THIRD QUARTERLY REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FINAL ACT OF THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE (CSCE)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79M00467A002500140006-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 91
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 15, 2002
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: August 16, 1976
• Content Type: MEMO

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE 77t~`
NSC UNDER SECRETARIES COMMITTEE
SECRET
NSC-U/DM-137B
August 16, 1976
TO: The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Deputy Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of Commerce
The Under Secretary of Health, Education
and Welfare
The Under Secretary of Transportation
The Special Trade Representative
The Chairman, Council on Environmental
Quality
The Administrator, Environmental Protection
Agency
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency
The Director, National Science Foundation
The Director, United States Information
Agency
The Acting Executive Director, Council on
International Economic Policy
SUBJECT: Third Quarterly Report on Implementation
of the Final Act of the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)
The Chairman has forwarded the attached Memorandum,
to the President. A copy is provided for your
information.
Ruh eord M. Poats
Acti g Staff Director
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GDS
State Dept. review completed
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NSC UNDER SECRETARIES COMMITTEE
SECRET
NSC-U/Dry--137B
August 16 F 1976
Subject: Third Quarterly Report on Implementation
of the Final Act of the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)
This is the third quarterly report submitted
by the NSC Under Secretaries Committee on imple-
mentation of the provisions of the Final Act of the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE). It covers the period February 1 - April 30,
1976, and reports those actions related to the CSCE
which have been taken since the end of the last
reporting period.
Implementation continues to be an extended
form of negotiation on East-West lines, with each
side seeking to establish its interpretation of
the provisions of the Final Act and to position'
itself advantageously for the follow-up meetings
scheduled to begin in Belgrade in June 1977. The
approach of East and West to this broad negotiation
clarified during the reporting period as CSCE
participant states began to think more actively
.about the Belgrade meetings and to relate those
.-.meetings to their present actions.
The Soviet Union and its allies have acted
along predictable lines. The Soviets have continued
-*to take modest steps to implement a few of the
provisions of the Final Act, albeit at a slower
pace than in the last quarter. They have also
displayed heightened sensitivity to charges that
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they are giving short shrift to Basket III. At the
same time they are attempting to deflect criticism
by going over to the offensive in four areas: polemical-
style criticism of the West for its.alleged failures
in implementing Final Act provisions; reinterpreta-
tion of the document to suit their own negotiating
positions and communist ideology; exaggeration of
their own implementation efforts; and an attempt to
shift the focus of public attention away from the
concept of implementation toward the idea of the CSCE
process as part of a developing and progressing trend
in European relations set in motion by the Soviets'
so-called Peace Program. The Eastern European states,
whose internal policies on humanitarian and informa-
tion subjects vary but are generally somewhat less
severe than those of the USSR, have, with the exception
of Romania, followed the Soviet lead in their positions
on,CSCE issues.
Neither the Soviet Union nor its Eastern allies
took any significant new implementation steps during
the reporting period, but modest progress was
registered in a few areas. There was a marked
increase in emigration from the USSR to the US which
appears to be continuing, though this was probably a
function of various pressures in addition to the
CSCE. Soviet Jewish emigration was up slightly in
comparison to last year's levels, though it remains
far below the 1972-1973 peak reached before the
Jackson-Vanik amendment was passed. Greatly increased
emigration by ethnic Germans from the USSR is largely
due to bilateral FRG-Soviet considerations. Similar
emigration from Poland to the FRG is primarily due
to the recent Polish-FRG emigration/credits treaty,
.although FRG officials state that the CSCE made it
possible to reach an agreement. The Soviet Union
continued to comply with the Final Act's Confidence
Building provisions on major military maneuvers
through notification, shortly after the end of the
reporting period, of a 25,000 troop maneuver held
near Leningrad, to which the USSR invited observers
from countries in the immediate area. Some progress
was also made on increasing the number of direct
contacts between US and Soviet institutions, but
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our own ability to follow-up on opportunities con-
tinued to be limited by lack of funds. A Soviet
dissident group has been formed to monitor the
Soviet Government's compliance with CSCE provisions,
especially those relating to human rights. Slower
implementation progress during the reporting period
may reflect Moscow's intention to husband possible
further implementation steps until the months leading
up to the Belgrade meetings next year.
Soviet and Eastern European efforts to take
the offensive on CSCE implementation have been carried
out principally through a broad program of propa-
ganda supporting official government statements
and initiatives pursued bilaterally and in multi-
lateral forums. The Soviets have also taken a more
polemical posture in our previously businesslike
private bilateral exchanges. They have advanced
interpretations of the CSCE provisions which often
do not accord with the language of the Final Act
or its negotiating history. The views they have
expressed on the legal nature of the Final Act, on
several principles, such as inviolability of frontiers
and non-intervention in internal affairs, and on
a variety of issues relating to Basket III, all
demonstrate this tendency to reinterpret and to
distort the significance of the Final Act. When it
serves their purpose the Soviets have suggested that
the principle of reciprocity, which is mentiondd in
the Final Act only in relation to a few specified
points, extends to all of Basket III. More spec-
fioally, they have alleged that the provisions of
Basket III impose restraints on the activities of
journalists and radio broadcasting stations.. For
example, the Soviet Foreign Ministry Press Chief
said in an interview that "the decisions of the
Helsinki Conference . . . call upon journalists to
..promote through their profession and skill the creation
of a genuine atmosphere of respect and trust among
peoples," which is in contradiction to the Final
Act commitment that governments should "facilitate
the freer and wider dissemination of information
of all kinds." In their complaints about our refusal
of visas to Soviet trade union leaders the Soviets
have claimed that we are violating Final Act provi-
sions, although there are no specific references
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to trade union exchanges in the Final Act. In fact
we carefully eliminated such references during the
CSCE negotiations so.as to avoid any basis for the
charges the Soviets are now making.
The Soviets have played up examples of their
own implementation, even when these do not derive
directly from the CSCE. They have stressed Brezhnev?s
grandiose proposal for conferences on transportation,
energy and the environment, their announcement of
two major military maneuvers and invitations to
observers, and the procedural changes on journalists'
visas and on emigration applications, which were
covered in previous reports. They have also stressed
the large amount of Western cultural material used
in the USSR and Eastern Europe, in comparison with
Soviet and East European material used in the West.
At the same time, the Soviets have accused the West
of neglecting implementation in these areas, largely
on the grounds that there should be strict reciprocity
in exchanges of cultural material between states.
They have also claimed that the Final Act was not
widely circulated in the West and have focused on
specific incidents in which they allege the CSCE
has been ignored, such as our visa policies and
alleged interference in the Italian political campaign.
These themes have increasingly been incorporated
into Soviet responses to our demarches to them on
CSGE implementation. The most recent Soviet response
was couched in a significantly sharper and more
accusatory tone.
In fact, the US implementation record is
generally excellent. Among several recent US imple-
mentation activities were meetings between government
and publishing industry representatives to discuss
implementation of CSCE provisions relating to books.
WTe believe that our emphasis on patient and persistent
efforts toward meaningful implementation remains
the most valid approach to the Conference and its
results. However, the application of US laws concerning
visas and the possibility that our consular fees may
be raised could make us vulnerable to criticism for
failure to carry out the CSCE provisions faithfully,
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and thus give the Soviets a pretext for non-compliance
and render it difficult for us to press for maximum
implementation. We are also forced to forego
opportunities for broadening cultural exchanges
because of the reduced availability of funds from
private and government sources.
The US and other Western countries have main-
tained their insistence on the need for meaningful
implementation of the Final Act, and implementation
remains the central theme of the Western approach
to the post-Helsinki period. We understood from
the outset that the CSCE would not lead to a funda-
mental transformation of the internal structure of
communist governments, and that'pati.ent efforts
would be required to bring about implementation
of the commitments contained in the document signed
in Helsinki. This has been the rationale underlying
our bilateral approaches to the Soviet Union and
other East European countries where we have sought
to use the CSCE.,provisions in support of our broad
foreign policy goals.
in addition to our bilateral approaches, we
have worked in multilateral forums such as the ECE
to focus on certain specific areas where early
implementation is possible. In all our activities
we have stressed that the degree to which the tSCE
has been implemented will be a key factor in the
development of our approach to the Belgrade follow-
up meetings at which a review of implementation
will take place. In pursuing our efforts, we have
continued a pattern of close consultation with our
Allies in order to maintain the essential Western
unity which made a successful CSCE possible.
With one year remaining before the Belgrade
.meetings, CSCE countries have begun to look ahead
and to prepare for them. Consultations among CSCE
participants have already begun, initially among
the neutral states which have the deepest interest
in a continuing follow-up mechanism of some kind.
The follow-up meetings offer useful leverage in our
efforts to encourage implementation. Since the
CSCE was originally a Soviet proposal, the Soviets
retain an overall interest in making the Final Act
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of the Conference a document of historical signi-
ficance. They are well aware that the Final Act
is viewed with great skepticism in the West and
that Western acceptance of the value of the CSCE
depends on the performance of the USSR and its
allies in the area of freer movement of people and
ideas. We have been using these factors to encourage
Soviet compliance.
A joint Legislative-Executive Commission to
monitor the results of the CSCE has been established
as the result of a Congressional initiative. This
Commission, the legislation for which you signed
into law on June 3, has the responsibility not only
for monitoring implementation actions, but also for
encouraging programs and activities to implement.
the Final Act.
Deep skepticism remains regarding Soviet inten-
tions to carry through on their commitments in any
significant way. We continue to press the Soviets
and the Eastern European states for meaningful
implementation of the Final Act as the key to developing
positive US attitudes toward the CSCE and a more favor-
able climate for US-Soviet relations.
cc,tL. L)
Charles W. Robinson
Chairman
Attachment:
CSCE report
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THIRD QUARTERLY REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE FINAL ACT OF THE CONFERENCE ON
SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE (CSCE)
February 1, 1976 - April 30, 1976
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CONTENTS
I. The Final Act
A. Questions Relating to Security
in Europe.
1. Declaration on. Principles.
Guiding Relations between
Participating States.
2. Document on Confidence Building
Measures and Certain Aspects of
Security and Disarmament.
B. Cooperation in the Field of Economics,
of Science and Technology, and of the
Environment.
C. Questions Relating to Security and
Cooperation in the Mediterranean. 32
D. Cooperation in Humanitarian and
Other Fields. 34
1. Human Contacts.
2. Information.
3. Cooperation and Exchanges in
the Field of Culture.
4. Cooperation and Exchanges in
the Field of Education
E. Follow Up to the Conference.
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A. QUESTIONS RELATING TO SECURITY IN EUROPE.
1. Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations
between Participating States.
A key feature of the reporting period was the
new exchange of views on CSCE implementation between the
US and the USSR which revealed sharply differing attitudes
toward and interpretation of the Final Act. A US demarche
was made by Ambassador Stoessel to Soviet Deputy Foreign
Minister Korniyenko on March 3 which took a positive line
as in previous such exchanges, sought general compliance
with CSCE provisions, and made several concrete proposals
for implementation projects. The Deputy Foreign Minister.
immediately replied with criticism of alleged US violations
of the CSCE principles, and noted that US interest was
concentrated on the third basket. Korniyenko accused the US
of having avoided sending bicentennial invitations to the-repre-
sentatives of the "Baltic Republics", which he called discrimi-
nation among the Soviet republics and therefore interference
in Soviet affairs. US support of the Brussels conference
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on Soviet Jewry, Korniyenko said, was also interference
in internal affairs, and the lack of adequate protection
of Soviet diplomats in the US represented US failure to
carry out the Tenth CSCE principle, Fulfillment of Inter-
national Obligations.
A formal Soviet response to our March 3
demarche was delivered on May 3 and further developed
the accusatory tone which characterized the earlier
informal comments. The Soviets said their "consistent
policy on implementing all principles and agreements
agreed to at Helsinki is well known" and went on to
accuse the US of violations of the CSCE principles.
The Soviets alluded to US policy toward the Baltic
states and failure to prevent attacks on Soviet offices
in the US,in phrases which were more strident and pro-
pagandistic in form than earlier Soviet statements on
implementation, and represented a departure from the
generally constructive atmosphere which both sides
have sought to maintain in these exchanges. The
Soviet attitude and the content of their response bore
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out the impression given by Soviet propaganda that the
USSR is seeking to divert attention from its.own record of
.CSCE implementation by attacking. alleged violations by...-
Western countries, and to shift?the focus away from.the
implementation of: Basket III, which-has been and will'
continue to be the center of Western interest.
The following is a review of incidents and issues.
which arose during the reporting period and which relate
to implementation of-the CSCE principles on interstate
relations:
Legal Status of the Final Act
The Soviets have been moving toward an interpretation
that the Final Act is a binding.legal document, and this
was reflected in an authoritative Pravda article during the
reporting period. This.interpretation is clearly.contradic
tory to the Final Act, which states that_.it'"is not eligible
for registration under Article 102 of. the Charter of the UN,"
as. it would be if it were an international treaty or agreements
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In addition, a letter agreed to at CSCE forwarding the
Final Act to the Secretary General of the UN, states
specifically that the Act is not a treaty or an agreement.
Continued Communist Stress on Certain Principles
Communist spokesmen continued to stress only a few of
the principles, especially inviolability of frontiers,
non-intervention in internal affairs and, most recently,
fulfillment in good faith of obligations under inter-
national law. Soviet officials maintain that the USSR is
fully implementing all the principles but, despite the
Final Act provision that each of the principles has equal
status, the Soviets cite only those which suit their
purposes and overlook those principles, such as respect
for human rights, which are awkward for them.
Soviet Accusations of Interference in Internal
Affairs
The.Soviets accused Western governments of inter-
vention in internal affairs on several occasions during
the reporting period. in addition to the accusations
made in the Soviet response to the US March 3 demarche,
the Soviet media have accused the US of interfering
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in the internal affairs of Italy by attempting to influence
the Italian election campaign. The Soviets have also
charged that creation of the US joint Legislative/Executive
CSCE Commission is an attempt to interfere in the internal
affairs of the USSR.
Observance of Human Rights Principle
While long-term trends give reason for some encourage-
ment, the Soviets have remained basically rigid in their
approach to human rights questions, despite the commitments
undertaken in CSCE. A "Public Group for the Assistance of
the Fulfillment of the Helsinki Agreements in the USSR" was
.formed by Soviet dissidents in May to monitor Soviet com-
pliance with the CSCE, especially in the area of human
rights. The intention of the group is to call attention.
of the.CSCE signatories to human rights violations in the
Soviet Union. The group, which is headed by the
scientist Yuri Orlov and includes several well known
dissidents such as Mrs'. Yelena Sakharov, sent its
first appeal to our Embassy in Moscow at the end
of May seeking support for Ukranian dissident Valentin
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Moroz who had been transferred to a psychiatric
prison.
in the multilateral sphere the UN Truman Rights
Commission meeting in Geneva considered a draft human
rights resolution submitted by the USSR and a counter
draft sponsored by the US and several other Western
states. An unsatisfactory "compromise" draft, sponsored
by Yugoslavia, Cuba and several non-aligned states
obtained majority approval despite solid Western opposition.
Our Embassy in Belgrade later protested the Yugoslav
action as an attempt to reinterpret an agreed CSCE text
and submit a distorted version to a vote in a non-CSCE
The Baltic States Question
In a message to AFericans of Estonian ancestry on
February 19 the President reaffirmed that US policy
of non-recognition of the Soviet incorporation of Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania was not: affected by the results of
the CSCE, and underlined that the CSCE principle of
Territorial Integrity includes the provision that no
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occupation or acquisition of territory in violation
of international law will be recognized as legal. The
Senate included the language of its Resolution 319,
which was passed last December and supports the non-
recognition policy, as an addendum to its resolution
on relations between the US and the Soviet Union which
was passed in May.
Cyprus Situation and the CSCE Principles
The Cyprus situation, which was the subject of
formal reservations by Cyprus and Turkey at the final
stage of the CSCE, remains essentially unchanged, despite
efforts of Western countries, including the US, to
encourage the parties to the Cyprus dispute to arrive
at a mutually acceptable solution.
US European Policies and CSCE
During the reporting period spokesmen from several
CSCE states, particularly Romania and Yugoslavia, stated
that any US policy which would tend to recognize spheres
of..influence in Europe would be contrary.to the CSCE
principles of Sovereign Equality and Respect for the
Rights Inherent in Sovereignty and Equal Rights and .
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Self Determination of Peoples. One Yugoslav official
expressed the view that elimination of the word "detente"
from the official US vocabulary was also contrary to the
CSCE Final Act, where this word appears prominently.
UK and Iceland Reach Peaceful Settlement to
Fisheries Dispute
In his speech at the Helsinki Summit, Icelandic
Prime Minister Hallgrirns.son mentioned the need to respect
Iceland's declared 200-mile fisheries zone. The Iceland-
UK settlement of their dispute over this issue, through
the good offices of the Norwegian Foreign Minister, was
in keeping with the CSCE principle of peaceful settlement
of disputes.
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9
2. Document on Confidence Building Measures and
Certain Aspects o Security an Disarmament
Prior Notification of Major Military Maneuvers.
As noted in the Second Quarterly Report, the
Soviet Union on January 4 made notification of a maneuver
around 25,000 troops called Kavkaz ("CAUCASUS"), to take
place near the USSR-Turkish frontier from January 25
to February 6, and invited observers to view it from
Bulgaria, Romania, Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey. The
limited part of CAUCASUS shown to observers was judged
by the Turkish and Greek observers to be a highly static
and conventional exercise.
While not within the reporting period, the Caucasus
pattern continued with the second.Soviet notification
made on May 24 for exercise Sever ("NORTH") to take
place in the Leningrad Military District near the Finnish
border on June 14-18. Military attaches from CSCE states
in Moscow were again called in by the Soviet Ministry of
Defense to receive the notification exactly 21 days
before the exercise. The exercise involved roughly
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25,000 troops - both ground and air force personnel. The
Soviet media had the details of the maneuver on the air.
waves and in print before the attaches were notified.
Alliance consultations during the reporting period
established a NATO Fall Exercise schedule of approximately
30 maneuvers in the SACEUR?s AUTUMN FORGE Exercise
series. The Allies will make notification of eight
of them and invite observers to four. The FRG has joined
France in attempting to discourage large numbers of
"voluntary" notifications of maneuvers under 25,000 troops.
There was general agreement that the West does not
want to present too high a profile on maneuver notifica-
tions, but the Allies also feel that notifications are
basic to a good western record and in many cases wish
to ensure that their rational CBM implementation record
is complete, with an eye to the Belgrade Conference.
For purposes of US notifications, it was decided
that readiness tests are not.military maneuvers in terms
of the Final Act, as they do not simulate combat but
rather test assembly and movement to local dispersal
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areas of troops from their garrison areas. The Supreme
Allied Commander, Europe called a readiness test of all
Allied ground forces on March 23 which involved USAREUR
units, among others. There was no discernable Warsaw
Pact military reaction, nor any communist media coverage.
A USAREUR readiness test is to take place this
summer e
Prior Notification of Other Military Maneuvers
Hungarian authorities announced on April 5 that
they would begin a field exercise the next day.involving
10,000 troops. This exercise was evidently organized.
around a callup of reservists. There was also signi-
ficant military activity on the Danube south of Budapest..
It is probable that Hungary was making a "voluntary" noti-.
fication with an eye toward the Belgrade follow-up meetings.
This was the first notification by.a Warsaw Pact member of
a maneuver clearly involving less than 25,000 troops.
The Allies conducted the NATO exercise ATLAS
EXPRESS of which they made notification as noted in
the last quarterly report. This exercise involved
.approximately 17,000 Norwegian and Allied troops in
Norway from February 26-March 22.
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Exchange of Observers
The Soviets have repeated the geographic character
of their invitations to CAUCASUS by inviting neighboring
states (Norway, Poland, East Germany, Finland and Sweden)
to send observers to SEVERO This group represents a
mix of NATO, neutral and Warsaw Pact member countries,
as- did the invitations to CAUCASUS.
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A. COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF ECONOMICS, OF SCIENCE
AND TECHNOLOGY, AND OF THE ENVIRONMENT.
1. Commercial Exchanges.
2. Industrial Cooperation and Projects of Common
Interest.
3. Provisions Concerning Trade and Industrial
Cooperation.
4. Science and Technology.
5. Environment.
6. Cooperation in Other Areas.
Transport
Tourism
Migrant Labor
Training of Personnel
During the reporting period, Western countries
continued to experience difficulties with the East on
various economic and trade issues. These have included
prolonged delays encountered by companies wishing to
obtain accreditation and open business offices, lack of
cooperation in providing office and residential space
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to Western firms, occasional apparently deliberate
delays in visa issuance for visiting businessmen, and
a general lack of improvement in business facilitation.
There was no noticeable increase in the provision of
economic, commercial or marketing information by Eastern
countries, despite the opportunity for doing so afforded
by the formal adoption of new five year economic plans
in several of these countries.
Unilateral and bilateral 'Basket II implementation
activities continued to be modest during the reporting
period. Perhaps most noteworthy in the unilateral context
is the campaign building up in the Communist countries
to relate Basket II with numerous trade complaints against
the West in general, and the EC-9 in particular. These
complaints, most of which are not supported by the provi-
sions of the Final Act, include the following:
-- continuing quantitative restrictions and other
non-tariff barriers on Eastern exports;
-- negative impact of the EC Common Agricultural Policy
on agricultural exports to the EC region;
-- discrimination in application of customs duties.
on Eastern exports (absence of MFN);
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-- continued existence of export controls on
Western strategic goods;
-- discriminatory licensing procedures and self-
restraint pressures applied against Eastern exports;
--difficulties in obtaining visas for, or applica-
tion of quantitative quotas on, staffs of.Eastern trade
representations in the West.
Bilateral Activity
There was a modest level of bilateral Basket II
activity during the reporting period, principally focused
on the activities of US business firms in Eastern Europe.
GDR
In the German Democratic Republic, economic and
commercial data are still available only in limited
quantities. The first representative of a US firm is
expected to open an office within the next few months
and the GDR signed an umbrella trade agreement with
another large US company at the Leipzig Trade Fair this
Spring. Others are being negotiatedo Since August, 1975,
the GDR has signed twelve treaties and agreements with
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six Western states, and is currently negotiating thirty
others The GDR has mixed trade commissions with the
UK, Norway, the Netherlands, and Finland.
Czechoslovakia
Since last January, when a decree permitting
opening of foreign business offices was issued, condi-
tions for foreign business firms in. Czechoslovakia have
not improved greatly. To date, only one US firm has
formally applied to set up an office, and there is still a
severe shortage of housing and office space. Moreover,
there has been some concern expressed that, since the
decree restricts the type and size of offices permitted,
it could even be used to close down some offices already
in existence (Japanese and British firms), which do not
meet the specifications.
In March, Czechoslovakia finally extended more
favorable visa treatment to Union. Carbide employees and
families living in Zaluzi, but there is no evidence that
this signals a trend. It seems rather to have been a
response to our Embassy's efforts in an individual case.
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.Of potential significance has been the endorse-
ment by Czechoslovakia of "industrial cooperation agree-
ments", which might eventually help to ease the burden on
the economy of the shortage of hard currency, and could
have positive effects on the extent of US business acti-
vity in the future.
There is evidence that the lack of action in making
available information and facilities which would make
possible greater technical and business activity is a
result of inertia and obstructionism at and below the
middle-level of Czechoslovak business and government.
Despite directives from above, middle-grade officials
are reportedly unwilling to make the extra effort needed
to carry out the provisions of Basket II of the Final
Act, a situation which would change if senior business
and government leaders were to make clear their determina-
tion-to improve business conditionso
Hungary
in Hungary during the reporting period, both the
Embassy and American-businessmen have been granted-some-
what greater access to the end-users of imported goods
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and technology. The hard currency shortage continues
to deter more contacts, as does bureaucratic foot-dragging.
Excessive bureaucracy has so delayed a request by one
L'S bank (Citibank) to open an office, that it has ceased
to press the application. offices, hotel rooms,' and
apartments are still hard to find, although a new Hilton
Hotel is expected to open in late 1976, and should
alleviate the shortage somewhat. Corning Glass and
Padelkis have entered into the first mixed capital joint
venture between a US and Hungarian firm. Another contem-
plated joint venture between Union Carbide and Medicor
has progressed from the planning stage to a trial period.
.However, a problem has arisen because AEC owns a portion
of the technology and is reluctant to license it to an
Eastern European country. A cooperation agreement has
been signed by General Motors and Raba/Gyor; a similar
cooperation agreement between Katy Industries and the
Minosege Shoe Factory awaits ministerial approval.
Romania
There has been no noticeable change in business
contacts in Romania. Access remains reasonably satis-
factory, although end-user access remains in the control of
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the central authorities. Romania recently published
data on the 1971-75 Five Year Plan, which was more
extensive than that published on previous plans. The
government also supplied our Embassy in Bucharest with 200
copies of the official Chamber of Commerce booklet on
Romanian business and industry for the use of American firms.
There has been some small expansion of hotel and apart-
ment space. In addition, drafts of a long-term economic
cooperation agreement were exchanged prior to negotiations
in May. The agreement, when concluded, will underline the
interest of both countries in promoting economic, industrial
and technical.cooperation and should provide some additional
facilities for American businessmen in Romania. Of
potential future significance was the appointment of three
special Romanian government counselors tasked,with the
promotion of trade with the US; they will report directly
to the Deputy Prime Minister/Minister of Foreign Trade
and Economic Cooperation. Hopefully, this will facilitate
imports from the US, as well as Romanian exports.
Poland
In Poland, access to end-users and business contacts
was satisfactory before August, 1975, and it has continued to
expand during the reporting period. New hotel space is under
construction, and a thirty-eight story Foreign Trade Center
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recently opened, alleviating the shortage of office
space. International Harvester has more than doubled
the extent of its industrial cooperation agreement with
its Polish partner enterprise for the manufacture of
earth moving equipment during the last year, and RCA
and Corning Glass are beginning activity under a $128
million agreement to produce color TV tubes. Currently
under negotiation is a General Motors proposal to produce
light vans. Although not complete by Western standards,
statistics on the economy are available and adequate to
conduct business.
Bulgaria
Since the Decree of December 19, 1975 authorizing
foreign firms with economic, technical, and production
agreements with Bulgaria to establish temporary repre
sentative agencies for periods up to two years, there
has been no activity involving US firms. Such agencies
would, in any case, be under the "guidance and control"
of Interpred, the official organization which deals
with foreign firms. The decree reflects recognition by
Bulgarian authorities of the need to cope with business
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practicalities, and the Bulgarians have entered into
several new cooperative agreements with foreign companies..
Nevertheless, American firms continue to be reluctant
to enter into such agreements, given the restrictive
conditions prevalent in Bulgaria.
USSR
There remain many restrictions and logistical
problems hindering business activity by foreign firms
in the Soviet Union. Ministries have the right to enter
into contact with foreign companies if they wish, but
access to end-users remains the exception rather than the
rule. Since August, 1975, four additional US firms have
been authorized to open Moscow offices, one application
was rejected, and one or two are expected to be approved
in the next reporting period. However, the rejection
rate does not include firms which are informally deterred
from submitting applications by the Soviets, or discouraged
by the extremely high cost of a Moscow office (at least
$200,000 per year initially). For our part, we treat
applications by Soviet firms cautiously because of internal
security problems.
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Accredited firms have been fairly treated when
applying for housing and office space, but the situation
is still difficult. and, in the case of hotels, growing
worse, since tour groups continue to receive precedence
over business applications. No change appears likely
before the end of the decade when the new Olympics facili.-
ties.and International Trade Center will open.
The Soviets remain sensitive about providing certain
economic statistics (e.g., grain crop forecast). Informa-
tion on trade legislation and bureaucratic organization
was exchanged at a joint seminar in Moscow in December,
1975.
The State Committee for Science and Technology
.currently has S and T agreements with 53 US companies,
an-increase of nine since the signing of the Final Act.
However, "joint ventures" in the Western sense of equity
ownership are not contemplated at this stage, and US
companies have little to gain from joint ventures within
the current restrictive legal and financial framework.
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- 23
Multilateral Activity
The main Basket II activity during the period
was in the multilateral arena. Some of this activity was based
on Soviet initiatives which were not directly related to the
specific terms of the Final Act. One example was the presen-
tation by the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMMA)
to the EC-9 of a draft umbrella cooperation agreement. The
Nine have pointed out, correctly, that discussion of a possible
CEMA-EC agreement pre-dates the CSCE, and that the CEMA
initiative is not an out-growth of the CSCE.
On February 16, East German Deputy Premier Gerhard
Weiss, in his capacity as CEMA Executive Committee Chairman,
tendered the draft CEMA proposals to Luxembourg Prime Minister
Gaston Thorn, in his role as President of the European Council
of Ministers. The CEMA initiative, which calls for establishing
official relations with the EC, appears intended as:
-- a major Communist CSCE Basket II initiative, the
onus.for rejection of which (or stalling in replying to)
would fall on the EC;
-- an attempt to elevate CEMA's stature as a
regional economic organization by equating it with the EC;
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-- a further effort by the Soviet Union to exercise
control over the bilateral economic relations of.its
Eastern Europe clients both with the Community and with.
individual EC member states by channelling them through
the CEM.A mechanism;
-- an attempt to extract economic concessions
from the EC as a price for its formal recognition by
CEMA.
Those purely economic elements which are proving
most contentious to the EC in considering a response to
the CEMA draft are the provisions for: 1. a blanket
application of 1IN by EC countries to CEMA countries;
2. elimination of non-tariff barriers, including QRs;
3. mutual consultations on measures to protect; the
.stability of domestic markets; 4. renunciation of
unilateral restrictions on agricultural products not
applied to third countries; 5. granting of credits on
the most favorable terms possible; and 6. preferential
treatment by the EC to those CEMA countries which are at
"an appropriate level of economic development."
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The Community is proceeding cautiously, and thus
slowly, in defining the issues presented by the CEMA
draft agreement and in considering an appropriate response.
It appears unlikely that the Nine will be prepared to
respond officially to CE_MA before autumn. Only then
could formal negotiations begin between the two bodies
on the language of an eventual agreement. In explicitly
linking their proposal to CSCE, moreover, the CEMA
countries (i.e. the Soviet Union) have put considerable
pressure on the EC to provide a substantive, forthcoming
response well in advance of the 1977 Belgrade follow-up
meetings or face the prospect of being accused of foot-
dragging on CSCE implementation.
Soviet-Proposed Conferences on Energy, Transportation
and'Environment
Another major Basket II-related initiative by the
East during the reporting period was the formal proposal
by the Soviet Union for convening all-European congresses
to deal with problems of energy, transport, and the
environment. This is a refinement of an idea first broached
by CPSU General Secretary Brezhnev in his speech at the 24th
Party Congress in 1972. it was renewed in his speech to
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the Polish party congress in December 1975. The Soviets
officially presented their proposal to Ambassador Stoessel
in Moscow Match 12. Other major Western countries were
given the proposal at about the same time.
In launching their proposal the Soviets noted
that the Final Act calls for cooperation in scientific
fields and that one form of such cooperation mentioned
in the Act is the holding of meetings to discuss scien-
tific, economic, and technical problems. The Soviets.
further stated that the Economic Commission for Europe
(ECE) is one organization mentioned in the Final Act
which could be utilized for scientific and technological
cooperation. The Soviets envisaged using the ECE to
"organize" their proposed congresses, and stated their
intention of formally submitting the idea at the 31st
annual plenary meeting of the ECE beginning at the end
of March. They also announced willingness to host the
energy.congress in Moscow this year.
Economic Commission for Europe. (ECE) Plenary
The US consulted fully with its Western partners
on the "Brezhnev Proposal" both at NATO and in the ECE
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Western Caucus prior to the opening of the ECE annual meet-
ing. A common view was quickly reached that the Soviet
initiative was essentially a propaganda ploy, largely devoid
of substance, intended: a) to demonstrate that the Soviets
take CSCE seriously by advocating significant, demonstrable
measures .aimed at full implementation; b) to mask Soviet
inactivity in Basket 2 'and in other more sensitive areas ofCSCE, such as freer movement of peoples and ideas; and c) to
gain more of a voice in.discussions of economic subjects going
on in Western Europe while controlling their Warsaw Pact
allies' involvement in these issues.
There was'less agreement in the West on how to
react to the Soviet initiative. Some initially suggested
outright rejection. Others-thought the proposals should be
relegated to ECE subsidiary technical bodies for study. The
.US position was that holding grandiose, all-European, CSCE-
like conferences was hardly a viable method of achieving
concrete East-West progress in the areas covered by
Basket II, and that we saw little in the Soviet proposals
to suggest that these congresses would result in the real
cooperation the CSCE participants desired. The US instead
proposed that the ECE adopt a limited number of specific,
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narrowly-defined projects for immediate implementation.
This approach found acceptance in the Western Caucus
during the course of the ECE meeting.
The ECE annual, meeting thus settled into an intense
round of East-West negotiation, with the Soviets seeking
first approval, then agreement in principle, and finally
mere expression of interest in the congresses idea. The
West, at the same time, worked for ECE approval of a
limited number of "special attention" projects for immediate
implementation. The final outcome was adoption of two
parallel and implicitly linked "decisions," both appended
to a broader resolution on the future activities of the
ECE. The decision on the Soviet proposal "noted the
interest" which had been expressed in it, "dreg the
attention" of the relevant subsidiary bodies to the topics
suggested for discussion at the proposed congresses,
"suggested" that ECE governments study the proposals,
and asked the ECE Executive Secretary to circulate such.
views on the proposals "as member governments may wish
to communicate to him."
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29 -
The projects decision called on the ECE to pay
"special attention" to all areas mandated to it in
the Final Act; to all other multilateral Basket II
proposals; and specifically to four concrete, limited
projects in the trade, environment, and transport areas,
in which early progress appears most feasible. It
called-on the competent subsidiary bodies to present
progress reports on ECE activities in these areas to
the 32nd session in April, 19770
Our assessment of the utility of the congresses
will be based primarily on our study of their substantive
implications and broader political considerations, but
Eastern cooperation in undertaking practical work on
the "special attention" projects, two of which are speci-
fically in the areas of environment and transport which
the Soviets wish to cover in their "congresses", could
be used by the Soviets to bargain for the convening of
the congresses. Most Western countries, however, remain
skeptical about holding any of the Soviet-proposed
congresses in the near future, whatever the degree of
Soviet cooperation-on Basket II projects.
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Despite the fact that the ECE meeting was engulfed
in consideration of the Soviet initiative, it managed
to approve a wide range of activities for implementation
over the near and. medium term. Many of these are Basket
II topics,. and all were drawn from a comprehensive review
of the ECE ongoing work program in the light of CSCE
prepared by ECE Executive Secretary Stanovnik.
Danish Symposium on Arctic Construction
We have recently received a query from the Danish
Government on our attitude toward a symposium. on construc-
tion technology, under Arctic conditions which Denmark
proposes to host in Greenland, in the context of Danish
CSCE follow-up, in September, 1.977. After consultations
.with the appropriate USG agencies. (HUD, EPA, DOD, etc.),
we have given a generally positive response to the idea,
but have suggested consultations with all the Western.
Allies in view of possible precedents which might be
established by the symposium. We are awaiting further
details from the Danes.
Results of Balkan Conference
Finally, the First Inter-Balkan Conference on
Economic and Technical Collaboration concluded on
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February 5 in Athens. Delegates from Bulgaria, Greece,
Romania, Turkey and Yugoslavia held discussions in six
sectors -.agriculture, commerce, energy, transport,
communications, and environment - in the "spirit of
Helsinki." A number of proposals, including an inter-
Balkan Chamber of Comm erce and a Balkan bank consortium,
indicated an improved overall climate in the area.
Bulgarian foot-dragging prevented a number of concrete
steps from being taken, including the establishment of
permanent subcommittees in the six sectors listed above
and the setting of a date for the next conference. It
seems unlikely, however, that Bulgaria alone will be
able to completely block future cooperation. The Greeks
were generally pleased with the results of the meeting,
and soon afterward hosted tripartite talks on industrial
collaboration (Greece, Romania, and Yugoslavia) in Athens.
They will also undertake to convene the second meeting
of the conference later this year with Albanian partici-
pation, if possible. We consider. this to be a favorable
trend as it permits contacts between East and West without
direct Soviet participation and control of their allies -
although Bulgaria was clearly acting as a Soviet surrogate
at the. Conference.
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C. QUESTIONS RELATING TO SECURITY AND COOPERATION
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
As noted in earlier quarterly reports, certain
actions taken by states independently of the CSCE can
be related to the very broad provisions of the Mediter-
ranean section of the Final Act. Thus, for example,
efforts by the US and other countries to promote a
Cyprus accord, or the US peace--keeping mission in the
Sinai can be depicted as efforts toward "lessening
tensions in the region", as recommended in the Final
Act. Similarly, other developments can be related to
Final Act provisions on promoting good-neighborly relations
strengthening security and improving economic relations
with.the "non-participating Mediterranean states".*
However, so far as we are aware, no CSCE state has
*In the CSCE context, the "non--participating Mediterranean
states" are Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Morocco, Syria and
Tunisia.
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chosen to explicitly link such activity to the Mediter-
ranean section of the Final Act.
As the CSCE follow-up meetings draw nearer, we
anticipate that some states, like Yugoslavia, which hope.
to expand the scope of the CSCE beyond Europe, and other
countries, like Malta, which have an intrinsic interest
in the Mediterranean section of.the Final Act, may begin
to draw attention to the provisions of this section.
One of the questions to be addressed at Belgrade is the
continuation of contacts with the Mediterranean littoral
states. Our attitude has been very cautious and prudent,
reflecting a general desire to avoid burdening European
security issues with the complexities of Mideast and
Mediterranean considerations.
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D. COOPERATION IN HUMANITARIAN AND OTHER FIELDS.
2. Information.
The US continued to stress the importance it
attaches to the human contacts and information provi-
sions of the Final Act during the February 1-April 30
reporting period, and we took several initiatives with the
communist countries related to these provisions. Addi-
tionally, we continued to exchange information with
the Allies at NATO about implementation of the provi-
sions on human contacts and information by the Eastern
countries.
There were but a few positive implementation
developments related to the CSCE in the communist countries,
and only limited progress was made. In addition, the
Communist states adopted more assertive positions,
attacking the US and the West for alleged non-fulfillment
of Basket III provisions on broadcasting and the exchange
of printed and filmed information.
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The Second Quarterly Report, covering the preceding
three month period, noted there had been an apparent
Communist, and particularly Soviet, effort to bring their
policy and procedures into line with CSCE provisions on
human contacts and information, but that it remained
to be seen whether these changes would have an effect
upon the peoples in the Eastern countries. While the
process of change is obviously a long-term matter, to date,
it appears that the lives of the Soviet and Eastern
European peoples have not been greatly affected by the
limited changes in Eastern practice that fall under the
Basket III provisions on human contacts and information. We
.will continue to press for progress in these fields in our
contacts with Eastern officials.
1. Human Contacts.
Family Reunification
The family reunification question continues to be
the subject of intense US interest and activity; there have
been further bilateral contacts with the Soviet and Eastern
European countries on this subject during the reporting period.
Ambassador Stoessel, following up on earlier representations,
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again raised the matter of divided families in a March 3
meeting in Moscow, expressing disappointment and noting that
the number of resolved family reunification cases on the US
Representation List seemed to be decreasing. On May 3,
the Soviets responded by claiming that their performance on.
this issue had been satisfactory, and that the number of
resolved cases had not declined. In fact, the overall
rate of emigration from the USSR to the US has increased
substantially during the first five months of 1976; our
Embassy in Moscow has processed 1,000 cases as opposed to
1,162 for all of 1975 and 1,029 for all of 1974. Soviet.
Jewish emigration was also up slightly during the reporting
period over last year's average, though the rate has not
approached that of the peak period of 1972-73. Although not
of direct concern to the US, FRG officials have provided us
with figures indicating a three-fold increase in ethnic German
emigration to the FRG from the USSR. The officials also have
stated that the (SCE made possible the FRG-Polish agreement
which has resulted in a large increase in ethnic German
emigration from Poland.
US implementation of the results of the CSCE is affected
in.some areas by restrictive provisions of the Immigration
and Nationality Act (INA). The Final Act calls on states to
facilitate the reunification of families, and "to facilitate
freer movement and contacts a . . and to contribute to the solo
tion of the humanitarian problems that arise in that connection
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However, it does not specifically recommend that states
abandon national entry restrictions.
Although we support the reunification of families
and the right of persons to freely emigrate, in certain
cases of Soviet emigrants, US law dictates the refusal of
documentation for onward travel on the basis of INA pro-
visions which call for such refusal due to past or present
Communist Party membership. There is provision in the INA
to waive this restriction if the visa applicant entered the
communist party "involuntarily". The Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service .(INS) Field Office in Rome has recently
refused visas on several occasions to Soviet emigrants due
to Communist Party membership, although the US Embassy in
Moscow had found them eligible for waivers on "involuntary"
grounds. The State Department is working with the INS on
a case-by-case basis to attempt to resolve the question of
these visa refusals so that these Soviet emigrants may be
allowed to enter the US. We may anticipate that if visas
are not issued.to such emigrants, the Eastern states could
and probably will cite this as an example of US non-
fulfillment of CSCE undertakings..
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The divided family issue continues to be a signi-
ficant irritant in US-Polish relations. Despite repeated
approaches to the-Polish Government on this question,
there has been no apparent change in rather strict Polish
policy on family reunification? Emigration to the US
continues at a relatively satisfactory rate in Romania,
but this is probably related more to the terms of the US
Trade Act and its provisions on emigration, than to the
CSCE. However, Romanian efforts to discourage emigration,
outlined in the last Quarterly Report, have elicited
charges of harrassment from relatives and others in the
US. The numbers of divided family cases in the GDR,
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary remain relatively
small in comparison with the USSR and Poland; neverthe-
less, we continue to foll.ew-up on family reunification
in these countries.
In February, the East German Ambassador in Washington
was told by Assistant Secretary Hartman that progress
in US-GDR divided family cases was expected. Also in February,
Ambassador Cooper made a similar presentation to the GDR
Foreign Minister in East Berlin. The US Charge in Prague
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took the same position on US-Czechoslovak family reuni-
fication cases in a meeting with Foreign Ministry
officials on March 2. our Ambassador in Budapest made a
similar presentation to the Hungarian Foreign Minister,
in March, and to the Prime Minister. in April. During a
visit to Sofia April 26-27, Secretary of Agriculture Butz
was informed by the Bulgarian authorities.that 42 of 72
cases of Bulgarians wishing to visit or.be reunited with
their families in the US would be given permission to do
so. To date, eight have been issued US visas.
The Hungarians have reduced the fee for emigration
passports from 1500 ($72) to 1000 florints ($48), a move
which is related to a CSCE provision which calls for
reduction of such fees to "a moderate level", and which
is similar to a reduction in the USSR reported in the
Second Quarterly Report. Our Embassy in Prague reports
there is no change in the Czechoslovak practice of
charging emigrants for the.expense of their state education;
such charges range from $30 to $1000.
The GAO has urged that US immigrant visa fees
be raised to cover costs, as required by law. As
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- 40 ?-
a result, the Department of State may be forced to raise
the US immigrant visa fees from $25 to $58 ($33 for
children under 16). While it could be argued that the
US fees remain "moderate" even at the increased level,
we can expect to. be strongly attacked in the CSCE context
by the Soviets and East Europeans for increasing the
immigrant visa fees, rather than lowering them as
specified in the Final Act.
Family Visits
Nationals in some communist countries such as Bulgaria,
Czechoslovakia.:and Hungary continue to be refused permis-
sion to visit relatives in the US who left their native
countries "illegally" (i.e., without official permission).
Naturalized American citizens wishing to return to their
homelands are also sometimes refused visas on the grounds
that they left their native countries "illegally". Add.i?
tionally Americans wishing to visit relatives in certain
East European countries, are occasionally refused visas for
being "politically undesirable"', or because their relatives
are "bearers of secrets". According to the American.
Embassy in Bucharest, it may be more difficult for
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Romanians to obtain permission to travel abroad for a
visit than to emigrate. It is estimated that 10-12%
of Romanians traveling abroad do not return. The GDR
continues to grant exit permits with little difficulty
to persons over 65 to visit relatives in the US. However,
GDR citizens under 65 are rarely allowed to leave. We
again raised family visits in Moscow and other Eastern
capitals during the reporting period, expressing dissatis-
faction with performance in this area.
Bi-national Marriages
Practice in the East on bi-national marriages
continues to vary widely. In recent years the Soviet
Union has moved from a position of active opposition to
reluctant tolerance. In March, Ambassador Stoessel expressed
disappcintment to Soviet officials on the lack of progress on
US-USSR bi-national marriage problems; the situation in this
area in the Soviet Union remains virtually unchanged since
the last Quarterly Report. By comparison, the policy'
on bi-national marriages is less severe in Poland, Hungary,
and even in Czechoslovakia, although delays of up to six
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months are experienced before the spouse in these
countries is processed to leave for the US.
In the GDR, the fiancee of an American citizen
was discharged from her teaching position as aaresult of her_
planned marriage and emigration. We protested this action
in connection with the CSCE provision that prospective
emigrants should not suffer penalties because of their
intention to leave. In Bulgaria, the case mentioned in the
Second Quarterly Report of a woman promised, then refused,
permission to emigrate after marriage to an American,
is nearing a satisfactory conclusion. After her case
was raised during Secretary Butz' visit, she received
new travel documents and is awaiting a French visa to
join her husband in Paris. Practice in Romania on
bi-national marriages has grown more restrictive since
Helsinki, with the Romanians claiming that this is due
to the massive return of disenchanted Romanian spouses
from the West.
The reasons for refusing visas to American citizens,
noted under Family visits, are also occasionally used-
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to prevent Americans from entering communist countries
for the purpose of marriage.
Travel for Personal or Professional Reasons
On March 4, Congressman Fraser asked the Secretary
at a Congressional hearing how US refusal of visas to
Communist Party members related to CSCE provisions on
the freer movement of people and ideas. In a later
written response, the Secretary explained that the CSCE
Final Act does not affect US law, including the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act which governs the issuance and
refusal of US visas to aliens who are Communist Party
members. It was further stated that the Congress has
the prerogative to change the visa law if. it wishes to do
so, and that the Department of State stands ready to
discuss such changes in light of the CSCE and the Presi-
dent?.s statements at Helsinki on the intention of the US
to fully implement the provisions of the Final Act.
The communists continue to complain about such
visa refusals, and about what they claim is undue delay
in issuing US visas. As noted in the Second Quarterly
Report, we are reviewing US visa procedures to determine
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what changes can be made in US practice, taking into
account the Final Act and US law; we anticipate this
review may be completed by the end of the period covered
by the next quarterly report. In connection with the
modification of US visa practice, for the Summer Olympic
games in Montreal, waivers of visa ineligibility because
.of Communist Party membership will be granted for multiple
entries rather than single entry into the US between
June 17 and August :31. This measure may affect a certain
number of travelers fr?m Eastern Europe and the USSR. The
Department is also studying the feasibility of issuing
multiple entry visas for long-term participants in the
Special Exchanges Program for exchange visitors from
several communist countries.
The. Final Act provides that states should lower
non-immigrant visa (NIV) fees to promote travel. In,
cases where foreign states charge NIV fees to American
citizens, by law the US reciprocates by charging similar
fees to their citizens. Among CSCE states, only Bulgaria,
Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Hungary and Poland continue to
charge such fees. in April, we instructed our embassies
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in these countries to make a presentation citing the
CSCE and calling on the host governments to reduce-NIV
fees charged to American citizens down to a no-fee status,
in which case the US would also eliminate its NIV fees,
The governments concerned promised to respond after
studying our. proposal.
There has been little change in restrictive Communist
practice during the reporting period regarding permission
for their citizens to travel abroad for tourism or pro-
fessional reasons. Aside from obtaining the necessary
travel documents, Soviet and Eastern European travelers
also continue to face difficulties in acquiring hard
currency for expenses in the West. In some instances
hard currency restrictions may be as great a barrier
to travel as hard-to-get travel documents. The cost
of documents remains generally lower for travel to
other communist states, than to the West.
A recent. change iri GDR regulations permits East
Germans to pay for trips to the US of less than 45 days
in GDR currency. This permits East Germans to finance
their own trips and relieves them from depending on hard
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currency sent from abroad by relatives or friends. on
the other hand, the GDR also obliges its citizens to
travel on the East German airline to Copenhagen for
onward connections to the US, thereby denying them access
to cheap charter flights from the FRG to the US.
have brought this problem to the attention of the GDR
authorities.
The Soviets and Eastern Europeans claim that their
citizens may travel abroad freely, and cite impressive
figures to support this contention. They do not, however,.
explain that the great majority of these travelers are
to other Eastern countries, and only a tiny fraction go
to the. West.
On March 3, Ambassador Stoessel informed a Soviet
official that the US was eliminating certain zones in
the US which had been temporarily closed to travel by Soviet
diplomats, in reciprocity for similar temporarily closed zones
in the USSR, and invited a Soviet response. The official Soviet
reply of May 3 simply "noted our proposal, but informally
Soviet officials have indicated that they are considering
the possibility of reciprocal action. (The US temporarily
closed zones exceed those temporarily closed by the Soviets.)
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We.have also formally proposed to the Bulgarians
and Czechoslovaks that all zones closed to our diplomats
be reciprocally eliminated. Closed zones no longer exist
in other Eastern European countries.
Several months ago the Soviets proposed consular
review talks on subjects of mutual interest. We accepted
this proposal, envisaging discussion of such CSCE-related
subjects as multiple entry/exit visas for US businessmen
and students resident in the USSR. The Soviets have post-
.poned the talks without explanation. We will continue to
pursue subjects such as students' and businessmens' visas on
an individual basis. On May 3, we received an ambiguous
indication from a Soviet official that the USSR might be
willing to accord multiple entry/exit visas to either
businessmen or students. In a related development, the
Romanians have approached us concerning visa facilitation
for Romanian businessmen, and we have this matter under
consideration.
Consular Conventions
The US-Czechoslovak Consular Convention still
requires Czechoslovak ratification in order to enter
into force,'and the Czechoslovaks continue to promise
ratification will occur soon. Negotiations on the US-GDR
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Consular Convention continue, but with the thorny question
of a definition of nationality yet to be resolved.
Religious Contacts and Information
According to Vatican sources there have been some
slight improvements in the religious field in the wake
of the CSCE. These include larger numbers of pilgrims
permitted to travel abroad by some communist countries;
priests in Rome allowed in some instances to visit their
families in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland; a limited
amount of printed religious material permitted into
Hungary and Czechoslovakia; the possibility of naming
new bishops in Bulgaria and Hungary; and the GDR and
Czechoslovakia appearing to be somewhat more forthcoming
on religious matters. According to the Vatican, similar
developments have not occured in the USSR, aside from
a change permitting the importation of religious material
into the Baltic States.
During the reporting period, an American rabbi
reported to the American Embassy in Moscow that the
Soviets were much more hospitable and cooperative toward
him than during previous visits. The Soviets facilitated
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meetings between the rabbi and government officials and
religious leaders.. In March-April a ten-man Soviet reli-
gious delegation visited the US as the guests of the Appeal
of Conscience Foundation and had discussions with co-
religionists in New York and Washington, and with several
members of Congress and State Department Officials. The
Polish Government is cooperating with a group of US
rabbis on the restoration of Jewish cemeteries in Poland.
Tourism; Meetings among Young People; Sport;
Expansion of Contacts
On March 3, Ambassador Stoessel informed Soviet
authorities of the plan, mentioned in the Second Quarterly
Report, to establish in Moscow a Visit USA Committee -
comprised of local .American businessmen and US Embassy
officials to promote tourism to the US. A Committee
has now been established and will meet with Soviet
officials to propose a number of steps designed to
promote Soviet tourist travel to the US.
A barrier to Western tourism to the East continues
to be the requirement to arrange pre-paid package tours
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through government travel agencies, such as Intourist
in the USSR, or to change a certain amount of hard
currency per day of stay. In the latter case the amount
may be as much as $10 for each family member. This
requirement places a heavy burden on persons planning
to stay with relatives for extended periods of time.
However, some Eastern European countries have reduced
hard currency exchange requirements for such visitors.
There were no major youth exchanges with the
Soviet Union or Eastern Europe during the reporting
period. The American Council of Young Political Leaders
(ACYPL) has, in certain cases, reduced the size of
delegations it sends and receives under the exchange with
the Soviet Committee on Youth Organizations (CYO).
Activities of the ACYPL and CYO are discussed further
in this report under. Cooperation and Exchanges in the
Field of Culture.
Despite our.efforts to promote full American parti-
cipation in the European Youth Security Conference, and
support from some Western'European youth groups, American
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representatives were not invited to preparatory meetings
by the communist-dominated youth organization which is
organizing the Conference. The Conference will address
the relationship between the CSCE and youth activities
and other questions.
Sports exchanges have continued to be active.
East European skiers competed in World Ski Cup competi-
tion at Aspen, Colorado in March. Also in March, a Soviet
coach took part in an international basketball seminar
in Philadelphia and Washington. The Moscow Junior
Basketball Team began a US tour in April.
In February, the American Athletic Union sent a
team to a track and field meet in Leningrad. Americans
competed in World Team Tennis in Moscow in March. In
Poland, American teams played in the world ice hockey
championship and competed in world junior fencing competi-
tion; both events occurred in March.
The Communist states remain sensitive .to the provi-
sions of the Final Act calling for expansion of contacts
among organizations and associations. In this regard,
a high-level-Soviet official on May 3 complained about
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the continuing US practice of refusing visas to certain
Communist groups. The Soviets are especially concerned
about visa refusals to Soviet trade union delegations
wishing to travel officially to the US to visit American
trade unions.
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2. Information.
Oral, Printed, Filmed and Broadcast Information;
Cooperation in Field of Information
The Soviet Union and Eastern European states have
continued to attack US and other Western international
broadcasting as being contrary to the CSCE provisions.
We continue to point out that the Final Act provisions
express the hope for a reduction in jamming, do not
concern the substance of broadcasts, and commit states
to a wider dissemination of all kinds of information.
These positions'were reiterated in discussions between
US and communist officials in Moscow and Prague during the
reporting period, but criticism of Western broadcasting
continued in the Soviet and Eastern European media.
On the occasion of the lapse of the. lease on
Radio Liberty facilities in Spain, the Soviets complained
that RL broadcasts were not in keeping with the CSCE in.
an apparent attempt to influence. the Spanish on renewal,
of the lease. We instructed our Embassy in Madrid to
point out to the Spanish that the Soviets had no grounds
for such complaints in view of their CSCE commitment "to
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facilitate the freer and wider dissemination of informa-
tion of all kinds." The Spanish are also committed to
that undertaking as a CSCE signatory state.
As the result of Soviet and Eastern European
protests to the International Olympic Committee (IOC),
the press accreditation of RFE newsmen to the Winter
Olympic Games was revoked. On February 13, Secretary
Kissinger protested the IOC's decision and requested,
that accreditation be restored. We understand that
the IOC is studying-the question of RFE, as well as Radio
Liberty (RL), press accreditation for the 1976 Summer
Games in Montreal, and that RFE and RL are taking steps
to assure such accreditation. The State Department has
expressed support for a Senate Resolution (SRA13) concerning
the revocation of RFE accreditation at the Winter Games
and freedom of the press at the Olympics.
There has been no reported change in Communist jamming
of US radios. VOA is not jammed; RFE is jammed in varying
degree in the Eastern European countries; and RL is jammed
in the USSR. Broadcasts of Radio in the American Sector
(BIAS) of Berlin are jammed by the GDR on medium wave but.
not on FM and short wave frequencies.
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The Soviet and Eastern European states have adopted
an assertive position on dissemination of printed and filmed
information, by continuing to claim that more Western
publications (not including news related materials) and films
are available in the East, than communist books and films
in the West. Copious statistics ure cited to support
this argument. For example, a Polish newspaper article
on March 9 compared the number of hours that US and other
Western films were shown on Polish TV, with the much lower
number of hours that Polish films were shown on Western
TV. Our response to this reasoning is that the CSCE was
intended to lower barriers to the flow of information, and
that we should seek to achieve this aim by allowing people,
not governments, to decide what they wish to see and read.
The availability of Western newspapers and news
magazines remains highly restricted in the communist:
countries, with such publications being customarily
obtainable only in places frequented by Western visitors..
However, the situation in Poland does not seem quite as
harsh as the other. Eastern states. For example, 1,105
copies of Newsweek are reportedly distributed, weekly in
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Poland, compared to 545 in Hungary, 261 in the USSR
and 161 in Czechoslovakia. In Romania, 96 copies of
Newsweek and 68 copies of the Paris Herald Tribune are
normally available; this number is increased to 136 copies
of Newsweek and 128 of the Tribune during the tourist season..
Following up on the Soviet announcement, noted in
the Second Quarterly Report, that the number of Western
newspapers imported into the Soviet Union was increased
to 18, American Embassy officials in Moscow requested an
appointment with the Director of the Soviet agency respon-
sible for newspaper distribution to discuss the matter.
The only difference noted in availability of newspapers
in Moscow is that they are now on display, rather than
under the counter, in places frequented by foreigners. A
similar situation prevails in Hungary,-although the number
of Western news magazines seems to have declined. The Buigar l
continue to claim that the number of Western newspapers ailowe<
into Bulgaria has increased, but our Embassy in Sofia has,
noted nothing to support this claim. Our Embassies uniformly
report from Eastern Capitals that the situation regarding
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availability of newspapers and news magazines.to?the
Soviet and East European peoples remains unchanged since
Helsinki.
There has been additional cooperation ;in the.field
of information during the reporting period., A - limited
exchange of films with the Soviet Union continues; the
Soviets specifically requested Walt Disney films to mark
the anniversary of Disney's birth. PBS officials visited
the USSR during the period under review, and Soviet.
newsman Pavel Kuznetsov participated in a Syracuse
University journalists' program. Our Embassy in Budapest
reports modest success in placing US films, TV and radio
items with the Hungarian media.
Working Conditions for Journalists
In March, Ambassador Stoessel proposed regular US-
USSR consultations in Moscow to discuss working conditions
for journalists. On May 3, the Soviets gave grudging
approval to.this idea. In the meantime, US.officials
met with aSoviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs press..
official and discussed wider travel opportunities and
greater access by Western journalists to Soviet officials,
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and the Soviet refusal of a visa to a VOA correspondent.
Two modest advances in Soviet practice on journalists
were noted during the reporting period. A West German
TV cameraman was, for the first time, accredited as a
journalist, thereby allowing him greater freedom of move-
ment and other advantages. Also, official Soviet permis-
sion is no longer needed to export films and tape recordings.
It appears that journalists over.a period of time simply
no longer bothered to submit these materials for approval,
and the Soviets did not complain.
Reciprocal issuance of multiple -entry visas for
journalists by the US and the GDR has been held up by
GDR refusal to accredit American correspondents stationed
in Bonn and West Berlin. We consider this to be an
unreasonable limitation on the activities of US journalists.,
There were mixed results on visa issuances to American
journalists by Czechoslovakia. One American newsman was
denied a visa to cover the Czechoslovak Communist Party
Congress; however, three other US journalists, previously
denied visas, were let in during the reporting period.
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American journalists familiar with Czechoslovakia believe
that the general situation there for Western newsmen
remains unchanged or has worsened since Helsinki. Our
embassies in other Eastern capitals report that American
journalists have obtained visas and visited the countries
in question without difficulty.
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D. COOPERATION IN HUMANITARIAN AND OTHER FIELDS.
3. Cooperation and Exchanges in the Field
of Culture.
4. Cooperation and Exchanges in the Field
of Education.
The cultural and educational provisions of the
Final Act continued during the reporting period to be
less controversial than the sections of Basket III
covering Human Contacts and Information, though (as
noted below) they are not totally immune to politicization.
Implementation for the most part has been absorbed into
bilateral exchange programs and multilateral programs
developed prior to the CSCE. Progress towards implementa-
tion of these Basket III provisions continued the previous
trend of gradually expanding East-West cultural and
educational relations. As in the past, broader implementa-
tion of the cultural and educational sections of the
Final Act is limited by ideological differences, national
interests and availability of :Funds.
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Some developments during the reporting period
were positive. On February 27, talks on a US-Czechoslovak
bilateral agreement on cultural, scientific and technical
exchanges, suspended in early 1974 dueto the initiation
of.negotiations over claims settlements, were resumed,
in Prague.. Negotiations on similar bilateral exchange
agreements, noted in the last Quarterly Report, are also
proceeding with Hungary and Bulgaria.
Within the framework of the US-Soviet exchange
agreement, the first seminar with the Soviets on higher
education focusing on selection and guidance of.students
and comparison of degrees - was held March 15-17 at the
Educational Testing-Service (ETS) in Princeton, New Jersey.
Participants agreed to hold a second seminar on higher
education in Moscow in the fall.
Bilateral talks were held with Romania.and Poland,
February 11-12-and March 2-3, respectively,.on the status
of exchanges. Begun in 1974, the third round of informal
cultural/information talks with Polish officials touched
upon a variety of topics ranging from education,. publishing
and textbooks, to films, TV, and the sister cities program.
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Such talks have proved to be a useful mechanism for
reviewing cultural and educational affairs in lieu of a
formal cultural exchange agreement. During the mid-term
review talks with Romania, attention centered on the
administrative difficulties the US has encountered in
implementing the existing US-Romanian exchanges agree--
mente Despite these problems, which remain far from
resolved, the fact that Deputy Foreign Minister.Vasili.
Gliga was designated to head this delegation indicates
the importance that Romania attaches to the 1974 exchanges
agreement.
As a result of a seminar held last November, the
Association of American Publishers has formulated, and
the Government Advisory Committee on International Book
and Library Programs has endorsed, a set of proposals
for implementing, with limited expenditure of public or
private funds, certain information and cultural provisions
of the Final Act. The feasibility of implementing the
publishers' recommendations ?- which include reinstit ,.
tion of the Informational Media Guaranty Program, esta-
blishment of an American Bookstore in Moscow, seminars
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on publishing and bookselling, and exchanges of publishing
and library personnel - was discussed recently ata
meeting of representatives from the public and private
sectors at the Department of State.
At the same time, there were some negative develop-
ments during the reporting period. Noting that US
journalists had visited dissidents and had written highly
critical articles on the USSR, the Soviet Committee on
Youth Organizations (CYO) informed the American Council
of Young Political Leaders (ACYPL) that it was terminating
the young journalists exchange program initiated two
years ago. However, the CYO also indicated it plans to
continue its participation in the young political leaders
exchange program which may include young journalists.
Because of reduced funding for their programs, the ACYPL was
agreeable to dropping the young journalists exchange.
The Soviets and their Allies have attempted to distort
agreed provisions of the CSCE through draft resolutions intro-
duced in the UNESCO framework relating to the work of,UNESCO ir.-
Implementing the provisions of the CSCE Final Act. These attempt
have thus far been effectively countered by joint Western
efforts. In a separate UNESCO project several communist and
non-aligned states have been drafting a resolution on
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working conditions for journalists. The most recent
versions have ignored the basic foundation of a free
press, as well as the East-West compromises on this
subject arrived at in the CSCE, to such an extent that
the Western nations have indicated they will no longer
participate in the drafting process.
The Soviets also appear to have been behind a move
to bar US and Canadian participation in the Conference
of European University Rectors (CRE) held in Trieste,
Italy, May 27-29. In. response, we consulted with our
NATO Allies and indicated to the Council of Rectors
that if the Trieste meeting was intended to focus on
implementation of the CSCE, we would expect equivalent
US groups or individuals to receive treatment equal to
that accorded groups from other CSCE signatory states.
Taking similar positions, France, the FRG, the UK, and
Canada decided not to send official representatives to
this CRE conference.
From a broader perspective, a basic substantive
obstacle to further implementation remains the East's
reluctance to facilitate greater access and direct
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65
contacts in the development of cultural and educational
programs. Citing their ideological responsibility to
protect "socialist culture" from "bourgeois" tendencies,
Eastern governments, except Poland, continue to regulate
contacts with the West through central control mechanisms.
The East has recently in some instances slightly modified
its insistence on total bureaucratic regulation, and the
Soviet trend appears to be to seek some direct contacts.
The US Embassy in Moscow, for example, is now able to approach.
many Soviet institutions without going through a maze
of official coordination channels. Moreover, officials
of-the Soviet Ministry of Higher Education as well as
Moscow and Leningrad Universities have been. seeking to
establish direct exchanges between US universities and.
their Soviet counterparts.
While such developments are encouraging, they
nevertheless remain limited. Direct efforts to broaden
.points of access and facilitate direct contacts are
still viewed suspiciously and are often countered
with charges of Western interference in internal.
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affairs. Experience has shown that a more natural, if slower
way to achieve our goals is through the long-term "ripple
effect" of existing programs, whereby contacts initiated
through government-to-government programs evolve into
long-standing institutional, professional and personal
relationships. This "ripple effect" generates pressure
on Eastern governments from their own people and insti-
tutions for-more exchanges, thus gradually moving imple-
mentation closer to our fundamental freer movement
approach that people rather than governments should
determine cultural and educational relationships.
A second positive trend - albeit halting, as in
the case of access and direct contacts - is the gradual
diversification of activities within existing bultural.
and educational programs. The East, quite naturally,
has emphasized exchanges in areas which promise to
augment its economic development and/or are ideologically
"safe". For our part, we have been urging a better
balance in academic exchanges between the physical
sciences and the social sciences and humanities. Thus
in addition to the traditional fields of history,
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literature and language, the US is making efforts to include
other disciplines - particularly in the social sciences -
in exchanges. While progress in this direction has been spotty,
in part because most US applicants for the programs are from
the "traditional" fields, there have been some positive results.
Another factor affecting US implementation of the
Final Act provisions on culture and education is the avail-
ability of funding. To help offset the partial loss of
Ford Foundation funding, the Department of State agreed
during the reporting period to increase its grant to the
International Research and Exchanges Program (IBEX) from
$615,000 to $875,000 in FY 76 to support academic exchanges
with the USSR. While this increase is causing a severe
financial strain and is forcing the Department to make
some difficult decisions affecting other programs with
the Eastern European countries, funds exist to maintain.
essential programs at an adequate level in all countries.
There will, however be rio room for growth in FY 77 except
in Hungary, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia.where rather
modest programs will be expanded. Moreover, this problem
will be aggravated further.in FY 77 when IREX loses
another $200,000 of its Ford Foundation funding.
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In view of the funding and other factors, our
approach has been to establish whether a specific subject
or idea is of interest to us, and then to see if the
CSCE language can be used to obtain what we want. The
US has not undertaken cultural and educational exchange
activities simply because of CSCE; there has to be a
specific US interest in specific projects. At the same
time we have been mindful of the Belgrade follow-up
meetings and the need to present and defend a positive
implementation record. On this latter score, the East -
as noted in the last Quarterly Report - has taken the
offensive. Citing what has now become a statistical
litany of the imbalances between East and west in the
circulation of cultural and educational materials (e.g.
books, films, etc.), the USSR and its allies have pressed
for acceptance of the principle of "reciprocity" with the
concomitant aim of deflecting criticism of Soviet and
Eastern European implementation on more sensitive freer
movement provisions of Basket III. In parrying this
offensive, we have maintained close consultations with
our NATO Allies and have coordinated our responses
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with the Allies so that the fundamental Western freer
movement principle is not obscured by the East's
statistical polemics.
Along this line, normal US bilateral consulta-
tions with allies and neutrals were supplemented during
the.reporting period by a meeting in Washington of
NATO's East-West Contacts Working Group to discuss
cultural and educational exchanges, March 22-24. Such
consultations have proven to be extremely valuable,
not only in helping to coordinate positions, but in
providing an opportunity to share experiences and develop
mutually supportive programs.
Set out below are specific examples of activities
in the educational and cultural fields covered by
Basket III.
3. Cooperation and Exchanges in the Field
of Culture.
While most activities related to the cultural
provisions of the Final Act are carried out through
bilateral agreements, multilateral fora also have enacted
programs to encourage implementation. During the reporting
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period, the Finnish National commission for UNESCO issued,
with the support of UNESCO, invitations to experts
from all National Commissions of the European Region
for a symposium August 27-26 on the principles and form
of international cultural cooperation. Other ongoing
UNESCO activities include studies on setting up a cul-
tural data bank, exchanges of information about cultural
festivals, encouraging cooperation in the protection
of artistic works and sites of cultural interest, and
international training courses for specialists.
Bilaterally, the USSR continues to be the United
States' largest exchanges partner in the East. The
Soviet Exhibit, "Scientific Siberia," continued its
visit to the US, being shown in Fort Worth and Salt
Lake City during the reporting period. In addition to
its scheduled future stops in Seattle and Chicago, the
Soviets have requested and we have agreed to extend
the exhibit.to three additional American cities in the
latter half of 1976. Contracts for two American exhibits -
"Photography USA", to be shown in three Soviet cities
in the latter half of 1976, and a special Bicentennial
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Exhibit, to be shown in Moscow, November .12 - December 13,
1976 were signed April 20. Unfortunately, however, the
exchange of young students in the performing arts with the
Soviets is not progressing so well. Since agreed to in
.1972, we have been able to place only two Americans in
the USSR under this program.
The Soviets have recently accepted a jazz band from
North Texas State University for a tour in June and July.
The Don Cossacks of Rostov dance troupe completed a
two-month tour of the US in April.. In other cultural
areas, the Soviets have been critical.of the American
film sector -- despite the recent awarding of an Oscar
to the Soviet movie "Dersu Uzala", as best foreign film,
and the American Film Institute's sponsoring of a festival
of Soviet classic films at the Kennedy Center.during
March and April. In particular the Soviets charge the.
Motion Picture Association of America with halting the
distribution of Soviet films in the.US and blocking American
participation in the Sixth Moscow International festival.
Such charges dovetail with the broader Soviet statistical
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offensive on Basket III implementation which has recently
been summarized in a 62-page pamphlet entitled "The
Truth about Culture Exchanged"
In the publishing field, the chairman of the US
Government Advisory Committee on International Book and
Library Programs reports that efforts at cooperation
are making steady, albeit slow, progress. This spring
the Association of American Publishers hosted a delega-
tion of Soviet publishers and copyright agency personnel
in a prelude to the US-USSR seminar on publishing tenta-
tively scheduled to be held in Moscow this fall. The
American Library Association (ALA), which planned to
send a delegation to the USSR this spring in return for
the Soviet librarian delegation which visited the US last
fall, has had to defer the trip, due to Department of
State budgetary constraints, until this fall. The AID.,
which is showing renewed interest in international
exchanges, has proposed future discussions with the
Soviets in the areas of library planning, service to
ethnic and minority groups, and training library personnel.
A related development was the Binational Literature
Symposium held at Indiana University, April 8-11.
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An exhibit of paintings from six US museums opened
in Leningrad in February. This exhibit will tour the
.Soviet Union in exchange for the exhibit of European
and Russian Masters from the Hermitage and Russian State
Museum which concluded its tour of the US during the
reporting period. This exchange was arranged privately
by the Armand Hammer Foundation, as was an exhibition
of paintings by the Soviet artist Nikolai Feshin which
also toured the US during the reporting period.
In Eastern Europe, the development of cultural
relations continues. An indication of the scope
for further exchanges is the fifty percent increase in
the number of East European applicants for the American
Council of Learned Societies American Studies,Program for
1976-77 over the previous high of forty applicants. Another
general indicator in this regard was the positive recep-
tion during the reporting period of Sister Cities Inter-
national officials in?their visits to Hungary, Poland,
Romania and Yugoslavia. -
On a country by country basis, Iowa University
-Press published the first collection in English of
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works by contemporary Bulgarian poets. A Bulgarian
publishing house, in turn, is preparing a collection
entitled Modern American and English Poetry. Hungary
for the first time has nominated ten candidates for
individual International Visitors grants, and is also
displaying increased receptivity to American visitors
sponsored by USIA and the Department of State. In
addition to the cultural/information talks in March, the
Department of State discussed with the president of the
Polish Authors Association the possibility of using blocked
zloty accounts in Poland for exchanges of US and Polish
writers. There have, however, been no recent developments
on this.
In the GDR, cultural as well as academic exchanges
continue to be essentially a one-way street and American
publications remain unavailable to local nationals, except
through restricted libraries and controlled subscriptions.
The number of commercial US films shown, however, has increased
in the past few months (though titles appear to be selected
on.the basis of critical content toward US or Western
society). This development coincides with the assessment
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of Dr. Heinz Kosim of the GDR Institute for Politics
and Economics that the upper echelons of the party
strongly opposed easing of the policy on printed informa-
tion, but would concentrate instead on bringing in
more Western films. Along this line and in return
for the GDR film retrospective sponsored by the New
York Museum of Modern Art.last December, the US has.
proposed a retrospective showing of US films in the
GDRO As yet, however, we have received no response
to this offer. ..
During the reporting period, the US also planned,
with apparent GDR approval, to show a US exhibit on
Working America at the March Leipzig Trade Fair. The
GDR at the last minute balked on a thematic rather than
trade exhibit, and only after the US noted that the denial
of the exhibit was not in keeping with the provisions
of the CSCE, and that under the circumstances we would
not be represented at the Leipzig Fair at all, did the
GDR agree to the Working America Exhibit. The exhibit
proved very successful and we have been invited to
sponsor another such exhibit at next year's Leipzig Fair.
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While the Romanians remain interested in main-
taining cultural and scientific exchanges with us at
current levels, for various reasons --- including a
strong emphasis on the applied sciences and concern
over potential defections -- it has become increasingly
difficult in recent months for Romanians nominated
for the various programs to receive passports... As
a result of these and other difficulties, American
institutions have become increasingly reluctant to
involve themselves in exchanges with Romania.
4. Cooperation and Exchanges in the Field
of cation.
As with cultural programs, developments in educa-
tional exchanges during the reporting period centered on
relations with the USSR. In addition to the first US-
USSR seminar on higher education, a six-person Soviet
delegation came to visit the Educational Resources
Information Center, and to study US education information
in general. During their visit, this Soviet delegation
noted the USSR Ministry of Education's interest in
developing a summer language training program for teachers-
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of English and Russian at the secondary school level.
(The present bilateral US-USSR agreement encompasses
a language program in both secondary and higher education.)
Another positive development has been the establishment
at Moscow University of a council and what in effect will
be a center of American Studies. In addition to sponsoring
a series of special courses on American economf.cs, geo-
graphy, history and law, the university plans in October
to conduct a conference of American studies specialists
devoted to the bicentennial, and to publish a journal
entitled "Problems in American Studies".
From the US side, Temple University has proposed
an in-service teacher education exchange with the Soviet
Ministry of Education. In response, the Soviets have
agreed to send a delegation this fall to observe programs
in this area at Temple-University. The Soviets have
also accepted the first American Fulbright lecturer at
Minsk who will teach physics at the Byelorussian Poly-
technic Institute. In the area of broader access and
.contacts, several American universities or groups of
universities have proposed during the reporting period
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to establish direct exchanges with their Soviet cccTmter--
parts o Finally, the National Academy of Sciences is
moving ahead to send 10-12 American psychologists
to visit the Institute of Psychology of the Soviet
Academy of Sciences this summer to discuss plans for
a series of joint seminars on scientific research to
be held over the next several years.
In Eastern Europe, educational exchange programs
continued during the reporting period to be augmented
by the US Fulbright and Arerican Specialists programs.
In addition, a delegation of eleven US state school
officers visited Poland, April 3-7, and Willamette
University in Salem, Oregon, reached an agreement with
Zagreb University to send 25 students for a two-month
program in Yugoslavia this fall.
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E. FOLLOW UP TO THE CONFERENCE.
There will be two follow-up meetings in Belgrade
in 1977. The first, to begin June 15, 1977, is pre-
paratory in nature and will. decide on.the dates, duration,
agenda and other details related to the second meeting,
which is to be held at the senior-official level before
the end of 1977. The Final Act suggests a broad agenda.-
for the second meeting: a review of implementation;
possible new substantive proposals; continuation of
contacts with the Mediterranean littoral states; and
modalities for further follow-up.arrangements.
Diplomatic activity related to the follow7up
meetings intensified during the reporting period. The
Yugoslavs, who will host the meetings,, began consulta-
tions on preparations by calling together in Belgrade
.local diplomatic representatives from neutral and non-
aligned CSCE countries on march 3. Representatives from
Austria, Sweden, Switzerland and Finland, the four most
significant CSCE neutral states, met in. Helsinki on
April 29-30 to discuss the follow-up meetings; another
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such meeting is scheduled for October in Viennnae. Special
Soviet emissaries have visited neutral and other CC(
states to make known their government's views an CSCE;
and the follow-up arrangements. Additionally, the
Romanians have been particularly active in consulting
with states on CSCE.
At a CSCE experts meeting held at NA'O in H'a h,
the question of the follow-up meetings was discussed;
a similar Allied meeting is scheduled for the fall- At, a March 29 North Atlantic Council meeting on Last-West
relations, the Counselor of the State Department suggested
that Ministers should address the follow-up meetings in
a preliminary way at the Oslo NATO Ministerial meeting
on May 20-21. Most Allies agree that we should begin
our preparations in order to shape the Belgrade meetings
to meet Western objectives.
Broad indications of Eastern, neutral and wester
positions on the follow-up meetings are emerging. The
communists appear to favor brief meetings that would
reaffirm the value of the CSCE and would not dwell on
the question of a review of implementation. The neutrals
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envisage relatively long meetings at which new proposals
might be made and East-West recriminations on imple-
mentation should be avoided. The US and NATO Allies
tend to stress the need to review implementation at
Belgrade and are developing ideas on other aspects of
the follow-up meetings.
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