THE LEBANON EVACUATION TASK FORCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79M00467A002500160012-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 7, 2004
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: July 1, 1976
• Content Type: MF

My remarks to N
colleagues h
for direc
.in a cr
ch an
.ma
s and other DDI and DDO
stressed the requirement
and personal support to the DCI
is. This support should be
ed.'through the task force for
m efficiency.:
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MEMORANDUM,FOR: William K. Parmenter
July 1, 1976
25X1A
The Lebanon Evacuation Task Force
1. The Lebanon Evacuation Task Force was activated at 25X1A
approximately 1130 on Friday the 18th of June. My association
with it began upon my return to-Headquarters from
at 1330 that day. The next two days provided.all o us valu-
able experience with the new Task Force area and the support
procedures developed for it. We also received some indications
of problems likely to-be faced by both. CIA Task Forces and
National Task Forces in the future. The views of some of my
colleagues on the task force were solicited for this memorandum
but the judgments are largely my own. - -- -~
The Physical Arrangements
2. The floor space was adequate for this task force but
some rearrangement of furniture, functions, and facilities will.
be necessary to achieve greater efficiency for a CIA task force.
In the event of a national task force, with representation from
other intelligence agencies, there will not be enough space in
the present task force area for a.satisfactory operation.
3. The furniture in the task force area should be rear-
ranged to reduce congestion in the aisles, allow the free flow
of traffic around the message. tube station, locate the message
traffic sorting table in a more central position, position the.
shift chief so he can observe the activities in the room, and,
provide a briefing and conference area where it will not inter-
fere with the analysts.
4. The telephone arrangements are generally satisfactory.
Improvements could be made in terms of support for the con-
ference and briefing area as well as providing a telephone
console for the shift chief and his administrative assistant
(this position is explained in para 9). The details of these
CONFIDENTIAL .
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communications arrangements are dependent upon the specific
locations and space allocated to the briefing area and the
shift chief. In general terms, however, the following
changes should be made:
-- grey phones should each have two numbers, so that
adjoining analyst positions can join in conversations
with outside parties
-- identical telephone consoles on the desks of the
shift chief, the administrative assistant, and the
director of the task force; these consoles to carry the
black and red lines allocated to the task force as well
as the direct line to the Operations Center.
-- simplified instruction cards for use .of combined
grey/green phones to be posted at each analyst station
with prefixes for locations frequently called
telephone array at side of_ briefing/conference area
to include grey/green, direct White House-r- black/r-ed---.
console and with speaker for each. There may be a
requirement for duplication on two sides of conference
area.
5. The production function of the task force should be
located away from the analysts' stations. In this instance,
a separate room was available that provided the required
space and protected the analysts from the noise and bustle
of manuscript and cable preparation. We note that this room
will be turned to other use in the next year.
Organization of Task Force
6. Each situation requiring an intelligence task force
will be different and we should expect to change our organiza-
tion from time to tome. There are, however, some observations
that should be discussed here.
7. It has been my experience that underestimating person-
nel requirements is more common than not and that leads me to
note that it is easier to reduce excess staff than to add
people to an organization in the midst of a crisis.
8. Most of the task force personnel came from the MEA
division of OCI, supplemented by geographic and functional
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CONFIDENTIAL
specialists from other offices as was necessary. The appro-
priate talents were assembled quickly and in approximately
the correct quantities. The cooperation extended to OCI by
OSR and OER was splendid. Invaluable support was provided by
Operations,Center personnel in operating the message tube
system, coordinating with the Operations Center, assisting
with the printing and dissemination of the Sit Rep and cable,
and providing cars and drivers for the task force. The know-
ledge, planning, and positive attitude of the Operations Center
people allowed us to devote our scarce analytical talent to the
substantive problems. Operations Center support of this type
is essential to the success of any task force.
9. In the Lebanon Task Force we produced a periodic
situation report and provided direct briefing and assistance
to the DCI and the NIO. Initially, we were not properly orga-
nized for both of these tasks. We concentrated upon the sit-
uation report and were not prepared to provide the personal
briefing support to the DCI for the first few hours. We
should consider an organization that allows us to meet both
responsibilities simultaneously. Suggested improvements to
the physical arrangements were discussed in paras-2-5 Duties
should be assigned as follows:
-- Director of Task Force:. Division Chief or his deputy
acting on behalf of Director, OCI to provide overall
supervision of task force; to insure administrative sup-
port for the task force; to mesh the task force operation
into the activities of the Community, State, and DOD by
direct personal action; to coordinate task force activi-
ties with NIO and DCI. The relative importance of this
position will decline after the- first day or so when the
task force develops an operating rhythm.
-- Assistant Director of Task Force: the Branch Chief
most directly concerned with the crisis, acting on behalf
of Task Force Director to organize the analytic effort
and to directly supervise the production of the Sit Rep
and the cable; he also will serve as principal briefer
for the DCI, NIO, and senior visitors to the task force
area.
-- Shift Leaders: will usually be selected from among
the more senior and experienced analysts and branch
chiefs in the OCI Division directly concerned; will pro-
vide themes for major sections of Sit Rep on his shift,
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will,draft significant sections of Sit Rep, and provide
initial editing; will act for Assistant Director of Task
Force in his absence.
-- Administrative Assistant: (new position) selected
for alertness and general DDI experience, to assist Shift
Leader by maintaining task force log, reproduce and dis-
tribute significant messages, and act as back-up to the
Operations Center person operating message tubes.
-- Operations Center Liaison and Support: one person
per.shift selected by Ops Ctr to operate message tubes;
coordinate support from Ops Ctr, motor pool, cable
secretariat and reproduction facilities.
-- DDO Liaison: this function usually can be fulfilled
by the DDO/DO and by telephone contact with the division;
in some instances, especially when the DCI is working
out of the task force, it will be. more efficient to
locate a DDO liaison officer in the task force. The
Lebanon Task Force clearly demonstrated the advantages,
to all parties, of having a senior DDO liaison-officer--.
in the task force when the DCI was present for extended
periods.
-- Secretarial support: one typist with production
experience, capable of using IBM Memory or MTST to be
on duty at all times.
-- Other support: the support provided'by NPIC, IAS,
and OGCR throughout the Lebanon Task Force was exemplary.
The task force would get off td a faster start if OGCR
had a representative on duty in the task force area for
the first day or two.
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