NOTE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79M00095A000100050011-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 2, 2005
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: March 24, 1977
• Content Type: NOTES

Approved FoQRelease 2005/02/14,: CIA-RDP79M000 000100050011-7
? INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF
24 March 1.977
Here are three paragraphs you
requested from me for your PRM-11
outline. They are pretty bare-bones
but can be expanded if necessary.
Please let me know if you need
Attachments:
As stated
INFORMATION
,4pproved For Release 2005/02/14.' CIA-RDP79M00095A000100050011-7
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 IAL
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III-A-3. Spokesman on operations
The DCI's role as spokesman on intelligence operations
within his responsibility as the President's foreign intelligence
advisor is exercised primarily through the mechanism of the
Special Coordination Committee (SCC). The SCC is the successor
to the Operations Advisory Group (OAG) and the earlier 40 Corn-
mittee, both of which were similar in purpose to the SCC. The
SCC is charged, inter alia, to deal with
oversight of sensitive intelligence activities, such as covert
action, which are undertaken on Presidential authority. The
SCC routinely reviews all peripheral reconnaissance operations,
overhead reconnaissance operations, and other sensitive, covert
or clandestine intelligence operations which require NSC-level
attention. The DCI is the sponsor or senior intelligence spokes-
man for all intelligence operations reviewed by the SCC. How-
ever, except for special and limited situations, the staff
support for the DCI in SCC matters is provided by CIA, and
the recommended positions are almost wholly representative of
CIA interests. Thus, the DCI position in support of specific
peripheral reconnaissance operations is based entirely on the
value to CIA of the data to be collected. Occasionally CIA
provides to the DCI comments on perceived political risks
entailed in reconnaissance operations, but normally the SCC
looks to State Department, Defense and JCS representatives
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 CONFIDENTIAL
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for risk assessments. Operational feasibility and the value
of collected intelligence from military reconnaissance operations
are also addressed by Do.D representatives. Normally, the DCI
is the operational spokesman only on CIA-proposed operations.
It seems appropriate to consider recognition of a broader
DCI role in all intelligence operations reviewed by the SCC
wherein the DCI would be the primary spokesman on :intelligence
value in satisfaction of requirements and the principal evalua-
tor of risk versus gain on all reconnaissance, sensitive,
covert and clandestine intelligence collection operations.
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 Approved FoQRelease 200Q /'1 PcL'lLicfl00OA000100050011-7
V-A. The DCI role as protector of sources and methods
Protection of sources and methods is one of the few DCI
responsibilities having a statutory basis. Despite the assignment
in law, however, the DCI has been provided with no means of
implementation or enforcement other than such rules and pro-
cedures as he may devise and promulgate. The greatest single
shortcoming of this situation is the complete lack of criminal
or civil. sanctions which can be applied to persons who violate
the procedures set forth by the DCI. Until this problem can
be rectified by further statutory enactment, there is little
or nothing additional that the DCI can do to enforce his current
responsibility for sources and methods protection.
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CONFIDENTIAL
 CONFIDENTIAL
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V-B. The DCI role as guarantor of propriety
The DCI has no unique responsibility or authority to be
the guarantor of propriety for the Intelligence Community. As
an appointed public official, he is sworn to uphold the Con-
stitution and to execute all duties of his office in a respon-
sible manner. As the head of the CIA, he is of course provided
with an Inspector General and the normal mechanisms for dis-
covery and investigation of improprieties within the CIA structure.
However, there is no existing or recognized structure or pro-
cedure whereby he can extend such authority beyond CIA into the
other elements of the Intelligence Community. His personal
integrity and his authoritative influence over other elements
of the Community represent the strongest means available to
guarantee propriety outside the CIA. Executive Order 11905
created the Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) for the purpose
of discovering and reporting on improprieties throughout the
Community, but the DCI has no responsibility to the IOB other
than to ensure cooperation and compliance by the CIA. The
absence of any sort of Community Inspector General and the
stipulation that Inspectors General of all Intelligence Com-
munity organizations should report discovered or suspected
improprieties directly to the IOB effectively removes from the
DCI any specific or directed role concerning improprieties
throughout the Community.
Approved For Release CMMMIT M00095A000100050011-7