DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79M00098A000200150019-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 20, 2004
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: November 23, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP79M00098A00020015619c4- '
Top Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
MEMORANDUM
Developments in Indochina
Top Secret
160 25X1
23 November 1971
Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP79M00098A000200 -
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP79M00098AO00200150019-4
Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP79M00098AO00200150019-4
 Approved For Release 20A&P/2ftft7r9M00098A001200150019-4
DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA
(Information as of 1500)
CAMBODIA
South Vietnamese forces are continuing to move
unopposed into eastern Kompong Cham Province.
The government has made little headway in the
clearing operations west of Phnom Penh, and
the Communists may be increasing the pressure
against Route 4.
SOUTH VIETNAM
Recent Viet Cong directives and instructions
have admitted that the campaign against Sai-
gon's pacification program has not been going
well.
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
The Communist dry season logistic campaign
is underway in the Laotian panhandle.
LAOS
Irregular forces operating against enemy
transportation routes north of the Bolovens
Plateau continue to meet little resistance.
The Communists have moved tanks to the Muong
Phalane area.
Approved For Release VB4/ (CIA 79M00098A000 00150019-4
 Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP79M00098A000200150019-4
Pich /V7 (f Lu ak
bi:w
Bridge destroyed
Pursat'
PHNOM PENH
B C p I.A
Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP79M00098A000200150019-4
iem Reap
 Approved For Release
The US defense attache reports that the gov-
ernment has made little headway in the clearing
operations west of Phnom Penh. Several additional
battalions from the Chenla II area, however, are
being ferried in by South Vietnamese helicopters
and are to be added to the government's relief
efforts during the next three days. In the mean-
time, elements of some 14 government battalions--
about 5,200 troops--remain in essentially static
positions.
The Communists may be increasing the pressure
against Route 4. Delayed reports indicate that
enemy sappers destroyed a key bridge about ten
miles north of Veal Renh over the weekend. Cam-
bodian Army engineers are trying to rig some sort
of a bypass. In the Pich Nil Pass area, the Com-
munists reportedly ambushed a government patrol,
killin four and wounding 15. F77 I
23 November 1971
Approved For Release' /0 - I -' D 79M00098A0
25X1
25X1
STAT
25X1
25X1
 Approved For Release,Q41i 200150019-4
Anti-Pacification: Still at Square One
Viet Cong directives and instructions for cadre
in South Vietnam have recently been more explicit
than in the past in admitting Saigon's pacification
program has not been going well. One directive, from
an area near Saigon, reveals that COSVN--the top Com-
munist command in the South--has warned its politi-
cal leaders they must "adjust their counterpacifica-
tion methods to the realities of the present situa-
tion" and end their -under est?llhat'it n, of the strength
of the government's program. COSVN singled out the
government's relocation of people away from the rural
areas as an example of the damage that had been caused
by the program.
To help meet the problem, COSVN has been encourag-
ing its subordinates to take another look at the prob-
lem of rebuilding the local cadre network. A South
Vietnamese intelligence source in Kien Phong Province
with contacts among local Viet Cong says that cadre
there were told recently to adopt a "cold war"strat-
egyr of evading large government operations and re-
building the local cadre network. The fundamental con-
cepts of winning support for the revolution were to
be emphasized, and more attention also was to be given
to rebuilding hamlet, village, and district adminis-
trations.
Communist documents from the delta emphasize this
line even more strongly. A document reportedly origi-
nating from COSVN states that "political activities"
are currently the most important part of the revolu-
tion, and that during the current phase military ac-
tion will be de-emphasized. Cadres also were instructed
to get back in touch with the people and to build up
25X1
25X1
I 25X1
Approved For Release TO6l4 & b 79M00098A0002b0150019-4 25X1
 Approved For Release 2p,LQ4/ftl~tt G l 00200150019-4
their local organizations by recruiting more people
from the ranks of dissatisfied citizens in govern-
ment-controlled areas.
Much of the information reported recently ap-
pears to echo Resolution 9, the Communist pronounce-
ment that changed Viet Cong strategy from big unit
warfare to low profile guerrilla strategy in the sum-
mer of 1969. Resolution 9 acknowledged then, as the
latest pronouncements do now, that the government's
pacification was having serious repercussions on the
enemy's local cadre network and that Viet Cong lead-
ers would have to focus their attention on destroying
the program and regaining contact with the people.
The latest indications seem to suggest that much of
what the Communists hoped to accomplish with Resolu-
tion 9 has failed, and that a renewed emphasis on
the basic precepts of the document is now being made
to keep the situation from deteriorating.
Recent authoritative pronouncements from Hanoi
carry a more broadly phrased version of much the
same message. In a series of four articles that
constitute one of the few comprehensive examinations
of guerrilla warfare strategy in recent years, the
North Vietnamese army journal takes the standard
line that pacification must be countered by a mix-
ture of political and military tactics. The articles
lay heavy stress on guerrilla warfare, political
agitation, and other traditional elements of the
Vietnamese Communist revolutionary scenario, and they
emphasize in customary fashion the evolutionary,
developmental nature of the struggle. "This truly is
a process of mass uprising," they assert, "from
phased, repeated, scattered uprisings to concerted
uprisings and from persistent struggle to big leaps
forward." .Moreover, the articles suggest that
"concerted uprisings" are still a long way off.
The army journal conveys the notion, largely
absent in information from South Vietnam, that the
I
Approved For Released 4W 79M00098A00020 150019-4
 Approved For ReleasefP 0Ii1 P79M00098A0002 0150019-4
Communists are looking toward a better coordinated
antipacification effort, possibly combined with a
bigger military effort sometime in the future.
"Only by launching concerted, large-scale offensive
waves under a unified plan," it says, "will the
southern armed forces and people be able to achieve
high combat efficiency, deal the enemy vigorous blows,
and demolish military subsectors." If the author,
is talking about larger-scale operations directly
against the pacification program, he is looking far
into the future; there are few heavily populated
areas in South Vietnam where the Communists are
now in a position. to sktri-ke with: large "numbers of
forces directly against pacification. The Com-
munists may also, however, be stretching the term
"unified plan" to include main-force action in
border areas--action which always is aimed partly
at distracting South Vietnamese forces ordinarily
used to shield pacification operations. This sort
of indirect pressure on the pacification effort can
be anticipated during the current dry season, and
the articles may be exhorting local Communist cadres
to gear their own activities more closely to these
diversionary thrusts.
As far as the "frontal assault" on pacification
itself is concerned, the evidence is reasonably
clear that the Communists will continue to concen-
trate mainly on low-level activities in the near
future in which cadre will be exhorted to make sure
that military actions they carry out are specifically
aimed at undercutting pacification. This will be
especially true in the southern half of the country,
where Communist military capabilities are thinnest.
The emphasis on political activity will probably be
less pronounced in northern South Vietnam, where
Communist capabilities for both main-forces
guerrilla warfare are in better shape.
23 November 1971
Approved For Release 4&(~6
25X1
25X1
STAT
25X1
25X1
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP79M00098AO00200150019-4
Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP79M00098AO00200150019-4
 Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP79M00098A000200150019-4
Increased Truck Activity
Ban Nape
Pass
NORTNt
Mu Gia
Pass
Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP79M00098A000200150019-4
 Approved For Release-,2?Q,0/RID
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
however, and with continued good weather likely,
truck activity is expected to increase and spread
The communist dry season logistic campaign is
under way in the Laotian panhandle. During the past
week sensor detections of truck traffic doubled over
the previous week, reaching the highest level since
the end of the last dry season. Most of this traf-
fic is concentrated in the area between the entry
routes from North Vietnam and Tchepone. The pan-
handle roadnet is generally in excellent condition,
southward during the coming weeks.
Approved For
Release 2MJV41ZE-(CIAK[kP
25X1
25X1
STAT
25X1
25X1
 Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP79M00098AO00200150019-4
Dong
Hene
Ban Karai
THAILAND
ShU1 Trengj
? Government-held location ?Communist-held location
Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP79M00098AO00200150019-4
 Approved For Release 2@ 2 Ff7 0019-4
Irregular forces operating against enemy trans-
portation routes north of the Bolovens Plateau continue
to meet little resistance. A four-battalion task
force is continuing to operate around Ban Phone, while
another irre
l
gu
ar battalion has moved to a
miles northeast of Thatena-
In the central panhandle, elements from two ir-
regular battalions that had been pushed back from
Muong Phalane by strong enemy attacks late last week
sent patrols to check the area south and southwest of
the town, but they encountered no enemy-forces. Gov-
ernment commanders believe that three to five new
battalions, along v*ith the NVA's 4th and 5th bat-
talions which have been defending the town, partici-
pated in the attacks. This estimate may be exaggerated,
hnwP i r
The Communists have moved tanks to the Muong
Phalane area. US pilots on 21 November discovered
that two tanks had moved along the road to a point
halfway between.Muong Phalane and Dong Hene. One
of the tanks was destroyed b an air;strike however.
23 November 1971
25X1
STAT
STAT
STAT
STAT
I 25X1
Approved For Release Vgg/'OTECUKKD~79MOO098AO~0200150019-4 25X1
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP79M00098AO00200150019-4
Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP79M00098AO00200150019-4