DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79M00098A000200150021-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 27, 2006
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: November 24, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
MEMORANDUM
Developments in Indochina
Top Secret
160
24 November 19 1
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DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA
(Information as of 1500)
CAMBODIA
The military situation is quiet as South Vietnam-
ese forces continue to move into eastern Kom-
pong Cham Province. Some insight. into Hanoi's
present inf-pn-hinngg in Cambodia has been pro-
vided by who talked
with a Viet Cong information officer in Paris.
SOUTH VIETNAM
Several Catholic political groups have finally
agreed to form a single party. The Phung Hoang
program--Saigon's controversial effort to coun-
teract the Communists' subversive network--is to
be consolidated under the National Police Com-
mand beginning in January.
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The military situation is quiet as South
Vietnamese forces continue to move into eastern
Kompong Cham Province. South Vietnamese airborne
troops with armor support are encountering little
resistance in clearing the area around the village
of Khna, which will serve as a support base for
future forays north and south of Route 7. Moves
into the major plantation areas nearby will begin
as soon as sufficient supplies and ground forces
are assembled at Khna. Other South Vietnamese
forces are scheduled to mount a diversionary at-
tack along Route 7 toward Mimot, while similar
spoiling operations by a smaller South Vietnamese
task force are under way in the Parrot's Beak area
along Route 1.
Communist main-force units have not reacted
to the South Vietnamese deployment so far. Radio
direction-finding of 24 November reveals that the
major elements of the three enemy divisions--5th,
7th, and 9th--that normally operate in the Kompong
Cham - Kratie Province area are still in the areas
they occupied prior to the South Vietnamese incur-
sion. In the Route 6 area, the mixed Vietnamese/
Khmer Communist 205th Regiment recently returned
to its regular base area in the Andoung planta-
tion just east of the roadway, possibly signaling
a return to action following a period of rest
and refitting. There has been little fighting
along Route 6 since Cambodian forces abandoned
a portion of the road two weeks ago.
In the Phnom Penh area, the government has
made little headway in pushing major elements of
the Communist Phuoc Long Front from positions close
to the capital. According to the US defense at-
tache, the clearing operations there continue to be
haphazardly directed.
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The presence of Communist units has had some
effect on morale in the city, and there is a wide-
spread fear that a terrorist campaign may be in the
works. The, distribution of anti-government leaflets
in recent days is the only evidence of unusual
activity, but government security in the city and
its environs is poor, and the Communists probably
do have the capability of mounting terrorist or
other actions in Phnom Penh itself.
Communist Intentions
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SOUTH VIETNAM
Catholic Politics
Leaders of several Catholic political groups
finally have agreed to form a single party, but
it is not clear whether they will be able to re-
verse the ' al
fortunes. the
Nhan Xa, t (e Greater Solidarity Force (GSF), and
the "Lily Group" of Catholic legislators associated
with Senator Huyen have agreed, after months of ne-
gotiation, to launch the new party by the beginning
of next year.
Some influential members of the clergy have
been urging Catholic political unity for some time,
but the most recent impetus leading to an agreement
apparently was the poor showing of the Catholic
groups in the Lower House elections last August.
The Nhan Xa and the GSF fared so poorly that some
observers had concluded that they faced the pos-
sibility of political extinction if they continued
to go it alone. Because of this, the Lily group,
which has considerable strength in the Senate, is
expected to dominate the new party.
Although the new party could become a more
effective force than the individual groups, some
significant Catholic factions remain out of the
coalition. Moreover, it is not clear whether the
party will be able to overcome the personal rival-
ries among Catholic politicians and the differences
over policy which have hindered, past efforts at
unity. The leaders of the new party have not yet
agreed on basic policy. In the past the Lily group
has taken an independent position and the Nhan Xa
has been pro-government; the GSF recently became
harshly critical of President Thieu's election policy.
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Thieu's attitude toward the party will have
an important bearing on its future. Despite the
recent critical attitude of some of its leaders,
the Catholics undoubtedly would welcome an oppor-
tunity to play an important role in the government
as their best hope of improving their political
position. The Catholics have formed an important
part of Thieu's support, but in recent years the
President has soured toward political parties and
politicians in general. Moreover, he probably is
still angry at some of the leaders of the new ap rty
fn-r f1hp-ir failure to Of pport his re-election. II
National Police Take Over Phung Hoang
The Phung Hoang program--Saigon's controver-
sial effort to counteract the Communists' subver-
sive network--is to be consolidated under the South
Vietnamese National Police Command beginning in
January. The consolidation is not scheduled to be
completed until late 1972.
Since Phung Hoang operations began in 1968, the
program has relied primarily on three elements of the
government's security and intelligence organization:
the Special Branch of the National Police, the Pro-
vincial Reconnaissance Units (PRU), and the National
Police Field Forces (NPFF). The Special Branch has
been primarily responsible for running clandestine
operations against the enemy's cadre network; the
PRU have been the program's main action arm, arrest-
ing suspects targeted by Phung Hoang informants
and conducting tactical intelligence operations
against local Viet Cong units; and the NPFF has
back-stopped the PRU when larger field units have
been needed. The program's bureaucracy has spread
throughout the country, functioning in a labyrinthine
command structure that often finds its operatives
at cross purposes.
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Trie consensus of observers who have worked with
the program is that Phung Hoang's accomplishments
have been meager. In part this has resulted from
the Communists' skill in avoiding detection and in
penetrating Saigon's security apparatus, but it
also stems from the program's cumbersome organiza-
tion. The absence of clearly defined command au-
thority over civilian and military components has
often held up operations and added to the confusion
over authority.
Consolidating control of Phung Hoang under the
National Police will not solve all the program's
problems, but a single command authority should
help to cut down jurisdictional disputes. Civilian
participation in the program probably will increase,
a trend the South Vietnamese must begin in all gov-
ernment agencies as the emphasis on military in-
volvement in them is reduced.
The changing nature of the war from big-unit
operations to small-scale attacks and political
subversion dictates the need for increased emphasis
and expertise in detecting and eliminating the
enemy's undercover apparatus. The Viet Cong have
indicated through recent policy pronouncements and
by their actions that they intend to put more em-
phasis on penetrating government security organ-
izations and national political parties and interest
groups. They also have indicated an intention to
step up recruiting in an attempt to rebuild their
weakened cadre network in much of the country.
Over the long term, the ability of the Saigon gov-
ernment to sustain its position as the authority
in majority control in South Vietnam will depend in
part on Saigon's ability to narrow what currently
is regarded as a gap between the government's intel-
ligence capabilities and those of the Communists.
Improvements in Phtina uLa?g will aid this process.
24 November 1971
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