CONFIRMATION HEARING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79M00467A000200050030-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 10, 2004
• Sequence Number: 30
• Publication Date: June 7, 1976
• Content Type: MF

Executive Registry
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. E. H. Knoche
SUBJECT : Confirmation Hearing
STATINTL
1. Ann Karalekas, a staff member of the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, called. She is doing a background paper
for the Committee on your nomination. She indicated that the Committee
will meet to consider the nomination sometime next week but that
your appearance will probably not take place until the following week.
2. She said she wanted to be back in touch with me if she
ran into other problems and I said for our part we would. certainly
like to know the lines of inquiry being developed in order to assure
that we could adequately prepare.
3. Her three specific questions were:
a. Who is sponsoring the Second Deputy
Legislation? I explained that this is an
Administration proposal and that it is now in
OMB for coordination prior to transmittal to
the Congress.
b. Who nominated you? I said of course
the nomination was by the President, but that you
were also the Director's personal choice.
c. What role will you assume in
congressional briefings since as the official
responsible for internal administration of the
Agency you would possess the necessary back-
ground and detail? I said that I would like to
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consult with you further on this point, but for
instance, on the budget briefings, it may be
logical for you to make the detailed presentation.
In previous hearings, the DCI had made the
overview presentation for the Intelligence
Community and the detailed presentation for the
Agency, and the individual elements of the
Intelligence Community made their detailed pre-
sentation. The Director, as statutory head of
the Central Intelligence Agency and not of the
elements of the Intelligence Community, creates
a legal difference but I was not sure that it would
be a difference in practice.
4. It may be helpful on this point if we supply Ms. Karalekas
with a wrapup of your role vis-a-vis the Committee as this obviously
will be a matter of prime interest to the membership. At a minimum
I suggest we might consider sending her a copy of your proposed
Deputy Legislative Counsel
STATINTL
2
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Executive Registry
10 May 1976 - -
George:
That was a mighty fine job done on the
Q's and A's for my confirmation hearing.
Many thanks to all involved, particularly
to I who I understand played a
primary role in getting the paper done.
H. Knoche
Original- -addressee
2 cys --Knoche
1 cy ER
STATINTL
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SENb EWILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM
UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
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DATE
INITIALS
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Remarks:
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER
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POSSIBLE QUESTIONS TO BE ASKED MR. KNOCHE DURING
SENATE ARMED SERVICES CONFIRMATION HEARINGS
PERSONAL
1. What are your qualifications for DDCI?
2. How long do you plan to serve as DDCI if you are confirmed?
3. Do you see any potential conflict of interest in your serving as
DDCI and your holding any of your present financial interests?
4'. If requested by this Committee, on the basis of conflict of
interest, will you divest yourself of any assets?
ROLE AND ORGANIZATION OF CIA AND IC
5. What is the proper role of a secret intelligence organization
an open society?
6. Based on your CIA experience, what is the proper role of CIA
in the U.S. Government?
7. What relative roles should civilians and the military have in
producing intelligence?
8. Should there be more than one statutory deputy to the DCI?
What should. their respective roles be? Who should act for the DCI in his
absence? What should be the civilian-military make-up of the DCI and his
principal deputies?
9. What changes need to be made in the National Security Act of 1947?
10. What are the strengths and weaknesses of E.O. 11905? What role
does it create, beyond the National Security Act, for the DDCI?
11. What is the proper distribution of resources within CIA for
collection vs. production? For overt vs. clandestine collection? For
scientific vs. human collection?
12. What suggestions do you have for improving the various aspects
of CIA's performance?
13. What is your management philosophy? How do CIA's unique
responsibilities and requirements affect this philosophy?
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.14. The analytical capabilities of the CIA have come under attack
during the congressional investigations. Do you think they need improving,
and if so, how do you believe this might be accomplished?
15. Is stronger management of the intelligence community as a whole
necessary?
16. What is your position on past Agency practices such as assassina-
lion plots, mail intercept programs, and drug testing on unsuspecting
humans?
17. Is the internal structure of the CIA sufficient for the challenges
of 1976? Would you recommend any changes? .
18. Why do CIA employees deserve their own separate retirement
CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH CIA
19. What is your view of the degree to which Congress should oversee
intelligence activities?
20. Do you have a view on the current debate in the Senate on the
establishment of a new oversight committee?
21. Do you feel congressional oversight of CIA has been effective?
22. What is your attitude toward furnishing substantive information
to Congress?
23. Have you read the recommendations and report of the Church
Committee? What comments do you have on their report?
24. Do you feel the CIA should maintain a capability for covert action?
How often should it be used? What would be your test for when a covert
operation should be undertaken? What role should Congress play in covert
action? Do you recommend changes in Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance
Act?
25. Do you feel CIA classifies more information than needs to be
classified? tf so, what can be done to reduce the amount of information
classified?
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26. Do you feel intelligence budget totals need to remain secret?
27. Should Government classification of information be governed
by statute or Executive order? Why?
28. Are CIA personnel overseas adequately protected? If not, what
can be done by the Executive branch to improve this situation? Do you.
support bills which have been introduced to provide criminal penalties for,
disclosure of information leading to the identification of CIA employees
under cover?
29. Are better laws necessary to protect intelligence secrets?
30. Do you see any danger that the abuses by CIA in the past might
be repeated? What can be done to insure that the efforts of CIA are never-
again directed at U . S . citizens?
31. Do you :know of any examples where intelligence estimates were
tailored or slanted so that they supported particular policy options? Would
you say that. it is essential that this never be permitted to happen? What has
been and can be done to insure that it is not?
32. What would you do if higher authorities insisted that you order
the Agency to undertake an improper act?
33. What is the state of CIA morale?
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POSSIBLE RESPONSES TO CERTAIN QUESTIONS LIKELY TO BE
ASKED MR. KNOCHE DURING HIS CONFIRMATION HEARINGS
5. What is the proper role of a secret intelligence organization in
an open society?
Organizations which must operate in secret certainly contravene
the spirit of an open society, -yet it is an inconsistency which nearly
all Americans recognize as essential. The remedy to the inconsistency
is to insure that intelligence agencies are accountable to the established
institutions of Government. The agencies must act strictly within
the i
h
t c
arters , and cannot operate so as to abridge or in any way
y
6. Based on your CIA experience, what is the proper role of CIA
the TT C /'. --- --- ... -
CIA's role in the U.S. Government is specified in the Nati
l'
ona
,
Security Act of 1947. CIA is to serve as the focal point in Government
where intelligence from all producing agencies would be correlated,
evaluated, and disseminated to the upper echelons of Government to
aid in the formulation of national security. policies. This centralization
would assure that all information vital to the formulation of such
policies was provided. Further, CIA was to perform services of
common concern for all intelligence agencies, and, under the direction
of the President and the National Security Council, perform other duties
related to intelligence as deemed necessary in the national interest.
The objective of the Agency is to provide the very best possible
intelligence to Government policy makers. CIA must remain free
from any considerations which could result in biased intelligence
reporting. .
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7. What relative roles should civilians and the military have in
producing intelligence?
Both civilians and the military have important roles in the
intelligence process. Generally speaking, the military has special
intelligence requirements which are related to its combat mission.
This means that the military must have its own intelligence capability
with respect to both collection and analysis of information. Military
intelligence, therefore, can be viewed as supplementing the more
broad and strategic efforts of the civilian agencies. Civilians and
the military have relatively independent, roles in the field though
there is coordination as appropriate to avoid duplication and assure
full coverage. The coordination in the production process allows the
civilian agencies to take exception to conclusions by the military in
national estimates and the military can take similar exceptions to
conclusions made by the civilian agencies. This process allows the
policy makers to make their decisions based on nationF 1 estimates _
which fully cover all sides of the issues involved. It is the best
assurance that estimates are not slanted or biased either in favor
of the military or the civilian agencies. The CIA is institutionally
insulated from such bias because it has no policy role.
8. Should there be more than one statutory deputy to the DCI?
What should their respective roles be? Who should act for the DCI in his
absence? What should be the civilian-military make-up of the DCI and his
principal deputies?
Yes. I think there should be two statutory deputies. As you
know, the DCI wears two hats. He is the executive-head of the CIA,
and, as the principal foreign intelligence officer of the Government,
he also has certain general administrative responsibilities with
respect to the entire Intelligence Community. The Director's duties
in administering the Intelligence Community, handling relations with
other components of the Government, and passing on broad questions
of policy leave him little time for day-to-day supervision of the
Agency. I think the Director needs a deputy to assist him in each of
his two roles. This was one of the recommendations of the Rockefeller
Commission Report. The two deputies concept is also reflected in
the recently issued Executive Order 11905, which directs the DCI
to delegate the day-to-day operation of the CIA to the Deputy Director
and which creates the position of "Deputy to the Director of Central
Intelligence for the Intelligence Community" to assist the DCI in his
supervision of the Intelligence Community. I think this latter
administratively-created position should be upgraded to a statutory
one, because I think it is important that both deputies be politically
responsible officials--appointed by the President and confirmed by
the S spate.
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As to who should act for the DCI in his absence, I think that
generally the Deputy for the Agency would continue handling Agency
matters and the Deputy for the Intelligence Community could deal with
Community matters. Responsibility in a few "gray'" areas could be
apportioned by internal directive.
Finally, I think the question of the civilian-military make-up
is largely a policy question for Congress to decide, although I think
that it would be generally appropriate for a military man to assist
the DCI irl Community matters while continuing the present arrange-
ment of having at least one civilian in the two top Agency positions.
9. What changes need to be made in the National. Security Act of 1947?
The CIA and intelligence community have somewhat outgrown
the National Security Act. I believe the Act should be amended to
reflect the DCI's dominant role for the intelligence community as a
whole. Additionally, the prohibitions on CIA are worded in very
broad and vague terms; some of these can be inconsistent with, the
positive responsibilities levied by the Act, such as the DCI's
responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods. I believe
these inconsistencies should be clarified. I believe Senator Stennis'
bill, introduced in the 93rd Congress, does this to a great extent.
10. What are the strengths and weaknesses of E. O. 11905? What
role does it create,. beyond the National Security Act, for the DDCI?
I think it is too early to detect weaknesses in the Order.
Certainly none have surfaced yet. On the other hand, its strengths
are obvious. For the first time, the respective authorities and
responsibilities of the various intelligence agencies and departments
have been delineated and clarified; provision has been made for strong
central supervision and direction of intelligence activities by the
DCI; strong internal and external oversight mechanisms have been
established to assure that intelligence activities are proper and
lawful; and detailed restrictions on intelligence activities have
been spelled out in order to safeguard the civil liberties of the
American people.
The Director's duties in administering the intelligence community,
handling relations with other components of the Government, and
passing on broad questions of policy leave him. little time for day-to-
day supervision of the Agency. Therefore, Executive Order 11905
directs the DCI to delegate the day-to-day operation of the CIA to
the Deputy Director for Central Intelligence.
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11. What is the proper distribution of resources within CIA for
collection vs. production? For overt vs. clandestine collection? For
scientific vs. human collection?
All collection and production must of course be focused to
meet specific requirements and priorities. The resources involved
must be carefully and judiciously allocated and utilized to assure,
that these requirements and priorities are fully met. Collection
must be tied to definite requirements and not be collection for the
sake of collection. This requires a continual reevaluation and re-
tailoring of the assets involved. There must also be a built-in
flexibility to allow the shifting of certain of these assets to meet
emergency situations without adversely affecting ongoing programs.
Recognizing the considerable efforts required in the collec-
tion of information by clandestine assets, there are considerable
resources allocated to the continual review and compilation of all
available overt materials and sources of possible interest. Clandestine
collection is developed and maintained as a position capability to collect
information not otherwise available.
Ongoing scientific collection programs provide needed informa-
tion, particularly concerning those geographic areas to which access
is restricted or denied. Human sources supplement technical informa-
tion collected and carry out intelligence assignments beyond the
capability of the technical collection efforts.
15. Is stronger management of the intelligence community as a whole
necessary?
Stronger management of the intelligence community as a
whole was lacking. This was a major factor prompting the issuance
of E. O. 11905. 1 believe this Order, through its creation of a strong
community role for the DCI, and the creation of such groups as the
Committee on Foreign Intelligence, with a charter to control budget
preparation and resource allocation community-wide, for the first
time provides the necessary strong community management.
16. What is your position on past Agency practices such as assassina-
tion plots, mail intercept programs, and drug testing on unsuspecting
humans?
The previous management of CIA long ago determined that
such practices were unacceptable, and clear instructions prohibiting
such activities were issued prior, to any outside disclosure of
pressure. I support those decisions 100 percent, and will do all
within my authority to insure that those programs are never resumed.
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18. Why do CIA employees deserve their own separate retirement
system?
CIA personnel abroad serve under conditions
hi
h i
w
c
n
some instances are hazardous to life or health. In recent years
with the ever increasing acts of international terrorism,, practically
any location abroad threatens personal safety. -Also, many serve
under situations which are specialized due to security requirements
and are di
ti
f
s
nct
rom normal Government employment. The
operational services must be young and vibrant to meet th
es
demands. The Agency recognizes these personal sac
ifi
r
ces and
dedication to serve wherever and whenever required by providing,
incentives for earl
ti
y re
rement for those in support of foreign
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19. What is your view of the degree to which Congress should
intelligence activities? oversee
Congress has far-reaching legislative oversight and appropria-
tions responsibilities under the Constitution. Obviously, appropriate
committees of Congress must have knowledge of the Agency', activities
so that the
can
i
y
exerc
se these fundamental responsibilities. 1 fully
recognize this, and I am committed to working with Congress in this
regard
I am not suggesting that it is either nec
s
e
es
ary or desirabl
for Congress to concern itself with the details of day-to-day opera-
tions.. That would
o b
d C
'
g
eyon
ongress
legislative fun.ction,, and. -
it
ould b
i
w
e
mpossible to run a secret intelligence organization
I think the American people want strong and effective congress-
_
sional oversight that imposes clear
bil
accounta
ity on the Agency,
while at the- same time not destroying the Agency's effectiveness.
20. Do you have a view on the current debate in the Senate on the
establishment of a
new oversight committee?
CIA has always taken the position that it is for the Congress to determine how best to exercise intelligence oversight. Hence,,
particular oversight plan. However, Mr
Bush
.
recently stated,
before the Rules Committee, his major concerns regarding over-
sight. These are that oversight should be concentrated, and not
proliferated to several committees
that he o
oses
,
pp
an annual
authorization requirement, which would inevitably result in budget
disclosure, and that the Senate should not disclose information
rovided b
th
p
y
e Executive branch over the President's objection.
21. Do you feel congressional oversight of CIA has been effective?
The effectiveness of congressional oversight is for the Congress
itself to judge. It is CIA's firm policy, reflecting our belief that
strong oversight is an asset to the Agency, to cooperate fully in
every way with our oversight committees.
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22. What is your attitude toward furnishing substantive information
to Congress?
Congress has an important role in the formulation of our foreign
and national defense policies. In order to make decisions on these
matters in an informed and reasoned manner, Congress must be
kept appraised of intelligence information and assessments. CIA
has played an important role in this process. We provide a daily
report on foreign developments to the congressional committees
directly concerned with our foreign policy and national defense.
The Agency provides background intelligence information on specific
events to any Member of Congress who requests it and to committees
on matters within their jurisdiction. I want CIA to continue to
provide this information.
24. Do you feel the CIA should maintain a capability for covert action?
How often should it be used? What would be your test for when a covert
operation should be undertaken? What role. should Congress play in covert
action? Do you recommend changes in Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance
Act?
I believe that covert actions are sometimes essential to
protecting the national security interests of the United States.
Although these actions have tapered off in recent years, I think for
the foreseeable future they will be necessary from time to time, and
certainly, it is important that the nation maintain a capability for
this kind of activity. As Mr. Colby has said: The U.S. must have
foreign policy options somewhere between hollow diplomatic protests
and sending in the Marine Corps. President Ford, the Murphy
Commission, and the Church Committee have all concluded that our
Government must. maintain a covert action capability.
The Executive branch, in my view, must be guided by the
national security interests of the United States and has the responsi-
bility for carefully weighing the risks involved in any proposed
action against the relative importance of these interests.
Then it is essential that Congress be kept advised of these
determinations in a timely fashion through certain designated Members.
This is what is done under Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1974. I am not sure if the precise arrangements under that Section
are entirely desirable for this purpose, however. Its requirement
that the President personally certify to the Congress the necessity
for all covert actions may be harmful in associating the head of state
7
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so formally with such activities. Moreover, Section 662 requires
that covert actions be reported to six committees of Congress.,, a total,
of 55 Members. This may be more than is necessary and perhaps this
procedure could be consolidated. Some of these suggestions. have
already been made by the Murphy Commission which recommended
that Section 662 be amended to require reporting of. covert actions to
a Joint Committee on National Security, and to omit any requirement
for the personal certification of the President as to their necessity.
25. Do you feel CIA classifies more information than needs to be
classified? If so, what can be done to reduce the amount of information
We recognize that there has been overclassification ;-
Government and that overclassification does exist in IA. Iti
recent years the Executive has recognized that the public must
i
ssue has been a proper balance to assure that the public is
informed and that national security is not endangered. The
Agency is carefully reviewing its programs to identify those
activities which require continued protection and those areas
where a broader disclosure will not be harmful
With the iss
.
uance
of Executive Order 11652 regarding classification and declassification,
the Agency has been able to reduce by 50 percent the number of
materials classified. We will periodically assess our classification
procedures and strive toward the maximum dissemination possible
consistent with national security.
26. Do you feel intelligence budget totals need to remain secret?
Yes. The disclosures of intelligence budgets would provide
adversaries with significant insight into the nature, direction, and
scope of our foreign intelligence programs, particularly when
year-to-year fluctuations are significant. Budget totals, when
correlated with other available information will enable our adversaries
to arrive at more accurate conclusions about major intelligence
community programs. This would aid our adversaries in thwarting
our efforts to collect important information. In addition, once overall
intelligence budget figures are made public, it will be impossible to
prevent the disclosure of budget details. Definitional questions
over where "intelligence" expenditures stop and operational
expenditures begin would lead to open discussion of sensitive
intelligence programs and techniques.
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The constitutionality of budget secrecy has been attacked, in
light of a constitutional clause requiring a statement of receipts and
expenditures to be published from time to time. No court has found
the present system to be unconstitutional, and I believe it to be
perfectly valid. Logic and numerous historical precedents indicate
that some budget secrecy is permissible. I believe it is within
Congress' discretion to publish a single defense figure.'which includes
closely related intelligence costs, without releasing a separate
27. Should Government classification of information be governed
by statute or Executive order? Why?
The essential point is that whatever classification system is
adopted must afford sufficient protectio,-i for sensitive information.
Under the National Security Act of 1947, the Director of Central.
Intelligence is made responsible for the protection of intelligence
sources and methods. The continued success of our foreign collec-
tion programs rests on this protection. Executive orders and court
decisions concerning secrecy have recognized this statutory responsi-
bility and have granted the Agency a degree of latitude and flexibility
to mold its security programs to assure the protection of intelligence.
sources and methods. Any statutory classification program must
grant an equal degree of protection, and must be administratively
workable.
28. Are CIA personnel overseas adequately protected? If not, what
can be done by the Executive branch to improve this situation? Do you
support bills which have been introduced to provide criminal penalties
for disclosure of information leading to the identification of CIA employees
under cover?
I think it is important that the country protect the dedicated..
men and women it sends overseas to engage in foreign intelligence
activities. If these people are to be effective, they usually must not
be openly identified as intelligence personnel. I think there is much
that both the Congress and the -Executive branch can do to improve
the "cover" arrangements made for these -Deople. For example,
Congress might consider providing explicit -statutory authority
for the Director to make adequate "cover" arrangements.
The exposure of individuals involved in the foreign intelligence
operations of the United States can seriously jeopardize their personal
safety and the safety of their families and associates Although the
nation has already witnessed tragedy in this respect, groups and
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individuals within the United States, whose avowed purpose is to
destroy the nation's foreign intelligence capability, are still attempting
to discover and publish the identities of intelligence personnel. In
my view, existing law is almost completely inadequate in deterring
this kind of rnalacious act. I strongly support legislation that will
strengthen existing law in this respect. Senator Beall has introduced
such legislation in the Senate--S. 3242. This proposal would make
it a crime to knowingly and willfully identify clandestine intelligence
personnel under certain circumstances.
29. Are better laws necessary to protect intelligence secrets?
In my view, current law is almost completely inadequate"
.
in protecting against the unauthorized disclosure of intelligence
As you know, the National Security Act places a respons.bil
on the DCI to protect intelligence sources and methods. However
,
no legal sanctions are provided for him to implement this responsi-
bi
lity, Over the years, serious damage to our foreign intelligence
effort has resulted from unauthorized disclosures of intelligence .
sources and methods. In many cases, the sources of these leaks =
have been individuals who acquired access to sensitive information
by virtue. of a special relationship of trust with the U.S. Government.
Existing law does not cover situations where a deliberate breach:..
of this relationship of trust occurs. In his 18 February message
,
the President proposed legislation which would strengthen existing
l
aw in this respect Itlthi lil
. srongy suppor tsegsation.
The proposed legislation recognizes the authority of the
Director of Central Intelligence, and the heads of other agencies
foreign intelligence activities for the United States, to designate
certain information as relating to intelligence sources and methods
and provides a criminal penalty for the disclosure of such information
to unauthorized persons. It is limited to individuals who gain access
to sensitive information by virtue of their position as officer, employee,
contractor, or other special relationship with the United States
Government.
30. Do you see any danger that the abuses by CIA in the past might
be repeated? What can be done to insure that the efforts of CIA are never
again directed at U.S. citizens?
Frankly, I do not think there is much of a dant er of past abuses
being repeated. Agency personnel are fully aware of the proper
limits on domestic activities and have been directed to report any
abuses that come to their attention.
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After all, it was the Agency which discovered and promptly .
remedied its own abuses. In addition, new internal and external
oversight mechanisms have been created by E. O. 11905. The role
of the IG and the General Counsel have been expanded within the
Agency. A civilian oversight board has been established, outside
the Agency. Also E. O. 11905 has eliminated many of the f?gray
areas" by spelling out restrictions on intelligence activitiea..
There is no question that vigorous oversight and supervision
are essential, but I think we must also recognize that there is a
real danger of smothering initiative and incentive. I think a delicate
balance has to be struck, and it will be my job to see that it is..
. 31. Do you know of any examples where intelligence estimates wer&
tailored or slanted so that they supported particular policy options? Would
you say that it is essential that this never be permitted to happen? What
I know of no examples where intelligence estimates were slanted
so as to support particular policy options. Objectivity must be the
hallmark of intelligence, or intelligence is worthless. Objectivity
can be insured by stressing its importance to our intelligence collectors
and analysts, and through their integrity and dedication to their
profession. Before being published, intelligence documents are-
reviewed by other analysts as well as supervisory personnel,, and
often by analysts of other agencies. This process of coordination
and review further insures objectivity.
32. What would you do if higher authorities insisted that you
the Agency to undertake an improper act?
I am quite confident that days of improper requests to CIA -
are behind us. Previous improper requests created such a furor
that I do not believe we will see any more. However, if asked to
order CIA to do an improper act, I would first point out to the
requester that the request was improper, and how it was so. I
would attempt to obtain a retraction of the order and, if unsuccessful,
would refuse to follow it. If it came down to carrying out the order
or resigning, I would resign.
11
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33. What is the state of CIA morale?
I am amazed that the morale of CIA employees has remained a%
high as it has. CIA has been subjected to an incredible buffetting.
both from the investigations and from the media
a
d
till CI
,
n
s
A has
been able to accomplish its tasks in a professional manner. Certainly
there are problems whi
h
d
c
a
versely affect morale-such as the lack
of adequate protection for the information which our officers risk their
liv
s t
b
e
o o
tain . but overall, morale has remained pretty good.,
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 BhNr'.ASSIFIED 0 TE ON L [] CONFIDENTIAL
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