conceal Communist direction of
war against France. When the focus shifted to South Vietnam after
the French War, the North Vietnamese organized the Vietnam Father-
land Front to garner support for "reunification" with the South.
This organization, headquartered in North Vietnam, had little
success in luring public backing in the South, and thus Hanoi
sought to build a new front organization, ostensibly independent
and based in the South, with more appeal to the South Vietnamese
populace. The North Vietnamese also hoped that the new front, which
quickly began to operate in some foreign countries, would serve to
bolster the international prestige of the insurgents.
The, theory underlying the Comm nist front movement in Vietnam
has been to establish very broad, general objectives which can be
accepted by the majority of people, and then to attempt the enlist-
ment of support from every section of the population in an all-
embracing political organization. This theory is implicit in the
North Vietnamese treatise on revolution in Vietnam, People's War,
People's Army, written by Hanoi's minister of defense, Vo Nguyen
'D C
Gi.ap, and in the earlier work, quoted above by Truong Chinh.
The first public announcement of the formation of the NFLSV was
made by; the insurgents in the South on 20 December 1960. In order,
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apparently, to sustain the fiction that the FFLSV was the product
/of an indigenous band of patriots in the South, Hanoi itself gave
no publicity to the new organization until January 1961. Later that
month, a Hanoi radio broadcast first aired the Front's ten-point
political program -- a procedure suggestive of Hanoi's guiding hand
in the formation of the organization. On 11 February, Hanoi again
broadcast the program using a text which contained significant
changes. These changes eliminated material the NVN, apparently on
second thought, believed would tend to undercut potential support
for the new organization in South Vietnam. Some passages which
suggested Communist origin or objectives were altered or deleted.
The term "agrarian reform," for example, was dropped. Vicious and
bloody excesses earlier carried out under this slogan in North
Vietnam had caused widespread revulsion in the South.
Partly because the Front program concentrated on the political
aims of the insurgency, and also because early Front propaganda
primarily stressed the political activities of the NFLSV, the
impression was created that Hanoi intended the new organization to
serve mainly as the overt "political arm" of the Vet Cong. In
fact, Hanoi intended that the NFLSV provide a facade covering all
facets of Viet Cong activity in South Vietnam, military as well
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as political. 61 Shortly after the Front's formation, for example,
it was publicly announced that all the insurgent forces had been
organized into the "Liberation Army of South Vietnam" under the
leadership of the NFLSV. Today, the Communists attempt to carry
out as much insurgent activity as possible in the name of the Front.
No precise estimates are possible on the number of South Viet-
namese who have bee.n enrolled by the Communists in the Front, or who
should be considered DFLSV members because of occasional participa-
tion in'the activities of some Front organ. Current estimates,
based on fragmentary figures in captured documents, place the number
of Front members and active sympathizers at between 700,000 and
800,000. Probably over eighty percent of these are residents of
rural areas where the Viet Cong are in firm control or'the govern-
ment presence is very shaky. It should be noted, however, that a
substantial portion of the followers living in contested and GVN-
controlled areas, as well as a significant number of those partici-
pating from Communist-dominated areas, are individuals who are not
necessarily attracted to Communist goals in South Vietnam, but who
have developed grievances of one sort or another against the Saigon
government and who see alliance with the Front as the best means of
opposing government policy. These are the people the Communist,
using the Front, are avidly seeking to attract.
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Behind the scenes Front activities are tightly controlled by
/the Communists. Several enemy documents have been captured, for
example, which describe in considerable detail the role of the
Communist Party in organizing and directing the Liberation Army
(LAF). A training bulletin of the LAF obtained in Vinh Long Pro-
vince in 196+ discusses in full the "birth, nature, methods, and
tasks" of the Army for the benefit of military cadre. 62 Following
are some of the statements from the document.
--"Since 1959...the Party has pushed the people to arm them-
selves...and has sparked a fiery revolution."
--"The Party has guided the Liberation Army in successive
stages.. .in fighting and organization."
--"The Party directly led the Liberation Army and organized
the three Branches." (i.e., regular, local, and guerrilla
forces)
--"The Party set up political cells...committees and the
political action system in the Liberation Army."
--"The Party indoctrinated and trained the Liberation Array
unceasingly."
As to the goals of the Liberation Army -- ostensibly a "nationalist"
group according to NFLSV progaganda -- the document, probably
written in 1962, has the following to say.
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--"Immediate goal: Overthrow W-Diem (the U.S. and the
Diem government in South Vietnam), bring about peace...
preparatory to peaceful unification of the country."
--"Long term goal: extermination of the depredatory classes...
ultimately a socialist, Communist state."
The document notes finally that, "when one refers to the organiza-
tion of the Army, one has to concern oneself with the organization
of the Party."
A copy of the Communist high command's "Regulations for the
Party Committee System in the South Vietnam Liberation Army" was
captured in III Corps in March 1966.63 It leads off by noting that
the "Liberation Army" is "an instrument for the Party" to "liberate"
South Vietnam. "Therefore various Party committee echelons" from
the village to the top authorities in the South "are responsible for
the leadership in every field of various armed and paramilitary
forces placed under their supervision." The document goes on to
detail the responsibilities for operations and coordination of the
Party committees at each level in guiding the LAF.
Communist control of the Front also extends comprehensively
through its political sections. This is indicated both by captured
documents and by prisoner statements. A Communist captured in 1962,
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for example, disclosed that "Front committee leadership at all
echelons included a number of Party representatives who directed
the implementation of the missions assigned to the committees." 64
He added that, "while in theory" the Front committee in his area
"assumed the directing role for the zone's military, political,
economic, cultural and social affairs, in reality it did not enjoy
very much authority. Its principal activity was that of conducting
overt propaganda campaigns among the masses."
A document captured in 1963 described the commanding party role
in the affairs of the Front in the Saigon area.65 It said that the
"Front is a national organization under Party leadership" established
for the purpose of uniting together all elements opposed to the
Government of South Vietnam. Party merdpers, it state, `"should be
thoroughly acquainted with the Front" and should carry out the
"activities of the Front" in such fields as propaganda proselytism.
Perhaps the most accurate statment on the reality of the National
Liberation Front was offered by
"once South Vietnam has been liberated, the NFLSV will suffer the same
fate as the Viet Minh did in North Vietnam after independence was
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gained from the French. The Front will atrophy and quickly disappear."
The Communist Party, he indicated, would be the only survivor of all
the Front organs and appendages. 66
The People's Revolutionary Party (PRP)
Over a year after the Front was formed, Hanoi decided to give the
party apparatus in the South the appearance of independence by osten-
sibly setting it up as a new party, following the tactics applied in
1951 with the Indochinese Communist Party and the Lao Dong Party. In
January 1962, Hanoi radio announced that a conference of "Marxist-
Leninist" delegates had formed the PRP after a meeting in South Viet-
nam.67 The conference decided that "workers, peasants, and laborers
in South Vietnam need a vanguard group" to serve as a "thoroughly
revolutionary party." The PRP, according to the broadcast, had
"volunteered" to join the National Liberation Front.
Despite the efforts of the Vietnamese Communists to portray the
PRP in public as an independent entity, they have readily admitted
in private that the organization is nothing more than a cover name
for the existing Lao Dong Party. A Communist document captured in
1962, for example, contained instructions from a .provincial party
in the South to district committees concerning the PRP.68 "In
regard to the founding" of the PRP, it said, its creation "is only
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a matter of strategy." In order to "deceive the enemy," it was
necessary that the new organ be given the appearance of a "division
of the Lao Dong Party into two and the founding of a new party."
Actually, said the document, "our party is nothing but the Lao Dong
Party of Vietnam, unified from North to South, under the direction
of the Central Executive Committee of the Party, the chief of which
is President Ho." The tactic was very similar to that used when
the Vietnamese Communist Party publicly reemerged in 1951.
A 1966 party directive captured in the delta told cadre the
correct party line to take during the annual celebration of the
founding of the Indochinese Communist Party. 69 It stated that "on
this occasion, the masses who have good sympathy towards the Party
should be well informed that the Lao Dong Party and the People's
Revolutionary Party are one party headed by the Central Committee
with Chairman Ho at the head." The same point was made by the
described above, who had
belonged to the party for a number of years. "The Lao Dong and
the PRP are one and the same organism," he stated. When North and
South Vietnam are united to form one country, "the PRP and the Lao
Dong will emerge into the open as one party.. .under Ho's authority."
Other captured party members in South Vietnam have also described the
Lao Dong and PRP as identical.
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The organization of the PRP was clearly an effort by Hanoi to
further the propaganda image of the insurgency in the South as an
indigenous patriotic movement. It also permitted the Communists to
gain an open and readily explicable voice in the NPLSV. Front con-
ferences attended by affiliated non-Communist organizations in the
Front, for example, could be more easily manipulated through the use
of the PRP operating openly at the meetings. There is good evidence
that Hanoi wished to avoid, in so far as possible, the connection of
NVN with the insurgency in the South, when it was necessary for party
spokesman to issue orders or to control the actions of non-Communist
sympathizers. A Communist directive captured in 1965, for example,
stated that a party unit had recently made a "true copy" of a message
signed by Pham Ngoc Thac -- now Hanoi's minister of health -- which
bore the line at the top: "Ministry of Public Health, Democratic
Republic of Vietnam to the Civilian Medical Section of South Vietnam."
The directive called on the party unit to avoid such disclosures in
the future and to disguise the origin of directives received from the
North and passed on in the South.70
Similar deceptive practices to cover- the NVN role were also called
for in another document from a provincial PRP chapter to lower levels
written in April 1966.71 This document noted that "recently, the
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Liberation news agency and radio referred much to Uncle Ho, party
leadership, etc." Such propaganda is "not appropriate," said the
document, which added that the "Central Party Committee" directed
instead that the "role of the National Liberation Front" should be
"praised." Party flags and portraits of Ho, it further stated,
could "only be hung in conferences held by party chapters." The
"Front flag and portrait of Nguyen Huu Tho" (Chairman of.the NFLSV)
should be hung at other conferences.
The Organization of the Control Lines from Hanoi
Through the analysis of prisoner statements and captured enemy
documents, it is possible to reconstruct the organizational apparatus
set up by Hanoi to control the insurgency in South Vietnam:. This is
n
a wiring diagram of the insurgency, so to speak. The mechanism
includes a party control channel and direct military control over
some PNA units by the military high command in Hanoi.
The, primary control link, and the one to which all others are
ultimately subordinate, runs from the policy-making Central Committee
and Politburo in the Lao Dong Party in Hanoi to its top echelon in
the South -- the Central Committee of the People's Revolutionary
Party. According to
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!up of some 30 to 40 high-ranking Communists. 72 The size and the
composition of the committee, which may include representatives from
lower echelons, varies from time to time as individuals rotate to and
from the North and or within the regions within South Vietnam. With-
in this committee, the real decision-making power resides in a select
group of its highest ranking members, a standing committee commonly
known as the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN).
the PRP's Central Committee is made
COSVN corresponds to a regional party secretariat in
of this elite group is the local party secretary. Since early 1965,
?this postiion has reportedly. been held by North Vietnamese Senior
General Nguyen Chi Thanh. As the highest southern command of the
Communist military and political apparatus,COSVN has two major sub-
divisions -- a Military Affairs Committee (MAC) and a Current Affairs
Committee (CAC). The MAC directs the Viet Cong military effort
through'. two subordinate organizations -- a Chief of the General Staff,
and a Political Department of the Army. Beginning in 1.965 and perhaps
even earlier, COSVN has been heavily weighted with prominent North
-Vietnamese general officers.
Communist organizational structure, and the highest ranking member
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The MAC provides the general policy direction for Viet Cong
military affairs; however, the NVA military high command in Hanoi
has increasingly assured direct control over some of the military
operations in the northern provinces of South Vietnam, particularly
since the introduction of entire North Vietnamese Army units
beginning in late 1964.
Hanoi, bet-ween mid-1965 and 1966, detached two subregions
from COSVN's MR V and placed them under its own direct control.73
North Vietnam, he said, also exercised operational control over certain
division-level elements in these two subregions and in the demilitarized
zone (DMZ). The existence of special Hanoi control channels into
MR V has now been noted by a large number of captured North Vietnamese
Army soldiers from the area.
The second major COMM subdivision, the Current Affairs Committee,
controls the political and administrative apparatus of the insurgency.
It has never been possible to identify precisely the CAC's Communist
leaders, since they use pseudonyms and code names extensively. It
functions through some ten internal subdivisions which encompass
social and economic support activities as well as security, communi-
cations, and proselytism. Knowledgeable defectors report that it is
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CO T OL U S TO THE VET CO S
LAO DONG PARTY
CENTRAL COMMITTEE
MINISTRY OF
PUBLIC SECURITY
CURRENT MILITARY
AFFAIRS AFFAIRS
COMMITTEE COMMITTEE
CIVILIAN
PROSELYTIZING
MILITARY
PROSELYTIZING
NATIONAL FRONT
FOR THE LIBERATION
OF SOUTH VIETNAM
PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY
PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE
DIRECTLY SUB.
MAIN FORCE
UNITS IN
MR I -VI
CENTRAL
RESEARCH
BUREAU
MINISTRY OF
NAT'L DEFENSE
REAR
SERVICES
NVA
HIGH CMD
INTELLIGENCE LOGISTICS SUPPORT
AGENTS ECO/MIL SUPPLIES
"COMMANDS" AND REGIONS IN
NORTHERN SVN DIRECTLY CONTROLLED
BY HANOI
"OPERATION 2 SUBREGIONS
FRONTS" "THUA THIEN"
"WESTERN"
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this "civilian proselytizing" department which provides the main
organizational channel between the Communist hierarchy and the
Liberation Front.74 The highest publicly identified PRP member,
Vo Chi Cong, is head of the CAC's civilian
proselytizing department, and apparently, is the party man chiefly
responsible for directing the Liberation Front.
Regional and Local PRP Organization
Under COSVN, the PRP is organized into zonal or regional,
interprovincial, provincial, district, and village committees.
(There are numerous captured documents and prisoner interrogations
now available whichdescribe the lower echelon organizations of the
PRP.)75 There are special zonal-level committees for Saigon and
possibly other cities. These regional and local committees follow
the COST structure and operate similarly, serving ultimately as
the bridge between COSVN and the village. For example, the regional
committee consists of the heads of its military and political sections
plus the provincial committee leaders under its jurisdiction. The
provincial committees are similarly organized. Judging from captured
documents, the party structure seems quite well fleshed out at higher
levels, but neither village nor district committees exist universally,
particularly in MT-controlled or in disputed territory.
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One of the most important functions of the regional committees
is to oversee activities by military units under their aegis and to
build up local and main force units. Although the nuniper and types
of units under their control vary considerably, regional committees
usually supervise regiments, provinces supervise battalions, and
districts supervise independent companies. One COSVN directive
spelled out the lines of party control.over the military for party
organizations below COSVN.76 The regional committee would set up
a Military Committee formed of members of the regional Current
Affairs Committee and other personnel, perhaps drawn from the mili-
tary units as well as associated party committees. The committee
was to follow orders from the COSVN Military Affairs Committee in
cooperation with regional political authorities. Coordination with
nonmilitary organizations for military operations was to be done
through the regional Current Affairs Committee itself -- another
method of insuring complete party control.
In the countryside, the party chapter or cell (chi bo) is the
basic organizational unit of the PRP. It is composed of no fewer
than three persons. A village committee is usually formed from the
membership of local party chapters. The size of the village committee
apparently varies with the number of chapters it controls. Its
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function organization and duties will also vary considerably, in
large measure depending on the degree of Viet Cong control or in-
fluence in the local area. In theory, the fully developed village
committee will. be a miniature of the district committee organization.
The village party committee, with main power vested in its Executive
Committee, develops and supervises all party and "popular" i.e.,
(NFLSV) organizations and, when feasible, the administrative organi-
zations in the village.
Party chapters operate clandestinely in villages under the
control of the government of Vietnam and attempt to organize secret
youth, peasant, and women's organizations in the name of the NFLSV.
These organizations seek to involve their participants in anti-government
activities, both to undercut governmental control and to build an
organization of persons responsive to PRP direction who have been
compromised or feel genuinely committed to the Viet Cong cause.
The Overt Viet Cong Leadership
In order to support their assertions that the insurgents repre-
sent many shades of popular opposition to the Saigon government, the
Vietnamese Communists studded the ostensible leadership of the NFLSV
with a number of "progressive" South Vietnamese who could not be
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positively identified as card-carrying Communists. These men were
to run the day-to-day activities of the Front's public administra-
tive apparatus, while remaining fully pliable to hard-core Communist
direction in the background. The objective was to give the Front the
appearance of broad representation among workers, religious orders,
soldiers, farmers, and intellectuals in South Vietnam. The Viet Cong
also attempted to select persons who would add prestige to the NFLSV
and who would be capable of winning active public support.
It appears that the Communists had a good deal of difficulty in
securing enough suitable personnel for all of the top public posts
in the Front. Although the first NFLSV Central Committee announced
in March 1962 reserved places for 52 members, it contained only 31
names, most of them unknowns even in South Vietnam.77 -The second
Central; Committee, announced in January 1964, had only 41 members.78
Of the 31 who had served on the first committee, only about half
retained their posts, suggesting that a number of the original
appointees proved incapable of fulfilling their duties. Despite
Hanoi's efforts to conceal the Communist domination of the Front,
a number of those chosen to fill the top public posts in the NFLSV
have known Communist associations.
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Most of the top NFLSV leaders are known to have long histories
/of cooperation with Viet Minh. The chairman of the JFLSV "Central
Committee" and the Front's major public spokesman, Nguyen Huu Tho,
is a lawyer who has been involved in pro-Communist agitation in
Vietnam since the late 1940's. In 1949, for example, Tho was identi-
fied as the editor of a clandestine, Viet Minh-supported newspaper
in Saigon. He was also active in inciting the rioting in Saigon in
1950 when U.S. warships visited the city.
has labeled Tho "a straw man," with "no real power. "79
Nguyen Van Hieu, the first secretary general of the Front, was
a leftist journalist who had spent most of his career propagandizing
in favor of the Communists and North Vietnam. In 1948, for example,
he worked in Saigon for Giai Photo (Liberation), the clandestine
propaganda organ of the Communist Lien Viet Front. After the Geneva
settlement in 1954, Hieu apparently concentrated on propaganda activ-
ities in behalf of the Viet Minh in educational and literary circles.
A 1955 report listed him as active in the training of Viet .Minh cadres
for the Saigon area. He was arrested by the South Vietnamese govern-
ment in 1958 for pro-Communist activities, and released a year later.
He apparently moved to a jungle base of the insurgents at that time.
In 1963, Hieu relinquished the post of Front secretary general and
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went to Prague where he directed the NFLSV's activities in Europe
until he was recalled to Vietnam in May 1966. Hieu terms himself
a socialist and is chairman of one of the "socialist" parties
affiliated with the Front.
Huynh Tan Phat, the present secretary general of the NFLSV, has
long been under North Vietnamese tutelage. A native of the South,
he was active in the Saigon area during most of his revolutionary
career, which began during his student days in the 1930's. In 194+4,
he was a founding member of the Democratic Party. This organization,
set up under the covert leadership of the Indochinese Communist Party
as part of the Viet Minh, is still extant as a component of Hanoi's
Fatherland Front. In 1947, after a term in French jails, Phat began
to be identified directly as a leader in various Viet Minh organiza-
tions in the South, mainly as a propaganda official. He was reported
present ',at several meetings attended by Le Duan and other top Communist
leaders in the South. He may be a secret Communist.
Than Buu Khiem, the head of the Front's "Foreign Affairs Commission,"
25X1 is reported to have been a former chief of security
of the Communist apparatus in South Vietnam. He made a short visit
to North Vietnam in 1949, probably for training in insurgent operations.
In 1954, he apparently went to North Vietnam for several years, returning
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to the South with the first waves of infiltrators around 1960. Before
his emergence as a Front leader, reportedly, he was in charge of the
organization of paramilitary forces in the Saigon area. It is very
likely that Tran Buu Khiem is a secret Communist.
Vo Chi Cong, one of the vice chairmen of the Front Centr--.1 Com-
mittee, is even more closely linked with the top Communist leaders in
the South. A number of Viet Cong defectors and prisoners have identi-
fied Cong as a key figure in the leadership of the party command in
the South. He is usually pinpointed as an official responsible for
the civilian proselytizing activities of the party. The details of
Cong's background are shadowy, although he is known to have been
active in Communist front causes since the 1930's and in Viet Minh
activities since 1945.
Tran'Nam Trung, the name used by another high-ranking member of
the Front, is actually the alias of a top communist leader in the South. 8o
Knowledgeable Viet Cong prisoners and defectors during the past several
years have consistently identified Tran Nam Trung as Lieutenant General
4
Tan Van Tra, who, as noted earlier in this study, has been active as
a top Communist military commander in the South during much of the
period since the war against the French. Tra is an alternate member
of the Lao Dong Central Committee in Hanoi. He has not appeared in
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the North since October 1963 when he apparently reinfiltrated the
South, ,,is now said to be deputy commander of the insurgent armed
forces in the southern section of South Vietnam. It is interesting
that Tra, alias Trung, does not travel abroad or give interviews-as
do some other prominent Front leaders like Nguyen Van Hieu. To do
so would doubtless reveal Trung's true identity.
Officers from the North
Aside from the formal mechanism of control exercised through the
chain of command from Hanoi, a more extensive and far reaching informal
control; at all levels has been achieved by Hanoi with the infusion of
a large number of North Vietnamese officers into most command levels
in the Communist organization in the South. At present, North Viet-
namese officers have been detected at all levels in the provinces
north of the Saigon area. In the densely populated provinces south
of Saigon, the Communist forces have been able to rely almost entirely
on local cadre and officers. Parts of this area have been virtually
unchallenged Communist preserves since the Viet Minh era, and the
party's political and military apparatus is particularly well entrenched.
A January 1966 document, giving detailed personal history state-
ments of key personnel on the military staff of Communist Military
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Region I (MR I), comprising eight provinces northeast and northwest
of Saigon, lists 47 officers and senior noncomissioned officers who
had been selected to attend a party meeting.81 Some 30 of the officers
listed, ranging from the chief of staff through the heads, deputies,
and assistants in such departments as artillery, personnel, and signal
service, infiltrated South Vietnam between 1961 and 1965. Seven of
those listed, all holding very high posts in the regional command,
were born in North Vietnam. Several had arrived in the South in 1961.
Dang Huu Thua, for example, who was born in Nam Dinh Province in the
North and had been a party member since 1948, was chief of the regional
operations and training staff. He had held many military positions in
the South with the Viet Minh, had regrouped to the North after the
French War and served with the NVA 330th Division before coming South.
again in 1961. He had been involved in training operations in MR I
since that time. Another captured document, which described the party
chapter in the training section of MR I, strongly suggests that all the
battalion com
ders in the section and many of the company commanders
OX
were infiltrators and party members in 1965-66.82
We know the
Viet Cong 165A Regiment, an important military unit which operates
in the districts around Saigon, that at least 8 of the 20 top officers
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at the battalion level in this regiment were infiltrators from
1 North Vietnam as of 1965. Two of them were battalion commanders. 83
Statements by defectors and prisoners who served with other Communist
units outside the Mekong River delta indicate that this is not an
usually high percentage. Probably at least one-third of the top
leadership at battalion level in the regular Viet Cong units is com-
posed of regroupees and ethnic North Vietnamese who have infiltrated
from the North.
Captured prisoners and documents have also revealed that control
of the top leadership of the Communist military apparatus in the
South is in the hands of individuals from the highest political and
military echelons in Hanoi, The presence of North Vietnamese General
Tran Van Tra in the South at various times dating back to the French
War has been described in a previous section. Several defectors in
a position to known have indicated that he is still in the South at
the COSVN headquarters where he holds the job of deputy military
commander. 84 During the past year, several high-level prisoners and
defectors have identified the top Communist leader in the South as
General Nguyen Chi Thanh, one of two men holding the rank of "Senior
General" in the North Vietnamese armed forces. He arrived in South
Vietnam in early 1965, after dropping out of sight in North Vietnam
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in late 1964. Recently, a film was captured in the vicinity of COSVN
headquarters in South Vietnam which depicted General Thanh in his role
as commander of the insurgent forces. Instruction documents bearing
Thanh'sname have also been captured in the South. 85
Among the other top North Vietnamese military commanders in the
South mentioned by defectors and PWs is Lieutenant General Tran Do,
an alternate member of the Lao Dong Central Committee in Hanoi.86 He
is reported to be at COSVN headquarters as a top political commissar
in the insurgent armed forces. North Vietnamese officers who have
defected in the I Corps Area indicate that top regional commands in
the northern part of South Vietnam are held by General Hoang Van Thai,
a deputy chief of staff in the North Vietnamese Army who has not
appeared in Hanoi since March 1966 and by Chu Huy Man, -a major general
in the North Vietnamese Army and a full member of the party's Central
Committee.
Hoang Van Thai apparently has as his deputy, General Nguyen Don,
who is also an alternate member of the party's Central Committee.
Don has been repeatedly identified over the past several years as
one of the top commanders in the northern part of South Vietnam.87
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Continuing Directives from the North
A series of documents captured during the last year has provided
additional evidence to show that the Central Committee and the
Politburo in Hanoi are still setting doirn the strategic and overall
tactical guidelines on the war. These decisions are then disseminated
to the rank and file, either in directives sent South or in instruc-
tions fashioned by the southern, party command. Among the most revealing
of the recently captured documents is the complete text of the letter
over the'I signature of the Lao Dong Party First Secretary Le Duan,
which was transmitted to the southern command and reproduced in early
1966 for lower echelons in the South.88.
The letter offers a detailed analysis of the South Vietnamese war
situation. It was pegged to the secret 12th Conference of the Lao
Dong Party's third Central Committee, which apparently took place late
in December 1965, and to the important resolution -- designated
Resolution 12 by the Communists -- passed by the Committee. Perhaps
the most striking statement in the letter -- one indicative of where
the Vietnamese Communist authority for decisions on war and peace
resides is Le Duan's assertion that the "whole central headquarters
has unanimously entrusted to the Politburo" the task of starting
political discussions on the war "whenever necessary."
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After noting that the war situation in South Vietnam had been
/discussed by the "Politburo and the central headquartersLe an
recapitulated the events since 1963 in South Vietnam and the various
Central Committee directives guiding the insurgents during that .
period. Before the buildup of U.S. forces in the South, he stated,
"we were very close to final victory." Resolution 12, he indicated,
set forth the proper response to the U.S. buildup.
It called for continued protraction of the war using both guer-
rilla and large-unit tactics, but with emphasis on gaining victory
in the shortest possible time by the concentration of main force units
for offensive action. Resolution 12 had been adopted, it should be
noted, after U.S. combat troops were beginning to inflict drastic
losses on the Communist regular forces in the South. Some voices in
the Communist high command, other evidence indicates, were questioning
whether the Communists could successfully conduct massed attacks
against the American units.89 These authorities preferred a more
defensive posture by the regular forces and greater concentration on
guerrilla tactics in order to tie down and sap U.S. offensive strength.
The Central Committee, however, decided in favor of continuing'the
use of concentrated tactics.
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Another document, containing a summary of Resolution 12, indicated
that the Central Committee hoped to accomplish its strategy by con-
tinuedlarge-scale introduction of North Vietnamese troops and their
use as the main mobile striking force in South Vietnam.90 This docu-
ment, produced in southern North Vietnam in April 1966, but captured
in South Vietnam, cited Resolution 12 as the basic authority for the
proper line on such tasks as the indoctrination and recruitment of
party members. Other captured documents indicate that Resolution 12
was widely disseminated throughout the ranks in both North and South
Vietnam, and that it provided. the basis for specific tactical instruc-
tions to the troops by Communist leaders in the South. A 16 May letter
from an unidentified military division in the North to party youth in
the division, for example, stated that "led by our Party and instructed
by Resolution 12," we have a "sacred appeal" urging us to "infiltrate
into South Vietnam to fight."91 A document captured in: the same area
on 16 May contains a several page appeal for an "emulation" movement 25X1
to defeat U.S. and South Vietnamese forces in "execution of the
Resolution of the 12th Conference of the Central Committee."
Resolution 12 also provided the basic text for a series of speeches
delivered by North Vietnamese military leaders in April and May 1966.
For example, a notebook belonging to a COSVN-level cadre which contained
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records of a briefing by a man named Vinh -- possibly Nguyen Van
Vinh, a deputy chief of staff of the PFVA -- was captured in
February 1967. The briefing presented a thorough exposition of
Hanoi attitudes, expectations, and intentions regarding the war,-
citing as its source of inspiration the resolutions of the Lao Dong
Central Committee in Hanoi.92 Vinh reportedly admitted that there
was a considerable discussion of the proper tactics in meeting the
U.S. buildup in the South, but indicated that the Central Committee
and the Politburo in Hanoi had resolved the situation and decided
on the necessary response. It is possible at some point, according
to the notes, that "the North will conduct negotiations while the
South continues fighting, or that the South may also participate in
negotiations while continuing to fight." However, the situation
"is not yet ripe for negotiations." Deciding when it is, is "a task
entrusted by the Party Central Committee to the Politburo," again
an affirmation that final policy on the war resides with the very
top levels in Hanoi.
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III. HANOI'S ROLE IN TEE SUPPORT OF THE PRESENT WAR
Early Support Activities in the North 1959-1963
Even before the early 1959 decision by Hanoi to expand the
military effort in South Vietnam, the North Vietnamese had taken
a number of steps to lay the groundwork for the infiltration of men
and supplies. After the decision, more extensive machinery for the
support of infiltration by land and by sea was authorized. Infiltra-
tion routes were laid out, training centers were established and an
orderly dispatching of infiltration groups was begun. Modern weapons
were introduced during the latter part of this period and the level
of military combat in the South increased markedly. By the end of
1963, the input of manpower and supplies from the North was already
forming an important component of the Communist regular military
structure in South Vietnam.
The Establishment of Land and Sea Infiltration Routes
Although there is evidence that North Vietnam never ceased
sending agents, couriers, and individual cadre into the South after
1954, it was in 1958 that Hanoi took the initial steps to organize
the movement of men and supplies through Laos and across the
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demilitarized zone (DMZ) into a coordinated and continuing effort.
A captured Communist party member has revealed that North Vietnam
was training mountain tribesmen native to Quang Tri and Thua Thien
provinces for infiltration support work in early 1958 at _a school
in the southern section of North Vietnam.93 The tribesmen were
taught how to establish and operate "secret" bases in the mountain
region of Laos and South Vietnam. In March 1959, the prisoner and
several other Communist cadres left on their first mission to
establish such bases and to organize local units to help operate the
installations. The prisoner made several such trips before his
capture. He also checked on the status of previously established
bases and participated in the construction of barracks-type instal-
lations'in the forest which were to serve as. future encampments for
infiltrating troops.
Several other. Communist prisoners have revealed that they were
selected by the North Vietnamese authorities in early 1959 to
participate in the organization of "special border-crossing teams"
operating across the DMZ into Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces. 94'
According to the prisoners, the teams were used to transport drugs,
food, and other necessities to insurgent groups in the South.
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More extensive machinery for the support of infiltration by
land and-sea was authorized and established by Hanoi shortly after
the 15th Resolution had been approved by the Central Committee. In
April 1959, according to a Communist prisoner who participated in the
work. "the Party Central. Committee ordered" the formation of the
"559th'I'ransportation Group" to "support the depleted Vietnamese
Communist bases in the Vietnam."95 This organization took its
designation from the date Of its founding, 5 May 1959. According to
the source, the "group was directly under the Party Central Committee
and in close liaison with the Ministry of Security, the NVA General
Staff and the Logistics Bureau."
One major subdivision of the 559th Group, according to another
Communist prisoner assigned to the -organization, was the "70th
Battalion" set up in 1959 in North Vietnam and sent to the Laotian
Panhandle as afield unit. This unit "received weapons, ammunition,
mail and supplies from Hanoi" and transported them to "where they
were turned over to the agency in charge of supplies" for the insur-
gents. 96 Another function of the 70th Battalion, according to this
source, was to-"escort units infiltrating from North Vietnam into
South Vietnam" and to transport sick and wounded personnel from Thua
Thien Province back to North Vietnam.
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Both of these organizations are still in operation in greatly
expanded form. Numerous captives have described their assignment
to the units for work in connection with infiltration. 97 These
prisoners indicate that the transport groups organized by Hanoi were
capable even. in the early period of channeling substantial assistance
to the Communists in South Vietnam.
Hanoi also established an extensive seaborne infiltration
apparatus beginning in 1959. A number of Communist sources have
described the 603d Battalion, formed in June of that year, as the
basic unit for clandestine maritime operations into South Vietnam. 98
Cadre for this organization were drawn from North Vietnamese Army (NVA)
units. The 603d Battalion was under the command of the NVA General
Staff and was in effect a "regular NVA military unit." It was based
initially near North Vietnam's Quang Khe naval base, but soon expanded
to other ports. Over 250 men comprised the battalion when it was
first organized. By December 1959, according to one prisoner's
account, the 603d Battalion had 11 "infiltration cells" each supported
by one battalion operating from several locations along the North
Vietnamese coast. Over the next several years, the 603d Battalion}
continued to expand its operations and facilities. A prisoner
captured'in 1961 had taken part in 11 maritime infiltration missions
to the South since 1959.
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Training for Infiltration
Apace with.the establishment of the logistic apparatus, active
preparations also began in North Vietnam for the training and
infiltration of large numbers of personnel to assume cadre and com-
mand positions in the insurgent military units. By January 1960,
a major training center for infiltrators was in operation by the
NVA at a military base in Son Tay, northwest of Hanoi.99 Instruc-
tion was given on a variety of military and politcal subjects use-
ful to personnel operating in South Vietnam.
Other infiltration training operations meanwhile, were simultane-
ously under development as Hanoi geared to support the developing
conflict in the South. The NVA 324th Division was ordered to begin
the training of infiltrators in early 1960 in Nghe An Province.100
This division subsequently trained a very large number of composite
groups and integral military units for infiltration. The famous
Xuan Mai Infiltration Training Center was also set up during this
period southwest of Hanoi in the former barracks of the NVA 338th
Brigade. 101 A large number of captured infiltrators have described
this school which, by 1961, appears to have been able to handle several
102
1,000-man classes at one time.
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The Infiltration of Men and Supplies
With an understanding of the military and political structure
of the North Vietnamese apparatus described in Section II, the
real significance of the more than 18,000 persons confirmed by
intelligence as having infiltrated into South Vietnam between
1959 and 1963 comes into focus. In addition to the rigid military
standards employed to "confirm" the infiltration of the 18,000 men,
a process which requires at least two prisoners, returnees, or
documents from each group, there is substantial, but less complete,
information from captured prisoners and documents indicating that
at least 12,500 other infiltrators also moved south between 1959
and 1963.103
Until late 1963, these infiltrators were virtually all ethnic
southerners drawn from the pool of regrouped Viet Minh forces and
supporters taken north after the Geneva cease-fire in 1951+. According
to Communist sources, the southern regroupees in large part were
retained in military units in North Vietnam after the French-Indochina
War, an indication that Hanoi was even then laying the groundwork for
their redeployment south should the need arise.101+ They were formed
into the 305th, 324th, 325th, 330th, and 338th Divisions of the North
Vietnamese Army. From 1955 to 1959, these divisions were reported
6
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to be composed entirely of South Vietnamese. 105 Thus, most of the
,/infiltrated southerners had already received extensive, disciplined
military training for several years in North Vietnam prior to their
movement south.
In 1959, after its decision to expand the insurgency in the
South, Hanoi began to introduce northern-born soldiers into the
divisions in North Vietnam composed of southern regroupees in order
to replace the southerners sent south. According to one source,
northern personnel in these divisions had increased to 50 percent by
1960 - an indication of the substantial preparations Hanoi was
making for infiltr.ation.106
From the interrogation of numerous captured infiltrators, it
has been possible to ascertain the identity and composition of many
of the groups and units sent-south and thus to determine the overall
parameters of the infiltration operation.107 The entry of at least
\26 groups of infiltrators comprising some 4,500 personnel in 1959
and 1960 has been confirmed by the interrogation or two or more
captured personnel from each group. Captured prisoners and documents
have also provided information on the movement of some 75 groups into
South Vietnam during 1961.108 The entry of over 4,100 men in these
groups has been confirmed by the statements of two or more prisoners
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from each group. By the end of 1961, therefore, the infiltration of
over 8,600 men from North Vietnam can be accepted as confirmed. There
is, moreover, substantial, but less complete information from captured
prisoners and documents, that some 2,200 other infiltrators also moved
south between 1959 and 1961.
Between 1962 and January 1964, the infiltration of over 10,000
cadre and officers from North to South Vietnam has been confirmed by
the testimony of numerous prisoners and captured documents. Less
extensive, but persuasive evidence of the same type, is available
on the infiltration of at least 10,000 other personnel from the North
during this period. log This was a major increment to the strength
of the Communist forces already present in the South.
The numerical aspect of infiltration from the North, moreover,
is only one element of the picture. Analysis of prisoner interrogation
reports shows that the overwhelming majority of the infiltrators
,through 1963 were well-trained officers or senior noncommissioned
officers who were placed in leading positions within the Communist
structure in South Vietnam, commanding all types of military elements
from regimental echelons down to the squad level and carrying out a
- wide range of political assignments. They thus formed the core, in
many respects, of the insurgent regular military and political
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apparatus and supplied much of the drive and continuity necessary
for its growth into a formidable organization. The documents and
prisoner interrogations of this period also strongly suggest that
at least 50 percent of the infiltrators through 1961, although
southerners by birth, were members of the Lao Dong Communist Party.110
One captured prisoner who attended an infiltration course at
Son Tay, North Vietnam, in January 1960, in a class of 60, was sent
south with his group in March. ill All members of his group were
experienced officers of NCOs who took leading positions in insurgent
units when they arrived in the South. One became a company commander
of a Viet Cong unit in Ruang Ngai; another became political commissar
of a battalion in the same province; another was deputy commander of
the same battalion. Thus, Hanoi with veteran personnel retained in
the North, was expanding its control over the insurgent units in the
South apace with the growth of the insurgent forces.
At the end of 1960, the strength of the Communist main and local
military forces in the South was estimated at just over 5,000, or
10 battalions. By January 1964, these forces had been expanded to
over 3+,000 troops formed into 29 battalions.ll` Local recruitment
and the inducement of Viet Minh veterans in the South to return to
the cause no doubt accounted for many of these newly formed units.
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The exact impact of the more than 18,000 infiltrators confirmed
./during this period cannot be quantified; however, considering the
quality of the cadre who came south, it is certain that the input
of manpower from the North was already forming an important component
of the Communist structure in South Vietnam.
In the early years through 1961, the Viet Cong forces equipped
themselves largely through the capture of weapons from ARVN units
and outposts and from caches of old French and U.S. weapons left
behind when the Viet Minh regrouped North. Local manufacture of
crude hand guns and rifles also supplemented their needs. In 1961,
however, Hanoi became more actively involved in Viet Cong supply
needs. Modified versions of the French Mat-l-9 rifle began to appear
on the battlefield. The chamber had been reworked to use the standard
Communist 7.62 round of ammunition -- a technique requiring factory,
tooling that the Viet Cong were unable to do themselves judging from
the smooth-bore locally made guns in use at that time and later.
Chinese Communist weapons began to show up in 1962-1963 with the K-50
submachinegun and the Chinese "Red Stock" carbine among the first
models to be captured. These weapons, we know from captured prisoners,
were being channeled to the Viet Cong through North Vietnam. Each
infiltrator usually brought at least one weapon with him, and crew-
served arms were also moved in.
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By the end of 1963, approximately seven percent of the total
captured weapons in South Vietnam were of Chinese Communist origin.
The Viet Cong arsenal was approximately 80 percent composed of U.S.
and French weapons which had been cached at the.end of the Indochina
War. The remainder were homemade guns.113
Expansion of Hanoi's Support 196+-1965
Optimism in Hanoi was definitely warranted in 1964. The govern-
ment of Ngo Dinh Diem had fallen in November 1963, and political
instability in Saigon. was deepening as 1964 wore on. The grim political
situation was accompanied by declining effectiveness in the army and
the disintegration of the rural hamlet program inaugurated under Diem.
In short, the Communists had reason to believe that they were well
on their way to victory in South Vietnam, and they made a decision.
to push for final success by a major step-up in the supply of manpower
and materiel to the South.
This step up eventually far outstripped the magnitude of the
earlier effort. There was a shift in emphasis in infiltration
characterized by the dispatch both of ethnic northerners in great
numbers and of entire North Vietnamese regular army battalions and
regiments.
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It is probable that the decision. to inaugurate a further major
increase in assistance from the North was at least tentatively made
at the 9th session of the third Central Committee in December 1963
which, a captured document states, "assessed the balance of forces
between, us and the enemy and set forth plans and guidelines to win
the special war."11 We know that Hanoi convened a "special
political conference" in Marc 1964 to publicize the "new.tasks" of
the North to the populace. At the March conference, Ho Chi Minh
called on "every person" in the North to "work as hard as two in
order to compensate for our brethern in the South." Party leaders
asserted that the war in the South was moving very favorably for the
insurgents. "Our people," they said, "are currently engaged in a
continuous attack " The "political crisis" in Saigon is becoming
more severe and the "political authority" of the government is
"steadily declining."115
It is worth noting that the North Vietnamese decision to inaugurate
a quantum jump in support of the war effort was taken and partially
implemented well prior to the appearance of U.S. combat troops in
South Vietnam in February of 1965. A North Vietnamese soldier who
infiltrated in late 196+ said his superiors told him in the North
before infiltration that "the South is now in a situation of turmoil
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and fever. Southerners are longing for the help of NVA soldiers
116 )r{,,
to unify the country quickly."
Infiltration: A Shift in Emphasis
The decision to use ethnic Northern cadre rather than regrouped
southerners for the big push was to some extent forced on Hanoi by
the depletion of its pool of physically-fit regroupees. Many of those
in fighting trim during the French War were no longer up to the'rigors
of the trek south and the subsequent campaigning. Analysis of PW
statements and captured documents indicates that at least 50 percent
of the infiltrators during 196+ were natives of North Vietnam. Many
of these men were draftees, and it appears that Hanoi intended them
for cannon-fodder in southern units, in contrast to the well-trained
cadre sent south in earlier years.
in Thua Thien Province.117 He was a native o
was captured
Vietnam. After service in the North Vietnamese Army, he came south
in May 196+ with a group of 90 North Vietnamese draftees. Another
prisoner from a Viet Cong regiment which operated in Quang Ngai
Province stated that native North Vietnamese troops began to reinforce
his unit in the early part of 1964. The first batch consisted of
some 80 replacements. 118
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During the first six months of 1964, Hanoi's efforts to supply
manpower to the forces in the South continued along previous lines
with more than a thousand men a month coming south. However, at
least some elements of the North Vietnamese Army regular units began
preparation for infiltration as early as April 1964.119
reported that his unit
was recalled from duty in Laos to North Vietnam in April to begin
preparations for the move south. 12o
In August 1964, the first entirely North Vietnamese tactical unit
the 808th Battalion, left the North. It arrived in South Vietnam in
November; to take its place as an integral northern tactical unit
fighting side-by-side with southern forces.121 This deployment was
followed in the fall of the year by the movement of the first elements.
of the North Vietnamese 325th Division. The 95th Regiment of the
division arrived in South Vietnam in December 1964; the 101st Regiment
in February 1965; and the 18th Regiment in April 1965. Numerous
captured prisoners have described the infiltration training of these
units of the 325th Division, their trek South, and the retention in
NVN of cadre personnel to form the core of new 325th Division regiments
who would be sent south in a new cycle of infiltration by -;he division
in the fall of 1965.
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Typical of the captured prisoners from this first cycle of
/infiltration was
the 95th Regiment of the 325th Division.122 He was captured
he was drafted into the 325th Division
North Vietnam.,
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25X1
25X1
He served first 25X1
with his regiment in the northern Laotian Panhandle assisting the
Pathet Lao in maintaining control over this key area. In April 1964,
his regiment was ordered to leave Laos and return
to North Vietnam "for preparation to infiltrate the South." In
November 1964, the 95th Regiment began to move South after several
months of special training on military and political tactics to be
used in South Vietnam. Its infiltrating strength was about 2,000 men,
the vast bulk of whom were ethnic North Vietnamese. Throughout early
1965, the regiment participated in several devastating attacks on
the government's regular army units in the vicinity of Route 19 in
,Phu Bon Province in South Vietnam.
Next to arrive in South Vietnam was the 101st Regiment which
entered South Vietnam in February 1965 at a strength of around 2,000.
ab out 10
percent of the regiment's rank and file soldiers were party members.
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Another 70 percent, however, belonged to the party youth group,
which is routinely the first step into party membership for young
cadre. The party youth area highly indoctrinated, well-motivated
and disciplined element of the populace in North Vietnam, highly-
sympathetic with Hanoi's objectives. the mission
of the '201st Regiment was to "liberate the areas along National
Route 14 in Kontum Province . and occupy ARVN posts.123
The final regiment of the 325th Division to arrive in the first
cycle of infiltration was the 18th Regiment which entered the South
in April 1965 with an estimated strength of 2,000 men. According
to a captive from the unit who was drafted into
the army) , the unit left the North in February and
arrived in April in Kontum Province. This source was wounded in an
attack on government post in Binh Dinh Province in January 1966 and
12~+
was captured after the battle.
Following the arrival of the three regiments of the 325th Division --
which numoered about 6,000 men -- additional service units to support
them were prepared for infiltration. These included a transportation
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battalions as well as medical, security, signal, and engineer companies.
According to
these units began their infiltration in March
1965 and arrived in South Vietnam in June.-"
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In addition to readying regular line units of the North Viet-
namese Army for infiltration in the spring of 1964, Hanoi also
formed separate regimental-sized units specifically for dispatch
to the South. One of these, the 32d Regiment, was activated some-
time in the spring of 1964.126 Its personnel were drawn from various
North Vietnamese Army units. Draftees who received their training
at Son Tay and Xuan Mai were also added to the 32d Regiment. The
regiment began its infiltration in the fall of 1964, and all three
battalions had arrived.in South Vietnam by March 1965.
In July 1.965, four more line regiments of the North Vietnamese
-Army were readied and sent south. According to a number of prisoners,
the 22d Regiment and the 250th Regiment, each composed of about
2,000 ment, left North Vietnam,7-128, They were followed by the 33d
and the 66th North Vietnamese Army Regiments .129-130 All four of
these regiments deployed to the northern portions of South Vietnam,
adding about 6,500 troops to the force structure.
Later in 1965, four additional regiments were readied and sent
South to augment the force structure in the northern half of South
Vietnam. The 6th NVA Regiment was formed out of one Viet Cong
battalion and two North Vietnamese battalions.131 The 21st NVA
Regiment departed the North in August and arrived in Quang Tin
Province in December,132 and the first two rebuilt regiments of the
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original 325th Division, the 18B and 95B, began their treks south
in December 1965, arriving in Phu Yen and Kontum provinces in
t133-134
February and March 1966.
The overall effect of the infiltration of regular North Viet-
namese Army units during 1964 and 1965 was an addition to 12 regiments
with approximately 32 battalions to the combined North Vietnamese Army
Viet Cong force structure.135 The overall combined Communist
military force structure in South Vietnam expanded from 29 battalions
in early 1964 to 98 battalions in late 1965. At the end of 1965, the
total main and local force structure, including those in North Viet-
namese regular units, numbered some 84,000 troops. North Vietnamese
regulars in organic units, such as the regiments of the 325th Divi-
sion, accounted for more than 26,000 of these.
From a tactical standpoint, Hanoi apparently planned from the
start to use the infiltrated NVA units as a mobile and flexible
reserve, capable of contributing strongly to the classic concentration
of forces relied on by the Communists before major attacks. By dint
of their mobility, discipline, and military prowess the regular North
Vietnamese Army units would help the Communists pose threats 'in widely
separated areas of South Vietnam. The overall enemy strategy for 1964
appeared to focus on conducting widespread attacks which would force
ARVN to thin out its general reserve of mobile forces in striving to
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meet the assaults. The great bulk- of ARVN troops were tied down
/on security missions throughout the country, and the general reserve
1
was the only remaining flexible reaction force. By mounting large
and widespread attacks during 1964, Communist forces managed to
whipsaw the ARVN general reserve force from one end of the country
to the other, each time reducing its fighting effectiveness.
By the fall of 1964, the Communists succeeded in forcing ARVN
to commit the last of its general reserve to security roles in
the Quang Ngai area. In December, the Communist apparently decided
to move in for the kill, setting the stage for the Binh Gia battle
which marked the opening of the third phase of the war, a campaign
of maneuver with multi-regimental operations.
Communist forces maintained their pressure throughout the country
during early 1965 with four battalion-size attacks through the end
of February. In March,however, with the arrival of the first regi-
ments of the 325th Division in the Central Highlands, the Communists
shifted their emphasis to this area, and began a fierce campaign.
During March and April, the first elements of the North Vietnamese
units clashed with ARVN. The 101st NVA Regiment engaged an ARVN
ranger battalion northwest of Kontum City in Kontum Province, and
the 18th and 95th NVA Regiments, deployed in Binh Dinh Province,
conducted major actions against the ARVN near Qui Knhon in April.
19
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In May, two Viet Cong regiments clashed with two ARVN battalions
at Ba Gia in Quang Ngai Province, and the 32d NVA Regiment seized
the outpost at Due Co and overran the district town as well as
effectively seizing control of Route 19 from Pleiku to the Cambodia
border., In May, at Dong Xoai, the Viet Ccng had laid out the
battlefield so well that they completely decim ted an ARVN battalion
in less than 30 minutes. This battle was followed by another multi-
regimental operation at Song Be which was fought to a standoff with
both sides receiving heavy casualties. In early June, the 95th NVA
Regiment; surrounded and badly mauled an ARVN airborne task force in
Phu Bon Province. In August, the 101st NVA Regiment ranged through
Nontum Province overrunning Tou 1Ioroung District headquarters and
seizing control of Route 14. The outcome of this fierce six months
of fighting was that the Communist forces managed to establish
effective control over the border area with Laos, the terminal point
for the infiltration corridors. To all intents and purposes, they
held overall control of the Central Highlands. It was the massive
intoduction of regular North Vietnamese Army units which enabled
them to do it.136
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Hanoi's Support as a Mainstay - 1966-1967
By early 1966, the input of both manpower and material from North
Vietnam was so extensive and important to the war effort in the south
that Hanoi
could already state
that "the North Vietnamese main forces are the organic mobile forces
of South Vietnam" -- i.e., the backbone of the insurgent war effort in
the Southl37By mid-1966 Communist roadbuilding efforts in the Laos
panhandle, which began in 1964, had extended the original roadnet to
about 700 miles and it now approached the borders of South Vietnam.138
Hundreds of trucks are now estimated to be using these roads to ferry
supplies south, Infiltration continued to climb during 1966, and the
direct violation of the Demilitarized Zone by entire North Vietnamese
combat units was initiated. The ratio of infiltrators to indigenous
personnel continued to increase, despite heavy casualties and the
expansion of the southern units. In addition, modern infantry assault
weapons and mortars introduced in large numbers since 1964 now make up
portion of the combined North Vietnamese and Viet Cong arsenal.
Laos: Backbone of Hanoi's Logistics Effort
With the eastern portions of the Laos panhandle securely under
Communist control, Hanoi as early as 1964 decided to augment its
labyrinth of paths and trails used for infiltration of personnel by
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initiating an extensive roadbuilding program which would facilitate
trucking supplies to South Vietnam, At that ~ time the motorable roads
from the Laos-North Vietnam border at the Ma Gia Pass, south to the
vicinity of Maong Nong in Laos, measured approximately 180 miles. A
sizeable contingent of several North Vietnamese army units were deployed
there to oversee the development of this roadnet.139 The scope of this
effort, which was not to become fully evident until 1966, indicates the
scale of Hanoi's planning in 196+, They foresaw the need not only for
a sizeable increase in manpower but also for the need to establish an
adequate channel to supply these forces in increased levels of combat.
The net result of the Communist roadbuilding effort in Laos since 1964
has been the extension of the existing roads more than 440 miles further
south -- right across the borders into South Vietnam. From here, supplies
which are trucked deep into the Laotian panhandle are transferred to
pack animals or human porters which fan out into the wilderness and
cross%. into Communist supply areas in the Central Highlands of South
Vietnam.
This expansion of the roadnet indicates an ever increasing dependence
on truck transport for logistic support. Judging from aerial photography
and pilot sightings, it is estimated by intelligence authorities that
over 300 trucks. are operating on the infiltration routes in Laos alone,
delivering at least 35-440 net tons of supplies each day of the dry season
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The Impact of Infiltration on the Force Structure
The Central Committee in Hanoi in late 1965 reaffirmed its earlier
decision to send organic North Vietnamese units to the South and called
for their continued introduction.
A total of seven additional regiments were confirmed by intelligence
as infiltrating south in early 1966. In January, three regiments were
drawn from various regular line units in the north. The iLlst Regiment
of the 312th Division deployed south through Laos to Phouc Long
Province near the Cambodian border. 14o The 24th Regiment of the 304th
Division left its garrison area with 2,000 men and. moved to Kontum
Province ,141-while-the 88th Regiment of the 308th Division, also with
2,000 men, moved to Pleiku Province. 142
In February and March 1966, Hanoi dispatched four more regular
army units through Laos. The 3rd Regiment, 1,500 men strong, went to
Quang Tin Province. 143 The 52nd Regiment, with 2,000 men deployed to
the southern portion of South Vietnam. 144 In March, 1600 men of the
165th Regiment also departed for the same area of South Vietnam. 145
The 84th Artillery Regiment which was a composite unit drawn from
two separate North Vietnamese outfits -- the 68th Artillery Regiment
and the 351st Division -- also left in March arriving in South Vietnam
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in August. 146 This apparently completed the buildup of regular units
Hanoi had planned, for the time being, to introduce via the Laos
corridors.
In May and June, Hanoi began moving units directly across the
Demilitarized Zone into the northern section of Quang Tri province.
Three regiments of the North Vietnamese 324th Division, the 812th,
the 90th and the 803rd were in place south of the DMZ by July.147
Subsequently, battalion elements of the NVA 341st Division also
moved south across the ME. Although the 3214th and the other units
which came across the DMZ suffered heavy casualties in encounters
with allied forces from July through October, sizeable elements of
these divisions are again operating in Quang Tri province after
regroupment and replacement in southern North Vietnam. They pose
part of the extensive Communist military threat now evident in
northern South Vietnam. During 1966, in addition to the regiments
described above, the infiltration of 37 other groups of infiltrators,
totalling over 24,00O men was confirmed by the capture of two or
more prisoners. Many of these were sent to indigenous Viet Cong units
as replacements upon their arrival in the South.
There is sufficient evidence available to indicate that another
112 groups of infiltrators containing over 37,000 men came south
during this same period. Total infiltration reported during 1966
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thus amounted to over 78,000 Yen.
The ratio of North Vietnamese to indigenous Viet Cong battalions
I
rose considerably during 1966.18 At the end of 1965 there were 66
Viet Cong battalions and 32 North Vietnamese battalions operating in
the south. The northern units then comprised about 32% of the over-
all Communist battalion strength. By the end of 1966, however, the
number of regular North Vietnamese battalions had more than doubled
over the previous year with 67 battalions in the south. The Viet
Cong`s force had expanded to 81 battalions during the year. Thus,
in one year, Northern units had expanded to approximately 45% of the
overall number of 148 Communist maneuver battalions, a fact which
testifies to the growing predominance of the northern units and the
increasing dependence of the southern Communist forces on Hanoi in
order to continue the overall expansion of their military apparatus.
The extent of this dependence cannot be precisely quantified
since the exact indigenous manpower resources available to the
Communists in South Vietnam, the rate at which they can commit this
manpower and their exact combat losses are unknown. The number of
Communist troops killed in action is both the most important and the
least reliable statistical measure used to assess the military progress
of the war. The figure is subject to error because of duplications,
omissions, possibly inflated body counts, and the frequent inability to
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pinpoint non-military battle casualties. These problems arise from
high] mobile combat situations and the physical impossibility of
i
accurately counting the dead in a hostile environment. The problems
are compounded by Viet Cong practices of engaging impressed civilian
labor as porters on the battlefield. The number of bodies buried in
caves, tunnels or under debris cannot be assessed, nor can we estimate
the deaths caused by aerial strikes and artillery attacks, where no
follow-up ground action is taken.
According to the best information available, more than 165,000
Communist troops have been reported killed in action since 1959.151
With some 100,000 of the losses inflicted since 1963. In 1966, over
55,000 were killed in action. Many of these were irregular troops,
however, and the losses cannot be applied directly to the Communist
regular forces. On the other hand, these figures do not include
enemy wounded in action nor those captured or lost to the Communist
force structure through desertion or sickness. Still, however, the
Communists were able to match these losses and even expand their
force structure considerably during 1966. We know, however, that
they did it largely by dint of the additional North Vietnamese
regular units and replacements sent to the South, since the casualties
absorbed by the Viet Gong have begun to put a strain on their
ability to mobilize additional manpower from the local populace in
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South Vietnam. There is no way to accurately determine exactly how
many,/men are conscripted or recruited. In 1966, one of the manpower
i
under Viet Cong control (when considered in the light of the amount
of territory either directly controlled by the Viet Cong or under
no control), indicated that the male population base was adequate to
support a theoretical recruitment or conscription levy of approximately
7,000 men per month this and, from what limited evidence is available
on the subject, it presently appears that the Communists are having
difficulties meeting such levies. There are captured documents which
indicate that.the increasing requirement for manpower during 1965
had already forced the VC to resort to monetary inducements and to
forced conscription and returnee programs to obtain local recruits.
During 1966, the manpower requirements increased even more, and the
growing seriousness of the problem was reflected in many other
captured documents and captive statements.
One particularly knowledgeable source on the subject of
recruitment was
stated that his division was short one regiment because of the lack
of recruits from the area. He further complained of the quality of
the recruits that were able to enlist or conscript stating that the
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regular Communist Party cadre had trouble keeping them disciplined
under fire as many were under 16 years of age.
The presence of North Vietnamese in large numbers in the South
has apparently become so well known among the rural populace in the
Viet Cong affected areas by 1966, that the insurgent command found
it necessary to provide an official explanation. In a captured
document containing propaganda instructions for "questions raised by
the public," insurgent cadre are told to admit that "North Vietnam is
a large and stable rear area for South Vietnam and is providing us
everything we need, including soldiers" 153, The southern insurgent
command had also, by 1966, issued instructions for the correct treat-
ment of ethnic North Vietnamese replacement personnel sent south to
fill up insurgent units. According to a captured document issued by
a division-level military authority in the South, "recruits from
North Vietnam" have been assigned to South Vietnam "to liberate this
part of the country."15i The majority of them are "proud of their
job," but many have had a hard journey getting to the South and
should be giben considerate treatment, the document stated. Military
personnel were instructed in the document to "absolutely avoid
friction . . disrespect . . and division" between South
Vietnamese and North Vietnamese.
While it is too early to say that the Viet Cong are entirely
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dependent on Hanoi for the supply of manpower -- the only war-making
commodity that on the surface appears plentiful in the south -- the
growing number of North Vietnamese regular units and replacements in
Viet Cong units indicates a definite trend in that direction. It
might be concluded that if the Viet Cong wished to maintain the
present levels of combat indefinitely or increase the intensity of
the fighting with the hope of achieving a quick victory, their actions
would be predicted almost entirely on the extent of Hanoi's willingness
to supply the manpower.
The Viet Cong Arsenal as a Measure of Dependence of Hanoi
The Communists in the South with Hanoi's help, have armed their
men in the years since 1964, with the latest automatic weapons from
the Communist World.149 By late 1964, the "new family" of Communist
weapons which all chamber a short 7.62 round of ammunition appeared
in large numbers in Viet Cong units. This new assortment of weapons
included the Soviet AK-47 assault rifle, the SKS carbine, and the RPD
light machine-gun. The term family is used because all of these
weapons fire the short 7.62-mm cartridge model 1943.
In addition to small arms, the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese
Army units are now supplied with a variety of Soviet and Chinese
machine-guns, mortars and rocket launchers. The Soviet 7.62-mm heavy
29
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machine-gun (SGM/SG-43) and the Soviet 12.7-mm heavy machine-gun
(DSH?, 38/46) are both in wide use. The 40-mm grenade launcher and the
60-mm, 82-mm, and 120-mm mortars are now in the hands of both VC and
NVA units. The 57-mm and 75-mm recoilless rifles have also become
commonly used weapons by the enemy. The Soviet 140-mm rocket launcher
has come into use in recent months.
The percentage of weapons captured since 1963, shows the steady
increase in the use of Chinese and Soviet manufactured arms.150 In
1963, only 8 percent of the captured weapons were of Chinese or
Soviet manufacture. In 1964, 17 percent of the captured weapons were
from China or the Soviet Union and in 1965, the percentage rose to 24.
Another rise was noted in 1966, to 33 percent, and presently, the
weapons captured from Viet Cong main and irregular forces contain
41 percent Soviet and Chinese weapons, reflecting the degree of
support required from Hanoi.
,This percentage can be expected to rise even higher as the
Communists attempt to simplify spare parts and ammunition resupply
problems. Modern Communist arms have even trickled down to the local
guerilla forces which, traditionally, are the poorest equipped elements
of the Communist forces in the South. French, US and homemade versions
still .'I make up the bulk of local arsenals; however, the French arms
are holdovers from the Indochina War and their use is decreasing
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rapidly because of loss, lack of spare parts and general deterioration.
The 6mooth-bore, homemade weapons are not efficient, and they are
frequently used merely to show the local populace the VC's manufacturing
capability. While a limited capability to hand produce crude weapons
has been developed there, no native industrial base exists which would
provide the Communists with the modern arms and ammunition required
to maintain levels of combat such as we have witnessed in the past
three years. Future equipment for these local guerilla forces will
increasingly depend on newer weapons provided by Hanoi.
As significant as the weapons themselves is the ammunition
requirement for these new arms. Battle demands for rifle, machine-
gun, and mortar ammunition are counted in tons. Captured or stolen
U. S. Ammunition of the same caliber is not interchangeable with the
"new f arLi..ly" weapons, and it presently appears that the Communist main
forces are more and more becoming dependent on external supply to
meet,these increasing needs.
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THE INFILTRATION OF ORGANIC NORTH VIETNAPNlESE
ARMY REGIMENTS INTO SOUTH VIETNAM
1964 - 1966
INFILTRATION
DATA
NO OF
PRISONERS
vo WHICH
CONFIRMATION
NO OF
CAPTURED DOCU-
MENTS ON WHICH
TOTAL NO
PRISONERS
TAKEN
UNIT
DEP NVN ARR SVN
STRENGTH
BASED
CONFIRMATION
BASED
FRO14 EACH
UNIT
95th Regt
Oct 64 Dec 64
2,000
7
1
35
101st Regt
Dec 64 Feb 65
2,000
3
2
13
18th Regt
Feb 65 Apr 65
2,000
5
2
43
32nd Regt
Sep-Oct Jan 65
64
1,800
4
4
53
22nd regt
Jul 65 Sep 65
2,000
5
1
42
33rd Regt
Jul 65 Oct 65
2,000
0
53
250th Regt
Jul 65 Oct 65
1,000
2
13
66th Regt
Aug 65 Nov 65
1,500
1
4
3
6th Regt
IJNK Oct 65
1,500
1
18
21st Regt
Aug 65 Oct 65
2,000
7
3 -
37
18B Regt
Dec 65 Feb 66
2
000
,
.
62
95B Regt
Dec 65 Mar 66
2,000
17
141st Regt
Jan 66 Mar 66
1,500
24th Regt
Jan 66 Feb 66
2
000
,
19
88th Regt.
Jan 66 Mar 66
2,000
3rd Regt
Feb 66 Mar 66
1
500
,
34
812th Regt
Jun 66 Jun 66
1,500
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THE INFILTRATION OF ORGANIC NORTH VIETNAMESE
ARMY REGIMENTS INTO SOUTH VIETNAM
196+ - 1966 (CONT..)
INFILTRATION
NO OF
PRISONERS
WHICH
NO OF -
CAPTURED DOCU-
MENTS ON WHICH
TOTAL NO
PRISONERS
TAKEN
DATA
CONFIRMATION
CONFIRMATION
FROM EACH
UNIT
DEP NVN
ARR SVN
STRENGTH
BASED
BASED
UNIT
90th Regt
Jun 66
Jun 66
1,500
3
0
12
803rd Regt
Jun 66
Jun 66
1,500
2
0
7
165th Regt
Feb 66
Jul 66
2,000
1
3
1
52nd Regt
Mar 66
Jul 66
1,600
3
1
_3
8th Arty
mar 66
Aug 66
1,200
1
3
1
Regt
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COMMUNIST LOSSES IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1960 - 1966
YEAR
TOTAL KILLED IN ACTION
1960
5,669
1961
1-2,133
1962
21,158
1963
20,575
1964
16,785
1965
35,x+36
1966
55,524
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WEAPONS CAPTURED FROM COMMUNIST FORCES
IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1960 - 1967
YEAR
TOTAL WEAPONS
CAPTURED
WEAPONS MIX SOVIET US FRENCH HOME-
CHINESE MADE
1960
Data not available
1961
2,753
DATA NOT AVAILABLE - 1960 - 1967
1962
4,049
1963
5,397
7%
1% 28% 50% 14%
1964
5,881
15%
2% 32% 36% 15%
1965
11,695
21%
3% 35% 26% 15%
1966
18,606
29%
4% 30% 22% 15%
1967
8,970
35%
6% 26% 18% 15%
lst quarter
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THE "IM FAMILY" WEAPONS
7.62MM ASSAULT RIFLE ( SOVIET AK-47,
CHICOM TYPE 56) STANDARD FOR NVA
UNITS, AUTOMATIC, SEMI-AUTOMATIC.
M-1943 AMMUNITION, 600 RNDS/MIN (CYCLIC)
80 RND$/MIN (PRACTICAL).
EFFECTIVE RANGE- 440 YARDS
SOVIET, CHICOM AND NORTH KOREAN
MODELS CAPURED).
7.62MM CARBINE (SOVIET SKS, CHICOM
TYPE 56)
PRINCIPALLY USED IN NVA UNITS, SEMI-
AUTOMATIC.
M1943 AMMUNITION, 20 RNDS/MIN.
EFFECTIVE RANGE 440 YARDS
(BOTH SOVIET, CHICOM, AND NORTH
KOREAN TYPES CAPTURED)
7.62 MM LIGHT MACHINEGUN (SOVIET RPD,
CHICOM TYPE 56) STANDARD FOR NVA
UNITS (SQUAD SUPPORT), AUTOMATIC,
M 1943 AMMUNITION, 750 RNDS/MIN
(CYCLIC), 150 RNDS/MIN., (PRACTICAL)
EFFECTIVE RANGE- 875 YARDS
(SOVIET, CHICOM AND NK TYPES
CAPTURED)
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MACHINE GUNS, MORTARS, & RECOILESS RIFLES IN
USE BY COMMUNIST FORCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM
7.62MM HEAVY MACHINEGUN (SOVIET
SGM/SG-43, CHICOM TYPE 57/53)
STANDARD FOR NVA UNITS, BATTALION
SUPPORT, AUTOMATIC.
M 1908 AMMUNITION, 700 RNDS/M1N
(CYCLIC), 250 RNDS/MIN (PRACTICAL)
EFFECTIVE RANGE- 1100 YARDS
(BOTH SOVIET AND CHICOM MODELS
CAPTU'Ri tyy
12.7MM HEAVY MACHINGUN (SOVIET
DSHK 38/46, CHICOM TYPE 54)
STANDARD FOR NVA UNITS, ANTI-
AIRCRAFT SUPPORT AUTOMATIC
ARMOR PIERCING-INCINDIARY
AMMUNITION, 600 RNDS/MIN (CYCLIC).
80 RNDS/MIN (PRACTICAL) EFFECTIVE
RANGE-GROUND 1640 YDS, AA 1100 YDS,
LCHICOM AND SOVIET TYPES CAPTURED)
40MM ANTI-TANK GRENADE LAUNCHER
(SOVIET RPG-2, CHICOM TYPE 56)
USED BY BOTH VC AND NVA UNITS,
80MM HEAT GRENADE EFFECTIVE
RANGE- 110 YDS, ARMOR PENETRATION
7 IN. (ONLY CHICOM TYPES CAPTURED
DESIGNATED B-40 BY NVA)
60MM MORTAR (US DESIGN, CHICOM
TYPE 31) USED BY BOTH VC AND
NVA UNITS
3.25 LS HE PROJECTILE
MAXIMUM RANGE- 1675 YDS.
(ONLY CHICOM TYPE CAPTURED)
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-vmIUNIar CHINA TYPES 52 AND 56)
USED BY BOTH VC AND NVA
HE AND HEAT AMMUNITION
MAX.. RANGE 7,300 YARDS
ONLY COMMUNIST (CHINA TYPE
CAPTURED
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120-MM MORTAR (SOVIET M 1943,
CHICOM TYPE 55) USED BY NVA AND
POSSIBLY VIET c ONG UNITS
33.9LB. HE PROJECTILE
MAX. RANGE 6,235 YARDS
CHICOM AMMUNITION AND BIPOL7
CAPTURED
82-MM MORTAR (SOVIET M 1937,
COMMUNIST TYPE 53) USED BY BOTH
VC AND NVN UNITS
6.9 LB. FIE PROJECTILE ( CAN FIRE
US 81-MM AMMUNITION
MAX. RANGE 3,320 YARDS
ONLY COMMUNIST CHINA TYPE
57MM RECOILLESS RIFLE ( US DESIGN,
CHICOM TYPE 36) USED BY BOTH VC
AND NVA UNITS
HE AND HEAT AMMUNITION
MAXIMUM RANGE-4900 YDS.
(ONLY CHICOM TYPE CAPTURED)
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EXPANSION OF COMMUNIST FORCE STRUCTURE
IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1960 - 1966
1960 1961 1962 1963 196+ 1965 1966
Viet Cong
Battalions
10
20
26
29
57
66
81
VC Main Force
Strength.
5,500
26,700
33,800
34,40o
)+9,300
61,700
64,300
VC Guerrilla.
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
60,000
103,600
11.2,800
Force Strength
North Viet-
namese Battalions
4
32
67
North Vietnamese
Strength
2,500
26,100
48,000
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INFILTRATION OF PERSONNEL INTO
SOUTH VIETiAM1
1959 - 1966
CATEGORY 1 & 2 CATEGORY 3 & 4
CONFIRMED PROBABLE
1959-60 4556 26 4582
1961 4118 2177 6295
1962 5362 7495 12857
1963 4726 3180 7906
1964 9316 3108 12424
ACCEPTED 2 3 4
CONFIRMED PROBABLE POSSIBLE TOTAL
1965 23,770 1,910 8050 33,730
1966 4o,goo 9,000 28,700 78,600
1. In mid-October, MACV performed a complete review of available
information relating to NVA infiltration into South Vietnam.
This review included a reexamination of all captured documents,
interrogation reports, in the MACV files from
1 January 1965. As a result of this reexamination, new criteria
and terminology for listing infiltration totals were adopted.
2. ACCEPTED - ACCEPTED CONFIRMED: A confirmed unit/group is one
which is determined to exist on the basis of
information provided by a minimum of two captives,
returnees or captured documents ( any combination).
ACCEPTED PROBABLE: A probable infiltration unit/
group is one believed to exist on the basis of
information which can be evaluated as probably
true provided by one captive, returnee or captured
document.
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3,. POSSIBLE - A possible infiltration group/unit
is one which is believed to exist on the basis
of information which can be evaluated as possibly
true, even though no captive, returnee or document
is available to verify the report of reports.
4. The total does not represent all infiltration data on hand.
Other information is held which, based upon the application
of consistent criteria and the professionbl judgement of
analysts has been evaluated as insufficient to warrant
inclusion in either of the above catagories. ,
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