THE LIMITS OF CUBAN SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B01737A002100110001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 16, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 28, 1974
• Content Type: MEMO

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28 August 1974
SUBJECT: The Limits of Cuban Subversion in Latin America
Cuban subversion in Latin America -- in all of its
forms -- is at its nadir. Tangible support of revolu-
tionaries is negligible, training in clandestine and
guerrilla methods has been sharply reduced, while stri-
dent, exhortative propaganda has been virtually elimi-
nated. Cuban intelligence officers and agents in the
region are primarily concerned with collecting informa-
tion and proselytizing, and only in the case of the
Chilean military government has recent evidence linked
them to subversive efforts. Castro's eschewal of aggres-
sive and surreptitious methods in recent years in favor
of conventional diplomacy reflects fundamental shifts
in his objectives in the hemisphere. He now collaborates
with governments and groups that conform to his loose
definition of "revolutionary," while withdrawing from
his previously intimate relationships with
the
subver-
sive factions of the 1960's. The outlook
for
the next
few years, moreover, is for a continuation
of
current
trends. Castro is not likely to endanger
the
gains he
has made in the region for the sake of any marginal
subversive group, and probably will continue to find
means of cooperating with most of the governments of the
region, including some that he considers his ideological
opposites.
1. After sponsoring subversive ventures in Latin
America for nine years, Castro began to reappraise his
methods and objectives in 1968. Successive and costly
failures by revolutionary groups, increasing Soviet
pressure, rapidly changing conditions in the hemisphere,
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and domestic problems persuaded him gradually to abandon
subversive techniques. Subsequent efforts to extend Cuban
influence through overt and legal means succeeded dramati-
cally, and encompassing shifts in Castro's view of his
role in the region became apparent. He continued to as-
sert that he would only work with "revolutionary" govern-
ments, but by the early 1970's his definition of the term
had changed so significantly that "patriotic" regimes "in-
dependent of the US" were fully acceptable to him. A ma-
jority of Latin American and Caribbean governments now
meet Castro's still evolving "revolutionary" criteria.
2. Eight of them maintain diplomatic ties with Cuba
despite the OAS sanctions and in defiance of the US. As
he considers these governments "revolutionary," it is
consistent that Castro has systematically loosened or cut
his ties with Communist and subversive groups that oppose
them. None of the latter are known to receive Cuban sup-
port. Castro favors the government-sponsored labor sector
in Peru for instance, instead of the Communist union. Ile
collaborates with the Burnham government in Guyana, though
this has been at the expense of his previously close ties
with Cheddi Jagan's Marxist opposition party. He supports
Mrs. Peron's government, despite its rightward drift, and
is more anxious to reap the benefits from his favorable
trade relationship with Argentina than to support dissi-
dents. The principal Argentine guerrilla group maintains
contact with Havana, and may receive small amounts of
technical support, but evidence of this is lacking.
Guerrillas in Mexico, on the other hand, probably have no
direct ties with Cuba.
3. Several other countries now considering the es-
tablishment of formal ties with Havana are also deemed
"revolutionary" by Castro. The new governments of
Venezuela, Colombia, and Costa Rica seem to qualify, and
there is no evidence of Cuban support to local subversives.
On July 26th Castro responded favorably to remarks by
Venezuelan government spokesmen advocating the normalization
of relations with Cuba. He indicated that he expects other
governments in the region to re-establish ties with Havana
in coming months, and pledged that this would be done "on
the basis of absolute reciprocal respect and fraternal
cooperation." Although not an explicit renunciation of
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subversion, this was Castro's most unequivocal effort to
date to reassure Latin American leaders that his objectives
in the hemisphere have changed since the 1960's.
4. Castro has also demonstrated a considerable ca-
pacity for compromise and pragmatic calculation in his
attitude toward many of the Latin American governments
that he does not consider "revolutionary." He has pro-
moted cultural, sports, and educational exchanges with
some of them and seeks to enter into profitable commercial
deals without regard to ideology. Havana even disscusses
economic issues with its philosophical opposites in the
hemisphere -- including the Brazilian military regime.
5. Castro has also assumed a flexible stance in
Central America. The Honduran government's willingness
to buy Cuban sugar last year undoubtedly is more pro-
mising in Havana's view than a loosely structured group
of about a dozen Honduran revolutionaries, several of
whom reportedly received guerrilla instruction in Cuba.
Even Guatemala, low on Cuba's list of progressive govern-
ments, reportedly is no longer a target of Cuban subver-
sion. A top leader of the Guatemalan Rebel Armed Forces
who recently visited Havana, reportedly wrote his col-
leagues early this year that he believes the Cubans have
abandoned the armed, violent approach to revolution in
favor of political infiltration and compromise.
6. There are nevertheless, a few governments in the
hemisphere that Castro is reluctant or unwilling to deal
with. He is contemptuous of the military rulers in
Uruguay, Bolivia, and Paraguay, and could decide in the
future to lend support to revolutionary groups opposed
to them if they seemed to pose a viable alternative.
Although the Uruguayan Tupamaros reportedly received
Cuban support last year, and undoubtedly remain in con-
tact with Havana, there is no recent evidence of Cuban
support. Castro's strongest enmity, however, is reserved
for the Chilean military government. In the unlikely
event that revolutionary Chileans were able to piece
together a viable opposition force, he might provide them
with important support.
7. Last September, after the demise of the Allende
government, Castro promised anti-junta Chileans "all
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the aid in Cuba's power to provide." As the prospects of
the Chilean leftists have declined since then, however,
Havana apparently has become resigned to the realities
of a situation it has little ability to influence. In-
telligence reports about current Cuban attitudes toward
the large community of Chilean exiles in Cuba differ, but
in mid-August Castro was quoted in one as saying that he
"will not provide support for new revolutionary adventures."
8. Thus, it is apparent that Havana's subversive and
clandestine activities have been a steadily diminishing
part of its overall diplomatic offensive in the hemisphere.
Cuban intelligence officers are present in relatively
large numbers in the countries where Havana is officially
represented, and the Cuban news service, national airline,
and fishing fleet are used as covers for agents. Unlike
in earlier years, however, the objectives of the Cuban
intelligence service are primarily to collect information
and to promote Cuban interests with established groups.
Cuban intelligence activities are more closely scrutinized
by advocates of conventional diplomacy than ever before.
9. Other indications support the view that all forms
of Cuban subversion are now at their nadir. Intelligence
reports received from several sources in Latin America
this year confirm the shift of Cuban policy, and suggest
that Havana is making it clear to revolutionaries that
they can no longer expect Cuban support. Three inter-
national front organizations created by Havana in the
1960's to support and coordinate subversive activities
have been dismantled or allowed to atrophy. The Latin
American Solidarity Organization, the Asian, African, and
Latin American People's Solidarity Organization, and the
Continental Latin American Student Organization are
seldom mentioned in the official Cuban media. The con-
tent of Cuban propaganda meanwhile, has shifted from the
clarion calls for armed revolution common in the 1960's
to reasoned discussions of many Latin American issues.
10. Castro's willingness to adopt new methods for
the new times in Latin America is the result both of his
reappraisal of international conditions and pressures,
and of personal and domestic considerations. Now 48,
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Fidel is no longer the inflexible revolutionary and incor-
rigible romantic that he was during his early years in
power. Instead, he has increasingly demonstrated a desire
to find compromise solutions for Cuba's problems. Today
he more frugally manages Cuba's limited resources and,
preoccupied with domestic development priorities and the
institutionalization of the Revolution, he appears to
have little interest in quixotic policies or personalities
at home or abroad. In short, Castro is no longer a reck-
less young gambler.
11. The outlook for the next few years, moreover, is
for a continuation of present trends. It is unlikely that
for the sake of any minuscule subversive group, Castro
will compromise the formal ties he has so worked so per-
sistently to acquire with Latin American countries. He
probably can be expected to honor his pledges to refrain
from meddling in the internal affairs of these governments,
and he will be increasingly mindful of his improving image
throughout the region and anxious to capitalize on it.
Even when his intrinsic revolutionary sensitivities are
strained by governments he is contemptuous of, he will
remember the deleterious effects that proof of significant
Cuban subversion would have on his entire foreign policy.
Ten years after the imposition of the OAS sanctions when
Cuba was caught in a massive subversive plot, Castro has
no intention of recreating the conditions that he has
struggled so arduously against.
25X1A
Chief, Central America
Caribbean Branch
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THE ~TATUS OF CUBAN SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA
1. Cuban support of armed subversion in Latin America
is at its lowest ebb since Castro came to power. Soviet
pressures, the failures and expense of subversive ventures
during the 1960's, and changing conditions in Latin America
persuaded Havana to begin reappraising its methods in 1968.
With the establishment of relations with Chile in 1970, it
became even more evident that violent tactics were being
gradually abandoned in favor of.more orthodox methods of.
diplomacy and political.penetration. Cuban advisors were
no longer assigned to Latin American guerrilla groups, and 25X1C
25X1 C
other forms of support to subversive groups abroad were
reduced.
Today a few dissident groups, including
communist parties, continue to receive some Cuban financial
support, and Havana provides training in clandestine and
guerrilla methods as well as technical support to selected
Latin American revolutionaries, but at levels significantly
lower than in previous years.
2. Havana now gives clear priority to its principal objec-
tive of wooing Latin American governments into establishing
diplomatic trade relations with Cuba. Some of the top
25X1C officers direct?
involved in support of armed insurgency, are now devoted to
the diplomatic effort. Fidel'Castro himself gave emphasis
to the diplomatic approach in his speech of 26 July 1974 when
he stated that Cuba was "willing to cooperate constructively
with that majority of governments capable of implementing an
independent foreign policy". He indicated that he expects a
number of governments in the region'to reestablish ties with
Cuba in the coming months and promised that this would be
done "on the basis of absolute reciprocal respect and fraternal
cooperation".
3. Havana's diplomatic offensive has had considerable
success... Eight-Latin American and Caribbean governments have
diplomatic ties with Havana, and several others are considering
similar action. Also, as part of its more flexible Latin
American policy, Havana has now, under Soviet pressure,
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reached an accommodation with most of the Moscow-line
communist parties in the area; these parties were previously
scorned by Havana as being insufficiently revolutionary
because of their lack of commitment to armed revolution.
4. it is improbable that the Castro regime will revert
to the massive subversive efforts of the 1960's, as long
as diplomatic efforts are going. well, but Havana will probably
continue to provide support to some guerrilla groups on a
highly selective, clandestine- basis. Cuba's paramilitary
involvement in several Near Eastern and African 'countries
is evidence of.its continued capability for such activity.
Indeed, Castro has not categorically rejected violent
revolution as a valid foreign policy instrument, and he is
not likely to give up his objective -- announced in September
1973 -- of supporting the armed overthrow of the military
regime in Chile. He has been able to do little toward
obtaining this goal, however, because the left in Chile is
in disarray and the Chilean security forces have been
effective.
5. There is little evidence of much Cuban involvement
in the export of armed revolution anywhere in Latin America
today. Havana is believed to maintain contact with the
extremist People's Revolutionary Army (ERP) in Argentina and
with the Uruguayan Tupamaros. A small group of Hondurans
received guerrilla instruction in Cuba in 1973 and 1974, and
at least one top leader of the Guatemalan Rebel Armed Forces
(FAR) recently visited Havana. The Castro regime has establish
a center to support the one thousand Chilean exiles now in
Cuba, and some of the Chileans are,teportedly receiving militax
training. Havana is also believed to maintain contact with
the Chilean Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) through
Cuban intelligence operatives in Peru and Argentina, although
there is no hard evidence of such contact. Havana might be
tempted to provide clandestine support for future efforts to
overthrow Latin American regimes distasteful to Cuba, but the
risk of endangering Cuba's diplomatic objectives will weigh
heavily in considering such support. For instance, despite
the increasingly rightist turn of the Argentine government
under Mrs. Peron, Havana is not likely to identify itself
with the ERP as long as the Peron regime maintains friendly
ties with Cuba.
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iic~r~urkH~:.. Attached is -draft which
we discussed on the phone. As I told you,
he would like it forwarded to the requeste J
Ias a dissenting view, or perhaps as
1"additional discussion". I support his
Irequest in principle, because we are urged
not to suppress dissenting views, but you
will have to judge how useful it will be
in this case.
RICHARD LEHMAN
D/OCI
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Copy of buckslip to for file.
28 August 1974
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