ARGUMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79M00095A000200040008-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 9, 2005
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: June 14, 1977
• Content Type: MISC

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ARGUMENT
SECDEF/JCS responsibilities for determining the size, composition,
capabilities and disposition of U.S. armed forces and for effective
command and control of military operations require direct management and
operational control of the assets and capabilities which provide the
intelligence necessary to support those missions. Their placement within
an independent authority under the DCI would exacerbate competition
between "national" and "defense" intelligence requirements at the cost of
understanding of and responsiveness to defense establishment needs.
COUNTERPOINTS
--The DoD argument emphasizes the potential contradictions between
national and defense intelligence requirements while overlooking the much
larger area of commonality. Thus, the issue is framed in an either/or
context which greatly overstates the case.
--The principal argument for centralized management of intelligence
resources and operations is not the primacy of national over defense
or other particular requirements, but that the very existence of differing
requirements against the same set of resources and capabilities requires
centralized management so that optimum investment of funds and employment
of assets to meet varying needs may be assured.
--In short, the losses or deficiencies DoD perceives will come from
centralization are, in great measure, the result of the very distinction
between "national" and "defense" that it is championing. Resulting
fragmentation of planning, investment and management creates inefficiencies
which leave all claimants unsatisfied and preclude realization of the
synergistic benefits to be derived from approaching requirements and
capabilities on an integrated basis.
--The practice of categorizing intelligence collection capabilities
and the information they yield as "national," "defense," "departmental"
and "tactical" has created administrative and operational difficulties
far exceeding the utility of such distinctions. While they clearly
characterize some valid differences, there are larger areas of overlap
which have become counterproductive sources of confusion and contention.
Specifically:
o "national" collection systems can be major sources of
tactical support and vice versa;
o the definitional distinctions between "national" and
"defense" or "tactical" intelligence tend to disappear in
specific operational contexts, where all levels of government
are focused on the same problems and questions;
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o the uniqueness of "departmental" intelligence require-
ments is, to a significant extent, contradicted by parallel
demands by the White House and Congress for independent, multi-
lateral estimates and net assessments pertaining to foreign
threat, force posture determination, weapons systems require-
ments, etc. Thus, intelligence required by DoD to perform its
mission in these areas, is also required by such agencies as
CIA, State, ACDA, OMB, et al.
--In sum, the concept of "predominat need" as the-principal factor
in determining who should control what intelligence resources and capa-
bilities is not useful since valid and multiple claims to predominance
can exist and will vary from one operational context to another. In the
longer term, an intelligence system subdivided along such lines would
actually operate to the detriment of DoD's interests, insofar as the trend
toward concentrating the bulk of investment resources irr:so-called
"national" assets, e.g., will gradually increase the proportion
of Community assets to which defense intelligence" is an external
claimant, as opposed to a centralized system in which DoD would be a
powerful insider.
--Further, the technical aspects of intelligence operations, particularly
in the area of collection, have evolved to the point that centralized
operation is mandatory from the system design, technical management and
economics viewpoints. This is most obvious in overhead reconnaissance
and increasingly so in SIGINT. The real.issue, therefore, is not centrali-
zation per se, but priority of access to the services of centrally managed
and operated capabilities and participation in their design.
--In this regard, DoD's argument for autarky appears to reflect a
belief that, within a centrally operated system, it would become a client
or customer of the DCI and, therefore, lose the capability to meet its
intelligence requirements. However, this view ignores the fact that
defense intelligence needs will be the single largest consideration under
any system of management and that this will give DoD a strong management
voice that could increase to effective system control in wartime.
--Creation of a National intelligence authority does not mean that
the DCI will directly operate all intelligence assets. Clearly, where
capabilities are designed to support the missions of particular organi-
zations, delegation of operational management authority would be indicated.
Similarly, the existence of a national intelligence authority would impose
no inherent limitation on DoD's requirement for and access to intelligence
necessary to perform its mission. In circumstances where competition for
access to particular intelligence capabilities occurs, the interests of all
parties would be better served by a common arbiter obligated to consilder
the needs of all claimants rather than by a determination ultimately
based on resource ownership. Thus, DoD access to needed intelligence
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capabilities and support would improve within a centralized structure
because of integration with the capabilities of other agencies such as
the CIA. Where, in effect, all requirements are "national," there will
be greater facility for judging them on merit rather than by who controls
the underlying resources.
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