US POLICY TOWARD SVALBARD (SPITSBERGEN)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79M00467A002500110003-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 3, 2002
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: February 23, 1976
• Content Type: MEMO

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NSC UNDER SECRETARIES COMMITTEE
SECRET
.NSC-U SM-162A
February 23,.1976
TO: The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The Director of Central. Intelligence
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
The'Under Secretary of the Interior
The Director, National Science Foundation.
The Administrator, Federal Energy
Administration
SUBJECT: US Policy Toward Svalbard (Spitsbergen)
Attached for your comment and/or concurrence
are a draft Memorandum for 4i he -P3 e'sident -and the
study of US policy toward Svalbard. Editorial
comments may be provided to Miss Anne Pinkney,
Department of State, 632-1774. Substantive
comments should be addressed to the Chairman in
writing.
Your response is requested by c.o.b. Monday,
March 1, 1976.
4A.Lc~ tz-
1
Wreatham E. Gathright
Staff Director
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
NSC UNDER SECRETARIES COMMITTEE
SECRET
NSC-U DM-
Subject: US Policy Toward Svalbard (Spitsbergen)
As directed, the Under Secretaries Committee has
conducted a comprehensive review of US policy toward
the Norwegian Arctic territory of Svalbard (formerly
called Spitsbergen) including US strategic, economic,
and political interests, legal questions posed by
Norway's sovereignty claims, relevant law-of-the-sea
interests, and the attitudes of our Allies. The principal
issues for policy decision are summarized below.
Recommendations of the Members of the Committee are
presented for your consideration. A detailed report,
prepared by an interagency group under the chairmanship
of the Department of State,is attached.
1. Background
Under the 1920 Treaty of Spitsbergen, the "full and
absolute sovereignty of Norway" over the Svalbard archi-
pelago is recognized, subject to certain stipulations,
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principally (1) that the nationals of all signatories
may carry on economic operations on a basis of absolute
equality and (2) that Norway not create or allow the
establishment of any naval base or construct any
fortification in the archipelago. This territory "may
never be used for war-like purposes."
The long-established Norwegian and Soviet coal mining
operations are the only economic enterprise of any size
on Svalbard. Oil exploration on the islands of the
archipelago has been undertaken by American and European
companies as well as by the Soviets from the 1960's.
No oil has been found and only insignificant amounts of
gas.
Geologic studies have, however, led to high
expectation of petroleum wealth lying under the continental
shelf around Svalbard. Estimates of unproven oil reserves
in the shelf area could be comparable to present-proven
reserves in the US or the North Sea. Taking into account
the necessary time for exploration and development of
necessary technology, initial oil production would not
be expected before the mid-1980's at the earliest, with
high production levels reachable in the 1990's. Develop-
ment would depend on continued high oil prices as costs
will be much higher than costs for North Sea oil. .
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The Svalbard archipelago and its adjacent seas also
have a present and a potential military significance
which derive from their proximity to the Soviet Kola
Peninsula, the importance of the ice-free routes between
the Barents and the Norwegian Seas, and the possible
utilization of these seas as patrol zones for ballistic
missile-submarines. From its bases along the Kola
Peninsula, the Soviet Northern Fleet (comprising about
one-fourth of the Soviet Union's major surface combatants
and one-half of its submarines) enjoys the only ice-free
unrestricted access to the open ocean from. European Russia.
II. Major Issues
1. Bolstering Norwegian Sovereignty on Svalbard
Only recently has Norway begun to formulate a
"national policy" for Svalbard which will strengthen
administration over the islands and support Norwegian
economic and research activities there. In effect,'the
policy is aimed at the affirmation of Norwegian sovereignty
vis-a-vis the Soviets, whose population on Svalbard is
double that of Norway's, and who constitute the only
major foreign presence. The Soviets appear determined
to maintain a larger presence than the Norwegians and to
expand it. They have resisted compliance with a series
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of Norwegian administrative and environmental regulations,
and for many years have operated their coal mining
communities.as independent enclaves, accessible to only
a limited number of Norwegian officals by invitation.
The Norwegians have indicated they would
appreciate US support for efforts to strengthen their
sovereignty, including the possible expansion of US
commercial and scientific activity as a counterweight to
the Soviets. They believe this would strengthen the
basis for Norway's enforcement of the Spitsbergen Treaty's
provisions for equality in regulation of economic
activities, and for demilitarization of the archipelago.
US Interests
The US must decide how to respond to the
Norwegian requests for support, taking into account (1)
our interest and NATO's interest in precluding. Soviet
encroachments in a region which is part of the NATO area,
and in avoiding destabilization in a region which has not
heretofore been subject to active East-West confrontation;
(2) our rights as a signatory of the Spitsbergen Treaty;
and (3) potential commercial and scientific benefits of
an enlarged US presence on Svalbard.
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If the Soviets push for military or economic
advantages, or simply to extend their presence, stability
in the East-West relationship in this area could be .
affected. Stability could also be undermined by US or
Norwegian actions which generate a Soviet perception of
a "threat", either to its security interests, or to Soviet
rights under the Treaty. Thus, efforts to bolster
Norwegian sovereignty on Svalbard would require a careful
combination of firmness and discretion. Such efforts
should include continued support for strict application
of the demilitarization provision of the Treaty.
The rights of the handful of US firms holding
claims on Svalbard do not appear to be involved in the
issue here discussed. While additional US firms are free
to undertake activity on Svalbard under the terms of the
Spitsbergen Treaty, US Government encouragements for
increased economic activity are judged not likely to have
any useful result. A preliminary survey of scientific
possibilities does, however, indicate that US projects o
scientific value could be undertaken.
2. National Rights on the Svalbard Continental Shelf
The prospect of substantial hydrocarbon wealth
on the continental shelf around Svalbard raises the
question of how exploitation of this wealth might be
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regulated. Norway has taken the legal position that it
has the sovereign rights over the entire continental
shelf connecting the Norwegian mainland and Svalbard
that, according to recognized international law, would
normally accrue to a coastal state. Norway asserts that
the Spitsbergen Treaty provision of equal rights for
economic exploitation does not apply to the shelf outside
of Svalbard's territorial waters. A legal case can also
be made for the alternative view that, as Norwegian
sovereign rights on the shelf arise as a natural extension
of sovereignty accorded by the Spitsbergen Treaty over
land areas, the limitations on that sovereignty stipulated
in the Treaty are likewise extended to the shelf.
With this Norwegian position in mind, and in
anticipation of the beginning of the Norwegian-Soviet
continental boundary delimitation talks, the US and UK
sent notes to the Norwegian Government in 1974 reserving
any rights to mineral resources of Svalbard's shelf that
they may have under the Treaty, without, however, setting
forth any interpretation of what those rights might be.
Other states (Italy, Soviet Union, and France) have also
entered reservations.
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US Interests
The US has a national interest and a commercial
interest in securing access to any large reserves of
oil or gas that may be found in the waters of the
Svalbard area. Moreover, although economically signifi-
cant exploitation of such reserves seems unlikely before
1990, and would depend on the maintenance of high oil
prices, the feasibility of such exploitation, if
recognized in the near term, could play an important role
in oil politics and in the energy policies of our Allies
and other nations.
Extension of Spitsbergen Treaty rights of
exploitation to the shelf is one technique for assurance
of access to its reserves, not only for the US but all
other states because the Treaty remains open to adherence
by other states. If sovereign rights on the shelf
resided in Norway without qualification, then, in
addition to exclusive control over access, Norway might
seek to delay exploitation indefinitely for environmental
or security reasons; Norway's economic interest could be
satisfied by oil from the North Sea and Norwegian Sea
for some time to come.
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Against these considerations must be weighed
the common US and Norwegian security~interests,in the.
area and Norway's important role on the northern flank
of NATO. Stability could be undermined if Soviet security
concerns were aroused by active oil exploration and
exploitation leading to the presence of many installations
belonging to many countries. As discussed in the attached.
study, security concerns are not likely to arise in the
near term from an identification of a specific threat,
but could arise from a generalized fear about the trend
of events and possible future development of threatening
capabilities.
Norway has pointed to practical problems of oil
exploration and exploitation under extension of the Treaty
regime to the shelf. For example, the. applicable mining
code adopted pursuant to the Treaty is inadequate in
many respects and supposedly could lead to a "Klondike-
like grab". It could be difficult to modify without a
consensus or at least a majority vote of all signatories.
There are, in any case, likely to be serious regulatory
problems regardless of what sovereignty status is applied,
with respect to allocation, policing, pollution controls,
and safeguarding of military and commercial rights of
navigation by sea and air.
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Therefore, as set forth in the recommendations
below, the best outcome would appear to be a negotiated
resolution of the shelf issue in which Norway obtains
the desired recognition of its sovereign rights, but
provide guarantees of access. A regulatory regime under
Norwegian administration, would be sought which was less
subject to the disadvantages of a regime under the Treaty,
and which would take security interests into account.
Maintaining our reservation on shelf rights prior to a
settlement along these lines could provide an incentive to
the Norwegians to seek a mutually acceptable accommodation.
In resolving whether Treaty parties have-rights
beyond the territorial sea of Svalbard, the US should
protect our broad law of the sea interests, insuring that
our positions in the Svalbard dispute are consistent with
our general law of the sea positions. Any restrictions on
the operation of naval ships in the waters of Svalbard, or
military aircraft over the associated air space, would be of
grave concern. Whatever Treaty rights may eventually be
extended to the shelf, the demilitarization provision should
not be interpreted to limit US military activities offshore.
If, however, Soviet or other security concerns arise from
proliferation of oil rigs or other installations on the shelf,
it could be desirable to provide assurances of legitimate intent,
e.g., by negotiating inspection arrangements for such installations
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The issue of sovereignty rights on the shelf
and its waters could also impact on fishing interests.
The major fishing activity in recent years has been by
the USSR, Norway, and UK. The US has no direct fishing
interest in the area.
3. Soviet-Norwegian Continental Shelf Boundary
Negotiations
In November, 1975, the Soviets and Norwegians
met for the second round of negotiations to delineate
the boundary between the continental shelves extending
from their northern borders. The Norwegians proposed
following the "equidistant-line" principle. The Soviets
have proposed a "sector" line running due north from
the Norwegian-Soviet border, which would lie to the west
of the equidistant line. The talks appear to have
settled down to routine boundary negotiations, with no
sense of urgency expressed by either side.
The US plays no direct role in these negotiations,
but has an interest in both the process and the outcome.
There have been informal Soviet suggestions of a possible
"package deal" which would handle a number of outstanding
issues in the Arctic. Such a package deal might call
for Norwegian concessions potentially adverse to
Western interests as a price for some degree of Soviet
accommodation in other areas.
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III. Recommendations
After examination of a range of alternatives, as
set forth with their pros and cons in Section VII of the
attached study, the Members of the Under Secretaries
Committee recommend a US policy toward Svalbard
consisting of the following elements:
1. The US should provide diplomatic support to
Norway's efforts to assert more vigorously its sovereignty
on Svalbard. This should include expressions of support
and encouragement to the Norwegians, encouragement of
support for Norway among our Allies and other Treaty
signatories, and demarches to the Soviets.
2. In determining how sovereignty is to be exercised,
the US should, in general, be guided by Norway's
perception of its sovereignty needs. The US should
counsel firmness in defense of Norway's legitimate rights.
as the approach best calculated to secure those rights.
At the same time, it would be appropriate for Norway to
supply assurances to the Soviets that the Norwegian
administrative requirements will be strictly in accordance
with the provisions of the Spitsbergen Treaty and, where
the Treaty is ambiguous, will be within the limits of
reason.
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3. Demarches to the Soviets would draw on the US-
Soviet mutual interest in.relaxing tensions, mataininq.
stability in the Northern area, and fulfillment of CSCE
objectives. Consideration should be given to inducing
US-Soviet cooperation on Arctic problems including joint
scientific activity on Svalbard. The US should provide
its own-assurances to the Soviets that Norway seeks
carefully delimited objectives, without constraint on
legitimate Soviet prerogatives. It should be made clear
that in any controversy with the Soviets, Norway does not
stand alone.
4. Depending on the progress of Norwegian and US
discussions with the Soviets, consideration should be
given at a future time to a proposal for reciprocal
assurances in support of strict adherence to the principle
of demilitarization of the Svalbard archipelago and its
territorial waters. However, whatever regime is eventually
placed over the continental shelf, the demilitarization
provision of the Treaty should not be interpreted to limit
US military activities offshore.
5. The US should undertake a program of expanded
scientific effort in the Svalbard region and additional
funds should be provided for this increased activity as
appropriate. Standards in regard to the scientific value
of projects and qualifications of researchers should be
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strictly maintained. Efforts to develop joint programs
with Norway, as well as multinational programs with
Soviet participation, should be expanded.
6. An intelligence survey of present Soviet
dispositions and activities in the-Svalbard region should
be carried out to provide a base-line against which to
measure future Soviet activity.
7. The US should seek to protect its economic
interests on the continental shelf and those of its
Allies through guarantees supplied by Norway in the
context of full acceptance of Norway's sovereignty rights
over the shelf, rather than through extension of Spitsbergen
Treaty rights. This approach is most likely to meet our
objectives in the Northern region, which include stability,
Alliance cohesion, law of the sea interests, and orderly
economic development. It would include these steps:
(a) The US reservation of rights it may have-
under the Spitsbergen Treaty, including any rights with
respect to exploration and exploitation of mineral
resources of the continental shelf appertaining to Svalbard
should be maintained for the time being. It should be
clear that, as was also stated by the British in their
reservation, the US has not yet been able to formulate a._
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definite view on the-Norwegian legal position with
regard to Norwegian jurisdiction over the continental
shelf in the Svalbard region.
(b) While reserving its position on jursidiction
over the Svalbard shelf, the US should seek to elucidate
Norwegian views and any Norwegian plans for a regulatory
regime to guide exploration and exploitation of hydro-
carbon resources under the waters of the Svalbard region.
In,general, the US should not seek a resolution of the
legal problems before a clearer picture of the practical
problems. and their possible solutions emerges.
(c) Depending on the progress of discussion
with the Norwegians along the above lines, the US should
consider entering into consultations with the Norwegians
and our principal allies, and eventually with other
Spitsbergen Treaty signatories, in order to formulate
.mutually acceptable guidelines for regulation of hydro
.carbon exploration and exploitation on the shelf with,
as a minimum, some form of assured access to the final
product.
if this approach to a policy for Svalbard is approved,
the Members of the Under Secretaries Committee recommend
the following specific measures to begin implementation:
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1. The Department of State should inform the
Norwegian Government of US views and policy toward
Svalbard. In developing US positions, the Department
of State should consult with the Department of Defense
on any related security matters, and in particular, on
any matters relating to US law of the sea interests or
to demilitarization of Svalbard.
2. Exploratory discussions with the Allies, the
Soviets and others should be undertaken by the Department
of State, as appropriate.
3. The Department of State and the National Science
Foundation should complete the survey now underway
regarding possible scientific projects in the Svalbard
region and develop an appropriate program. The Nansen
Drift Station project, already in the planning stage,
should be prosecuted expeditiously.
4. .The Department of State and Department of Defense
should jointly submit through appropriate channels a
specific proposal for an intelligence survey on the Soviet
presence on Svalbard.
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5. The Department of State and Federal Energy
Administration should prepare a preliminary study of
possible regulatory regimes that might be applied to
exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbon resources
in the waters of the Svalbard region under various types
of jurisdiction. The study would be exploratory, rather
than definitive.
Robert S. Ingersoll
Chairman
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2/19/76
US Policy Towards Svalbard (Spitsbergen)
Response to NSSM 232
TABLE OF CONTENTS '
Section
Page
1.
Introduction
I- 1
II.
Svalbard - Land and Territorial Waters
II- 1
A.
B.
C.
D.
Historical Development
and Treaty Rights
Economic Development
Norwegian Sovereignty and
Norwegian-Soviet Relations
Norway's Approach to
II- 1
II- 8
11-13
a Svalbard Policy
III.
The Continental Shelf - Economic
III- 1
and Resource Considerations
A.
Hydrocarbon Resources
III- 1
1. Prospects for Exploitation III- 1
2. Norwegian Outlook III- 4
3. Practical Problems III- 5
B.
? Fisheries I
II 7
IV.
Legal and LOS'Issues
IV- 1
A.
Continental Shelf around Svalbard
IV- 1.
1. The Continental Shelf Doctrine IV- 1
2. Norwegian Legal Position IV- 6
3. Reservations by the US and IV- 8
th
St
t
er
a
o
es
4. Legal Issues and Summary of IV-10
Conclusions
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B. Soviet-Norwegian Continental
Shelf Boundary Negotiation IV-13
V, Security Considerations V-i
A. The Svalbard Region in the Context
of the East-West Military Balance V-1
B. Relation to the Svalbard Issues V-4
1. Svalbard Land Areas and
Territorial Waters V-4
2. Contested Continental Shelf
Area between USSR and Norway V-7
3. Svalbard Continental Shelf Issue V-11
C. Implications of Security Considera-
tions for US Policy in this Area V-13
VI. Scientific Considerations VI-1
A. Scientifiq Activity to Date VI-1
B. Prospects for Future US
Scientific Activity VI-2
1. General Prospects VI-2
2. Specific Projects VI-4
3. US Cooperation with
other Nations VI-7
VII. US Interests and Alternatives VII-1
A. US Policy Objectives VII-1
B. Options and Recommendations VII-8
1. Norwegian Sovereignty
on Svalbard VII-8
2. The Svalbard Continental Shelf VII-15
ANNEX A - 1. Spitsbergen Treaty and
List of Signatories A-1
2. Convention on the Continental Shelf A-4
ANNEX B. Reservations Related to Rights under
Spitsbergen Treaty B-1
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ANNEX C.
Legal Memorandum on Issues Related C-1
to the Continental Shelf around Svalbard
ANNEX D. Military Forces of the Soviet
Union in Northwestern USSR and
Norway
Maps of the Svalbard Region
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Routing Slip
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIAL
1
DCI
2
DDC1
3
S/MC
4
DDS&T
5
DDI
6
DDA
7
DDO
8
D/DCI/IC
9
D/DCI/NI
10
GC
11
LC
12
IG
13
M
Compt
14
D/Pers
15
D/S
16
DTR
17
Asst/ DCI
18
AO/DCI
19
20
21
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