REDRAFT OF PRM-11 AND COMMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79M00095A000100030023-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 30, 2007
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: February 17, 1977
• Content Type: MF

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ICS 77-2119
Deputy to the DCI for the
Intelligence Community
Director of Performance Evaluation
and Improvement
SUBJECT Redraft of PPM-11 and Comments
1. This proposed draft of PPM/NSC 11 attempts to do
three things:
a. It levies acomprehensive review including
most of the substance of the earlier (Hoskinson)
draft;
b. It separates in a suitable way what should
be separated, namely the management and performance
issues from the legal environment issues;
c. And, most important, it gives the DCI the
kind of central leadership role -- not dictatorial
role -- that he should have in this review.
2. There are several reasons why DCI leadership is
crucial: First, the key Community management issue is the
balance between responsibilities and authorities,. Numerous
past studies and directives, dominated by those who did not
have to implement them (including the Schlesinger study of
1971 and Executive Order 11905), dodged or fuzzed this
fundamental issue. They ended up giving the DCI responsibility
for rationalizing Community resource allocations that exceeded
his authority or power to achieve in an effective and conven-
ient way. This is not to say that the Executive Order was a
misstep or that working with it is impossible. It is just
very difficult, and probably unnecessarily difficult, to
achieve its objectives with the powers it provides. The
essential point is this: People who do not have to bear
NSC Review Completed.
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the responsibility for a management result almost always
underestimate the problems of achieving them through vague,
collegial, committee-like instruments.
3. The second reason why the DCI should be put in
charge is that such a role at this time is crucial for his
image, his reputation, his standing as the man to whom the
President looks for wise and-fair stewardship of US national
intelligence affairs. After all the President's talk about
fully relying on his senior officers to manage in their
spheres of responsibility, not putting the DCI in charge
would prejudge the effective outcome of the review, whatever
the specific decisions resulting turned out to be. It would
say, in effect, the President does not really want the DCI
to manage the national. intelligence community.
4. There are several important reasons why it is possible
for DCI leadership of the major portion of this review to be
fair and balanced. First, as this draft does, the President
can outright tell him to take full'account of all options,
and all agencies' views of them. Now, if these words are not
credible, it is not the DCI who has a problem but the President
who has a problem. Moreover, there is no practical way the
DCI can so cook the boos that the Secretary of Defense cannc-.
have his full day in court with all the arguments raised up
to him from his vast domain.
5. Second, I recall that Secretary Brown reportedly
told you and Mr. Knoche that the DCI should take the lead
in this review. This ought to take some of the wind out of
the argument that Defense will never go along with DCI
leadership.
6. Third -- and this argument gets close to hitting
below the belt, but I believe it still is true -- the
Department of Defense is not necessarily the best judge of
its own best interest in intelligence management matters.
With all the responsibility and all the power, what has the
Department of Defense done to rationalize the so-called
national-tactical interface, to make the Defense Intelligence
Agency and the Service intelligence elements effectively
meet the many intelligence needs of the departmcnn t, to
examine fully the pros and cons of and find
a proper place in the budget for it. With all its many,
more important, and conflicting concerns, Department of
Defense management simply has not had much time for
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effectively managing those intelligence activities it fully
controls. Why have all the studies on intelligence resource
management looked, not to the Secretary of Defense, who owns
80 percent of them, but to the DCI to make sense of it all?
Not just because he is independent, but because intelligence
is his full- time job; he has no other.
7. Following are some additional comments on specific
points of the proposed PRMM.to help explain, justify, and, if
necessary, fall back gracefully:
Note 1, Page 1: It may be desirable for the
President to sign this PRIM, saying "I direct . "
I have seen one draft PRM (#10) which would carry his
signature. I called Hoskinson to ask, in passing, if
they have any ground rules on which ones he personally
signs. Evidently they do not. But it would surely
add to the credibility of the instructions..
Note 2, Page 1: The charge to the SCC, headed by
Brzezinski, is more than a mere bone. It tells the
senior working level of the NSC machinery, in effect,
to take seriously the task of looking at its intelli-
gence needs and developing some -eliable way of
conveying them. In part it would be a forced learning
process for the new team, but it would also, early in
the review, help to set the ultimate substantive
goals and priorities of intelligence management that
the DCI is supposed to pursue.
Note 3, Page 1: This review of past performance
could rely on recent studies such as the IC Staff
Semiannual Review for the NSC -- which the previous
Administration never really came to grips with. And
we could feed the second semiannual review into this
SCC effort with, hopefully, more substantial results.
Note 4, Page 2: This look at mechanisms is
intended to embrace such functions as OAG, ,7SAG,
and it could also include PFIAB.
Note 5, Page 2: Here is the crunch! The DCI is
indicated as the chairman of the PRC for the main body
of this review. The arguments for this are in the
opening paragraphs of this memorandum. But we could
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retain the essence of DCI leadership if the chairman
were Brzezinski while the DCI was charged to run the
study effort and personally report the results to
the PRC. If we went this way, we would have to get
a clear understanding from Brzezinski that, while
chairing the review meeting of the PRC, he would not
try to organize the study himself or micro-manage
the proceedings. In any case, a senior NSC staffer
should be represented in the actual working machinery
that produces the study.
Note 6, Page ? and 4: The language of the
Hoskinson draft PRM makes it clear that the review
should not only look at the DCI's management responsi-
bilities under present or alternative structures, nor
merely at areas outside his responsibilities that
directly affect them, but also at how purely
departmental intelligence management meets departmental
needs. This is supposed to be a national level review
of all US foreign intelligence. Thus, for example,
the role and control of foreign service reporting is
a germane topic.
Not---7, Page 4: We include counterintelligence as
a major management issue for the DCI. We dropped a
bullet on covert action, but it would naturally be
addressed under the first bullet on DCI roles.
Note 8, Page 4: This omnibus item on intelligence
planning, evaluation, and improvement is there in part
because Hoskinson told me the study had to go beyond
responsibilities, powers, and organization; it had to
say something about how, in fact, the DCI would seek
to optimize performance and resource allocations; by
what tools, methods, and suborganizations. Clearly
this would get into, among other things, his staff
organizations, the role and use of NFIB, data bases
and management techniques for controlling resources,
zero-base budgeting, the committee structure, etc.
Note 9, Page 5: Assigning the job on the legal
environment to the Attorney General seems proper for
a number of reasons. He is the lawyer of the President
and the Executive Branch. In the matter of legal
powers, the DCI might be seen to have credibility
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a r, ~_ n i 'X
problems in an area of greater public concern than
resource management. Putting the Attorney General
role here would force him, and the subordinates he
.puts on this job, to take seriously the national
security imperatives of the subject, which his pred-
ecessor seems to have failed to do. "Close collabora-
tion with the DCI" would assure that the DCI's interests
get a fair shake. Incidentally, if Brzezinski is
designated to chair the PRC on intelligence management,
it might be wise that he also chair the one on intelli-
gence law, with the Attorney General and the DCI as
chief rapporteurs. Putting the Attorney General in
the chair here would only further emphasize the DCI's
less exalted role on the second task.
8. Ultimately, I would expect the President: to chair a
full meeting of the NSC to make decisions on the whole package.
How the PRM process leads from study tasking to Presidential
decision, in a procedural. sense, is still somewhat confused.
Those on the NSC Staff whom I have asked about. this say they
know it is confused now but that it will get sorted out in
time. They protest that preoccupation with procedures now
is the hallmPrk of a petty bureaucrat. I wonder how long it
will take them to learn that confused procedures. usually
reveal weak leadership and tend to leave the petty bureaucrats
in charge.
Attachment:
17 February 1977 Draft of
PRM/NSC 11
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D/OPEI:
-- D/DCI/IC
- EO/ICS and
D/OPBD
D/OPP
AD/DCI/IC
D/OPEI Chrono
(2/17/77)
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SECRET
DRAFT
17 February 1977
Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC-11
TO The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
ALSO: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Attorney General
Director, Office of Management and Budget
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Administrator, Energy Research and
Development Administration
SUBJECT: The Structure, Missions, and Functions of United
States Foreign Intelligence
The President) has directed a comprehensive review of the
structure, missions, and functions of United States foreign
intelligence. This review shall be conducted in three parts:
1. The NSC Special Coordination Committee2 shall
examine the needs for intelligence on the part
of the President, the NSC, senior departmental
decisionmakers, policy'and force planners, mili-
tary commanders, diplomatic representatives, and Congress.
Specifically, this part of the review shall examine:
.,Recent Intelligence Community performance in
meeting such needs.3
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-- The scope and quality of intelligence support
policymakers can be expected to need in the
near and mid-term (out five years), and the
expected priority among major substantive
areas;
Present and possible alternative mechanisms
for expressing intelligence needs to producing
organizations.
-- Present and possible alternative mechanisms by
which policymakers influence intelligence
operations and intelligence support to crisis
management.4
This portion of the review shall be completed by
15 May 1977.
2. Under the Chairmanship of the Director of Central
Intelligence5, the Policy Review Committee (PRC)
shall review the structure and missions of United
States foreign intelligence organizations and
management entities. The basis for this review
shall be a comprehensive report prepared under the
auspices of the Director of Central Intelligence
with participation of all agencies of the Intelligence
Community. This report shall examine, make appropriate
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recommendations on, and identify all major differing
views regarding the following issues:
-- The responsibilities and powers of the Director
of Central Intelligence as principal foreign
intelligence advisor to the President, chief_
authority in the production of national intelli-
gence, and senior manager of the National Foreign
Intelligence Program and Budget.
-- The organizational structure of and lines of
command authority within the United States
Intelligence Community, particularly as between
the Director of Central Intelligence and
departmental Secretaries.
-- The composition and scope of the National Foreign
Intelligence Program (NFIP) and budget, the process
of its. preparation, the process of its approval
by the President and Congress, and the relationship
of non-NFIP intelligence-related activities to the
NFIP process.
-- Departmental intelligence structures, their
adequacy in meeting departmental intelligence
needs, and their relationship to alternative
national intelligence management structures.6
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Mechanisms for planning, evaluating, and improving
Intelligence Community performance in rationally
tasking collection requirements on all sources,
processing and analyzing intelligence, and pro--
deicing needed intelligence, including warning
and crisis support.8
This report may examine any other matters essential to
the sound management of United States foreign intelli-
gence. It should present carefully prepared alternative
options for organizing the Intelligence Community. Such
options should address, but need not be limited to:
-- Preserving and improving present arrangements
under Executive Order 11905.
-- Adding to the line authority of the Director of
Central Intelligence over national intelligence
collection programs; for example, National
Security Agency and special reconnaissance
activities.
The management implications of increased support
to military operations on the part of national
intelligence systems and organizations, and of
the intelligence supplied to national decision-
makers by tactical military intelligence elements.
The effectiveness, orc{anization, and management
of United States counterintelligence activiti_es.7
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Nor
-- Separating the role of the Director of Central
Intelligence as Community manager from the role
of Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
-- Separating intelligence analysis and production
from all collection, operational, and intelligence-
related research and development activities.
This report shall be completed by 15 July 1977.
3. Under the chairmanship of the Attorney General9, the
NSC-PRC shall conduct a thorough review of and make
recommendations pertaining to the legal environment
in which United States foreign intelligence functions.
With the close collaboration of the Director of Central
Intelligence, the Attorney General shall prepare a
report that:
-- Assesses the current legislation, legal guidelines,
and oversight mechanisms governing foreign intelli-
gence operations;
-- Proposes regulations and legislation that assure
the effective conduct of foreign intelligence
and counterintelligence operations, the reliable
protection of intelligence sources and methods,
the effective oversight of intelligence operations
by proper Executive and Legislative authorities,
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and the protection of the civil rights, privacy,
and the right to information of the American
people.
This report shall be completed by 15 July 1977.
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