VOLUME IV, SECTION B. VIETNAM BECOMES MAJOR PREOCCUPATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79M00098A000200120001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 61
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 3, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: REPORT

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B. Vietnam Becomes Major Preoccupation
55. During the 17 months of this period, developments
in Vietnam and Laos were given high priority attention by the USIB
with Board actions averaging nearly one each week. The problems
faced in these areas by the policy makers and the intelligence
community were of a critical nature in both the political and military
arenas. The assassination of President Diem and his brother on
1 November 1963 less than a month before the assassination of
President Kennedy ushered in a very unstable situation in the govern-
ment of South Vietnam-. Then on 4 August 1964 the attack by
North Vietnamese PT boats on U. S. destroyers in the Tonkin Gulf
led to the initiation of U. S. air attacks on North Vietnam under the
Southeast Asia Resolution of 10 August 1964. The serious nature and
consequences of U. S. policy decisions stemming from these and
other related developments required the continuous efforts of the
USIB in furnishing intelligence support to the President and the NSC.
56. More than one third of the USIB actions during this
period related specifically to Vietnam and Laos were concerned with
the preparation of Special National Intelligence Estimates, many of
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 which were requests from the policy makers for estimated
consequences and reactions to possible U. S. courses of action.
North Vietnamese violations involved nearly one-fourth of the
Board's actions. Another fourth of the USIB actions in this period
were concerned with COMOR reports on intelligence requirements
and collection using overhead reconnaissance to obtain essential
intelligence on Vietnam and Laos. CCPC also was directed to
prepare a series of studies on the overall resources and capabilities
for intelligence collection on these areas. In addition consideration
of the regular weekly Watch Reports resulted in a number of Board
requests for special reports by the committee or the National
Indications Center. Altogether the USIB during this period devoted
as much of its time and effort to Vietnam and Laos as it did to any
of the other major problems discussed in succeeding sections.
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57. The Board's initial actions on these areas were
stimulated by an oral report by the DCI at the 23 December 1963
meeting on the visit which he and Secretary of Defense McNamara
had made to South Vietnam (SVN). Mr. McCone pointed out that
there was no real organized government at that time in SVN, even
though it was ostensibly being run by the Military Revolutionary
Committee (MRC). The lack of an outstanding individual to lead
the
and/absence of administrative experience within the MRC were
ominous indicators, which made the political stability of the new
government subject to serious doubt. He noted that information
furnished the U. S. by SVN authorities during the past two years
had been inaccurate and misleading. Mr. McCone generally
concluded that the problem of overcoming the Vietcong (VC)
movement by the government of South Vietnam (GVN) was
formidable and difficult but not impossible. In his judgment, there
was more reason to doubt the outcome than to be optimistic, and
Secretary McNamara was even more pessimistic. 89/
58. At its 8 January meeting, USIB approved a proposal
by the Chairman of BNE for a full-dress estimate on North Vietnam
(DRV) for Board consideration in mid-February. 90/ On
5 February after discussing the Watch Report item on South Vietnam,
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Mr. McCone indicated great concern and the urgent need for a
new appraisal of, the current situation in Southeast Asia, while
concentrating on South Vietnam in view of the recent military
coup in which General Khanh ousted General Minh from power in
SVN. The Board agreed that a memorandum or SNIE should be
prepared on an urgent basis. 91/ These two actions were the
forerunner of USIB deliberations during this period leading to the
of twelve of the most significant estimates dealing with
Vietnam and Laos, which will be summarized below.
59. The urgent estimate on"Short-Term Prospects in
Southeast Asial'was approved by the Board on 12 February 1964.
The estimate noted that recent developments in that area raised
the question whether the situations in South Vietnam and Laos might
be on the verge of collapse. Even with current U. S. assistance it
v'asbelieved that, without marked improvement in the effectiveness
of the South Vietnamese Government and armed forces, SVN had
at best an even chance of withstanding the insurgency menace during the
next few weeks or months. If present trends in Laos were not checked,
there would be continued erosion of the non-Communist position
there. The situation might deteriorate rapidly, and could take a
turn which would further improve the VC position in SVN.
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Dramatic new Chinese Communist (ChiCom) intervention in
The
Vietnam or Laos was unlikely. /DRV was stepping up support to the
Pathet Lao (PL) and might do so for the VC, perhaps with increased
ChiCom material assistance. The Communist hope in SVN would
be sufficient quick victories before General Khanh's new govern-
ment could bring its military potential to bear, to undermine the
SVN will to resist, and to induce the U. S. to consider a negotiated
settlement its only feasible option. Developments elsewhere
in Southeast Asia, save in Cambodia, thus far had little impact
on those in Vietnam and Laos, but the outcome of the present war
in SVN would have a serious effect on the future willingness of
governments in Southeast Asia to adopt anti-Communist, rather than
neutralist, stances. 92/
60. The previously scheduled estimate orl'The Outlook for
North Vietnamuuwas amended and approved on 4 March, while a
Post-Mortem prepared with the estimate was withdrawn at that
time and a subsequent version approved on 15 April (which will be
discussed in later paragraphs on CCPC activities). This estimate
at
expressed the belief that DRV leaders looked/ Communist prospects
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with considerable confidence, probably feeling that the GVN
will to resist was waning and that the same might be true
of the U. S. The DRV might seek to speed this process by
stepping up VC tactics of pressure and terror, but would stop
short of introducing sizable DRV military units into SVN lest
this bring about a major U. S. military retaliation. In Laos,
the DRV would protect positions already achieved and support
PL efforts to erode the non-Communist position, but would seek
to avoid initiatives that would provoke U. S. military intervention.
DRV external successes had been achieved despite important
internal problems and vulnerabilities, including food shortages,
an
widespread apathy, and/economy overcommitted to heavy
industry at the expense of agriculture and heavily dependent on
Bloc aid. It was believed that the personal dominance of Ho Chi Minh
masked differences within the leadership which would be
sharpened after his death. These problems and vulnerabilities
did not threaten the regime's control at home nor materially
hamper its present or somewhat higher level of effort against
SVN and Laos. The DRV probably could not sustain large-scale
military involvement such as open invasion, without considerable
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increases in ChiCom or Soviet aid. The Sino-Soviet split posed
a painful dilemma to the DRV. While powerful motives
avoid
impelled it to/taking sides, efforts had moved the DRV progressively
closer to the Chinese position, but Hanoi probably did'try to
maintain as cordial relations with Moscow as circumstances
permitted. 93/
61. The next estimate was the first in which the USIB was
requested to estimate the probable consequences of certain U. S.
actions with respect to Vietnam and Laos. In this case the policy
makers provided assumptions regarding certain U. S. actions
against the DRV and Communist -held Laos with the objectives of
nducirig the DRV to bring about a major reduction of VC insur-
activity in SVN and to respect the 1962 "Geneva agree-
ment an Laos . These actions, primarily air and naval, would
begin with GVN (US-assisted) operations against the DRV and
Communist held Laos, and might subsequently involve overt U. S.
military actions. On a graduated scale of intensity, they would
range from reconnaissance, threats, cross-border operations,
and limited strikes on logistical targets supporting DRV efforts
in SVN and Laos; to strikes (if necessary) on a growing number
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of military and economic targets in the DRV. In the absence of
Communist China,
all-out attacks in the DRV or / the measures did not
involve attacks on population centers and resort to nuclear
weapons. These actions would be accompanied by such U. S.
moves as: (a) conveying the limited nature of U. S. intentions,
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(c) giving evidence of U. S. seriousness by readying and deploying
strong U. S. strike units - naval, air, and ground assault - to the
Western Pacific and South China Sea, (d) increased military
support including air defenses to SVN, and (e) acting diplomatically
to avert-a-new Geneva conference at least until these actions had
improved the U. S. bargaining position.
62. The Conclusions of this estimate began by noting
that, in response to U. S. preparatory and low-scale actions,
Hanoi would probably agitate world opinion against the U. S. ,
hoping for a new Geneva conference or UN action to result and
bring cessation of attacks. The DRV while taking precautionary
moves would order the VC and PL to refrain from dramatic new
attacks, and might reduce the level of insurrections for the moment.
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Communist China and the USSR would support these courses. The
Communist's line would probably be that a conference should
stabili, the situation in SVN and Laos, while their intention would
be to preserve Communist gains and assets in those countries and
resume insurrectionary campaigns later. If these initial responses did
riot succeed and attacks on DRV continued, the Communisiswere
likely to intensify political action efforts against the U. S. course,
intermittently
stepping up the tempo of insurrections in SVN and
Laos while 'seeking a negotiated settlement. If these tactics failed
and the attacks broadened with the DRV beginning to suffer
considerable destruction, Hanoi's leaders would ask themselves
whether these tactics were worth the destruction of their country.
While unable to set any odds for the DRV course at this juncture
the estimators inclined to the view that they would lower their
negotiating terms in the interest of preserving their regime,
expecting to be able to renew the insurrection at a later date.
There would nevertheless be a significant danger that the DRV
believing
would fight, / that the U. S. would still not undertake a major
ground war or that if it did-, it could ultimately be defeated by the
successful methods used against the French. Communist China
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not wish
almost certainly would/ to become involved. in hostilities with
U. S. forces, accordingly proceeding with caution while making
threatening gestures. There was probably not high risk of
ChiCom ground intervention unless major US/GVN ground units
moved into the DRV or Communist-held Northern Laos, or
possibly the Chinese had committed their air and subsequently
suffered attack on CCAF bases in China. The USSR would make
propaganda and political efforts in Hanoi's behalf and probably offer
weapons and air defense equipment, but would refrain from military
actions from the area and not provoke a crisis with the U. S. elsewhere.
The primary concern of the USSR would be to exert its influence for
a negotiated settlement without prejudicing future relations with Hanoi.
Finally it was estimated that clear-cut achievement of the stated U. S.
not
objectives would signify/that the Communist threat in Southeast Asia
removed, but simply that time had been gained for further
constructive action to deal with the threat. The U. S. commitment
itself would improve anti-Communist morale and the chances for
such action.iQithe other hand, to the degree that the consequences of
U. S. actions were ambiguous or unsuccessful, there would almost
certainly be a strong tendency for morale and discipline in SVN and
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Laos to deteriorate rapidly, perhaps more than if the U. S. had
not begun its intensified effort. Such deterioration would be
felt generally through non-Communist Asia. 94 / During the
rest of 1964 there were two other estimates on the situation within
South Vietnam, particularly with respect to continued deterioration.
The first estimate as of 8 September 1964 assessing the chances for
an established government in South Vietnam was prompted by a series
of unsettling changes in the government during August. After
discussing the political situation and appraising the politically
influential individuals and principal power factors in South Vietnam,
the estimate concluded that the present odds were against the
emergence of a stable government capable of effectively prosecuting
the war in SVN. Yet the situation was
not considered hopeless since, if a viable regime could evolve from the
present confusion, it might even gain strength from the release of long-
pent pressures and the sobering effect of the current crisis. Of the
men on the scene General Khanh probably had the best chance of
mustering sufficient support to restore a reasonably stable and
workable government. 95/ Five days after that estimate was approved,
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there was an abortive coup, following which General Khanh made
sweeping changes in the military command and established a
council to prepare a new constitution. In light of these new develop-
ments another SNIE was issued on 1 October 1964 which examined
the situation since early September and assessed its implications for
the U. S. Citing the continued deterioration, it noted that a coup by
disgruntled SVN military figures could occur at any time. In any case
it was believed that conditions favored a further decay of GVN will
and effectiveness. The likely pattern would be increasing defeatism,
paralysis of leadership, friction with Americans, exploration of
accommodation
possible lines of political with the other side, and a
general petering out of the war effort. It was considered possible
that the civilian government promised at the end of October could
improve GVN esprit and effectiveness, but based on present
indications that was unlikely. It was not believed that the Viet Cong
would make any early effort to seize power by force of arms, since
it was doubted that they had the capability for such a takeover. They
would however continue to exploit and encourage the trend toward
anarchy, looking for emergence of a neutralist coalition government
which they could dominate. 96-/
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63. On 9 October 1964 USIB approved another estimate in
response to a request by the policy makers for probable communist
reactions to certain possible US/GVN courses of action. This SNIE
began by assessing the current Communist view of the Indochina'
situation, stating that North Vietnam and Communist China
undoubtedly felt that present trends in SVN were much in their favor
since they anticipated a political vacuum forming which they could
soon fill with a "neutralist" coalition government dominated by pro-
Communist s. The Communists also saw a temporary stalemate in
Laos which they viewed as a secondary theater in which their major
concern was to keep the corridor and areas bordering DRVand China
in Communist hands. For these reasons it was believed that they were
willing for the time being to accept the Laos situation as it was. Both
there and in SVN they wished to avoid actions which might risk altering
the present apparently favorable campaign to undermine the GVN.
While seeking to exploit the deterioration in Saigon, they probably would
avoid actions unduly increasing the chances of major U. S. response
against DRV or Communist China. The estimate was almost certain
that both Hanoi and Peiping were anxious not to become involved in the'
kind of war in which the great weight of U. S. superior weaponry could
be brought against them-Moreover they could not be sure that the U. S.
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would not use nuclear weapons against them. It was estimated that
at present both Hanoi and Peiping would persist in support of the
VC even at the risk of limited U. S. retaliation against the DRV,
probably on the calculation that victory was near in the South and they
could through political couteraction prevent prolonged or expanded
U. S. attacks in the North. The limited U. S. response to the Tonkin
an
Gulf incident probably lessened Communist fear of/early major U. S.
move to bring _ the war to the North. On the other hand, natural
caution plus ideological bias made the Communistshighly suspicious of
the U. S. so that they had serious concern that the U. S. might carry the
war to the North and both had taken defensive measures for this
contingency. While further actions by Hanoi and Peiping would be based
on estimated U. S. intentions, it was possible that they could come to
believe that the SVN situation had becomeso fragile that an all-out VC
effort aided by increased personnel would topple the anti-Communist
GVN before the U. S. could take major action against the North.
Whether they nmd~ such an effort, they would continue to work for
a
their longstanding goal of/neutralist coalition government dominated by
Communists. The USSR was probably uneasy about this situation and,
if tensions increased,the Soviet interest would probably be to contain
or reduce a crisis.
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64. Following this overall assessment of the Communists'
viewpoint of this situation, this estimate then expressed the
Board's views on the specific U. S. courses of action and probable
responses. These courses ranged from resumption of destroyer
patrols or maritime operations off the DRV coast, to air action or
ground operations against infiltration associated targets in the
Lao panhandle and finally to a systematic pattern of gradually
intensifying U. S./GVN attacks against targets in the DRV itself,
including infiltration routes and military and economic targets. The
attacks would not include use of nuclear weapons or U. S. ground
forces. The program would be combined with communicated assurances
that U. S. objectives were confined to eliminating outside Communist
support and guidance of the VC and PL insurrections. On the first
two types of U.S. actions, the estimate generally anticipated a limited
Communist reaction unless an attack by the U. S. against bases in
Communist China were involved.: With respect to the intensified U. S.
courses of action, the estimated DRV and ChiCom reactions generally
corresponded to those contained in the previous May 1964 estimate
61 and 62
paragraphs/ above). If U. S. attacks continued despite the initial
Communist effort referred to in the previous estimate, two possible
types of reactions were presented. In the first case, the DRV might
calculate that the VC could stop their military attacks for the time
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beingand renew the insurrection at a later date. The DRV would then
press for a negotiated settlement in the South and an international
conference. They would not however make any meaningful concessions
such as effective international inspection of infiltration routes. In
the other case the Communistsmight embark on a bold course feeling
that the prize to be won by all out attacks on SVN outweighed any
damage suffered from U. S. attacks on the DRV.. The DRV would then
carry on the fight and send its armed forces on a large scale to Laos
and SVN. On balance, the estimate inclined toward the view that the
DRV would choose the first more conservative course on the grounds
they were only giving up a little time in return for avoiding damage to
their country and escaping the risk of further escalation. It was noted
however that there was substantial danger that the DRV might choose
a more aggressive course, and the State Member of USIB expressed a
dissenting view that the DRV would choose that course. The final
conclusion of the estimate was that, even if the intensified U. S.
actions succeeded in halting outside support to the VC,the
principal accomplishment would not be a solution to the larger
problem of South Vietnam, but rather the buying of time to continue
U. S. efforts to establish a viable regime in the South and to deal
with indigenous VC insurgency, 97 /
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65. The next SNIE on Vietnam and Laos was initiated as
a result of ominous developments reported to USIB in an oral briefing
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element of a North Vietnamese division from the DRV to an area in
Laos near the SVN border caused Mr. McCone to request the NIC to
compile and collate all indicators of Communist military actions in the
Southeast Asia area for study by the Board. 98/ USIB consideration
at its 22 January meeting of this NIC study together with a CIA
memorandum on Communist military posture and capabilities vis-a-vis
Southeast Asia resulted in (a) agreement that a SNIE be produced
urgently on the near-term prospects for Indochina, and (b) direction
for the preparation of a coordinated USIB intelligence memorandum based
on the above mentioned CIA memorandum. 99/ This memorandum
as approved by the Board on 26 January noted significant Communist
troop movements in Laos and although DRV forces there were rein-
forced each year after the rainy season, the force was further to the
South and the totals probably exceeded those in recent years. It
concluded that this deployment had improved Communist capability
to defend their position, and their capability to undertake offensive
operations and to supply reinforcements for the VC. 100/
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 66. The requested SNIE on "Communist Military Capabilities
and Near-Term Intentions in Laos and South Vietnam", was
approved by USIB at its 4 February 1965 meeting. The estimate
cited a gradual buildup over several years which had given ChiCom,
DRV, PL and VC forces potent military capabilities in and near
Laos and SVN. The purpose of these new deployments was believed
to be improvements of military capabilities where U. S. -supported
pressure had increased as in the Laos panhandle and in the air
over the DRV. The Communists also hoped to deter the U. S. from
expanding the war to the DRV. The deployments did not appear to
be a prelude to a major change in Communist military activity in
Laos or Vietnam such as an overt offensive. Increased air defense
introduction
capabilities, including the / of 50 fighters into the DRV and
strength
increased Chinese air / near the border, were believed to
U. S.
be responsive to a similar/buildup in the area. It was not believed
that the fighters would be used for surpi-ise raids against Laos or
northern SVN but would certainly be used against air strikes on the
DRV. The troop reinforcements from the DRV had increased
offensive capabilities for launching ground activity in Laos during
the dry season. While VC forces in SVN had been appreciably
augmented during the past year, they had not yet willingly engaged
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GVN regular units except when the VC outnumbered the GVN.
Unless GVN military capabilities deteriorated sharply the
chances were less than even that the next four or five months would
While
see prolonged 'offensives. /Hanoi and Peiping were somewhat less
apprehensive about possible U. S. attacks on the DRV, they were
believed to be determined to continue present policies in Laos and
SVN. While not yet ready for a general offensive, they would continue
support of insurrectionary forces and prepare to exploit any new
opportunities. The USSR was believed to be hoping to rebuild
influence in Hanoi and deter the U. S. from expanding hostilities,
while also hoping that the DRV would avoid actions provoking U. S.
reprisals or further escalation. It was noted however that this
estimate of what the Communists probably would do militarily
in the near-term falls far short of what they could do against
indigenous forces if the latter were not reinforced from the outside. 101/
67. At the same 4 February 1965 Board meeting the
USIB also approved a SNIE on "Short-Term Prospects in South
Vietnam", which assessed significant political forces and attitudes
there and estimated prospects for the next month or so, in light of
the recent removal of Premier< Huong by a cooperative arrangement
between the Buddhists under Tri Quang and the military under
General Khanh. Recent events in Saigon had underlined the fact that
and
apart from the Communists / U. S. presence, the military
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establishment and the Buddhists were the primary political
forces in SVN, with U. S. political leverage at a low point. Both
the military and the Buddhists suffered from political and
personal rivalries but, while power rested with the military, the
Buddhists were strong enough to make unworkable new political
arrangemertstheir leaders opposed. In assessing the near-term
prospects, it was noted that the present arrangements were
temporary and there was a faint chance in the ensuing weeks for
improved political stability. However tolerable stability could
only be achieved with a central government acceptable to the
majority of the important military and Buddhists, which was not
judged likely. Nor was it likely that aNational Assembly, if
convened in March, would devise a more permanent structure. If
both these contingencies were met, a stronger base might evolve
for prosecuting the counterinsurgency effort, but the odds on such
an outcome were considerably less than even. Extreme nationalist
sentiments, whipped up recently would cause considerable complications
for the U. S. effort. The chances had increased that nationalist
sentiments, together with war weariness and frustrations, could
take a pro-neutralist turn which the Communists would endeavor to
exploit. On the other hand a vigorous nationalism identified with an
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 indigenously devised government reflecting local political realities would
be an essential ingredient for any dynamic and successful counter-
insurgency effort. 102/ A week later the USIB considered an
estimate on Communist reactions, particularly Soviet reactions, to
a U. S. course of sustained air attacks on North Vietnam. This U. S.
course which started with a public declaration linking this policy to
the entire range of VC guerrilla and terrorists activity in SVN, made
clear that the US meant to go beyond specific repraisals for
"individual , VC action and to continue air attacks until the threat to
South Vietnam had been reduced to tolerable levels. It was believed that
the Soviet response to this US program would consist both of a
vigorous diplomatic and propaganda effort to bring the US to the
conference table, and the provision of military support to the DRV.
While this support would include anti-aircraft and radars the DRV
would also press for surface-to-air-missiles (SAMS) or advanced jet
fighters which would at present have to be installed and operated by
Soviet personnel. While the USSR would recognize the vulnerability
of missile sites and fighter bases to US attack, on balance the chances
were considered about even that the Soviets would provide some SA-Zs
ways
to the DRV, doing so in. / calculated to minimize the initial risks.
With these increased risks the USSR would seek means to curb the
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conflict both with threats against the US and attempts to mobilize
pressures to the US to negotiate. Elsewhere in the world Soviet
was
general policy would harden against the US, but it I unlikely that
they would deliberately provoke a major crises in some other area.
The new US policy would not lead Hanoi to restrain the VC, and it
would probably maintain the current intense levels of activity or even
step up the pressures in Laos. If the US persevered however and more
damage was inflicted on the DRV, the chances of reduced VC activity
would rise. China would be violent in castigating the new US course,
introducing
with a fair chance, at the outset of / limited 'Chinese ground
forces as volunteers into the DRV. Introduction by China of large-
scale ground force , combat units into the DRV or northern Laos
could be possible but unlikely in the early stages. If the US program
continued and inflicted severe damage on the DRV the chances of such
a movement would rise. It was thought that China, conscious of the danger
of major US attacks on its territory, probably would not take this step,
by all USIB Members except the State Member who believed that the
chance of such an introduction of Chinese ground forces into the DRV
or northern Laos was considerably higher. Only three airfields, all
in the northern part of the DRV,were fully capable of sustaining jet
fighter operations, which created difficulties in engaging US/GVN
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air attacks in the southe? ;part of the DRV. The Communistsalso
that
recognized/US retaliation against these air fields would be
feasible and effective. Despite these limited capabilities it was
estimated that the Communistsprobably would employ the fighters
based in North Vietnam against the US air attacks. If these air
attacks reached the northern DRV, it was believed China might
react over the DRV with fighters from its own bases, although the
State Member of USIB believed that China would probably react
in that manner. It was thought unlikely that the Communisiswould
react by launching air attacks against the SVN from the DRV or
Chinese bases. If US attacks inflicted severe damage and the US made
clear it would reduce or cease attacks in return for a sharp reduction
of VC activity in SVN, the DRV might order such a reduction, using
the ensuing calm to press for a negotiated cease-fire and international
conference, and at the same time use the respite for a major buildup
assisted by its allies. It was believed however that policy -coordination
involved
among the three Communist countries/would be chronically imperfect
at time s
and ocasionally erratic, so that their policy and reactions would/be
faltering and uncertain and at others bold to the point of rashness. 103 /
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68. The following week on 18 February 1965 the USIB issued
a Supplement to the above estimate which noted that US air attacks
on the DRV had added another ingredient to an already intricate and
not
complex situation, causing Communist reactions/to be the product
of the attacks alone, but of numerous other factors which could not
be estimated. Specifically this Supplement believed that DRV/VC
reaction to a few more air attacks like those of early February would
probably be to continue pressures in the south on the present scale,
although it was possible but not probable that they might refrain for
a week or two from direct attacks on US installations. The ChiComs
would almost certainly encourage the DRV in a more militant course,
but would not intervene in Vietnam with substantial military force at
declared
this stage. However, reaction to a / and sustained US
program of bombing in the North would probably be greeted in Hanoi
with mixed fellings of trepidation and skepticism. The Communists
would apply pressure to make the US desist, and probably threaten dire
consequencesto US interestsin the area. ChiCom threats would be more
If
insistent', and VC attacks would probably continue;/even despite these
pressures the US continued its attacks and damaged important
economic or military assets, The DRV might decide to intensify the
struggle, accepting the destructive consequences in the North in the
expectation of early victory in the South. It seemed to all of the USIB
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Members (except State) somewhat more likely that the DRV would
decide to make an effort to secure a respite from US air attack,
especially if the US had indicated that such a respite would follow
a sharp reduction of VC activity. The State Member however
believed this DRV course of action less likely than the preceding
course of intensifying the struggle. It was agreed that the Chinese
Communistswould almost certainly be willing to support the DRV even
in the most militant courses of action. Other possible but unlikely
Communist reactions which could not be ignored were: (a) a large-
scale DRV invasion of SVN and/or Laos, (b) air attacks on US
Vietnamese
aircraft carriers or South / airfields or (c) a major crisis;
The State Member believed however that,
started by the ChiComs elsewhere on the periphery;: China. ;/ once
major
US attacks de storyed /industrial and military targets in the Hanoi-
Haiphong complex, the DRV would probably carry on the fight and
send its own armed forces on a large scale to Laos and SVN. As to
the Soviet ingredieni,it was believed likely that Soviet promises of aid
to DRV defenses along with the fact of Soviet reinvolvement would make
the DRV leaders somewhat more confident and aggressive. 104 /
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69. On 19 March 1965 the USIB completed a further estimate
requested by the policymakers on "Probable Communist Reactions to
Deployment of a Republic of Korea (ROK) Combat Division for Base
not
Security Duty in South Vietnam". The Board did/believe that introduc-
tion of one ROK combat division into SVN for static defense purposes
would provoke Communist China, North Korea, or North Vietnam
overtly to invade South Korea or SVN. Neither did it believe that this
action would in itself change Communist attitudes toward negotiations,
or lead to a slackening of the insurrection in SVN. As to the interpre-
tation the Communistswould put on this action, they would almost
would
certainly estimate that it" / hot in itself significantly alter the
military situation. They might consider that it portended a substantial
buildup of foreign forces - e. g. Chinese Nationalist, Thai, Philippine
and US - for ground combat. In any case they would try to discourage
such a buildup. The Communists would probably supplement their
propaganda with some sortsof actions such as protests in South Korea,
military movements in North Korea and/or VC terrorist efforts and
military harassment against the ROK forces. It was considered unlikely
that North Korean volunteers would be sent to the DRV although it was
possible that some technicians or anti-aircraft personnel might be
brought in. Communist China might try to scare off further such moves
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in SVN by destroying ChiCom forces toward the DRV border, but
would not do, much else. The introduction of a ROK division might
cause the DRV to press the USSR for more and quicker military
aid, to which the USSR might agree without increasing the risks of
direct Soviet involvement. 104a/
70. At the last USIB meeting chaired by Mr. McCone on
28 April 1965, the USIB approved a SNIE requested by the Director,
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff which addressed Soviet/ChiCom reaction
to US conventional air attacks against the mainland of China. While
went far beyond
this estimate in its entirety/the situations in Vietnam and Laos, the
Terms of Reference assumed that the initial US strike was in response
to direct and overt attacks by Chinese fighter aircraft from Chinese
bases against US forces bombing in North Vietnam. The estimate was
divided into three sections which assumed a sequence of events,
involving an estimation of the nature and extent of the hostilities. The
would be
first section assumed that the first US strike/against the fighter
base or bases from which the Chinese attacks were launched, with
the US objective limited to making the Chinese cease their attacks. It
was believed that the initial US retaliatory attack would not cause the
Chinese to discontinue their air attacks against the type of US bombings
of DRV targets that caused the initial encounter. If Chinese attacks
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continued and the US continued to retaliate against Chinese fighter
bases, the Chinese would try to defendthemselves and put the US
under more pressure to halt all bombing, such as feelers for negotiations,
new threats, and further military deployments. In seeking to avoid
further escalation, the chances were considered less than even that
the Chinese would attack US carriers or operational bases. The main
sharp intensification of the
Communist reaction would be/ struggle in South Vietnam. It was
ari air
unlikely however that the Chinese would continue such/ war with the
were necessary
US for very long before c?ecidi:ng to take whatever political steps/to
halt the conflict, or to shift their xnost'effective weapon, a ground
offensive. It was likely that Peiping would make its choice between
these alternatives sometime before its capabilities in South China
for supporting air action had been completelydestroyed. There was
almost an even chance that the Chinese would choose to break off the
battle and make political moves to dissuade the US from continuing air
its bombing of the DRV. On balance however it was thought somewhat
more likely that they would make a major military response to the con-
tinuation or expansion of US strikes against China. ('Ile State Member
of USIB believed that this military response was much more likely
than the .preceding use of political moves.) ChiCom forces would
probably move into the DRV and Northern Laos. DRV forces with
Chinese support would probably open an offensive against SVN.
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Thailand would also be $reatened if its bases were used in air
attacks against China. These military moves might be accompanied
by probing for negotiations. The principal Soviet aim would be to
halt the escalation, hoping to impress the US that the USSR had no
choice but to support its ally. Moscow however would also try to
restrain the Chinese by privately indicating to them that they could
not count on the USSR to use its own forces or nuclear power to
support China's war in Southeast Asia. The Sovietshowever were
likely to supply China with military equipment of a strategically
defensive character. It was possible but unlikely that the Soviets,
important
by putting eomei US or Western interest in jeopardy elsewhere,
would try to force the US to pause or reverse its course in Vietnam
and China. While growing US attacks against the DRV might cause
Hanoi to believe that its fate was becoming subordinate to the
larger struggle, it was not believed that the differences
between Peiping and Hanoi would impair the present degree of
cooperation in the war effort.
71. The second section of this estimate assumed that the
US expanded its air strikes to include other military targets in
South China. The first US strikes at other targets would probably
bring on, if it had not already occurred, an escalation of the war
including DRV offensives against the South. This expansion of US
bombings would probably convince the Chinese that attacks on
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northern China would soon follow. If they had not already attacked
US carriers or operational bases, they would probably do so, as
well as moving Chinese troops into North Vietnam or Laos. It was
possible that regular Chinese forces would move into South Vietnam.
It was not believed that the Chinese would counter expanded US bombing
action by initiating large-scale fighting outside Southeast Asia,
although it was possible that Peiping would try to renew the war in
Korea as a means of bringing the USSR into the conflict. It was not
believed that these US attacks would unite Moscow and Peiping in a
solid alliance but the Soviets would feel a strong desire to deter the
US and a- necessity to display solidarity toward a socialist ally under
attack, primarily by intense propaganda and some demonstrative
incidents. It was believed that the Soviets would be inhibited from
generating crises elsewhere, and unlikely to openly undertake direct
engagements with US forces in the absence of a direct threat to Soviet
territory or the existence of a Communist regime in China.
72. The final section of this estimate was concerned with the
Chinese reactions to extensive US bombing throughout China. Long
before the US air campaign reached attacks on hundreds of targets of
major military significance throughout China, the Chinese would have
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felt compelled either to engage the US in large-scale hostilities or
to move openly toward at least temporary conciliation. US bombing
throughout China would almost certainly cause Peiping to conclude
that the USwas determined to wage a full-scale war, perhaps
including eventual use of nuclear weapons. Thus there was a chance
that the Chinese, if they had still deferred a choice, would then
decide it was necessary to halt the conflict and shift for a time to
political tactics. It was believed however that they would probably res-
pond with a combination of major military moves in Southeast Asia.
Further, since the US had demonstrateda readiness to bomb North China,
Peiping would probably judge that a general showdown had arrived and
would engage the US with all the forces at its disposal. At this level
of crises, the USSR would have to consider on the one hand the
possiblity that the existence of a Communist regime in China was
general
in jeopardy, and on the other the danger of/nuclear war. The USSR
would almost certainly make a considerable effort as an emergency
to sustain Chinese war fighting capabilities. At the same time it would
make a maximum effort to stop the war through political action,
particularly by mobilizing world opinion against the US and persuading
China to negotiate. Beyond this so much would depend upon the
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circumstances in which the crisis had developed that Soviet reaction
could not be anticipated. The Soviets would probably still believe
they
that the US was not bent on attacking the USSR, and hence/would not
attack US forces outside China, initiate the use of nuclear weapons
or provide them to China. It was believed that Soviet actions would be
calculated to limit the risk to further escalation, but it was not sure
that Moscow would correctly calculate these risks. 105/
73. These estimates reflect the crucial nature of the political
and military developments and decisions concerning Vietnam and Laos
during this period. The uncertain and unstable political situation in
South Vietnam raised serious questions regarding the prospects for an
effective government. After the initial turmoil following the Diem
assassination, however, the period ended with some measure of improve-
ment with the cooperative arrangement between the military under
General Khanh and the Buddhists under Tri Quang. In the military
sphere, there was continued escalation of the war by all of the
opposing forces involved in both Vietnam and Laos, resulting in the
initial commitment following the Tonkin Gulf incident of organized U. S.
forces in combat first in air attacks on the DRV and then during the
spring of 1965 in the dispatch of U. S. ground forces to South Vietnam.
The intelligence estimates and other reports by the USIB during this
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violated these agreements which called for complete withdrawal of all
Communist forces from the South, and non-interference in the South's
internal affairs, as well as a prohibition against DRV personnel
crossing the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) into SVN. Since 1955, the
25X1
believed however that Hanoi direction to the VC largely concerned
policy and general plans, while individual tactical activities
apparently were left to the VC commands for decision. There was
clear evidence of DRV plans to infiltrate hard-core Communist
cadres into SVN, possibly as many as 10, 000 VC cadres since 1960.
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evidence, that Hanoi had flagrantly violated the Geneva Agreements
on Laos. These agreements called for complete withdrawal of all
DRV forces and prohibited their reintroduction, as well as banning
DRV military bases in Laos, shipping war material to the Communists,
and political interference in Laotian internal affairs. This study
traced the violations in detail, noting that about 10, 000 regular DRV
troops were introduced into Laos to bolster the Communist position
there by 1962 and all indications were that substantial DRV forces
remained in Laos and were still active. Hanoi also interfered directly
and indirectly in the internal affairs of Laos through its continued
general control of the Communist Pathet Lao (PL), one of the
factions within the coalition government. In addition Hanoi attempted
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requested by the Chairman, the State Member of USIB agreed to look
into a request from Assistant Secretary of State Manning for all
information on North Vietnamese involvement in Laos and Vietnam. 112/
79. At the 19 June USIB meeting after hearing a brief report
by the State Member that the request by Assistant Secretary Manning
referred to at the 17 June meeting had been sent to DIA and CIA, the
Board agreed with Mr. McCone that the response to this request should
be a comprehensive USIB intelligence memorandum on the subject of
North Vietnamese intervention in Laos and South Vietnam, to be
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prepared by BNE and the USIB representatives. 114/ Accordingly
two separate memorandanda, one on Vietnam and the other on Laos,
were considered and approved by the USIB at its 24 June meeting.
These memoranda were essentially an updating of the previous studies
on North Vietnamese violations of the Geneva Agreements on Vietnam
and Laos approved by USIB in March and April 1964. 115/ While
25X1
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83. As in other critical areas and situations, information derived
from overhead reconnaissance was an essential input to national intelli-
gence on Vietnam and Laos. Consequently, the Committee on Overhead
Reconnaissance had a key role in stating the requirements and reviewing
the collection effort in its field during this period. Most of its reports to
USIB on Vietnam and Laos were of this character, although COMOR also
submitted many recommendations related to the security handling of the
information regarding this program. These recommendations dealt with
such matters as the release of photographs or. the information derived from
them to selected U. S. officials or foreign governments, security
procedures for handling the photographs, and the security classification of
the products from overflights of Southeast Asia.
84. The first of a series of COMOR reports during this period
reviewing the intelligence requirements for photographic coverage of this
area was based upon the results of a CIA/DIA team sent to South Vietnam
by USIB in January 1964 to examine the existing photo reconnaissance
system and recommend any improvements needed. 122/ The subsequent
report by
25X1
referred by the Chairman of USIB to COMOR for use in the preparation
of an assessment of requirements for U-2 reconnaissance in South
Vietnam and border areas of North Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in
connection with the current crisis there. The response by COMOR was
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considered and approved with amendments by USIB in February 1964.
The five principal requirements in the
report in 25X1
summary were: (a) comprehensive photo coverage of South Vietnam
to assess the extent, disposition and status of the strategic hamlet
program, (b) regular surveillance of logistleroutes from the DRV to
SVN through Laos and Cambodia, (c) coverage of targets in Cambodia,
Laos and the DRV involved in contingency planning, (d) timely tactical
and post-strike reconnaissance against targets for which operations had
been approved in the DRV and (e) R&D emphasis on improvement of
infra-red photography and low-level color photography and the develop-
ment of multi-sensor correlation techniques (these latter require-
ment were not evaluated by COMOR). The COMOR recommendations
based on its evaluation of the first four requirements summarized
above as approved by the USIB were: (a) comprehensive coverage of
South Vietnam in connection with the strategic hamlet program, (b)
preparation of a study (including an engineering analysis of the
capability of pertinent xcads from available photography of the road
nets of concern, identifying important gaps for future coverage, (c)
as near as possible daily coverage of roads and logistic routes from the
DRV to SVN through Laos and Cambodia, the results to be subject to
continuing analysis by MACV and the Washington intelligence community
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to determine whether the data required was of sufficient value to
warrant continuation or modification of the program, and (d) pre-
and post-strike reconnaissance of~targets in the DRV. In 25X1
discussing these recommendations Mr. McCone emphasized that,
even if these requirements were approved, he did not want authorization
for the program to give the President and the Secretary of Defense the
impression that photographic reconnaissance, especially high-level,
could collect all the information needed, particularly regarding VC supply
routes and penetration. 123 /
In April 1964 COMOR at the request of the Chairman of
USIB submitted an evaluation of the collection efforts to meet the USIB-
approved reconnaissance requirements stated above. This evaluation
analyzed both the SAC and CIA IDEALIST missions over the areas
concerned, and concluded that in. terms of the Board's requirements:
(a) the hamlet program coverage was now 75 percent completed and
should be finished, (b) coverage of
targets in the DRV appeared well
along in terms of establishing base line coverage, leaving only MACV
requests for pre-or post-strike coverage as appropriate, (c) critical
roads in southern Laos should be covered daily as near as possible
until sufficient data was available to assesswhat useful intelligence could
be drawn from it and (d) IDEALIST should fly no further missions over
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the DRV and Laos unless CIA received an appropriate request
(DIA however reaffirmed the need for coverage in areas
inaccessible to SAC operations). USIB on 15 April approved these
conclusions, subject to the understanding that the Director of NRO
an
would request the Special Group to authorize SAC to cover /additional
area of route 12 in Laos. The Board further agreed that the
coverage contemplated under this action should continue for a
couple of weeks, pending completion and review of analyses
by CIA, NPIC and DIA as a basis for determining the need for
future coverage. The Board also noted that the Chairman had
requested a report on whether Cambodian IDEALIST flights were
being tracked by Cambodian radar to determine whether to recommend
Special Group authorization for SAC coverage of targets in the
Cambodian border area. 124/
86. On 30 April 1964 COMOR in response to a request by
Mr. McCone submitted to USIB recommendations on requirements
for low-level reconnaissance over Laos, directed primarily toward
coverage of routes 9 and 12A in southern Laos leading into or
toward SVN. COMDR identified the following specific needs:
(a) confirming concentrations and movement of military equipment
and personnel, (b) identifying and determining the quantity
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of artillery pieces, amunition dumps, and vehicles at known or
suspected assembly points and installations, (c) determining the
status and pattern of activity at identified and suspected logistical
facilities and (d) clarifying and establishing more definitive data
regarding roads and trails possibly associated with infiltration into
SVN. COMOR noted that MACV was currently aware of the increased
number of VC operating in SVN and of increased logistical support.
However he could not with available intelligence from existing collec-
tion methods identify the critical points within SVN against which SVN
military action could be effectively taken. Consequently he needed
more precise and timely identification of the critical points of interest
into SVN. COMOR recommended and the Board approved on 1 May
the above stated requirements. The Board however revised additional
COMOR recommendations along the following lines: (b) recommended
that authority be obtained for low-level reconnaissance to meet these
requirements in the absence of other means for satisfying them, (c)
recommended that such reconnaissance be accomplished by COMUSMACV
in pursuanceof hi`s mission, limited to routes 9 and 12A and contiguous
roads and trails, and (d) agreed that the intelligence community should
make an appraisal as the products of this reconnaissance became
available and report to the Board whether the information derived was
as useful as expected. 125/
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87. Later in May, CIA and DIA submitted to USIB, in
response to the Board's action on 15 April, a preliminary
analysis of truck traffic patterns in the DRV and Communist-
held portionsof Laos, which included the following conclusions.
Aerial photography and reports from road watchers showed
truck activity of sufficient magnitude to confirm the identification
of the principal roads used to supply Communist forces in Laos.
There was not a sufficient number of samples of truck activity
on these routes to estimate with confidence the magnitude of
this supply activity. If the days with complete photographic
coverage were representative, traffic entering Laos over route
7 from the DRV was more that adequate to supply Communist forces
in northern Laos, while there appeared to be enough trucks on
route 12 to supply Communist forces in southern Laos. However
not enough vehicles had been detected to estimate the daily logistic
support intended for Communist forces in southern Laos as
opposed to the amount for stockpiling or for the VC in SVN. If
more reconnaisance missions were flown therefore they should be
concentrated on certain routes identified in the study. Although
road watch team reports were useful, they were not sufficient to
compensate for deficiencies in photographic coverage. 126 /
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COMOR submitted comments on this CIA/DIA analysis which
concluded that: (a) a conclusive judgment on whether daily
road coverage should be continued must await final assessment
based on available materials, (b) such final assessment might
permit establishment of a useful base of information for appraising
future movements, and/or /pending this assessment, daily U-2
photography of the selected routes should be continued insofar as
weather permitted. The USIB on 20 May approved these conclusions
subject to the revision of a footnote to conclusion(c) to read as
follows: "It should be noted that useful truck traffic analysis
can only be made from useable photography which provides
substantial coverage at any one time of the routes of interest. This
observation should not be interpreted however as a restriction on
the scheduling of flights to provide the coverage specified in that
paragraph". This footnote was based in part on observations made
at the meeting by
that this reconnaissance effort
proved conclusively that trucks could be seen and counted in this
type of aerial photography, and that useful analysis.; of truck traffic
could be made from this reconnaissance. He noted however that to
do this a larger sample of information was needed than that
currently available to the analyst, and that they needed a
substantial sample from a single mission or a number of missions
at approximately the same time covering each route. 127/
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88. CIA and DIA in August 1964 prepared another
analysis of truck traffic over selected routes in the DRV and
Laos, which DIA referred to COMOR. This analysis based on
recent aerial photography and road watch reports contained new
conclusions which in summary indicated that, even though they
had been able to confirm the principal routes in use and to obtain
over
a rough measure of the trucks moving/them from these sources,
several problems had been encountered in their use so that
little reliance could be placed on the magnitude of truck traffic
indicated .'as moving over them. Accordingly, although these
sources served various other purposes, they had not been of much
value in ensuring the volume and cycle of truck movements which
could be used in producing specific estimates of enemy capabilities
and intentions. Taking account of the many operational problems,
the analysis suggested that consideration be given to revised
intelligence requirements, the most important of which were: (a)
establishing ground-observation posts at particular locations to
provide consistent coverage of priority routes, (b) including
additional details in the ground -observer reports, (c) treating
the priority routes which carry truck traffic as photographic targets
and covering them as fully as possible when photographic missions
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are flown over them, (d) programming photographic missions to
follow the entire length of the routes rather than to crisscross the
the
routes, (e) reporting / percent of route visible in photography for
each mission and the unduplicated number of trucks on that portion,
and (E) increasing the coverage of priority routes by both ground
and aerial observation to at least ten days per month, choosing days
that would provide a random sample. In transmitting this analysis,
the DIA member of COMOR requested that the committee note and
approve the study, particularly the revised intelligence requirements.
He specifically cited the proposed plan for coverage of priority
routes which carried truck traffic, and the proposed mode of
programming photo missions to follow the entire length of the routes
rather than crisscrossing them, which he suggested be referred to
SAC and MACV for implementation. He also requested that NPIC
revise reporting procedures in accordance with the report's
recommendations, and that the report be forwarded to USIB for
notation and approval. COMOR's comments indicated that they
considered the proposed plan for coverage of priority routes to be
sound, but did not propose any other changes to present requirements.
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COMOR therefore suggested that DIA request SAC and MACV to
revise their aerial reconnaissance procedures accordingly. The
DIA memorandum to COMOR and its enclosed analyses, together
with the COMOR comments were circulated to the USIB for information
and noting if there was no objection. The only comment was by the
Acting CIA Member of USIB who stated that his noting of this USIB
paper should not be construed as committing NPIC to any particular
degree of effort. 128/ In March 1965 COMOR, referring to the
above USIB actions, advised the Board that in December it had
considered the need for continuation of near-daily coverage of key ___
routes in North Vietnam for the purpose of truck traffic analysis.
It had been decided at that time that the continued requirement for
such an analysis to be conducted in Washington did not exist. NPIC
for
advised that no requirement was currently levied on it/ maintaining
of truck traffic data. It was now NPIC's practice to rescan new
materials received from photographic coverage of roads and targets
in the DRV, reporting to the community only when something not
previously reported was identified. COMOR concluded that (a)
photo reconnaissance in Southeast Asia was now primarily responsive
to the requirements of COMUSMACV, CINCPAC, and the National
Command Authorities, (b) COMOR, on behalf of USIB, established for
the record that the previous stated requirement for near-daily
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coverage solely for the purpose of a road traffic analysis survey
no longer existed and (c) COMOR would through DIA request target
coverage as it might require to meet special needs. 128A/
89. The final USIB action during this period with respect to
requirements for overhead reconnaissance of Vietnam and Laos
occurred at the last Board meeting chaired by Mr. McCone on
28 April 1965. At that meeting the Director of DIA tabled a
memorandum for USIB consideration regarding a requirement for low-
level reconnaissance coverage of the DRV North of 210. General
Carroll stated that the current U-2 high altitude reconnaissance effort
in Southeast Asia, particularly against targets in North Vietnam
an
North of 210 , was not providing /adequate base of intelligence infor -
mation to assess the character or extent of Communist China's support
of the DRV. This reconnaissance was inadequate in frequency and
quality of coverage necessary to provide information on the various cate-
gories of Bloc equipment, including SAM's, arriving in the DRV. The
U-2 was hampered primarily by: severely deteriorating weaEerTenvianment
.and prognostications. This: deficiency was further aggravated
by the inadequate reconnaissance effort currently directed against key
airfields, naval ports, and military staging and supply bases in
South China. He concluded that it was apparent that high-altitude
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reconnaissance alone could not meet the needs in this critical area
during the next few months, and that reconnaissance below 8, 000
an
feet offered /immediately, responsive and improved opportunity to
bridge and mitigate this rapidly developing deficiency. . Accordingly,
in consideration of urgent national need for timely and adequate
intelligence during the current period of air strikes by the US
against the DRV, General Carroll recommended that the USIB endorse
the requirement for low-level reconnaissance in the areas of the DRV
North of 21? as a supplement to U-2 operations. After discussion
regarding the reasons (primarily weather) for falling short of stated USIB
(drone)
requirements by U-2, BLUE SPRINGS/KH-7 and KH-4 means, USIB
endorsed this requirement for low-level reconnaissance as recommended
by General Carroll. 129/
90. In addition to these COMOR reports on intelligence
requirements for overhead reconnaissance, the Critical Collection
Problems Committee submitted to USIB during this period two
comprehensive studies appraising intelligence collection capabilities
with respect to Vietnam and Laos. The first of these studies stemmed
from the Post-Mortem on the March 1964 SNIE on the Outlook for
North Vietnam. At the 4 March USIB meeting when this estimate
was approved, there was extensive discussion and criticism of the
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related post-mortem, primarily because it involved a critique of
intelligence collection and processing instead of restricting itself
to pointing out intelligence gaps. USIB therefore agreed to withdraw
all copies of this draft post-mortern, and direct BNE with the
USIB Representatives to produce another version which confined
itself to a critique of intelligence deficiencies. It was also agreed
that, after submittal to the USIB, the new post-mortern would be
referred to the CCPC for recommendations concerning collection actions.
The further discussion at this meeting however resulted in a
directive to BNE to review the overall problem of post-mortems and
submit recommendations to make them more useful. 130/ Based
on this review, the USIB on 24 June approved the following guidelines
for preparing post-mortems: (a) they should be produced selectively
when serious gaps and deficiencies were encountered affecting the
quality and completeness of national intelligence on important topics,
(b) BNE consulting with the USIB representatives would normally
determine whether a post-mortem should be initiated but any USIB
Member could request one, (c) in preparing estimates, the question
of a post-mortem should be kept in mind with specific information gaps
passed to collection components immediately and the draft post-mortem
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forwarded to USIB at the same time as the draft estimate whenever
practicable, and (d) post-mortems should enumerate important
intelligence gaps and deficiencies, leaving to USIB, and through
USIB to the CCPC and to member agencies, the responsibility for
remedial measures. 131/ Under these selective guidelines, only
seven post-mortems were approved by USIB in the 15-month
for post-mortems
period up to September 1965 when supplementary procedures/were
adopted by the Board.
91. Pursuant to the previously mentioned Board action on
15 April 1964, the CCPC transmitted to USIB in May a report on
intelligence coverage of North Vietnam containing recommendations
to overcome deficiencies identified in the post-mortem on the SNIE
regarding the outlook for North Vietnam. These recommendations
included a series of proposed collection actions with respect to
SIGINT, prisoners and defectors, clandestine collection, broadcasts
and publications, visitors to North Vietnam, North Vietnamese
living abroad, and other governments. In view of the importance of
obtaining prompt and coordinated action, the CCPC also proposed that
agencies having implementing responsibilities regarding these
recommendations report their actions to the CCPC as a basis for an
interim report to USIB within 90 days. The USIB on 3 June approved
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with amendments the CCPC recommendations. 132/ The interim
report by CCPC on the status of actions by USIB agencies to carry
out these approved recommendations was noted by the Board in
October 1964. 133/
92. The second major study related to Vietnam by the CCPC
during this period was in response to a memorandum from the DCI
in February 1965 expressing his belief that urgent attention should be
given to the problem of possible large-scale intervention in South
Vietnam by the military forces of North Vietnam acting alone or in
conjunction with the Chinese Communists. Accordingly he requested
the CCPC to review all capabilities for the collection of information
relevant to this subject and submit appropriate recommendations.
The CCPC response as submitted to USIB on 15 March examined the
problems in three major phases of enemy activity: (a) the decision
to intervene on a large scale, (b) the preparations for such interven-
tion and (c) the movement of armed forces into attack positions. The
capabilities of SIGINT, clandestine resources, overhead and peripheral
reconnaissance and overt resources to provide on each of these
phases necessary intelligence for advanced warning and adequate
knowledge of enemy activity were analyzed. For the first phase it
was concluded that there was only the most remote possibility that
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any available collection capability would report on the intention or
decision to attack. The second phase, preparation for attack, was
more susceptible to collection efforts by SIGINT, clandestine assets,
high altitude photography if weather permitted, and medium and low
level photography with greater assurance. The third phase, actual
movement of Communist forces, would probably be detected and reported
by clandestine assets. SIGINT might collect certain phases. High-
altitude photography could not be counted upon primarily because of
infrequent coverage, but medium or low level if used frequently would
provide greater chance of detecting military movements. CCPC saw
evidence of continuing and expanding efforts to improve capabilities
against China and the DRV, particularly for identifying major military
moves in Southeast Asia. The CCPC believed however that
the following actions, some already in progress, would enhance
overall capabilities for a maximum effort against this critical
target: (a) supplement current high-altitude reconnaissance by a
regular program of medium and low level coverage using photo-
graphic and other sensors, (b) surveillance of ports of entry of the
DRV and coastal waters of SVN and Cambodia by U. S. forces, (c)
completion as soon as possible of the programmed build-up of SIGINT
resources at Southeast Asia mainland sites, and (4) priority
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procurement and i.mplacement of devices to report on vehicle and
railroad traffic within the DRV. The CCPC recommended USIB
agreement with these actions, as well as the following long-term
actions to (a) support local tribal elements in Northern Laos and
expand such assets into the DRV and China for intelligence purposes,
and (b) initiate a CIA study in conjunction with Defense of the use
inside Communist China of Chinese Nationalist paramilitary teams
to expand early warning coverage. The USIB on 18 March after
discussion remanded the paper to the CCPC for revision to include
an evaluation of the ability to provide warning, not only of large scale
overt invasion, but also of increased large scale infiltration into South
Vietnam by small groups over a period of time which could result
in a covert Communist buildup large enough to confront and
overwhelm the SVN armed forces. Mr. McCone agreed however that
there was no objection if any action agency began implementing the
CCPC recommendations prior to Board consideration of the revised
paper. 134/
93. The revised CCPC report in summary consisted of the
same conclusions and recommendations regarding large-scale
armed forces infiltration as in the previous version, subject to the
following additional statements related to covert infiltration. Current
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capabilities should be able to detect a significant step-up of
personnel and materiel infiltration, but there was little likelihood
that they could give any accurate indication of the increased strength
or its specific objectives. As intensified insurgency and counter-
insurgency increased. within SVN, however, the opportunity to acquire
more VC prisoners who might provide specific information would
improve. The CCPC added as an additional recommended action the
major practicable expansion of operations to: (a) penetrate Communist
infiltration mechanisms, (b) detect infiltration movement by increasing
road watchers and surveillance of critical staging areas, and (c)
capture knowledgeable individuals. The USIB on 24 March approved
the CCPC conclusions and recommendations in this revised report
essentially as submitted except that the action regarding devices to
report on vehicle and railracd traffic within the DRV was modified
to call for priority examination of their availability and effectiveness
instead of priority procurement and 4mplacement. These approved
conclusions and recommendations were disseminated separately and
not as an integral part' of the subject paper, since Dr. Cline as
Acting CIA Member pointed out that the rest of the CCPC paper implied
a higher degree of assurance of advance warning than was felt by
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CIA analysts. The USIB also agreed to review at its next meeting
all available photographic reconnaissance assets and capabilities
and how they were being used to cover North Vietnam, South China
and Laos, on the basis of a DIA briefing on tactical reconnaissance
supplemented by a COMOR report. 135/
94. Two other special studies were prepared pursuant to
USIB instructions as a result of discussion of the Watch Report at
the 13 January 1965 Board meeting relative to a "probable" or
"possible" move of a DRV division element from the DRV to south
Laos near the SVN border. This discussion prompted Mr. McCone
to voice his concern that the policy makers might not be taking full
account of the possible implications of reported Communist efforts
to strengthen their military position in Laos and Vietnam. After
considering the possible need for a SNIE, Mr. McCone asked the
National Indications Center to compile and collate all indications of
Communist military actions in the Southeast Asia area for study by
USIB. 136/ When this NIC Summary of Indications 137/ was con-
sidered at the 22 January Board meeting, Dr. R. J. Smith as
Acting Chairman of the Watch Committee pointed out that the NIC
compilation of indicators properly did not make any assessments or
draw any conclusions. He said that CIA therefore had used the NIC
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material to produce an assessment which the Board might want to
note or, after coordination, issue as a USIB document. Mr. McCone
suggested that the Board also consider following these two papers with
a SNIE on possible or probable Communist intentions. Consequently
USIB agreed that a SNIE should be produced in the shortest
reasonable time on the near term prospects for Indochina, which
subsequently was issued in February under the subject of Communist
Military Capabilities and Near-Term Intentions in Laos and South Vietnam. *
The Board also asked Dr. R. J. Smith to arrange for the immediate
preparation, in consultation with USIB representatives, of a coordinated
USIB intelligence memorandum on Communist Military Posture and
Capabilities vis-a-vis Southeast Asia, for approval by the Board. 138/
This memorandum as concurred in by USIB on 26 January 1965
noted in summary that, since the Tonkin Gulf incident in August
1964, the Chinese Communists had stepped up efforts to improve
their military posture in South China, particularly their air defense
capabilities. There had been no significant Chinese ground force
deployments, but those already within 200 miles of the Sino-DRV
border were capable of conducting major ground operations and they
could be heavily reinforced within a few weeks. Recently significant
*See summary in paragraph 66 above.
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Communist troop movements had been noted in Laos, concentrated
in the northern panhandle. Although such reinforcement occurred
each year after the rainy season, the focus was farther south and
the totals probably exceeded estimates in recent years. This
deployment had improved Communist capability to defend their
positions, as well as to undertake offensive operations and to supply
reinforcements for the VC. 139/
95. The concentration of effort placed by the USIB during
this entire period on developments in and related to Vietnam and
Laos foreshadowed the expanding scope and escalating severity of
the struggle throughout the ensuing years. There was hardly any
Board meeting during these 17 months when the increasingly critical
stituation regarding these areas was not appraised in terms of the
Watch Report, SNIEs, intelligence requirements, collection capabilities,
additional resources, and protection of sources and methods.
Special requests were levied at an accelerating pace by the President,
NSC, and other policy makers or operating officials for such
intelligence support, much of which had to be coordinated at the USIB
level. In sum, the USIB during this period was a key element in
providing essential advice and assistance with respect to Vietnam
and Laos required in the interests of U. S. national security.
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