PROPOSED GUIDELINES FOR ADP DISASTER PREVENTION AND CONTINGENCY BACK-UP PLANNING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79M00096A000100060010-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 22, 2004
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: December 6, 1971
• Content Type: MF

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6 December 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, United States Intelligence Board
Security Committee
SUBJECT : Proposed Guidelines for ADP Disaster
Prevention and Contingency Back-up Planning
1. Attached for Security Committee approval are Proposed
Guidelines for ADP Disaster Prevention and Contingency Back-up
Planning. These guidelines have been developed by the Computer
Security Subcommittee In cooperation with the Support Staff of the
Intelligence Information Handling Committee,. and are designed for
dissemination to the USIB Community to assist member organizations
in addressing the problems of disaster prevention and contingency
planning in automatic data processing operations.
2. The proposed guidelines have been coordinated throughout
the USIB Community at the Subcommittee level with the exception
of the Atomic Energy Commission, which has not consistently
participated in recent CSS meetings. All other Subcommittee
members have concurred in the content of the proposed guidelines.
3. Since promulgation of this paper is to be co-sponsored
with the Intelligence Information Handling Committee, copies of
the attachment are being furnished the IHC Support Staff for IHC
dissemination at this time. After SECOM approval of the document,
it will be forwarded to the Chairman, .IHC for coordination with his
Committee.
"SIGNED"
I
Chairman
Computer Security Subcommittee
CCs Chief, IHC Support Staff w/att
STAT
Will? I
Excluded from automatic
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1. PURPOSE
C 3EC 1971
To provide basic guidance for the development of a
disaster prevention and contingency back-up program for
insuring the continuous computer processing and exchange of
vital information. To outline the major areas of concern and
list conditions and procedures necessary to insure the
protection of ADP assets. To list actions and procedures for
consideration in the formulation of a contingency plan.
H. APPROACH
Guidance set forth herein is based on the premise that
organizations relying heavily on computer system operations
should develop an integrated ADP Disaster Prevention and
Contingency Back-Up Program to minimize the severity and
effects of unforeseen computer system di_sas.ters. Such
planning should be a specific design factor integrated into
total system planning for each individual system and its
unique environment.
111. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
'Potential causes of disaster vary considerably in their
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probability of occurrence, degree of criticality and
feasibility of preventive and/or hack-up measures. Fires,
explosions', toxic fumes, nuclear weapon detonation and the
effects of natural disasters such as'earthquakes, hurricanes
and floods can be immediately disastrous resulting in the
death or serious Injury to personnel. The damage caused by
such events to computer equipment, the physical structure
housing the system, and the storage media may be disastrous
for an extended period of time depending upon resource
recovery capabilities. Other disruptive events such as
outages of electric power or air conditioning, the loss of
telecommunications facilities or the erasure of vital
information from magnetic 'storage media are not likely to be
as serious because back-up measures can be provided.
Although positive security actions and procedures can reduce
the effects of riots, theft, sabotage and vandalism, these
events can occur and result in disastrous operating
consequences.
IV. DISASTER ANALYSIS
A disaster includes any incident or event which results
in a critical disruption of the computer operations.
Rescheduling of work loads according to user priority may be
required depending upon the allowable delay of the most
critical user processing requirements. Processing priorities
may also he required if the disruption results in partial
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operability of the system. The disruption can reach major
proportions rendering the system inoperable for a prolonged
period of time and requiring movement of highest priority
processing to an alternate computer site.
The emergency or back-up actions needed to restore the
capabilities of a computer system after a disaster has
occurred should be proportionate to the critical effects of
that disaster. These actions may be identified through
consideration of at least the following:
1. The event, cause or condition creating the disruption;
2. The capability to restore the system;
3. The total period of time the system is expected to be
nonoperational;
.4. The tolerable time-limits of system inactivity based
on user requirements and dependent upon the type of system;
5. The feasibility of a degraded mode of system operation
whereby critical processing could continue; and
6. The availability of an alternate system capable of
assuming the critical processing requirements for a
specified period of time.
V. MAJOR AREAS OF CONCERN AND PREVENTIVE MEASURES
The major areas of concern involve the protection of
assets required for computer operation. The protection of
AC)P assets requires the Implementation of various measures
as part of a disaster prevention program. Security and
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computer personnel should be alert to the possibility that a
disruption in computer activity may be deliberate rather
than accidental and should investigate any situation where
such evidence exists. Although the configuration of computer
systems and the physical environment of computer centers
vary, the following areas are applicable to all systems:
1. System Hardware: The mechanical, electronic,
magnetic and electrical components of a computer system.
a. Maintenance: Normal maintenance contracts with
equipment vendors represent the initial preventive measure
against a potentially serious disruption of operations.
b. Engineering Support: Technical support should be
available on a 24 hour on-site basis if the computer center
requires such support. Back-up . of critical hardware
components should be provided by the equipment vendor
on-site or in a readily accessible location.
c. Hardware Security: The implementation of measures
such as memory protection and user/executive modes of
operation is recommended to insure protection of user data
sets.
2. System Software: Computer programs and procedures
including system and user programs.
a. Testing a New Installation: Duplicate programs
should be run on both the current and proposed system so
that the data can be compared. If duplicate testing is not
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feasible, a test deck should be used to check the system's
logic.
b. Program Changes and Testing: Extensive program
debugging is recommended to reduce the number of disruptions
caused by software errors. Any request for a program change
should be submitted in writing and the action authorized
only by a responsible manager. The. number of persons
authorized to make changes in operating programs should be
limited. Program testing should be subject to review by
authorized personnel and not conducted solely by the person
who wrote the program.
c. Software Security: Software security measures such
as user identification and authorization should be used to
reduce the possibility of unauthorized personnel accessing
the system.
3. System Operational Personnel: The individuals whose
primary duties are concerned with the operation of the
computer system.
a. Selection of Key Personnel: Key personnel
designated to continue the operation of a computer system
should be briefed and provided written guidance as to their
responsibilities and duties in the event of a disaster.
b. Training of Key Personnel: Training programs
should be developed which stress the proper handling and
maintenance of computer system components. Key personnel
should he broadly cross-trained in the event that certain
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key personnel should be unable to respond to an emergency
situation.
c.'Personnel Security: Computer personnel, visitors
and users constitute a theft and/or'sabotare threat to the
computer center. Restrictions on 'the number of people
allowed unescorted access and on the areas to which they
have access are recommended.
4. System Environment: The computer facility,
supporting utilities and operational posture.
a. Facility (General): The facility housing a
computer system should be constructed of fire resistant
building materials and equipped with appropriate smoke
detection, heat sensing and fire fighting devices. Periodic
safety checks of such devices for their operational
capability is encouraged. The use of the FPMR and the
National Fire Code volume 5, section 75 is recommended in
the construction of computer facilities. Consideration
should be given to maximum physical protection against the
potentially catastrophic effects of natural disasters
(hurricanes, earthquakes and floods) as well as conventional
and nuclear weapons.
b. Auxiliary Power and Air Conditioning:
Malfunctions and failures of electric power and/or air
conditioning are two of the major causes of disaster
affecting a computer system. Provisions should be made for
the use of an independent back-up power source as well as
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providing for immediate repair or replacement of air
conditioning equipment. Consideration of line monitors
and/or overvoltage protectors to prevent damage from power
failure and power surges is recommended. Security controls
should be applied to reduce the possibility of willful or
inadvertent damage to the electrical and air conditioning
equipments.
c. Physical Security and Control: Access to the
facility housing the system by other than authorized
personnel should be prohibited. The mechanisms installed to
enhance the security of the computer system area should be
controlled by personnel designated as responsible for their
maintenance and integrity. All procedures relating to
facility control should be in writing and made available to
assigned personnel.
5. Data Files: Storage areas for magnetic storage media
should be located outside the main computer area, preferably
in a vault or secure area depending upon security
considerations. Proper temperature and humidity should be
maintained and cleanliness restrictions should be observed.
All appropriate executive programs, system documentation,
operation manuals, etc., required for the computerized
processing of information should be identified, duplicated,
and safely stored. Security procedures should be installed
to prevent unauthorized personnel from removing files such
as magnetic tapes from the computer center.
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6. Communication Lines: Requirements for protecting
communication lines will vary depending upon the existence
and location of remote terminals. The communication links
from the central processor to the remote consoles are
vulnerable to crosstalk, electromagnetic radiation and
wiretaps. Unprotected data transmission should be
eliminated by use of cryptographic techniques or by physical
security measures. Back-up communication facilities should
be available to reduce the effect of failures in the
communication area.
7. Supplies: Supplies that are essential to computer
operations should he identified and accessibility to
back-up supplies should be provided.
V I . CONTINGENCY PLANNING
A manual or handbook detailing the computer center
methods of operation In the event of a disaster should be
prepared. It should specify the contingency or back-up
actions to be taken, individual responsibilities for these
actions and the follow-on investigative and reporting
requirements. The degree of implementation of the
contingency plan will depend upon the criticality of the
disaster.
Planning for possible emergencies should consider the
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recommendations listed below for disaster prevention and/or
coping with disasters which have occurred.
A. Prior Planning
1. Duplication and storage of vital programs,
documentation and data files in a readily accessible
location, preferably off-site.
2. A determination that the fire safety equipment and
emergency plans are adequate to minimize damage from smoke,
chemicals, water or fire.
3. A determination that adequate electrical power, air
conditioning equipment, and heating systems are available
for back-up use.
4. Training of computer personnel to insure that they
are aware of proper procedures for operating and protecting
equipment and are aware of their responsibilities in the
event of a disaster.
5. Up-to-date lists of emergency and support
organizations and personnel with whom contact may be
required. This may include medical centers, fire stations,
security services and equipment maintenance services.
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6. All data being processed should bear a priority of
processing order. Users should be alert to the need for
manual information processing in the event computer
processing is not available for low priority processing.
7. Copies of all disaster planning documentation should
be provided to each major functional area supporting the
organization. Specific roles and responsibilities of each
supporting function should be closely coordinated.
8. The contingency plan should he updated periodically
to reflect changes in equipment, user requirements,
personnel, and back-up computer compatibility and
.availability.
B. Major Disaster Planning- Contingency planning for a
major disaster which requires movement of computer
processing activities to an alternate site should also
consider the following recommendations:
1. Prior Identification of an alternate computer system
compatible with in-house systems that can be available if
.needed. Physical surrondings of the alternate system should
conform to required security and safety standards.
2. Identification and designation of personnel to
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manage and operate the alternate system should be documented
and updated as the need arises.
3. The computer operations at the alternate site should
be carefully documented. Among other issues, this document
should address such items as the transportation of alternate
site computer personnel, their responsibilities during
alternate site operations, the necessary security
considerations for the computer environment and the transfer
of classified data to the alternate site, and the priority
processing order of data.
4. Periodic operation of the alternate computer system
using the duplicate documentation, software and data files
by the designated alternate system personnel should be made.
Results should be compared with normal operations in order
for changes to be effected if required.
5. Instructions for the destruction of classified.-data'
and/or equipment under combat-emergency conditions where
such classified materials may be reasonably expected to fall
Into the possession of unauthorized persons.
C. Post Disaster Planning
1. A determination of the criticality of the disaster
considering anticipated time of system inoperability and
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user processing requirements.
2. Immediate notification to management and system
users of the estimated length of delay in operations to
allow the users to consider alternate operational methods.
3. Notification of the appropriate higher levels of
management if the time delay exceeds initial estimates.
4. Contact with the appropriate emergency and support
organizations depending upon the cause and extent of the
disaster.
5. A determination of the feasibility of continued
computer operation in a degraded mode.
6. Initiation of actions to move computer operations to
an alternate site if conditions warrant the move.
7. A determination that the disaster has not degraded
the essential system hardware, software or physical security
features and that procedural security controls remain in
effect.
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