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SECURITY IN THE CIA HISTORICAL PROGRAM

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79M00098A000100020002-7
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
12
Document Creation Date: 
December 20, 2016
Document Release Date: 
December 8, 2006
Sequence Number: 
2
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
September 8, 1971
Content Type: 
MF
File: 
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79M00098A000100020002-7.pdf463.55 KB
Body: 
Approved For Release 2006/12/08: CIA-RDP79M00098A000100020002-7 MEMORANDUM FOR: 7E19 Headquarters Attached are the revised security regula- tions governing the control of histories. Your directorate historical officer will answer questions and will supply the component historical officers with the necessary forms. STAT STAT Howard M. EHrmann Chief, CIA Historical Staff 15 Septembeg 1971 (DATE) FORM NO. i REPLACES FORM 10-101 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED. Approved For Release 2006/12/08: CIA-RDP79M00098A000100020002-7 Approved For Release 2006/12/08: CIA-R DP79M00098A000100020002-7 SECRET 8 September 1971 MEMORANDUM FOR: Historical Officers and Writers SUBJECT Security in the CIA Historical Program REFERENCE Memorandum from Executive Director- Comptroller to Deputy Directors, 27 July 1971 1. The maintenance of security has been and con- tinues to be a prime objective of the CIA Historical Program. In furtherance of this objective this memo- randum establishes procedures to place even greater emphasis on the security of the Program, in accordance with the policies stated by the Executive Director- Comptroller, referenced above. Under these procedures each component will continue to be responsible for safeguarding histories in progress and completed his- tories and for limiting access to such histories in accordance with the need to know. Historical officers and writers in each component will insure that measures are taken to comply with these objectives as provided below. 2. Semiannual Audits of Histories a. Historical officers of components within the Office and the Area of the DCI, of deputy directorates, and of components within directorates will insure that custodians for their components maintain a log of all histories in their custody (Form 3434), showing the title, the volume number, the control number, the copy number, and the loca- tion. Custodians will maintain the log on a cur- rent basis and enter therein the names and compo- nents of all persons granted access to such his- tories, together with the dates of access. b. In January and July of each year every historical officer of a component within a direc- torate will make a physical audit of all histories for which his component is responsible, to review Approved For Release 2006/12/OECIA-RDP79M00098A000100020002-7 Approved For Release 2006/12/08: CIA-RDP79M00098A000100020002-7 SECRET and verify the information shown in the custodial log. He will then transmit through his component to the historical officer of the directorate a xerox copy of the log, together with a statement certifying that the log has been inspected and is an accurate inventory of the histories for which the component is responsible (Form 3435). In the case of histories held within the office of a directorate, the historical officer of the direc- torate will similarly review, verify, and certify such information. In the Office and Area of the DCI this audit will be performed by the component historical officer who will make his certification to the Chief of the CIA Historical Staff. c. In order to review the effectiveness of these security procedures, the Chief and Deputy Chief of the CIA Historical Staff may as they deem necessary, also inspect the custodial logs. 3. Protection and Disposition of Draft Histories a. Historical writers will insure the security of histories in preparation and will take precautions that histories transmitted for review will be hand carried and receive Eyes Only handling. Each writer will maintain a record of all persons to whom he provides draft histories for review and coordination. (Form 3434 shall be used for this purpose.) b. Normally, all preliminary, partial, and final drafts will be destroyed when a history has been accepted into the CIA Historical Program and published in final form. All such drafts will be transmitted for destruction to the component his- torical officer, who will maintain a log of drafts destroyed (Form 3436), showing the title, author, component, copy number, and date of destruction. The historical officer of the component will trans- mit a xerox copy of the record of destruction for each draft destroyed during the semiannual reporting period to the appropriate person as described in Paragraph 2b above. SECRET Approved For Release 2006/12/08: CIA-RDP79M00098A000100020002-7 Approved For Release 2006/12/08: CIA-RDP79M00098A000100020002-7 SECRET c. When there is a valid requirement to preserve the draft of a completed history, the draft will be'registered and controlled as if it were an extra copy of the finished history. It will be included in the log and reported in the semiannual audit. 4. Extra Copies of Completed Histories The number of copies of a completed history will normally be determined by the degree of sensi- tivity of the history and the number of components which have participated in its preparation. Where more than four copies are required, permission to make them must be secured from the deputy director or his designee of the directorate responsible for preparing the history. The component historical officer will inform the Chief of the Historical Staff of the number of copies authorized and the extra copies will be registered in the log of com- pleted histories held by the component of origin. These extra copies will be inventoried in the semi- annual report. 5. Access to Completed Histories The intent of these instructions is to main- tain the security of draft and finished histories. Nothing in this memorandum is to be construed as diminishing the access to histories by personnel who have a need to know. It will continue to be Agency policy to encourage the use of histories consistent with their sensitivity and the need to know principle. Chief, CIA Historical Staff. Executive Director-Comptroller 7/ Approved For Release 2006/12/08`" C1J~U 79M00098AO00100020002-7 Approved For Release 2006/12/08: CIA-RDP79M00098AO00100020002-7 SECRET (When Filled In) CIA HISTORICAL PROGRAM Custodial Log ------------------ --- DIRECTORATE TITLE COMPONENT PROJECT NO. if draft VOLUME NO. PUBLICATION NO. (if published) LOCATION Building and room COPY NO. OF ACCESS RECORD NAME COMPONENT DATE OUT DATE BACK ------------ --- f OROUF t FORM ,,,.proved For Release 2006/1 2/085ECRA RDP79M00098A0pQ iJ -7 Approved For Release 2006/12/08: CIA-RDP79M00098A000100020002-7 SECRET (When Filled In) Semiannual Audit of Histories I certify that I have compared the attached inventory of histories with the actual holdings of the and find COMPONENT the inventory to be accurate except as stated below. EXCEPTIONS AND REMARKS FORM 3435 9-71 % GROUP I eeiiir~rior+ 'c Approved For Release 2006/12/08: CIA-RDP79M00098A000100020002-7 Approved For Release 2006/12/08: CIA-RDP79M00098A000100020002-7 SECRET (When Filled In) Record of Destruction of the Draft of a Published History I certify that I have destroyed draft copy(s) INDICATE NUMBER of the following published history and that to the best of my knowledge no other draft copies exist: Title of History Author Directorate Component Remarks FORM 9-, l 3436 rrII OROU~F o Lc~ , Approved For Release 2006/12/08: CIA-RDP79M00098A000100020002-7 Approved For Release 200 ;jIA-RDP79M00098A000100020002-7 27 July 1971 pORANDI FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence Deputy Director for Plans Deputy Director, for Science and Technology Deputy Director for Support SUBJECT : Security in the CIA Historical Program 1. Recently I reviewed with the Chief of the CIA Historical Staff, the security system in effect in the Agency Historical Program. Idsthhim e to examine curity Secuityp and to recommend additionalssestaff and wi wi measures if they seemed warranted. 2. Dr. Ehrmann describes the current system in the attached statement. He points out that a control system has been in effect from the beginning of the Program; that responsibility for safeguarding a origin history rests limited,candhishcoratrolled byathe; and that dissemi component of origin. 3 As a result of our review, it appears that there are three respects in which the security of the Historical Program can be strengthened. These are: a. Introduction of semi-annual audits of histories. In January ill Bead to the Chief of the t w and July of each year, each componen Historical Staff, through the component and directorate historical officers, (1) an inventory of all.histories for which the component h including all copies is responsible, showing the location of ea,, and drafts, and (2) a list of names of all readers, since .the last report, with their components. istration of all draft manuscripts. e g b. Destruction or r Normally all preliminary, partial, and final drafts of manuscripts will be destroyed when a history has been approved. If there is good reason for preserving a draft this may be done, provided that in each instance the draft it registered in the same way as an extra copy of a finished history and is included in the semi- annual audito SECdE sro?~r WW ken 1- MIE-l Approved For Release 2006/12/08: CIA-RDP79M00098A000100020002-7 Approved For Release 200612/08: CIA-RDP79M00098A000100020002-7 c. Extra copies of published histories. Where copies in excess of the four which arc now allowed are desired) permission to make them must be secured from the deputy director or his desirnce of the directorate of origin of the history. The Historical Staff must be notified, so that its records may be adjusted, and the extra copies must be rer;istered and entered in the list of completed histories held by the component of origin. These extra copies will be included in the semi-annual report. lr . I have asked the Chief of the Historical Staff to issue instructions to All historical officers and writers calling for a semi-annual inventory of all histories with a list of readers, the destruction or registration of all drafts and partial drafts, and authorization to produce extra copies of histories' which must also be registered. ' L. K. White Executive Director-Comptroller SURE" 12/08: Clt Approved For Release 2006/ RDP79M00098A0001.00020002-7 0.8 CIA-RDP79MOO098A000100020002-7 _..__:__. ; Approved For Release 2QO ! F yy E.;.. utive _, aetay The Security Syatem at Present in Effect in the CIA ll:i.rtnri.cn]. Program 1. A control system has been In effect from the beginning of the Program. Each history is assigned a project number on soon as the topic is accepted, and receives a publication nianbcr when it han been completed and approved. For histories in the Directorates for Intelli- gence, Science and Technology, and Support, the record is maintained by the Senior Editor of the Historical Staff. In the Directorate for Plans, the record is kept by the CS Control Officer of the Historical Staff. All published histories and those that have been completed in draft, but have not been found acceptable for publication, are entered in the Source Document Index by the Historical Staff Documents Officer. In addition, the four. Historical Off icerp of the Historical Staff keep detailed records of all projects in their directorates. 2. Responsibility for the safeguarding of a history while in draft form, and of all notes, outlines, and documents used in its preparations rests with the writer and the component in which the histor je being prduced. This responsibility passes to the Historical Staff only while a manuscript is undergoing review and revision by the Staff. Responsibility for the security of a published history rests with the custodian of that history, as also for the security of all extra copies, drafts, source documents, or backup materials in. its possession. 3. At least two copies of a history are made. The ribbon copy is given to the component in which the history was produced, and a xerox copy goes to the deputy director of the directorate of origin or his designee. In the Directorate for Intelligence and the Directorate for Support another xerox copy is frequently made, except in the case of quite sensitive histories. This second xerox copy is kept in the Secure Room of the Historical Staff, where it is available only to Chief, Deputy Chief, Senior Editor, Documents, Officer, and the historical officer of the directorate in which the history was produced. It is available to readers only on the authorization of the component or directorate of origin. In a few instances a third xerox copy may be made where two components were involved in the production of the-history. Ia. Dissemination of histories is quite limited. Control over a history rests with the component of origin and the directorate of which it is a part, either of which may grant permission to read-the history. The usual procedure for securi?hg access to a history is to ask permission of the historical officer of the component of origin. 5. All custodians of histories. are expected to maintain a record of their holdings and a circulation log of all readers, with titles of the histories read and the dates of readings At present the Clandestine sLGRiEI Approved For Release 2006/12/08: CIA-RDP79MOO098AO00100020002-7 Approved For Releases T : CIA-RDP79M00098A000100020002-7 Service alone of the directorates requires that an inventory be mode, annually, by all components of the histories which are in their possession, and a list on readers be submitted semi-annually by components. These reports are sent to the DDP Historical Officer. 6. Increasingly components want extra copies of histories, beyond the four that are now permitted, for training or briefing purposes, or to reach a wider audience in the belief that something valuable is to be gained from having the information and experience in a particular history more generally known. In all such cases permission to make extra copies must be secured from the deputy director of the directorate of origin or his designee, and the Historical, Staff must be informed. Chief, CIA Historical Staff 6EG6lEl" Approved For Release 2006/12/08: CIA-R.DP79M00098A000100020002-7 SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP TO NAME AND ADDRESS DATE INITIALS I USIB / S 2 4 5 6 ACTION DIRECT REPLY PREPARE REPLY APPROVAL DISPATCH RECOMMENDATION COMMENT FILE RETURN CONCURRENCE INFORMATION SIGNATURE Remarks : The Executive Director asked that I forward the attached to you since it will apply to any histories being written in your area. FOLD HERE TO RETU O SENDER FROM: NAME, ADDRESS A ONE NO. DATE O/Executive DirectorA 7D59 3Aug71 UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET FO OM NO. Use revious editions (40) Tppro V For Release 2006/12/08: CIA-RDP79M00098AO00100020002-7