UNDERSTANDING THE AGENCY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79M00467A000300060005-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 8, 2004
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: September 9, 1976
• Content Type: MF

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Vlr'1 tli F31- Ail ,4 1 VP
SEP !- `St
MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant to the Director - Review Staff
SUBJECT : Understanding the Agency
Seymour -
1. As the dust settles from the investigations certain thoughts
of mine have crystalized concerning attitudes on the part of the
Senate investigators that were never corrected. Unfortunately
these probably affect the way in which legislative proposals will
be advanced and the justifications advanced in support of them.
Because I have a high personal regard for the integrity and
basic professionalism of many of the old SSC staff, some of
whom continue with the new oversight committee,I feel it worth
addressing what seems to me to be misconceptions they hold.
With the emotional pressures of the investigations over they
may be more amenable to a broader view than they adopted
during the investigations. If my understanding of your responsi-
bilities is correct you would be the proper person to take ini-
tiatives in this area in developing a proper Agency posture.
2. While the "rogue elephant" characterization was, in
essence, withdrawn in the final SSC report the initial impression
was allowed to stand. As you know, in the tussle on the HAIK
paper, one member of the SSC staff still tried to make the case
there in spite of evidence to the contrary. Unfortunately, we
live in an age in which doctrine takes the place of fact and
ideologues tend to argue from conviction instead of proof;
even with people of high quality, as the oversight staff, this
sociological phenomenon creates a communication problem
for us. Additionally in trying to modify some of their pre-
conceptions we face the obstacle of their fear of being
"co-opted. " They may have a problem in adjusting their views
and seeing facts as they are, because in some way to do so
would violate an earlier intellectual commitment.
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3. I would like to list below just a few examples of attitudes
that should be addressed:
a. Anne Karalekas, in her history, fell into one of
the errors observed throughout the investigation. There
is no distinction between problems that.once existed in
a new Agency, and the solution of them. The past often
seems to be treated as though it is a part of the present,,
the environment within which the past activities occurred
receiving short shrift. The Karalekas history does not
seem to recognize the evolutionary character of CIA,
which any perceptive evaluation would have seen as a
dramatic demonstration of bureaucratic responsibility,
as Agency managers and employees built an unusually
effective and controlled organization. The maturing of
responsible command, direction and control was an
important message to be given in describing what the
investigators saw in,1975. It only further skewed the
findings when the Karalekas history sees the DDO as
dominating the Agency. The DDI, the DDA, and later the
DDS&T did very much their own thing and all of them had
influence on the others. The DDO was involved in some of
the more dramatic things during the dramatic period of
the cold war, but that is not the same thing as the view
set out in the Karalekas history.
b. Elliot Maxwell, in writing about the Inspector
General, did not point out that practically all of the in-
vestigative leads pursued by the investigators (other than
the big CA projects) came from the files of the Office of
the Inspector General. The SSC report was inclined to
treat the past as though all of it was in the present, rather
than being a limited number of questionable activities
addressed and handled over a period of time. As an
example of the attitude, the Maxwell draft report asserted
that the Inspector General had tolerated "many" illegal
activities; when challenged he could lt~ccite two nsotances
in which there may have been a basis for nd removed
the word "many. " As with Elliot Maxwell, many of the
investigators had never lived in a complex organization
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and had difficulty wrapping their minds around the workings
of a complex organization such as CIA, in which a reviewing
authority such as the Inspector General does not have (as it
should not have) final say on whams n! what should not be
done. The failure to understand the imperatives of command
in an organization such as CIA, and an unreadiness to credit
the contribution of the Inspector General in his internal
policing function left the Maxwell portion of the report some-
what one-dimensional, both in tone and in the depth of
analysis.
c. Even the SSC report on assassination is skewed.
We can speculate that the committee had difficulty speaking
with full candor because presidents of both parties were
responsible for the policies from which the so-called
assassination plotting stemmed. It was easier to treat the
series of operations as separate indications of immoral
conduct by Agency employees than it was to address the
question of whether or not a president should decide that
he wanted a foreign government replaced, along with its
leaders. The moral statement of opposition to assassination
is hard to take issue with, although most people add the
qualifier "except in time of war. " But the statutory provision
leaves something to be desired in terms of the problem being
treated. Politically this was difficult for the SSC to face
and intellectually was beyond their power in the environment
that they created. Members of the SSC have expressed the
private view that the heavy investment of manpower for the
extended period of time seriously impaired the more general
aspects of the investigation that should have been undertaken.
Certainly, in missing the basic issue in the so-called assas-
sination plo% with all the alarums sounded for the press,
did not help ready SSC staff members for the main task they
had to do.
d. One recommendation, as an example, requires
that CIA stop giving "support" to foreign liaison services
guilty of "systemic violation of human rights. " As stated
the recommendation applies only to CIA, although both AID
and the U. S. military services have relations with many of
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these foreign instrumentalities as well. And in any event,
the relationships with these foreign organizations is only
one part of a larger U. S. relationship, in which the Depart-
ment of State deals in diplomatic niceties with repressive
governments. It is also noted that CIA has a traditional
policy that there should be "net advantage" in its liaison
relationships, which complicates interpretation of the word
"support" in the SSC recommendation. Additionally, one
might raise the question as to the extent to which such a
provision invades the constitutional authority of the
president to conduct foreign policy.
4. There continues to be argument as to whether or not
CIA was authorized in 1947 to engage in espionage. The
Karalekas history views this from a lay historian's point of
view rather than in terms of the policy development and
legislative history of the Act. There also is a clear trail in
the legislative history of the 1949 Act making it apparent that
Covert Action, as we now call it, was a considered justification
for the special authorities granted to CIA at that time; it was
only by virtue of legislative procedure that the 1949 Act was not
passed in 1948'on the heels of the 1947 Act. These points. of
original authorization, expanding upon some of the legalistic
views offered by the General Counsel, would be well worth
organizing into one piece of paper. It would be useful if
who has written in this field, be asked to develop this
aspect for an article in "Studies in Intelligence. " Such a study,
receiving the distribution of the publication j would inform a
large number of Agency employees on something they really
don't know much about now dip, thereby equipping them to speak
knowledgeably when the question arises. It would help Agency
employees understand the background of what they do, as well
as providing a basis for tempering the accusatory attitude of
the oversight committee staffers that we have done things we
were not authorized, or that were not intended at the time of
the founding of CIA.
5. OLC has been collecting reactions of people to the
various SSC recommendations as a staff exercise. That has
gone about as far as it can and probably should now become
the subject of an Agency working group with representation
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from the various directorates and independent offices. The
Agency undoubtedly will have to establish both positions and
rationales on various recommendations that will be offered
for statutory enactment. It must be in a position to express
its reservation about proposals that trespass on the rights
of the president to conduct foreign affairs, that are so
simplistic on their face that they are not acceptable as a
basis for useful legislation, or simply represent bad legis-
lative practice through intrusion into the organization and
management of a complex executive agency.
6. To develop a positive Agency posture and attitude,
basic issues must be addressed comprehensively. This means
some education in our own attitudes. It also means a hard-
headed and practical approach to the SSC recommendations
as to whether or not they make sense, and what we really
think serves the government's interest, as distinguished
.from simply accepting them because some one in a position
of public authority has proposed them. It strikes me that
this undertaking is one that you are uniquely qualified to
launch and direct between now and the end of the year. It will
serve as preparation for the next Administration and what we
might anticipate to be a period in which the Senate will under-
take its legislative program. Were we prepared with materials
similar to that produced by Sam Wilson's group during the in-
vestigations, we will be well along the way when we need some
organized views and positions.
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S. D. Breckinridge
R ti t W. - a. n 1 ..- S
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