DOWNGRADING THE CLASSIFICATION OF 'THE FACT OF: PHOTOSATELLITES AND OF PHOTINT AND SIGINT PRODUCTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79M00467A002400080010-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 15, 2004
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: May 18, 1976
• Content Type: MF

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FRL~~~!: NA!AE, ADDRESS. Ai~D PHQME td Q.
DATE
Arms Control & Disarmament
Washington, D. C. 20451
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 ,~ ~~ ~ ~' - ~ Arpprove For Release 2005/04/22: CIA-RDP79M004 00240008001
OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR
UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENC
WASHINGTON p~ ~
Copy ~ .
May 18, 1976
Fact of: Photosatellites
SUBJBCT: Downgrading the Classification of "The
Products
It is my understanding that the subject downgrading
actions are under active consideration. I have read some
of the arguments for and against such actions but have not
seen any considerations of how such actions might impact
treaty verification and, hence, the viability of our arms
limitation efforts now and in the forseeable future.
1) Downgrading/Declassification of "The Fact of"
Photosatellites:
The purpose of keeping classified "the fact of" is
not, of course, to keep the :existence of a US satellite
reconnaissance program "secret", but to restrain public
discussion of a vital and sensitive intelligence program
and to avoid the need for official recognition of such a
program which might lead to a succession of further
inquiries and disclosures. Although the "confidential"
level of classification ~ld restrain public discussion
and avoid the need for official recognition of "the fact of"
it is not clear what would be gained by downgrading. It
implies lessening of concern about avoiding official
recognition, invites broader discussion, and moves us
closer to declassification.
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 I recommend against declassification of "the fact of"
photosatellites. If we discontinued the present policy
of avoiding discussion of this program in public forum
this could result in
-- embarrassing the Governments of count~i?es where
our ground stations are located and jeopardising
future agreements on ground stations or comple-
tion of stations under construction;
-- further aggravating political pressures on the
Soviets toward concealment;
-- increasing the scope and fervor of the internatio-
nal debate about unauthorized data gathering which
is already in progress in the UN with respect to
Earth Resources Imaging Satellites;
-- jeopardizing the efficacy of which
I consider vital for treaty monitoring.
In developing a new, presumably more efficient classifi-
cation policy, security concerns must be traded-off against
the potential benefits which might accrue from gre~iter access
to sensitive products. Undoubtedly many users have legitimate
needs for greater access to more information. From ACDA's
viewpoint, the merits of these requirements and the concomitant
changes in product classification must be judged with respect
to an important criterion: whether or not the contemplated
changes in classification increase the likelihood of divulging
to the Soviets the capabilities of those satellite systems
which provide verification information. The requirements of
arms control verification argue for continuation of the
tightest security concerning our capabilities with respect to:
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I would also urge that the US continue its policy of
being non-specific which systems are National Technical
Means of Verification. Any distinction between "NTMs"
and "non-NTMs" which may creep in as a result of classifi-
cation policies, access control, or break-out of certain
satellite reconnaissance systems from the National
Reconnaissance Program (NRP) could lead to serious problems
down the road with respect to the protection afforded our
verification assets by the non-interference provisions of
present and future arms limitation treaties.
C :1~~~
Fr d C. Ikle
cc: Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
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 Ap~ro?
Ed Proctor
SUBJECT Ikle Letter on Classification
of Satellite. Recoru~aissance
Ikle has written you the attached letter
urging that no changes be made in the security
aspects of satellite reconnaissance.
Not only is he against declassifying the
fact of satellite reconnaissance, he is also
against reclassifying it at the Confidential
level. He says even the latter would imply a
lessening of concern about the programs s
security and would move us closer to declas-
sification of the fact. He then presents a
list of horrors that "could result" from a
change.
Ikle says that the requirements of arms
control verification argue for continuation of
the tightest security for the products of the
program. He lists five specific aspects which
need protection.
satellite reconnaissance. I believe that the
way the products of the program are handled
gard to the classification of the fact of
I disagree with Ikle's judgment with re-
x~.wq ~mn w. .may. _
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can be changed. without. endangering the
sensitive aspects of the. program. Obviously,
these are things I will be working on next
month.
Although. Ikle~ s letter does: not. require
an answer, you may want to acknowledge its
receipt. Do you want. me to draft a short
reply for your signature ?
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