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Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79BO1737AO02 Lon 39 aj& No Foreign Dissem Response to NSSM No.9 Volume VII : Disarmament and Miscellaneous 25X1A 25X1 A Handle via Top Secret -Talent-Keyhole-Comint 20 February 1969 Channels jointly -141769 Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79B01737A00280d1?001 Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79BO1737AO02400010001-4 25X1A WARNING `].'his document contains information alfecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws U. S. Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794 and 798. The law prohibits its transmission or the reve- lation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner projudicial to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detriment of the United States. It is to be seen only by personnel especially indoctrinated and authorized to receive information in the. designated control channels. its security must be maintained in accordance with regulations pertaining to the TALENT-KEY[ IOT.E and Communications Intelligence Controls. No action is to he taken on any communications intelligence which may be contained herein, regardless of the advantage to be gained, if such action might have the effect of revealing the existence and nature of the source, unless such action is first approved by the appropriate authority. Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79BO1737AO02400010001-4 Approved: For Release 2000/05/12 CIA-RDP791301737A00240001 0001-4 Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79BO1737AO02400010001-4 Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79BO1737AO02400010001-4 VOLUME VI_._L DISARMAMENT AND MISCELLANEOUS Questions Section Answered Nuclear Proliferation I 9 Strategic Arms Talks II 1 Other Disarmament Matters III 3 AID/MAP IV 1 Foreign Economic Policy V 1 Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79BO1737AO02400010001-4 Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79BO1737AO02400010001-4 NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79BO1737AO02400010001-4 Approved For Release 2000/05/1(WDP79B01737A002400010001-4 1. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION 1. Describe the state of the capabilities of the nations which could build a nuclear weapon in the next five years. a. Which nations have a "stand-by" capa- bility and how many months are they away from a bomb? b. Are any nations actively pursuing con- struction of the bomb--rather than acquisition of a stand-by capability? c. What are the sources of our information? Identify the "hard" and "soft" areas. Political rather than economic and technical factors restrain most of the nations which are capa- ble of developing nuclear weapons from doing so. Beyond the present five nuclear powers, we believe that at least nine nations could--from the stand- point of capabilities alone--build a nuclear weapon in the next five years: 25X6 Could produce a first nuclear device within six to twelve months after a decision to do so. DISARMAMENT AND MISCELLANEOUS Volume VII - Section I Approved For Release 2000/05/1 GEDP79B01737A002400010001-4 Approved For Release 2000/05 C1 1 d DP79B01737A002400010001-4 NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION 1. (continued) India's only reactor capable of producing sufficient plutonium for weapons (one or two a year) was built under an agreement with Canada which stipulated that it would be used for peaceful purposes only. Canada has no right of inspection, however, and there are no safeguards. Nuclear power stations to be built under safeguards in India in the next several years could provide more plutonium for weapons, if India were willing to violate the safeguards. 25X6 DISARMAMENT AND MISCELLANEOUS 2 Volume VII - Section I Approved For Release 2000/05/~RG~tlp DP79B01737AO02400010001-4 Approved For Release 2000/05/$ECMN RDP79B01737A002400010001-4 1. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION 25X6 Two to three years from a first device, if it undertook a crash program. The limiting factor is lack of a plutonium extraction plant. Swedish nuclear facilities are not under safeguards. Italy Also about two to three years from a first device, if it undertook a crash program and disre- garded safeguard commitments. 25X6 25X6 DISARMAMENT AND MISCELLANEOUS Volume VII - Section I Approved For Release 2000/05/1 Fqfff P79B01737A002400010001-4 Approved For Release 2000/05/1!t]P79BO1737AO02400010001-4 1. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION 25X6 Holland for some years has also been develop- ing the centrifuge process for commercial purposes. We include the Netherlands in this list only because it could build centrifuge facilities, and conceivably design and manufacture a nuclear device within five years. Most of the nations listed above would have to import some nonnuclear materials and equipment for a weapons program, but they could obtain what they needed on the open market. Other countries could acquire nuclear weapons in the next five years only if given large scale aid from outside. Such aid probably would be available only if one or an- other of the advanced states took a conscious deci- sion to help another nation obtain nuclear weapons. 25X6 25X6 Active weapons programs versus"stand-by" capabilities Of the nine nations listed, Allllllllllllllllll Only India has what we would call a "stand-by" capa ility; i.e., possession as of now of all facilities needed to produce nuclear weapons. Sources and quality of our information 25X1 C We have a large quantity of overt information on the peaceful nuclear programs of nations DISARMAMENT AND MISCELLANEOUS Volume VII - Section I 25X1 C Approved For Release 2000/05/1 gplp*MP79BO1737AOO24OOO1 OOO1-4 Approved For Release 2000/05/WDP79B01737A002400010001-4 25X1 B C.I.A./OSI. Nuclear Proliferation--Uranium Avail- ability. STIR 41-68. December 1968. (S/NFD) C.I.A./OSI. Nuclear Proliferation--Fissionable Ma- terials Production: Capabilities of Nth Coun- tries. STIR 69-6. (to be published in March or April 1969) (S/NFD) C.I.A./OER. Economic Capability of Selected Free World Countries to Produce Nuclear Weapons. IR 69-2. (to be published in March 1969) (S/NFD) DISARMAMENT AND MISCELLANEOUS 5 Volume VII - Section I Approved For Release 2000/05/14RCCI DP79BO1737A002400010001-4 Approved For Release 2000/0519IZCCJ DP79BO1737A002400010001-4 I. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION 2. Identify scarce materials required for a stand-by capability, and for moving from a stand-by capability to a weapon. a. How effectively can the acquisition of these materials be monitored? b. How effectively can the acquisition of these materials be controlled? C. How effective at detecting evasions are the inspection provisions of the NPT? For relatively simple fission weapons, the only materials which could still be called scarce are the fissionable materials themselves--plutonium or enriched U-235.* Some of the nations we are con- sidering--Japan, Italy, the Netherlands--do not have domestic reserves of natural uranium, from which both plutonium and enriched U-235 are derived. But over the years it has not been very difficult for nations to buy uranium without submitting to controls against military use. Nations have also been able to purchase heavy water, another material often used in a weapons program, or to obtain equipment with which to produce their own heavy water. In the design and final assembly of a weapon, no particularly scarce materials or equipment are required, although a na- tion does need an advanced technology in high explo- sives and shaped charges. Once a nation reached the 25X2 ^ DISARMAMENT AND MISCELLANEOUS Volume VII - Section I Approved For Release 2000/05/12~P79B01737A002400010001-4 Approved For Release 2000/05/'E"'DP79B01737A002400010001-4 25X6 25X6 25X6 1. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION 2. (continued) stand-by stage, therefore, it could probably move on to building a weapon without encountering any further material bottlenecks. assistance. Even fissionable materials are likely to become less scarce in coming years. An increasing number of nuclear power reactors are being built throughout the world which could produce weapons- grade plutonium as a by-product. And the ability to produce enriched U-235 will probably spread beyond the present five nuclear powers as the gas centri- fuge and perhaps other new processes are introduced. At the same time, at least partially effec- tive international safeguards have been established in the past 15 years over the movement and use of fissionable materials. The safeguard systems which have been set up (principally by the IAEA, EURATOM, the US, and the UK) do not cover all nuclear facil- ities throughout the world. India has a plutonium-producing reactor which is not ef- fectively safeguarded, and Sweden has one under no safeguards at all since it was built without foreign In most he other nations with which we are concerned-- 25X6 the safeguard systems are now quite ettective. AS the nuclear power programs of these countries expand, however, the unauthorized diversion of enough fis- sionable material for one or two weapons would be- come more difficult to detect. Whether safeguards can control violations as well as monitor them, however, is problematical. Most DISARMAMENT AND MISCELLANEOUS 2 Volume VII - Section I Approved For Release 2000/05/1 ~E -IA P79B01737A002400010001-4 Approved For Release 2000/05/'*DP79B01737A002400010001-4 1. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION 2. (continued) safeguard arrangements contain no automatic penalties for violations. Nations which originally supplied safeguarded material or equipment would presumably refuse to ship further nuclear material to the of- fending state. If the situation were publicized, the offender presumably would be subjected to inter- national criticism. Whether actual sanctions were imposed would depend on political decisions of gov- ernments at the time, made in the light of their own national interests and feelings. The reactions could be different in different cases. Many countries, for instance, might react more harshly to a deliberate West German violation of safeguards than to one by another nation. The*.insection provisions associated with the NPT still have to be worked out in agreements between tie signatories and the IAEA. If the agreements in- clude all the provisions now proposed by the IAEA, they should be quite effective--but not fool-proof-- in detecting evasions. As with existing safeguard systems, the detection of evasions will not neces- sarily be followed by punitive action. Sanctions will depend ultimately on political decisions of the inter- ested states. DISARMAMENT AND MISCELLANEOUS 3 Volume VII - Section I Approved For Release 2000/05/125: ~gP79BO1737A002400010001-4 Approved For Release 2000/05/s . WDP79B01737A002400010001-4 1. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION 3. What testing facilities are available to each nation that could produce a bomb within the next five years? What facilities would be required for safe tests up to what yields? (NOTE: For nations seeking a modest nu- clear capability based on fission weapons, the testing of nuclear devices is no longer as es- sential as it was thought to be several years ago.) 25X6 None of the nations we are considering has nuclear test facilities in being. Normal armaments plants could easily be adapted for the required high explosive, fuzing, and firing tests. All the nations except the Netherlands have domestic areas where un- derground tests could be held. Underground tests in tens of kilotons could easily be conducted, and tests of several hundred kilotons could be carried out safely if the country concerned were willing2*6 Y ~d the funds and effort necessary for test p t~'ons (i.e., greater depth of burial, etc.). of radioactive fallout from atmospheric tests would be no greater than those which the present nuclear powers have accepted at some stage of their own pro- grams. a equa e or atmospneric sts as well. The dangers DISARMAMENT AND MISCELLANEOUS Volume VII - Section I Approved For Release 2000/05/123. P79B01737A002400010001-4 Approved For Release 2000/05/ JIA .DP79B01737A002400010001-4 I. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION 4. What is the state of the delivery capability of each nation that could produce a weapon within the next five years? 25X6 We discuss below each of the nine nations to whom we ascribe a potential nuclear capability within the next five years: India The only delivery system which India presently has is a force of obsolescent Canberra light bombers. It has tried, so far without success, to purchase TU-16 medium jet bombers from the Soviet Union. It is not developing a strategic missile system, though the government may feel increasing pressure to do so as Communist China's nuclear and missile programs ad- vance. In contrast to its fairly advanced nuclear status, however, India does not possess the resources to sustain a strategic missile development program. It would have to import a considerable amount of for- eign technology and would have to hire qualified tech- nical personnel from abroad. Even so, unless India could buy a complete system, a missile development program would almost certainly take longer than five years. 25X6 DISARMAMENT AND MISCELLANEOUS Volume VII - Section I Approved For Release 2000/05/1 g]RP*jP79B01737A002400010001-4 Approved For Release 2000/05gW. 1. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION 4. (continued) 25X6 *BaZZistic missiles are arbitrarily designated In- tercontinental (ICBMs) if their range is greater than 3,000 n.m. IRBMs (intermediate range) have ranges from 1,500 to 3,000 n.m.; MRBMs (medium range) have ranges from 500 n.m. to 1,500 n.m.; and SRBMs (short range) have ranges Less than 500 n.m. DISARMAMENT AND MISCELLANEOUS Volume VII - Section I Approved For Release 2000/05/1?~E j pP79B01737A002400010001-4 Approved For Release 2000/05MCMR'RDP79B01737A002400010001-4 1. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION 4. (continued) 25X6 Sweden has little capability to develop bal- listic missiles. When Swedish military leaders have considered nuclear weapons, they have deliberately eschewed--as being provocative--delivery systems able to reach Soviet population centers. They have regarded nuclear weapons mainly as a means of deter- ring an invasion, or stopping one offshore. If the Swedes ever should go for nuclear weapons, they prob- ably would limit the means of delivery to tactical aircraft, and possibly pre-position some devices off- shore in the most likely invasion areas. Italy Italy would probably need at least ten years to develop a missile system of IRBM or ICBM range, without large-scale outside assistance. Even then, it would have to make arrangements with some other nation or nations for a suitable test range. Italy already has tactical aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons. 25X6 DISARMAMENT AND MISCELLANEOUS 3 Volume VII - Section I Approved For Release 2000/05/13E?* P79B01737A002400010001-4 Approved For Release 2000/05/1]Rc lA'RDP79B01737A002400010001-4 1. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION 4. (continued) 25X6 Netherlands Development of a ballistic missile system by the Dutch is almost inconceivable, and is in any case beyond their capacity for many years to come. If they should develop nuclear weapons--which is also almost inconceivable--they could use their present tactical aircraft for delivery, or might seek other means of delivery from their allies. DISARMAMENT AND MISCELLANEOUS 4 Volume VII - Section I Approved For Release 2000/05/1 ~]R'Eff P79B01737A002400010001-4 Approved For Releaser 1/( %M CfA-F fcB01737AO02400010001-4 HANDLE VIA TALENT - KEYHOLE CONTROL SYSTEM ONLY 25X6 25X6 1. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION 5. How effectively can the source of an in- comin missile be identified? For example, if an fell on Soviet territory, could it be anonymous. At present, the USSR and the US could iden- tify missiles coming from fixed launching sites in each other's homeland. Soviet long-range warning radars, however, do not provide coverage of the multi- directional threat from US Polaris submarines. Nor do they adequately cover areas from which future French or Chinese land-based missiles might be launched. But the USSR could install radar facilities to cover 25X6 these areas, and to track missiles launched The So- 25X1 B 25X1 B viets are already building six additional rge ra- dars, but at their present early stage of construc- tion we cannot make a confident estimate of their purpose. In the future, if missiles are deployed which are designed to evade early warning radar--for example. depressed trajectory or fractional orbit ICBMs Identifying the nationality of missiles fired from submarines would be extremely difficult if a number of nations possessed such submarines. Since only the US, the UK, and the USSR now have them, each would be fairly certain of the origin of a missile attack launched from the high seas. The USSR might not be able to distinguish between the US and the UK, but would probably consider an at- tack from one as an attack from both. France is the only other country seriously working on missile sub- marines at present; she will have one, and possibly DISARMAMENT AND MISCELLANEOUS Volume VII - Section I 25X1 B Approved For Release 20 ff/%(AM DR t39'I 737A002400010001-4 Approved For Release/tkA-lW[#B01737A002400010001-4 HANDLE VIA TALENT - KEYHOLE CONTROL SYSTEM ONLY I. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION 5. (continued) two, such submarines in operation--and possibly three more under construction--five years hence. The Com- munist Chinese in five years conceivably could have missiles which they could launch from their conven- tionally-powered G-class submarine, but there is no good evidence that they are actively pursuing the early development of a submarine missile force. DISARMAMENT AND MISCELLANEOUS 2 Volume VII - Section I Approved For Release 2000/05/12 ClA-RD 01737A002400010001-4 TOP SEC---- UFF Approved For Release 2000/05/$ECQ.E- tDP79B01737A002400010001-4 1. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION 6, Do programs for the peaceful use of nuclear weapons, such as the US Project PLOWSHARE, hinder or aid the proliferation of nuclear weapons? Project PLOWSHARE, or any program to use nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, probably will encourage nations to seek the prerequisites for nuclear weapons. If experience shows that nu- clear explosions can be safely and profitably used in large construction or earth-moving projects, some nations will not long be satisfied to contract such tasks out to the present nuclear powers. Where possible, they will want to do the work themselves. The US can mute, but not eliminate these desires, by carrying out PLOWSHARE explosions for other nations on very generous terms. Those nonnuclear nations which sign and ratify the NPT, of course, will be foreclosed from developing nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes as well as for weapons. Under the treaty's terms, PLOWSHARE-type devices can be made available to nonnuclear states, but only if they remain in the control of the nuclear power which provides them. DISARMAMENT AND PROLIFERATION Volume VII - Section I Approved For Release 2000/05~WR AIR DP79B01737AO02400010001-4 Approved For Release 20061Ji 23 1i Ut'79B01737A002400010001-4 1. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION 7. Have any of the present powers (or nations which could produce a weapon within five years) ex- hibited an interest in unconventional delivery capa- bilities, such as a bomb in a suitcase or a bomb in a freighter in New York harbor? How effectively can such activity be monitored? To our knowledge, none of the present or potential nuclear powers has shown interest in such unconventional means of delivery. But we probably would not know if they had. Any government which considered such schemes would keep security on the project as tight as possible. If a nation actually used these or similar delivery methods, the chances are good that it could place the weapons in position without being detected. Of the present and potential nuclear powers, we believe that for the foreseeable future only the USSR and Communist China would consider clandestinely introducing nuclear weapons into the US. The Soviets clearly have a capability to do so, and might do so if they planned a surprise attack on the US. On the other hand, with the large numbers of strategic weapons now in their arsenal, the Soviets would probably consider marginal the contribution of a clandestine emplacement effort. They probably would consider any advantages it offered as outweighed by the risks of jeopardizing surprise and of precipi- tating a US preemptive attack. Because the Chinese presently have no other means of attacking the US with nuclear weapons, they might consider undertaking a clandestine em- placement effort with the object of deterring the US from attack on Communist China. Their capabili- ties to carry out such an effort, however, are much less than those of the USSR. Moreover, they could DISARMAMENT AND MISCELLANEOUS Volume VII - Section I Approved For Release 2000# 128 1jJ P79B01737A002400010001-4 Approved For Release 200010p12S MRCW79B01737A002400010001-4 1. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION 7. (continued) not be sure that the US would be deterred and they would have to consider that detection might result in, rather than stave off, a devastating US strike. For these reasons, we think it unlikely that Commu- nist China will attempt to introduce nuclear weapons clandestinely into the US. It is possible that a third country (e.g. Cuba) might assist the USSR or China in the clandes- tine introduction of nuclear weapons into the US. We consider this highly unlikely. We doubt that either the Soviets or the Chinese would seek to enlist the aid of another nation in such a sensitive undertaking. If they should, that nation's leaders would almost certainly react unfavorably to a pro- posal that could jeopardize their national survival merely to support Soviet or Chinese policy. Additional References NIE 4-68: The Clandestine Introduction of Weapons of Mass Destruction into the US. 13 June 1968 (TS/RD) DISARMAMENT AND MISCELLANEOUS Volume VII - Section I 2 Approved For Release 2000/0~/ : R[ 9B01737AO02400010001-4 Approved For Release 2000/05/1~4r6DP79BO1737AOO24OOO1OOO1-4 25X6 I. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION 8. Which nations are unlikely to sign the NPT? a. What levers are available to whom (to persuade a particular nation to sign)? b. How strong is the Soviet interest in having each of these nations sign? c. If these nations are coerced into sign- ing, how likely is their signature to prevent their acquisition of nuclear weapons within the next five years? The NPT has been signed by 88 countries, ratified by nine (including the U.K.), but will not come into effect until it is ratified by the US and USSR, and 32 additional states. We list below those nations which have not yet signed, and then consider which of them will continue to withhold their signatures. Non-signers who alreadypossess nuclear weapons France Communist China Non-signers capable of developing nuclear weapons in Five years 25X6 India Other non-signers Albania Algeria Argentina Brazil Burma Burundi Cambodia Central African Rep Chile Congo-Brazz. Cuba Gabon Guinea Guyana Indonesia Jamaica Malawi Mali Malta Mauritania Niger Pakistan Portugal Rwanda Saudi Arabia Sierra Leone Singapore South Africa Spain Swaziland Tanzania Thailand Uganda Zambia DISARMAMENT AND MISCELLANEOUS Volume VII - Section I Approved For Release 2000/05/ARC - DP79BO1737AOO24OOO1OOO1-4 Approved For Release 2000/0 ?Ip;C; f -RDP79B01737A002400010001-4 NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION 8. (ccn:inued) Communist China will almost certainly con- tinue to reject the NPT, and it is unlikely that France will sign at least while de Gaulle is in power. Among the states which could develop nu- clear weapons within five years, we see little pos- sibility that Israel would sign unless intense pres- sure were brought to bear (and major inducement of- fered) by the US. India is also unlikely to change its position. New Delhi wants to keep its options open in the face of the nuclear threat from Commu- nist China, and it also regards the NPT as a dero- gation of its claim to great power status. In West Germany, the NPT has become a major and highly divisive, political issue. Most SPD lead- ers in the Grand Coalition, and some moderate CDU figures, support the treaty. They would hope by signing it to improve the prospects of Bonn's east- ern policies. The majority of CDU/CSU leaders, how- ever, oppose the NPT, basically on the ground that it would relegate Bonn to permanent inferior status. Both political parties wish that the whole issue of the NPT did not exist, and Bonn is unlikely to sign the NPT at least until after the national elections next October. Whether the West Germans will sign thereafter is uncertain. It will depend on such things as the outcome of the October elections, de- velopments in West German - Soviet relations, and the amount of pressure brought to bear by the US and other states. Some uncertainties also attend the NPT's pros- pects in Japan and Australia. Japanese leaders basically support it, but conservative opposition has increased during the past year. The Japanese government probably will move to sign after US DISARMAMENT AND MISCELLANEOUS 2 Volume VII - Section I Approved For Release 2000/05/ ,R,DP791301737AO02400010001-4 Approved For Release 2000/05/4-Cf.*DP79B01737A002400010001-4 ratification, but can be expected to wait a dig- nified period to avoid appearing overly responsive 25X6 25X6 As for Australia, some evidence suggests that t e government may now be favorably inclined toward the treaty, but Prime Min- ister Gorton indicated last October that he would not sign it. Many Australians foresee a long-term Chinese threat in their part of the world. While continuing to pin their security on close alliance with the US, they are unwilling to renounce nuclear weapons permanently. In any case, Gorton probably will take no immediate action. Some comment should be made on a few of the other nations which have not signed the NPT. Pakis- tan will not sign unless India does. South-Africa, an important uranium producer, could eventually pro- duce nuclear weapons, though not within five years. It probably wants to keep the option open, though for the foreseeable future the military value of nuclear weapons in the African context would be small. Semi-isolated in world councils and facing a hostile black Africa, South Africa might seek a nuclear capability more for its political impact than for its military usefulness. Spain and Portugal will both probably try to use the NPT to get political concessions on other issues. Spain already has linked its sig- nature to the Gibraltar dispute with Great Britain and to the renegotiation of US base rights. Por- tugal will probably use the NPT in seeking support for its African policies and a favorable agreement on US bases in the Azores. The Portuguese have also argued that more effective security guarantees should be given non-nuclear states before they sign the treaty. DISARMAMENT AND MISCELLANEOUS 3 Volume VII - Section I Approved For Release 2000/05/1gE(gj4DP79B01737A002400010001-4 Approved For Release 2000/05/3i4DP79B01737A002400010001-4 In Latin America, Brazil will probably con- tinue to reject the NPT. The government argues that the treaty, over the long run, would impede Brazil's progress toward great-power status. It also refuses to renounce the right to develop nu- clear explosive devices for peaceful purposes. Finally, like some other states, Brazil alleges that the security guarantees associated with the treaty are inadequate, and that the US and USSR have not committed themselves sufficiently to limit and re- duce their own nuclear arsenals. Argentina, for reasons of prestige, probably will not sign the NPT unless Brazil does, and Chile will also follow Brazil's lead. Most of the other states which have not signed are insignificant. Collectively, however, their ratifications could be important in bringing the treaty into effect. Some have followed Peking's lead in rejecting the NPT (Albania and probably Tanzania). A number of states in Africa with close ties to Paris have followed the French lead. Some former colonial areas have not signed simply to show their independence of all great powers. Some prob- ably have just not gotten around to signing. Levers which might be used: The principal levers available to persuade nations to sign the NPT are diplomatic pressure and the weight of world opinion, together with the inherent leverage of the treaty as more nations accede to it. World opinion itself would not decisively influence any government's de- cision on the NPT, but it could contribute to the isolation of foot-draggers if all but a few nations had ratified. The effectiveness of diplomatic pres- sure from the USSR or US would depend on their over- all political influence in a given country. Of the DISARMAMENT AND MISCELLANEOUS 4 Volume VII - Section I Approved For Release 2000/05/% iDP79B01737A002400010001-4 Approved For Release 2000/01AJRDP79B01737A002400010001-4 1. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION 8., (continued) five major, holdouts against the NPT, the US has a 25X6 lmr"gl de ree of influence in four 25X6 Both the US and the USSR have a mo est amount of political influ- ence with the other holdout, India. Neither the US nor the USSR, however, could dictate a decision on the NPT to these nations. Even if the major powers were willing to employ drastic sanctions, the results might be counter- productive. Ending economic aid to India, for example, or cutting off monetary remittances from US citizens to Israel, could conceivably bring these nations to heel on the NPT, though we doubt it. There are potential inducements which might be effective in various countries. In the long run, the treaty itself offers some internal leverage. If all major suppliers of uranium and nuclear equip- ment accepted the NPT, holdouts would face a drying up of their foreign sources of supply, since signa- tories are obliged to refrain from supplying mater- ials except under safeguards. Both West Germany and Japan are anxious to gain admission to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee. In addition, the Ger- mans would like to have the US intercede on their behalf to gain Moscow's renunciation of its claim to intervention rights, and to achieve progress to- ward a West German - Soviet Non-Use of Force agree- ment. Aggressive US sponsorship of these causes probably would improve German and Japanese attitudes toward the treaty. But heavy US pressure--as op- posed to inducements--would be regarded as interfer- ence in internal affairs, and would probably strengthen political forces which are less well disposed to the US than the present governments. DISARMAMENT AND MISCELLANEOUS Volume VII - Section I Approved For Release 2000/05/1$EdA P79B01737A002400010001-4 Approved For Release 2000/05/1 %ECIlk bP79B01737A002400010001-4 NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION 8. (continued) How Strong Is Soviet Interest? Soviet in- terest is greatest in having West Germany sign the treaty, and in assuring that Germany never again becomes a major military power. When the USSR be- gan negotiating the NPT, it probably was not seri- ously concerned about other potential nuclear pow- ers. The Soviets now do show more concern about these others, and at the least probably believe that West Germany will be under more pressure to accept the NPT if other near-nuclear powers sign it. 25X6 If Nations Are Coerced Into Signing...? 25X6 As indicated above, In is probably could not be coerced into signing the NPT. In effect, the US probably has no-.feasible means of preventing these nations from acquiring nuclear weapons if they decide that vital national interest require them to do so. 25X6 25X6 25X6 DISARMAMENT AND MISCELLANEOUS 6 Volume VII - Section I Approved For Release 2000/05/'_rRDP79B01737A002400010001-4 Approved For Release 2000/05/if-X'kDP79B01737A002400010001-4 Ie NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION 25X6 Among the technically advanced countries that sign, as well as the less advanced states, there will be great interest in any progress among the nuclear powers toward the limitation or reduc- tion of existing nuclear arsenals. Any progress in these areas would strengthen the commitments of NPT signatories to remain non-nuclear. Over a five- year period, it might substantially enhance the prospects for gaining broader adherence to the treaty. DISARMAMENT AND MISCELLANEOUS 7 Volume VII - Section I Approved For Release 2000/05/' .~ftDP79B01737A002400010001-4 Approved For Release 2000/O5JRDP79B01737A002400010001-4 1. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION 9. Would the Soviet Union sign /the NPT/ first or simultaneously? The Soviet Union is not likely to ratify the NPT before the US does, but probably will do so shortly thereafter. The most recent authori- tative statement by Moscow--issued on 20 January --said that the USSR "fully shares" the view of those who favor the "most rapid entry into force" of the NPT. Some Soviet officials have intimated that Soviet ratification is linked to movement by West Germany on the treaty, but it is doubtful that Moscow will wish to be seen lagging behind the US. The ratification process will pose no problem in the USSR; it can be accomplished by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet without a meeting of the full body. Whenever the Soviet leadership decides to ratify, it can do so without delay. DISARMAMENT AND MISCELLANEOUS Volume VII - Section I Approved For Release 2000/05/~? ai - DP79B01737A002400010001-4 Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79BO1737AO02400010001-4 STRATEGIC ARMS TALKS II Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79BO1737AO02400010001-4 Approved For Release 2000/05/ E A=R DP79BO1737A002400010001-4 No Foreign Dissem II. STRATEGIC ARMS TALKS 1. Why, and how strongly, does the Soviet lead- ership want strategic arms limitations talks with the US? What are the sources within the Soviet leadership and society of support for and opposi- tion to meaningful talks? We judge that the Soviet government has made a serious decision to enter strategic arms limita- tions talks with the United States, but that there is much internal opposition to such talks. The chief reason why the Soviet leaders de- cided to support such negotiations probably is their assessment of the present strategic relationship be- tween the US and the USSR. The Soviets are now en- gaged in the final stages of an ICBM buildup which by mid-1969 will give them rough numerical equality with the US ICBM force. They also have well under- way a program to build improved missle launching sub- marines similar to Polaris. We think that the So- viets probably were unwilling to countenance arms control negotiations before they achieved a rough balance with the US in strategic offensive missiles. The Soviets may doubt their ability to match the US over the whole range of technological develop- ment for advanced systems--MIRV, ABM, etc.--if they do choose to compete. They might also believe that continued delays in initiating the negotiations--while the US weapons testing is continuing--could impair their ability to negotiate effectively on future levels of deployment of advanced systems. Economic considerations undoubtedly are an- other major reason for Soviet interest in arms con- trol talks. Some Soviet leaders have expressed deep concern over the adverse effects of high levels of defense spending. The rate of growth of the Soviet economy has declined in the 1960's. DISARMAMENT AND MISCELLANEOUS Volume VII - Section II No Forei n Dissem Approved For Release 2000/051 ]k r RDP79B01737A002400010001-4 Approved For Release 200Q/05ftGNDP79B01737AO02400010001-4 NO Foreign Dissem II. STRATEGIC ARMS TALKS .1. (continued) An arms control agreement that would allow the Soviets to hold military expenditures near pre- sent levels would allow a continuation of the re- cent emphasis on improving the lot of the consumer and an acceleration of investment in industry. The cost of new strategic weapons programs to offset the effects of the planned improvements in US strategic forces could easily raise the level of total Soviet defense spending by one-fourth or more by the mid-1970's. This increase in spending would not provide the USSR with a strategic gain over the US and would not allow for major improvements in the general purpose forces. If future increases in mili- tary expenditures come mainly at the expense of in- vestment programs, prospects for future Soviet growth would be reduced. On the other hand, given the re- cent expansion. of consumer programs, the Soviet lead- ers may view the political cost of cutting back on the consumer as greater now then it has been in the past. While the Soviets have cogent incentives to arrive at an arms control agreement with the United States, they are certain to reject any solution which they believe might jeopardize their deterrent or one which would conflict with their claim to equality with the United States in strategic power. The So- viet leadership is interested not only in being as- sured of the USSR's security, but also in convincing the world that the Soviet Union is a global power in the same class as the United States. Soviet sen- sitivity on this point was reflected in Premier Kosygin's conversation with Senators Gore and Pell in November 1968. Kosygin denied the implication, DISARMAMENT AND MISCELLANEOUS 2 Volume VIT - Section II Approved For Release 2000/0 %B01737AO02400010001-4 Approved For Release 2000/05AQi1A-RDP79B01737A002400010001-4 No Foreign Dissem II. STRATEGIC ARMS TALKS 1. (continued) allegedly attributed to Secretary Rusk in a press account, that the USSR was more in need of arms control measures than the United States, and insisted that this subject was equally important to both sides. There are signs that the decision to discuss arms control was the product of a shaky consensus, and that misgivings remain on the part of some Soviet interest groups--especially certain elements within the military-industrial complex and the ideological apparatus--which do not agree with the decision, or at least have reservations about some aspect of the scope of the negotiations. Those individuals and agencies whose primary interests and responsibilities center on the state of the economy and consumer wel- fare probably form the backbone of support for arms. talks. This group may see in arms limitations re- lief from pressing economic problems as well as benefits to be derived from reduced tensions and better relations with the US. Regarding signs of opposition-, articles in the military press have shown a marked aversion to strategic arms talks. References to the subject have been handled differently than in the civilian media, to the point of editing selectively--and tenden- tiously--official Soviet statements on strategic arms talks. In addition, some military writers have implied that they are dissatisfied with this aspect of Soviet policy. These tendencies are no doubt due in large measure to professional interest, but since the regime is receptive to the military point of view, they cannot be discounted as influences on Soviet policy. There may be conflicts of interest even among those who favor arms control agreements with the DISARMAMENT AND MISCELLANEOUS 3 Volume VII - Section II Approved For Release 2W?.WRPJ b 79B01737AO02400010001-4 Approved For Release 2000/06140=RDP79BO1737AO02400010001-4 No Foreign Dissem II. STRATEGIC ARMS TALKS 1. (continued) United States. At stake are the considerable re- sources that could be shifted into other uses by such agreements. Investment and consumer interests are the main civilian competitors, and on the mili- tary side, research and development and general purpose forces also would like a share of these re- sources. Underlying the implied unity of the Soviet announcements to commence negotiations, therefore, are a variety of points of view, some incompatible. This suggests that future positions taken by the So- viets will be the product of compromises arrived at with difficulty. Additional References CIA/OSR, Soviet Initiatives on Arms Talks Since the Czechoslovak Crisis. IM 68-26, December '68 (S/NFD) SNIE 11-16-68, The Soviet Approach to Arms Control. November '68, (S/CD) CIA/OSR, Military and Economic Considerations Behind the Soviet Interest in Strategic Arms Talks, IM 68-20, July '68 (S/NFD) DISARMAMENT AND MISCELLANEOUS 4 Volume VII - Section II No Foreign Dissem Approved For Release 2000/0?/?~iRDP79BO1737AOO24OOO1OOO1-4 Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79BO1737AO02400010001-4 OTHER DISARMAMENT MATTERS III Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79BO1737AO02400010001-4 Approved For Release 2000/05/1Y1NDP79B01737A002400010001-4 No Foreign Dissem III. OTHER DISARMAMENT ITEMS 1. What is the status of the US-Soviet exchanges on "technical" violations of the test ban treaty? How significant and frequent have such violations been? US-Soviet exchanges which have taken place following "technical" violations of the limited test ban treaty have adhered to no firmly estab- lished pattern. (Such a violation occurs when an underground nuclear test vents and radioactive debris is carried beyond the borders of the testing nation.) Some of the diplomatic exchanges have been oral and others written. Some, but not all, have been publicized. Some violations have been officially ignored, probably for reasons related to the overall political climate, the relative magnitude of the violation, or the time elapsed between a test and the confirmation of data indi- cating a violation. In general, the US-Soviet exchanges on alleged violations appear to have been designed mainly to let the other side know that its activity had been monitored. For propaganda purposes, the Soviets have also labeled as "violations" nuclear accidents such as occurred in 1966 when a US mili- tary aircraft lost three nuclear bombs over the coast of Spain. The US officially requested information from the Soviets on possible Soviet violations resulting from one test in 1965 and two tests in 1966, and made these inquiries public. The US has also indicated informally to the Soviets that debris from other Soviet tests has been detected, even though official representations were not made. 25X1B 25X1 B The Soviets have conducted a total of underground nuclear tests-- since the 1963 treaty. They DISARMAMENT AND MISCELLANEOUS Volume VII - Section III No Foreign Dissem Approved For Release 2000/05WCPW RDP79B01737AO02400010001-4 Approved For Release 2000/05/1 P79B01737A002400010001-4 No Foreign Dissem III. OTHER DISARMAMENT ITEMS 25X1 B 25X1 B 25X1 B 25X6 VAW 25X6 Since the Limited Test Ban treaty entered into force in 1963, the US has detected radioactive debris definitely associ- ated with the venting of six Soviet underground tests. Moreover, debris has been detected that probably came from four other Soviet tests, and possibly from 18 others. The USSR has admitted that some of its tests vented, but has denied that the quantity of debris that leaked into the atmo- sphere was significant enough to cause fallout beyond the territorial limits of the Soviet Union. The USSR, in an aide-memoire of 21 January 1969, accused the US of a violation resulting from a nuclear explosion of 8 December 1968. Moscow's news media noted the test at the time, sequent press reatment suggests they do not intend to make a major issue of it. The US responded orally upon receipt of the demarche by disclaiming a violation, and observing that the US has not complained about some Soviet nuclear events from which radioactivity was detected. A written reply was promised. In general, US-Soviet diplomatic communi- cations on such incidents have been predicated on the assumption that reasonable precautions were taken and that, a violation was not intended. Some Soviet nuclear devices have been detonated inten- tionally at relatively shallow depths in connection with research on peaceful uses of nuclear explosions. With the present state of the art, it is very diffi- cult, despite rigorous preventive measures and care- ful planning and execution, to conduct these tests without releasing some radioactive debris into the atmosphere. There is no evidence, however, of a Soviet intention to flout the treaty or to seek to loosen its terms. DISARMAMENT AND MISCELLANEOUS Volume VII - Section III 2 25X6 Approved For Release 2008/ @jJ ' 9B01737A002400010001-4 Approved For Release 2000/05/M(J RDP79B01737A002400010001-4 No Foreign Dissem III. OTHER DISARMAMENT ITEMS 2. What is the status of US contacts with the USSR on problems of space, including matters pend- ing before the UN? In recent years, the USSR has shown grow- ing awareness of the advantages of cooperation with the US on some space matters. Agreement on joint projects has been hampered, however, by inhibitions against joint efforts with the US in any field, by the Soviet penchant for secrecy in areas where mili- tary and civilian affairs overlap, and in some cases by Soviet embarrassment over the relative inferior- ity of their own capabilities. Cooperation between the two states, however, was instrumental in achieving in 1967 the treaty on exploration and use of outer space, which among other things prohibits the stationing of weapons of mass destruction in outer space. Soviet-US collaboration also paved the way for an international agreement in 1968 on rescue and return of astronauts. This most recent accord, which grew out of the Outer Space Treaty, also established legal procedures for return- ing fallen space objects to the launching authority. Moscow showed sudden interest in negotiating in earnest on the assistance and return agreement in the early fall of 1967--about the same time that it made demarches to several states asking their assist- ance, if needed, to recover a Soviet space vehicle in the Indian Ocean area. Bilateral negotiations with the US subsequently went smoothly and at a rel- atively brisk pace. The Soviets offered a compro- mise to provide an article that would acknowledge the interests of regional organizations, thus help- ing to overcome objections raised by the European Space Research Organization. Remaining language dif- ficulties were resolved, and concerted US-Soviet DISARMAMENT AND MISCELLANEOUS 1 Volume VII - Section III No Foreign Dissem Approved For Release 2000/05/I PfDP79B01737AO02400010001-4 Approved For Release 2000/05/1 MFWP79B01737A002400010001-4 No Foreign Dissem efforts at the UN resulted in approval of the agree- ment in December 1967. Bilateral agreements on the exchange of weather satellite data date back to 1962. The first Soviet meteorological satellite to operate satis- factorily was not launched until June 1966, however, one year after the date date set for the actual ex- change of information. Moscow sent no data at all until September 1966, and transmitted only limited amounts to the US in 1967. In July of 1968, the USSR showed new inter- est in exchanging weather data, and an understanding was reached at talks between US and Soviet special- ists in Moscow for undertaking improvements on the Washington-Moscow high-speed weather link. The two sides recommended that each government increase the exchange of satellite and conventional weather data, and study the possibility of simultaneous facsimile/ teletype transmission pending installation of high- speed terminal equipment. The discussions were con- ducted in a friendly, cooperative atmosphere, and included briefings and tours of Soviet computer, com- munications and analysis centers and the terminal of the US-Soviet bilateral link. The quality of So- viet data still is less than satisfactory, although this is apparently for technical rather than politi- cal reasons. The Soviets have shown new signs of interest in the International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium (INTELSAT), and are sending an observer delegation to a conference of the 63-member organi- zation to be held in Washington in late February 1969. DISARMAMENT AND MISCEALLENOUS 2 Volume VII - Section III No Foreign Dissent Approved For Release 2000/05/12(C P79B01737A002400010001-4 Approved For Release 2000/05/WRDP79B01737A002400010001-4 No Foreign Dissem III. OTHER DISARMAMENT ITEMS In August of 1968, Moscow proposed a rival organi- zation, Intersputnik, whose members have equal voting power in contrast to the weighed voting system which assures US control of INTELSAT. Al- though a number of nations are critical of aspects of the INTELSAT agreement, particularly the voting provisions, Intersputnik does not offer serious competition for INTELSAT as a world-wide system be- cause of serious technical and economic disadvan- tages. To date only eight Communist states have joined Intersputnik and the enlistment of a signifi- cant number of non-Communist states is highly un- likely. The Soviets may try, however, to influence the forthcoming INTELSAT discussions in favor of a voting system more to their liking and a general loosening of US control. Whether or not Moscow will seriously seek to negotiate terms for membership in INTELSAT remains to be seen. Leading Soviet scientists have on occasion expressed interest in US-Soviet cooperation in the exploration of space. At a news conference follow- ing the January 1969 Soyuz-4 and Soyuz-5 space flights, the president of the Soviet Academy of Sciences said that the USSR has no objection to the idea. In 1967, a Soviet cosmonaut publicly plugged US-Soviet coopera- tive space ventures, and quoted Leonid Sedov--the dean of Soviet space scientists--who on three occa- sions that same year had publicly alluded to the bene- fits of joint efforts in manned space exploration. These sentiments are compatible with the of- ficial Soviet positions that the USSR does not op- pose space cooperation in principle. The scientists and cosmonauts are not policy-makers, however, and DISARMAMENT AND MISCELLANEOUS 3 Volume VII - Section III No Foreign Dissem Approved For Release 2000/05/' (+F DP79B01737A002400010001-4 Approved For Release 2000/05kI CC.t DP79B01737A002400010001-4 No Foreign Dissem III, OTHER DISARMAMENT ITEMS 2m (contznued) there is significant opposition--especially in mili- tary circles--to space cooperation with the US. The scientists are probably more aware of the high cost of space programs and the technical benefits to be derived from US space research. The prospect of gaining access to sophisticated Western technology is one of the reasons for Soviet collaboration with France in the space field. The imaginative idea of joint ventures into distant space has naturally commanded attention in the Western press, but there still is no indication that the Soviets have any answers to the long-intract- able problem of how to organize such cooperation. Those in the Soviet space community who have ex- pressed interest in the notion have made no specific proposals. In fact, they seem to regard prospects for agreement as remote, and have said that a "new international climate" would first have to be created. The Soviets nevertheless may believe that such hints about grand but distant perspectives may open the way for less ambitious efforts at international co- operation. NIE 11-1-67: The Soviet Space Program. 4 April 1968. (TS) CIA/OER, IM 69-12, Soviet International COMSAT Initia- tives and their Meaning for INTELSAT. 31 January 1969. (S/NFD) DISARMAMENT AND MISCELLANEOUS 4 Volume VII - Section III No Foreign Dissem Approved For Release 2000/05/1 CbP79B01737A002400010001-4 Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79BO1737AO02400010001-4 IV AID/MAP Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79BO1737AO02400010001-4 25X1 C Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79BO1737AO02400010001-4 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79BO1737AO02400010001-4 Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79BO1737AO02400010001-4 V FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY Approved For Release 2000/05/12 : CIA-RDP79BO1737AO02400010001-4 Approved For Release CONE IDENTIAL 79B0l 737A002400010001-4 V. FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY A. Balance of Payments The questions are not within CIA's responsi- bility. B. International Monetary System Questions I thru 5: not within CIA's respon- sibility. 6. What is the likelihood of renewed specu- lative attacks against the French franc, pound ster- ling, and/or other currencies and/or in favor of the Deutschemark, lira and/or other currencies? Sterling The end of sterling's extreme vulnerability to speculative attack is nowhere in sight. As in the recent past, it will be one of the first cur- rencies affected by strong disturbances anywhere in the foreign exchanges, whatever the proximate cause. Speculation against the pound might resume with almost any adverse economic news from Britain-- poor monthly trade figures, large-scale strikes, substantial wage settlements in key industries, sharp increases in price levels. There will be danger of a sterling crisis in the fall when statutory authority for much of the government's austerity program lapses. A san- guine outlook for the balance of payments depends upon continuation of the full austerity program. The present government, however, lacks the power to push an extension through parliament and is unlikely even to try. Thus, the balance of payments is un- likely to improve enough in the next year or two to remove the danger of a new crisis. In the face of heavy selling pressure, we believe the present gov- ernment would be inclined to let the pound float. DISARMAMENT AND MISCELLANEOUS Volume VII - Section V Approved For Release 2W65/1_2:CIA-RD679B01737A002400010001-4 Approved For Release 20 1QQM 1 I ERDR79BO1737AO02400010001-4 V. FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY B. 6. (continued) French Franc Present exchange controls make it more diffi- cult for Frenchmen to speculate against the franc. But speculative attacks by others will resume if widespread social unrest in France develops or if the present austerity program demonstrably fails. Thus far the austerity program has been reasonably effective. Its future success, however, will hinge to an important extent on the outcome of wage nego- tiations in key industries that begin in March. The mark remains undervalued. The firm position and indirect measures adopted by German authorities last November merely postponed the day of reckoning. Speculation in favor of the mark al- most certainly will resume at the first sign of serious weakness in the French franc, the pound, or the dollar. But German authorities are likely to resist strongly any pressure to revalue before fall elections. Once elections are over they may be less adamant, especially if inflationary pressures in the domestic economy are present when a wave of specu- lation hits the foreign exchanges. Italian Lira Heavy speculation in favor of the lira is not likely to develop in the near future. Although Italy has run substantial. payments surpluses since 1965, Italian monetary authorities are not apt to consider revaluation seriously in present domestic political circumstances. If speculation in favor of the lira should develop, it is not likely to last. long or significantly to affect the prices of other major currencies. DISARMAMENT AND MISCELLANEOUS Volume VII - Section V 2 Approved For Release 2001 ' D -F 9BO1737AO02400010001-4 Approved For Release 20 '2DUIDk-'RDW9BO1737A002400010001-4 V. FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY C. Trade The questions are not within CIA's respon- sibility. DISARMAMENT AND MISCELLANEOUS Volume VII - Section V 1 Approved For Release 20QJ/j /P?Df;K T9B01737A002400010001-4