ESCAPE FROM INDOCHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79M00467A002500170004-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 57
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 22, 2003
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: August 1, 1976
• Content Type: PAPER

CONF1DENJIAll!4674
ApprovecT'roar Relese DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, D.C.
REPLY TO
ATTN OF:
IN
"Escape from Indochina -- South Vietnam a Year After the Fall" (U)
The Honorable Hank Knoche
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
1. (C) You may recall that in late June we sent you and other
members of the National Foreign Intelligence Board some of the
highlights resulting from the debriefing of HO KIM HAI, the
former Vietnamese Air Force helicopter pilot who escaped to
Thailand in his UH-1 helicopter, together with his wife, four
children, and his flight mechanic.
2. (U) At the time, we promised to forward a wrap-up of the
significant information obtained from the debriefing. That
wrap-up has now been completed, and we are pleased to forward
a copy herewith.
1 Atch
"Escape from Indochina" (C)
1 cy
'~. ~:~)1l L J. 1 EEGANI jR.
` c for General, USAF
Asst Chief of Staff, Intelligence
USAF review(s)
completed.
Underwrite Your Country's M t - Buy
Classified by;_fics~t ,. (tt _QSfl_F
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE
OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11552
1'Y: , `1TION CATEGORY --=z'----
3L_Q c.a.
.,_-A, A?3S1FY ON
4$7A002500170004-3
avings on
 A roved For Release 2003/10/01 ICIA-RDP79J 004IA002500170004-3
Egcape
faosa
{~ n /~cdock~~ca
SOUTH VIETNAM
A YEAR AFTER THE FALL
Q
AUGUST 1976
1602d AIR INTELLIGENCE GROUP
FORT BELVOIR, VIRGINIA 22060
Classified By ACS/I, HQ USAF
Exempt From General Declassification
Schedule of Executive Order 11652
Exemption Category 2 Declassify on
A proved For Releasg2Q03N/F I:D E N T 100 ~7A002500jfA914006
c
 Approved I iRelease 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M004 7A002500170004-3
ESCAPE FROM INDOCHINA
South Vietnam a Year After the FaZZ
August 1976
7602d Air Intelligence Group
Fort Belvoir, Virginia, 22060
Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M00467A002500170004-3
 Approved FrwRelease 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M0046YA002500170004-3
This document is classified CONFIDENTIAL
to protect the sources of the information
contained herein and their association with
the 7602d Air Intelligence Group. It also
serves to protect the activities and iden-
tity of those former members of the South
Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) who are still
active in Vietnam. Classified portions of
the document are so marked; other portions
may be excerpted and used if the above
caveats are observed.
Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M00467A002500170004-3
 Approved FQRelease 2C N FMtPl VII7 J 002500170004-3
Since the collapse of the South Vietnamese
Government in April 1975, the flow of information
on conditions existing there has been reduced to
a trickle. This situation changed dramatically
in early March of this year, when a former South
Vietnamese Air Force pilot escaped to Thailand
in a UH-1 helicopter, bringing with him his family
and crew chief.
The intelligence reporting which stemmed from
the subsequent in-depth debriefing of this escapee
and his family has now been synthesized in this
book, which we believe will shed light on a great
many hitherto obscure areas concerning conditions
in Vietnam today. It should be pointed out that
this pilot served under the Communists after the
fall of South Vietnam and was entrusted by the North
Vietnamese to continue flying for them.. This gave
him a unique vantage point from which to observe the
day-to-day operations of the North Vietnamese Air
Force in the South and to converse with Communist
officers and cadre on a wide range of military and
political topics.
Much of the information on the following pages
has since. been confirmed. Other portions of this
account, although impossible to verify, appear to
present a good picture of conditions as they exist
in Vietnam today.
RICHARD F. HUM, Colonel, USAF
Commander
Approved For Release 2 3 O/ fLA--Rf ZW=rAt02500170004-3
CON ID NT
 Approved FQRelease 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M00d6r7A002500170004-3
Chapter
1. The Escape (C) . . . . . . . .
Page
2. Life in the Prison Camp . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. North Vietnamese Treatment of Former VNAF
Personnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
... In Saigon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
... In the Countryside . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
... In the Schools . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
... In the Churches and Temples . . ... . . . 19
... Reprisals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
... The Cuban Influence . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5. Sabotage and Resistance Activity Since the Fall
... Among the Military . . . . . . . ... . . . 27
... Among Ethnic and Religious Minorities . . 28
... Among Former VNAF Personnel (C). . . . . . 31
... Among the Populace . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
... Quelling the Resistance . . . . . . . . . 33
... With the Chinese . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
... The Spratly Issue . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
... Chinese Reconstruction of Uong Bi Thermal
Power Plant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
... With the Cambodians . . . . . . . . . . . 39
... With the Cubans . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
7. The LINEBACKER II Campaign
... North Vietnamese Tactics Against the B-52 42
... One More Week . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M00467A002500170004-3
 Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M00467AO02500170004-3
 Approved F ReleaC26d3N Ell :QE&T 7A002500170004-3
At 1030 hours on the morning of Monday, 8 March
1976, former Vietnamese Air Force Lt HO KIM HAI success-
fully landed his US-built UH-1 helicopter in the small
Thai village of Amphur Makham, 130 miles southeast of
Bangkok in Chantaburi Province and 225 miles from the
nearest Vietnamese landmass.
Accompanying HAI on this first known airborne
escape from Vietnam since the collapse of the country
were his wife, NGUYEN THI THUAN, his four young children,
and his flight mechanic, former Sgt NGUYEN VAN THANG.
HAI explained that he had fled his country, after
two months of planning, because he and his family could
no longer endure the political pressures and. other
hardships of the Communist regime. After imprisonment
in a work camp in Can Tho from May to August, 1975, HAI
was released to fly the UH-1 for the North Vietnamese
Air Force (NVAF) at Binh Thuy Air Base. By October
he had persuaded the NVAF to use him as a test pilot.
At first he was accompanied on test flights by two
guards but, by January 1976, he had earned such a
Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M00467A002500170004-3
 Approved FQF ReleaCONF1 DIE-NgJOWA002500170004-3
reputation for recklessness in the air that the cquards
preferred to watch him from the ground.
On the morning of the escape, he was scheduled to
test hop a UH-1 that was to carry officials to Chau Doc
later in the day. Using the excuse that he planned to
fly the full, route to Chau Doc and return as part of
the flight test, HAI managed to get a full load of 1000
liters of fuel and to have his flight mechanic accompany
him. By prior arrangement, he rendezvoused with his
family in a field about two kilometers east of Binh Thuy,
and, after persuading the mechanic to accompany them to
Thailand, he set off for U-Tapao Air Base.
Flying low from the start in order to avoid radar
detection, HAI skirted the Cambodian coast and, with no
fuel left, landed his aircraft at a gas station in the
village of Amphur Makham. The helicopter was immediately
surrounded by Thai police and the seven escapees were
taken into custody. HAI told the police he was happy
to be free and would face the consequences of his unau-
thorized flight as long as he was not sent back to
Vietnam. HAI subsequently requested assistance in going
to the United States with his family.
Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M00467A002500170004-3
 Approved Faj ReleaG ON F 1 D EMT7lAo7A002500170004-3
After holding Lt HAI and his family in custody
in Amphur Makham for a few days, the Thai authorities
moved the escapees to a detention camp near Korat
until their eventual disposition could be worked out.
After some negotiation between the US State Department,
the American Embassy, Bangkok, and the Royal Thai
Government, Detachment 5 of the 7602d Air Intelligence
Group accepted custody of the refugees, moved them to
a house in Bangkok on 7 May 1976, and immediately
began in-depth debriefings.
When the former VNAF pilot and his family were moved
to San Francisco on 21 May, the debriefings were resumed
in that city, using a special team of 7602d Air Intelli-
gence Group personnel. What follows is the substance
of what has been learned through this debriefing effort
concerning conditions in Vietnam since the fall of that
country to the Communists.
Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M00467AO02500170004-3
rmmnnIN1
 Approved F.,pc Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M09 7A002500170004-3
LIFE IN THE PRISON CAMP
Once South Vietnam had fallen, the North Vietnamese
lost no time rounding up former members of the South
Vietnamese military. On 1 May 1975, the first full day
of North Vietnamese control, the former Airbase Wing
Commander of the Binh Thuy Airbase appeared.on television,
directing all VNAF personnel in the area to report to
the base on 4 May.
When he reported as directed, HAI was required to
surrender his VNAF ID card and his weapon permit, and in
return was given a slip of paper bearing only his name
and the date he reported.
During the following two weeks, Saigon radio broad-
cast instructions for all first and second lieutenants
in the Can Tho area to report to the Phan Thanh Gian
High School on 15 May. They were directed to bring along
clothing and enough money -- 13,300 South Vietnamese
piasters -- for food for a month, to be paid when they
reported in..
Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M00467A002500170004-3
 Approved F.pp Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M0Q 7A002500170004-3
Lt HAI reported on the 15th, along with about 2,000
other officers. They were classified in alphabetical
order by name, rather than by service, and assigned,
20 to a room, in the former classrooms. The men wore
forced to sleep on the floor and were permitted no
cooking privileges.
The seven-day-a-week daily routine was unvarying,
beginning with awakening each morning at 0600, no break-
fast, work details in the vegetable gardens, Communist
headquarters, or mine-clearing operations, and ending
with lights out at 2100 hours. Doors were locked at
2200 hours and guards were always posted. Two meals a
day were served, each man receiving two bowls of rice
with vegetables and fish, but this ration was cut in
half after the first month. Each day included two hours
of political indoctrination, with each officer taking
daily turns as discussion leader.
Lt HAI stressed that this was not a reindoctrination
camp per se, but a prison/work camp. NVA political offi-
cers visited the prisoners frequently, usually a captain
but occasionally as high in rank as a lieutenant colonel,
who lectured and rebuked the men on their past crimes.
Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M00467AO02500170004-3
 Approved FRelease 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M06A87A002500170004-3
Pilots were castigated as the greatest enemy of the
people because of the death and destruction they had
caused, followed by officers who had served in artillery
or armored units.
At first, the prisoners' families were permitted
half-hour visits on Saturdays and Sundays, but this
privilege was withdrawn after the first month. Both
outgoing.and incoming mail continued, but was subject
to censorship.
There were no escapes or escape attempts while Lt
HAI was detained in the camp, although the prisoners
never ceased to discuss escape plans. Although at
least six men were killed while clearing mines, no one
was killed or tortured by the NVA. The communists
provided no medicines and very little medical care; the
prisoners had to rely on their families for whatever
medicines they could provide. As a result, some men
died and about half of the prisoners suffered from
malaria in varying degrees. Only the very ill were sent
to hospitals.
Until the day before, Lt HAI had no warning of his
Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M00467A002500170004-3
 Approved F ,,Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79MO04 'A002500170004-3
impending release, nor did his wife. In August 1975, he
was freed along with five other UH-1 pilots and immediately
taken by truck to Binh Thuy AB. He managed to write a
note, and as he passed his uncle's house in Can Tho, he
threw it from the truck. The uncle delivered it to his
family. HAI later learned from a VNAF mechanic that the
camp was closed in September 1975 and all the remaining
prisoners sent to the camp at Chi Lang in Chau Doc
Province.
Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M00467AO02500170004-3
 Approved FQpRelease 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M00TA002500170004-3
Ever since the fall of the country, former VNAF
personnel have posed a dilemma to the North Vietnamese.
On the one hand, as former enemy military personnel,
VNAF people constituted a high security risk to the
North Vietnamese, who understandably did not trust them.
On the other hand, without their help, the NVAF would
never be able to fly or maintain the hundreds of air-
craft captured in the course of the collapse of the
country.
For these reasons, the North Vietnamese have
exhibited a certain ambivalence in their treatment of
former VNAF pilots and mechanics. Treatment of these
people varied, partly due, apparently, to where they
had originally been captured. According to both HAI and
THANG, airmen caught in the area north of Phan Thiet as
far as Da Nang, in former Military Regions I and II,
were categorized as prisoners of war, while those captured
south of Phan Thiet, in III and IV Corps, were termed
"surrenderers."
Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M00467A002500170004-3
 Approved F Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M00i8'7A002500170004-3
The length of time the former South Vietnamese
military were held in detention camps also varied.
One NVA officer remarked to Lt HAI that he had been
very lucky,. since HAI had been held only from May to
August 1975, but many POWs are still in detention.
HAI tells of one group of former 3rd Air Division
officers who were not released from the Lai Khe Reedu-
cation Camp until February 1976. And HAT remembers
one occasion, in late 1975 or early 1976, when he
overheard several high-ranking North Vietnamese officers
mention that eleven former VNAF pilots were still being
held on Con Son Island. The "air pirates," as they were
called, reportedly were captured there on 1 May 1975, as
they were attempting to escape.
The North Vietnamese themselves cannot seem to
agree on a standard policy toward former VNAF pilots.
HAI states that the NVAF would have preferred to have
all South Vietnamese flying personnel released from
detention, but camp officials, citing the security
risks inherent in such a move, demanded that the NVAF
vouch in writing for the pilots' reliability, and this
the NVAF would not do.
once released from detention, former VNAF pilots
9
Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M00467A002500170004-3
 Approved F,prr Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M0(7A002500170004-3
and ground crew personnel have been put to work by
the NVAF. For example, at Binh Thuy, the NVAF has
formed "cells" of thirty former VNAF mechanics, each
cell responsible for all engine and airframe maintenance
on the UH-l, U-17, 0-1, and A-37 aircraft stationed
there. Two NVAF officers are in charge of all mainte-
nance, one of whom is a trained maintenance officer on
the MIG-21. This officer reportedly spent seven or
eight years in the USSR studying engineering, and now
is described as very eager to pick the brains of the
former VNAF mechanics.
Nominally, the UH-1 maintenance cell is supervised
by a NVAF NCO who is rotated every other month, but he
is a mere figurehead; the group is actually supervised
by a former VNAF senior NCO. Sgt THANG said that, as
late as March 1976, NVAF mechanics were still unable to
perform any maintenance on the UH-1.
Once released, former VNAF pilots also have been
pressed into service by the NVAF. One former VNAF
officer, an A-37 pilot, was one of the first to report
to the new authorities. He has now completed training
all NVAF MIG pilots of the 937th Air Defense Regiment
,r
10
Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M00467A002500170004-3
 Approved Fa Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M00"7A002500170004-3
at Binh Thuy, some of whom, in turn, also have now become
A-37 instructor pilots. These men were then returned to
Phan Rang Airbase to form a flying school, using T-37
aircraft left intact when that base was evacuated in
April 1975.
Two other A-37 pilots from the 61st Fighter Wing at
Da Nang were ordered to train NVAF Senior Colonel TRAN
HANH to. fly the A-37 immediately after the fall of Da Nang
in March 1975. Colonel HANH then flew as pilot in the
third A-37 of the three-plane strike on Tan Son Nhut
Airbase on 28 April 1975. Colonel HANH,.a famed NVAF MIG
ace, is credited with at least 15 US aircraft kills.
One former VNAF F-5 pilot, Lt NGUYEN GIA CAN, after
being released from the Lai Khe Reeducation Camp in
February 1976, was sent to Bien Hoa Airbase, where he
was put on a special diet designed to build up his
strength for flying duty. CAN ate with the NVAF jet
pilots., who are fed according to NVAF "jet pilot standards."
Others are fed according to a "propellor pilot diet."
After a month of rest and recuperation on this diet,
CAN was tasked with training NVAF pilots on the F-5E
radar system.
^r
Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M00467A002500170004-3
 Approved Apr Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M09+Ii7A002500170004-3
Other VNAF pilots participated in the campaign
to suppress resistance forces near Da Lat and Ban Me
Thuot, some flying FACs and others flying UH-1 slicks
and gunships.
According to Lt HAI, at the time of his escape,
there was a plan afoot to deploy former VNAF pilots
and mechanics from Binh Thuy to all four corps areas,
since no former VNAF were working at Da Nang, Pleiku,
Phu Cat, or Nha Trang.
Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M00467AO02500170004-3
 Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M0O*67A002500170004-3
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS IN VIETNAM
... In Saigon
During Mrs. HAI's last visit to Saigon on 4 March
1976, she strolled through the downtown shopping areas,
observing the activity there. At the Central Market,
she saw hundreds of people trying to buy various luxury
goods such as watches, jewelry, and transistor radios
from passers-by. These are then resold to NVA soldiers
as a source of income. On Ham Nghi Street there is a
large thieves' market where people come each day trying
to sell personal possessions, including their own clothing.
Along Le Thanh Ton Street, behind the Central Market
and leading toward the Continental Hotel, gangs of youths
aged 13 to 16 have been active in stealing watches,
jewelry, and money in broad daylight. The gangs were
reportedly organized by the resistance movement to
create disturbances for the security forces and at the
same time to obtain funds.
A lively black market in currency exists, with the
dollar apparently having the most value. Mrs. HAI was
approached many times and asked if she had dollars to
sell. After the currency exchange in September 1975,
13
roved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M00467A002500170004-3
App
 Approved Fir Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M07A002500170004-3
the value of gold tripled (from 32,000 South Vietnamese
piasters to 100,000 for one tael of gold leaf). In
February 1976, six days after Tet, the Communists imposed
a curfew so a census could be taken. This sparked a
rumor that another currency exchange was coming and sent
the price of gold soaring to 700,000 South Vietnamese
piasters for one tael of gold.
According to Lt HAI, this, combined with the shortage
of rice and other foodstuffs, has resulted in skyrocketing
prices since April 1975. A packet of Capstan cigarettes
that cost 275 piasters at the time of the fall now sells
for 2,000 to 2,500 piasters. The poor have been hit
particularly hard by the soaring prices and the flourishing
black market. Some have not had the money to purchase
rice.
HAI observed that the fixed prices set on commod-
ities apply only to purchases by Communist military
personnel; prices for the ordinary citizen are always
higher.
In Saigon, all the homes of those who fled in April
1975 have been appropriated to North Vietnamese cadre
and their families. The people find it grimly amusing
14
Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M00467AO02500170004-3
 Approved F wRelease 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M004677A002500170004-3
that many of the cadre's wives have already become
corrupted by the dresses, jewelry, and homes they
"liberated." Their newly acquired tastes even extend
to such things as cosmetics and Western style music,
usually deemed decadent in Communist societies.
Mrs. HAI heard that those cadre who had gone to
North Vietnam in 1954 and who were now allowed to
return to visit relatives in Saigon were being detained
upon their return north, supposedly to purify them of
tales of the luxuries of Saigon.
... In the Countryside
Mrs. HAI's last visit to Saigon was by bus. At
each checkpoint on the bus route, male travelers were
required to present their reeducation certification and
the travel permit issued by district security officials.
En route, Mrs. HAI witnessed the arrest of several men
who lacked the required papers. The checkpoints, manned
by uniformed NVA troops, were located at every major
intersection.
At one point, where the bus crossed the Mekong
River, Mrs. HAI observed long convoys of trucks, loaded
Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M00467AO02500170004-3
 Approved Fcr Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M0b467A002500170004-3
to capacity with rice, being driven to North Vietnam
by South Vietnamese civilian drivers. She states that
the Communists are stripping the South of rice and
preventing it from being brought into Saigon in order
to force the population out into the countryside.
Travelers are checked for any rice they may be carrying
at the numerous roadblocks, and any amount over one
liter is confiscated in exchange for a receipt.
The rice fields of farmers in the Delta have been
appraised for expected yields, and the estimate posted
on the perimeter of the fields. If the estimated
yield is not met, the farmer faces a penalty. The crop,
when harvested, may not be sold in the cities, but
instead is bought by the government in exchange for
scrip, with only enough rice left for family consumption.
As a result, this year many farmers are reluctant
to cultivate their land, because they know if they
produce more than their assigned yield, they are liable
either to an increase in the yield estimate or confis-
cation of the surplus, or both.
Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M00467AO02500170004-3
 Approved E Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M0Q7A002500170004-3
In the Schools
Less than a month after the fall of the country,
in May 1975, education cadres began to visit every
home, urging parents to register their children for
elementary school. During the evenings, teachers
gathered.local groups of children together in the
neighborhoods and taught them songs and dances of the
revolution, the fight against the French, and later
the American imperialists.
In the schools, even basic arithmetic problems
are heavily tainted with war and revolution. As an
example, a problem might state, "A group of six American
invaders is on patrol to terrorize our population. Our
revolutionary fighters ambush them and kill three or
four. How many are left?" HAI's children were upset
over having to hear about more killing when peace had
supposedly arrived.
Mrs. HAI cited the following examples of songs
about Ho Chi Minh which the children would sing both
before and after class:
"Last night, I saw Uncle Ho in my dreams,
His beard is long, and his hair is all silver-like.
I tenderly kissed both of his cheeks,
17
Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M00467A002500170004-3
 Approved Msr' Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M07A002500170004-3
I happily danced, I happily sang.
He nodded his head; he commended me on my good
behavior.
Last night, I saw Uncle Ho in my dreams,
I was already awake, but still dreaming dreams.
i tenderly kissed both of his cheeks,
Happily beside him, I danced and sang.
He smiled and he commended me on my good
behavior."
One feature of the new system which particularly
upset the HAI family and played an important part in
Lt HAI's decision to escape South Vietnam was that, not
only was he labeled a lackey because of his past service
to the Government of Vietnam, but that his children's
birth certificate would be stamped on the back with
"son (or daughter) of a puppet officer." All children
born of South Vietnamese parents who had cooperated
with the old regime or were members of the former armed
forces were so stigmatized. HAI found the words "lackey"
and "puppet" revolting and did not want to suffer this
humiliation, nor did he want his children to have to
endure it throughout their future.
Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M00467A002500170004-3
 Approved or Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79Mdb 67A002500170004-3
... In the Churches and Temples
After an incident in Saigon's Vinh Son Cathedral,
in which an underground radio station, a printing
press, and resistance movement personnel were captured,
there were reports in Can Tho of many attempts to
incriminate local priests and pastors. Mrs. HAI heard
that some priests were framed by NVA cadre, who, while
ostensibly visiting the church, secreted rounds of
small arms ammunition, pamphlets, a small pistol, and
even a grenade in a cache where the contraband could be
"discovered" a few hours later by security personnel.
Other priests reportedly were detained for no apparent
reason.
Mrs. HAI is a Buddhist, as is her father, but
other family members are Roman Catholics, and she fears
that, now that the Communists control all of Vietnam,
they will "eventually exterminate" the Catholics (her
exact words) -- especially those who fled to the South
after partition.
On her last trip from Can Tho to Saigon, Mrs. HAI
observed that all of the religious shrines, altars, and
flags normally displayed in front of the homes of
members of the Hoa Hao religious sect had been removed.
19
Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M00467A002500170004-3
 Approved F p Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M09 7AO02500170004-3
Mrs. HAI was told the Communists had ordered the destruc-
tion of all such religious displays. She commented that
the Hoa Hao may someday revolt.
... Reprisals
After South Vietnam fell, it became, for all prac-
tical purposes, a "closed" country to representatives
of the Western press. There was considerable specula-
tion that the North Vietnamese were taking reprisals
against their former enemy -- members of the former
South Vietnamese military and government officials.
Rumors of executions and "blood baths" circulated
freely, but the first reliable indication that such
reprisals did indeed take place emerged from the testi-
mony of Lt HAI's wife and his flight mechanic, Sgt
NGUYEN VAN THANG.
Within days after the fall of Can Tho on 30 April
1975, THANG said sound trucks cruised the streets of
the town, warning that certain classes of "high crimes"
against the people (that is, against the North Viet-
namese) were punishable by death. Sgt THANG remembers
that these crimes included continuing to fight against
the "Liberation Forces" beyond 30 April; having rallied
to the South and assisted the Saigon government; and
Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M00467AO02500170004-3
 Approved Fir Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M07A002500170004-3
having held certain civilian or military positions
under the defeated government.
The first execution occurred near the end of May.
The day before the shooting was to take place, sound
trucks announced that Colonel HO NGOC CAN, Chief of
Chuong Thien Province, would be publicly tried at the
soccer field. On the following day a large crowd of
townspeople and soldiers watched as a petty thief was
denounced and shot.
Immediately afterward, Colonel CAN was led out onto
the field and a statement of charges against him were
read. The principal charge was that he was personally
responsible for two thousand NVA casualties between
30 April and the date of his capture in mid-May. He
also was accused of stealing rice, but the townspeople
understood that this had been in order to supply his
still-active forces.
The crowd was asked to judge whether or not the
colonel should die, and all the Communist soldiers
present, plus perhaps a few of the townspeople, voted
"yea." The captive was then tied, standing, to a post
in front of a sandbagged wall on the athletic field.
21
Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M00467A002500170004-3
 Approved F Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M0WA002500170004-3
Shouting defiantly, he was heard to exclaim that he
could not commit suicide because he was a Catholic.
A three-man squad, armed with AK's, fired a salvo at
the captive, seriously wounding him. After one more
anti-Communist shout, a second salvo took him out of
his misery. The mood of the onlookers was one of
disgust and chagrin.
A movie was made of the execution that was later
shown on Can Tho television. Photographs of the trial
and execution also were displayed in the library near
the house of the former IV Corps commander in Can Tho.
Following somewhat the same pattern, in August and
September 1975 the Communists proceeded to execute the
province and district chiefs, and members of the self-
defense forces of Vinh Long Province, especially those
of Binh Minh District. This was presumably in retalia-
tion for the stiff resistance this area had offered in
February 1975, when the Communists had tried to cut
Route 4, the main highway running through the area from
the Delta to Saigon. In addition, two or three people
-- mostly ralliers -- were shot each day along the main
roads of the area, which is heavily populated by
members of the Hoa Hao sect. Mrs. HAI personally saw
Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M00467AO02500170004-3
 Approved Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M0d 'A002500170004-3
several bodies lying along Route 4 during a trip from
Can Tho to Vinh Long and witnessed two other executions
at the Vinh Long soccer field. Virtually all Hoi Chanh
(ralliers under the Chieu Hoi program) were shot as
they were captured, but some were given "trials" along
with other "criminals."
In October 1975, the Communists attempted to stage
a public trial and execution of the former chief of
Phung Hiep District, Phong Dinh provice, at the Can
Tho soccer field. The onlookers chose this occasion
to display their disgust with the continued slayings.
When asked for the pro forma vote, the people shouted
for the killings to stop and demanded the prisoner's
release. According to popular rumor, the district
chief was taken across the Mekong River and later shot
secretly. It was also generally believed that the
punitive executions were continuing, but in secret.
... The Cuban Influence
Many of the new economic programs being put into
effect by the North Vietnamese are apparently due to
significant assistance received from the Cubans.
During his political indoctrination classes at Binh
Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M00467A002500170004-3
 Approved FbvwRelease 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M00WA002500170004-3
Thuy, Lt HAI was told about the economic aid that Cuba
was providing and about a five-year plan, from 1976 to
1981, under which the Cubans would assist the Vietnamese
in growing sugar cane and sugar beets and help in
developing the fishing industry,
One of these new programs was the establishment in
1975 of several "new economic zones" throughout South
Vietnam where reluctant South Vietnamese are being
forced to settle and farm. According to HAI, because
life is so difficult in the new economic areas, almost
sixty percent of the people resettled in those zones
have fled them.
One such "new economic zone" has been established
in the Duc Co, Pleiku, Tieu Ata area of the South Viet-
namese highlands. It was rumored that fifteen Communist
divisions, totalling 150,000 men, were being sent to
the highlands to clear the land and plant sugar cane
and sugar beets. This zone is to be a "showcase" to
the South Vietnamese, and when the crops take hold, the
NVA soldiers will be encouraged to bring their families
south and settle there permanently, to be joined later
by the people from the cities (in the words of the
Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M00467A002500170004-3
 Approved Ff Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M0 7A002500170004-3
political reeducation teachers) "after they've spent
everything they have."
Seed for the sugar cane and beets will be provided by
Cuba, and Cuban agricultural technicians will teach the
Vietnamese how to plant, grow, and harvest the crops.
South Vietnam has been given a target of exporting one
billion dollars worth of sugar by 1981 and, according
to the political officers, until that time "no South Viet-
namese will taste so much as one grain of sugar."
In their political indoctrination classes, the former
VNAF pilots were told that Vietnam now has some of the
finest fishing grounds in the world and, now that peace
has arrived, the fishing industry will be greatly expanded.
The Cubans are assisting by building a fish cannery at
Rach Gia, in Kien Giang Province.
All fishing boats have now been nationalized and
the former captains put on a salaried basis. In spite
of the fact that each boat now carries two or three NVA
guards, many still try to escape by that method.
According to the political officers, the Government of
North Vietnam and the Provisional Revolutionary Government
25
Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M00467AO02500170004-3
 Approved F( Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M0 7A002500170004-3
signed an economic agreement under which North Vietnam
would concentrate on industrial development, while
South Vietnam would place its emphasis on agriculture
and fishing. According to one of HAI's political
instructors, the South Vietnamese people are to be
reduced to the status of serfs.
26
Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M00467AO02500170004-3
 Approved Fo46Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M00444002500170004-3
SABOTAGE AND RESISTANCE ACTIVITY SINCE THE FALL
Among the Military
(U) Although South Vietnam fell on 30 April 1975,
the fighting did not cease on that day. Instead of
surrendering and disbanding, some military units remained
together and continued to resist from isolated pockets
and strongholds. For example, the U Minh Forest in the
Delta became the base of operations for the 33rd Regiment
of the 21st ARVN Division. As the Viet Cong returned to
their homes at the end of the war, the 33rd took over
the bases of their old enemy and are reportedly still
very active. They have distributed propaganda leaflets
and flags which are used as safe-conduct passes to the
resistance movement base areas.
(U) Another group, reportedly the 45th Regiment of
the 23rd ARVN Division, attacked Phu Cat Air Base during
the night sometime in July or August 1975. Lt HAI was
told about the raid by a young NVAF, airman who had been
sleeping in a room on the base along with nine others
when the attack began. A bandit (the young soldier's term
for the ARVN soldiers) threw a grenade into the room,
Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M00467A002500170004-3
 Approved FQF Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M06ig7A002500170004-3
killing six and wounding four of the occupants, including
the young airman. The NVA airman told HAI that this was
the most terrifying night of his life.
The attackers held Phu Cat throughout that night and
the following day until the base was retaken by an NVA
division. The young airman told HAI that there had been
a great many attackers and that they had inflicted heavy
casualties. HAI later was told that Phu Cat had been
seized in order to capture supplies.
... Among Ethnic and Religious Minority Groups
(U) Resistance groups are not limited to former
military units. According to a political officer at
Bien Hoa, a resistance group consisting of former Cath-
olic refugees from North Vietnam has been formed in the
area just north of that city. The group, whose strength
is unknown, is led by their former parish priest in
Hanoi. It has been operating around Rung La in Long
Khanh Province. On 1 March 1976, while Lt HAI was on
SAR standby at Bien Hoa Air Base, he was told that the
base had been shelled earlier that day by resistance
forces, possibly by this group. There was no apparent
damage.
no Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M00467A002500170004-3
 Approved F'Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79MOGWA002500170004-3
(U) Another group, known as the FULRO forces
(acronym for "Front Unifie pour la Liberation des Races
Opprimees") consists of Montagnards and perhaps other
ethnic minorities. It has been operating in Darlac
Province, west-northwest of Ban Me Thuot along the
Cambodian border, and reportedly is being supplied by
night parachute drops. The NVA have thus far been unable
to detect the aircraft.
(U) In July or August 1975, while Sgt THANG was at
home in Can Tho on liberty, the city was shaken by
tremendous explosions from the ammunition dump located
approximately half way between Can Tho and Binh Thuy.
This had been the largest ammunition dump in all of IV
Corps. The explosions continued for over two hours, and
the populace believed the area was being bombed by air-
craft. As a result, a tight curfew was imposed on Can
Tho, and the people were forbidden to move around the
city, but were to remain in place for five days while an
investigation was conducted. The number of casualties
resulting from the blast was unknown but was the subject
of much speculation. It was generally agreed that the
explosions were the result of sabotage by resistance
forces.
29
Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M00467AO02500170004-3
 Approved Fe.Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M004A002500170004-3
(U) This same ammunition storage area was attacked
twice more in the following months -- in September 1975,
causing explosions lasting for six hours, and again in
December 1975, resulting in another half hour of explo-
sions. After each attack a curfew was imposed in the
Binh Thuy-Can Tho area.
(U) On another occasion, in November, while Sgt
THANG was deployed to the Cam Ly airstrip at Da Lat, the
ammunition dump there was blown up by resistance forces.
Rockets, small arms ammo, and bombs exploded continuously
from 1400 hours until approximately 1800 hours, while
fires continued to burn until the following morning. No
casualties were reported. THANG said the NVA later claimed
to have captured three Montagnards, including a boy about
15 years old. The boy was said to have been caught with
lengths of primer cord in his possession.
(U) There is also evidence that religious resistance
groups are actively cooperating with military resistance
organizations. An informant who is well known to Lt HAI
told him that in early May 1975, the former Commander and
Deputy Commander of IV Corps had turned over large amounts
of arms and ammunition to elements of the Hoa Hao religious
Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M00467A002500170004-3
 Approved F rReC I/? ;UA& A002500170004-3
sect operating in Long Xuyen and Chau Doc Provinces.
The informant said the Communists made an intensive
search for the arms but were unable to locate them,
adding that Hoa Hao groups were working closely with
elements of the 33rd Regiment, mentioned above, in
carrying out resistance activity.
... Among Former VNAF Personnel
(C) Former VNAF mechanics are indispensable to
the NVAF; without them, the NVAF would be unable to
fly or maintain any of the hundreds of captured VNAF
aircraft. For that reason, the NVAF initially treated
these men well, but eventually most of them became
disillusioned after months of hardship, broken prom-
ises, and irregular wages.
(C) HAI and THANG believe that, if well led, the
former VNAF mechanics could greatly hamper or even
cripple air operations at former VNAF bases. Sgt
THANG knows of many cases of sabotage committed by
individual mechanics, much of it done in such a way
that it would not be discovered for some time. For
example, mechanics overtorque screws on both heli-
copters and fixed-wing aircraft or deliberately fail,to
Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M00467AO02500170004-3
COFIIDFTIE
 Approved f_Qr Re1waONF1ID ENU LW7AO02500170004-3
treat parts properly for corrosion control. In one
well-known incident, a former VNAF flight mechanic
and aircraft tractor driver deliberately crushed CH-47
rotor blades with his tractor. Arrested by North
Vietnamese security for gross negligence, the mechanic
received three months imprisonment.
(C) The main deterrent to further sabotage efforts
is the knowledge that, if successful, the sabotage could
result in the serious injury or death of other former
VNAF personnel on the aircraft. For that reason, and
because of a constant watch by North Vietnamese secu-
rity and planted informers, there has not thus far been
a concerted effort to sabotage or destroy aircraft.
However, Lt HAI believes that, if a well-led resistance
movement should develop, the mechanics have the capacity
to seriously undermine all NVAF air operations in South
Vietnam.
... Among the Populace
(U) Evidence also exists of both active and pas-
sive resistance amongst the South Vietnamese populace.
For example, there have been many reports of young
female students luring NVA soldiers into ambush from
Approved For Rele ,a40 t D N rWOf67AO02500170004-3
 Approved Fao,Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M00A002500170004-3
My Tho, the Delta city where assassinations of NVA
troops occur most frequently.
(U) An informant has told Lt HAI that many former
ARVN soldiers who are now motorized pedicab drivers in
Saigon are members of the resistance, as are some
former Viet Cong who have become disenchanted with the
way in which the Northerners have taken over.
(U) Around Binh Thuy Airbase and all over the city
of Can Tho, the Communists put up posters saying "There
is nothing more precious than independence and freedom."
At night, the citizens alter the posters to read, "There
is no independence and freedom."
... Quelling the Resistance
(U) Characteristically, the North Vietnamese lost
no time taking strong steps to stamp out any manifes-
tations of resistance. Beginning in July 1975 and
continuing for the next six months, the NVA flew daily
strikes against the resistance groups, using Cam Ly
airstrip as a base of operations. The gunships were
flown by former VNAF crews, but the gunners were NVA
troops and the strikes were controlled by an NVA officer
who flew as a passenger in a U-17. After the first week
33
Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M00467AO02500170004-3
 Approved ForwRelease 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M0044VA002500170004-3
of operations, UH-1 slicks airlifted troops into the
D'Mrong area northwest of Da Lat in Tuyen Doc Province.
THANG stated that the combination of air strikes and
troop insertions was successful in relieving the pressure
on Da Lat.
(U) During this same period, UH-1 gunships and
slicks flew similar operations against the FULRO forces
in Darlac Province. Other operations were conducted
during September and October 1975 around Tanh Linh in
Binh Thuan Province. THANG states that operations
against resistance forces in the Da Lat area were still
being conducted sporadically at the time of his escape
in March 1976.
Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M00467A002500170004-3
 Approved F' Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79MO04KA002500170004-3
... With the Chinese
In view of the traditional, and apparently growing,
Vietnamese dislike and distrust of the Chinese, it is
not surprising that some information on this subject
should surface in the debriefings of Lt HAI.
In early 1976, several North Vietnamese officers
confided to HAI that North Vietnam was experiencing
many difficulties in China. They told him of clashes
between PRC and NVA troops in the Lang Son and Cao Bang
areas on the northwestern border between the two coun-
tries. A major cause of the friction, according to
the NVA cadre, was a Chinese demand that North Vietnam
repay its debts to China in gold. Both North Vietnam
and China expected to fall heir to South Vietnamese
gold upon the collapse of the Government of South Viet-
nam, but this reportedly never came about.
the small arms, especially the AK-47s, that China had
.W 35
Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M00467AO02500170004-3
 Approved F .Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79MO0 AO02500170004-3
supplied to the NVA; North Vietnam refused. It was
then that the border outbreaks began. The clashes were
reportedly serious enough to persuade North Vietnam to
pull several NVA divisions out of South Vietnam and
send them north in preparation for any emergency.
Exemplifying the apparent enmity between the two
countries is the fact that Chinese troops have erected
a huge statue of Chairman Mao Tse Tung on the border,
with a hand pointing southward. In retaliation, the
NVA erected an equally huge statue of Ho Chi Minh nearby,
with the slogan, "There is nothing more precious than
independence and freedom."
Several low-level cadre once confided to HAI that
China resents North Vietnam's willingness to "donate"
the port of Cam Ranh Bay to the USSR. Gossip in North
Vietnamese officer circles says that North Vietnam had
promised the USSR use of all former US ports in South
Vietnam.
... The Spratly Issue
Another source of friction between China and North
Vietnam revolves around ownership of the Spratly Islands,
Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M00467AO02500170004-3
 Approved Fpp Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M0QM7A002500170004-3
which lie about midway between the Vietnamese landmass
and the Philippines.
During a trip to Con Son Island, Lt HAI learned
from several North Vietnamese that a number of high-ranking
officers of the Joint General Staff were visiting the
island to develop a contingency plan for the Spratly
group in case China decided to enforce her claim to them.
If they ever had to face the Chinese on this issue,
they envisioned the use of former South Vietnamese Navy
ships, suitable for transporting helicopters, to carry
a number of UH-ls for heliborne operations against the
Chinese. The helicopters were to be piloted by former
VNAF pilots.
The PRC had laid claim to some 2,000 islands in
the South China Sea, including Con Son, Phu Quoc, and
Poulo Yanmar, the site of the former US communications
station. To back up the claim, Chinese naval vessels
have reportedly visited the area.
Reacting to the Chinese claim, North Vietnamese
Defense Minister VO NGUYEN GIAP declared that all
Mi Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M00467A002500170004-3
 Approved FQp Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M09,a,67A002500170004-3
islands off the Vietnamese continental shelf belonged
to the Vietnamese people and would be protected "to the
last drop of blood."
... Chinese Reconstruction of Uong Bi Thermal Power Plant
The theme of gold recurs in a story HAI was told
concerning Chinese assistance to North Vietnam in
rebuilding the Uong Bi Thermal Power Plant, which had
been heavily damaged by US airstrikes. After the recon-
struction was completed, the North Vietnamese were thor-
oughly disgusted with the plant's inefficient and uneco-
nomical operation. As one NVA cadre put it, they found
that, for each measure of coal consumed, they received
only about an equal amount of power.
According to the cadre, the Vietnamese found to
their chagrin that the Chinese had discovered gold while
rebuilding the plant and had secretly forged some of it
into digging tools and other work implements. They then
packaged the tools for shipment to the PRC. When their
hosts requested tools and other equipment for a display
commemorating the project, the Chinese hedged, thereby
arousing Vietnamese suspicions. The tools were seized,
the disguised gold discovered, and the North Vietnamese
Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M00467AO02500170004-3
 Approved Fbr'Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M00OKA002500170004-3
demanded that the Chinese turn over all gold extracted
from the site. The Chinese complied. The cadre commented
that this was just another example of Chinese treachery.
While this story may well be propaganda for Viet-
namese consumption, it is significant because it typifies
the attitude of the North Vietnamese toward the Chinese.
... With the Cambodians
Friction between North Vietnam and her neighbors
has not been limited to border clashes with China.
Shortly after the collapse of South Vietnam, Cambodian
forces invaded the island of Poulo Yanmar, some 50 to 60
miles south of Phu Quoc Island. The Cambodians reportedly
killed 120 Vietnamese nationals living on the island, but
NVA forces later reconquered it. Again, in June or July
1975, Vietnamese forces fought a short "war" with the
Cambodian Communists over possession of Poulo Wai Island
in the Gulf of Siam. Over a period of about a month,
North Vietnamese pilots flew A-37s from Binh Thuy Air
Base against the Cambodian forces. Each sortie consisted
of four aircraft, each carrying two 250-pound general
purpose bombs. Although the Vietnamese successfully
captured the island, the Vietnamese Government eventually
ceded it back to Cambodia as a fraternal gesture.
Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M00467A002500170004-3
 Approved F* Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M0W7A002500170004-3
Beginning approximately in August 1975, the Viet-
namese also were involved in continuing border clashes
with the Cambodians in the area adjacent to Kien Giang
and Chau Doc Provinces, primarily because of the estab-
lishment of "new economic zones" by the Vietnamese
Government on lands claimed by the Cambodians. From
August through December 1975, Lt HAI observed North
Vietnamese A-37 missions launched against the Cambodians
approximately twice a week. Ordinarily, the missions
involved two aircraft, each loaded with two 250-pound
general purpose bombs.
The latest instance of Vietnamese aggression against
Cambodia took place on 25 February 1976, when Lt HAI was
on a half-hour stopover at Bien Hoa. He observed fourteen
MIG-21/FISHBED Js and 2 F5Es taking off in flights of two
each over a fifteen-minute time frame, beginning at
approximately 1400 hours. Each MIG carried belly tanks
and what appeared to be two US-manufactured 250-pound
general purpose bombs, one mounted under each wing. In
conversation with a mechanic friend, Lt HAI asked where
the aircraft were headed, and the response was "Cambodia."
It is interesting to note that the Khmer Communists
accused the United States of bombing the provincial capital
40Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M00467AO02500170004-3
 Approved F Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M0W7A002500170004-3
of Siem Reap with F-111 aircraft on 25 February, the same
day the above incident took place. Although the analy-
tical community is aware of the coincidence, no corre-
lation has yet been made.
... With the Cubans
Among all the Communist counties, the closest ties
North Vietnam has are with Cuba. During Lt HAI's political
indoctrination classes, the former VNAF pilots were told of
the strong bond between the two countries. Much was made
of Cuba's unwavering support of the North Vietnamese during
the 1972-1973 bombings of Hanoi, as opposed to Soviet and
Chinese advice that North Vietnam capitulate.
In addition to other types of economic assistance
(See chapter on Economic and Political Conditions in Viet-
nam), Cuba is providing aid in reconstruction in North
Vietnam, especially in housing projects for the workers.
In the area of military cooperation, HAI was told that,
had the Communist victory not come so swiftly in Angola,
Vietnam was prepared to send military forces to fight along-
side the Cuban forces there. HAI says the Cuban presence
is "almost everywhere," and gives as an example a Cuban
anti-H bomb delegation and other groups of visitors he had
encountered whom he was told were Cuban.
41Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M00467A002500170004-3
 Approved Fbw?-Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M000frTA002500170004-3
... North Vietnamese Tactics Against the B-52
While attending political indoctrination classes
at Binh Thuy, the 937th Regiment political officer,
Captain BINH, discussed the threat posed by US B-52
bomb strikes and the measures adopted by the North
Vietnamese to counter the threat.
BINH claimed that, in almost all cases, North Viet-
namese air defenses were warned at least five minutes in
advance which target the B-52s would strike.
According to BINH, the North Vietnamese considered
the B-52 to be the United States' most dangerous weapon,
especially after the city of Thanh Hoa and its airport
were virtually obliterated by a single B-52 strike.
Special tactics therefore had to be devised to counter
this formidable threat.
The B-52s were able to jam North Vietnamese radars
from as far as 40 miles away, thereby denying firing
data to their SAMs and AAA. The North Vietnamese Air
42
Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M00467AO02500170004-3
 Approved FewRelease 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M00*fi'A002500170004-3
Force therefore used a single PIG-21 to climb above the
B-52 operating altitude and take a position
strike force. The North Vietnamese ground radar would
then track the MIG-21.
Normally, North Vietnamese SAM sites would fire
only two SA-2 missiles at a single attacking fighter
aircraft; in the case
"salvo after salvo."
strike a considerable
Force and the
even one B-52.
these tactics
of B-52s, however, they fired
Their belief was that they could
blow at the morale of the US Air
American people if they could shoot down
during
claimed that, after twelve days of
the strikes of December 1972, the
supply of SA-2s was almost depleted at the North Viet-
North Vietnamese air-to-air tactics against the
B-52s consisted of one or two MIG-21s attempting to lure
away the F-4 escort while another MIG would make a pass
on the B-52 strike force from a higher altitude. Capt
BINH claimed that one B-52 had been shot down by a MIG-21.
43
Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M00467AO02500170004-3
 Approved F4W Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M00467A002500170004-3
... One More Week
Lt Hai gave eloquent testimony, learned from a high-
ranking member of the North Vietnamese Ministry of
Defense, of just how close North Vietnam came to capitu-
lation at the height of the B-52 strikes mounted during
late December 1972. One more week of bombing, this
official insisted, would have decided the issue and
forced the North Vietnamese to their knees. Both the
Soviet and Chinese governments pressed the Vietnamese
to sue for peace; only the Cubans supported the Viet-
namese decision to gamble that the United States would
not continue the strikes to the point of confrontation
with the PRC.
How Lt HAI learned these startling facts came about
this way: In early September 1975, on the occasion of
North Vietnam's Independence Day, Maj Gen HOANG KHAM
of the North Vietnamese Ministry of Defense arrived at
Binh Thuy AB by MI-8 helicopter with a large personal
party.
Later in the day, when the North Vietnamese dis-
covered that they had no tennis players of their own to
entertain the general, they recruited HAI to play with
Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M00467A002500170004-3
 Approved P "Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M0OOVA002500170004-3
him. Between sets of tennis, KIIAM discussed the recent
war with former Vietnamese Air Force officers. KHAM
told them that "now that there is no more war, you're no
longer our enemies, and there's nothing to hide of the
bombing." He added, "the American bastards left only
Gia Lam untouched. The other bases didn't even resemble
airfields."
The general emphasized the seriousness of the North
Vietnamese position during the bombing raids. He stated
that one more week of bombing would have been intolerable.
KHAM said that, prior to the signing of the Paris Accords,
the USSR and PRC had pressed North Vietnam to remove the
300,000 North Vietnamese Army troops from South Vietnam
and return to protracted guerrilla warfare. The North
Vietnamese, however, viewed the US signing of the Paris
Accords as a great victory and proof that they would
eventually be victorious over South Vietnam.
General KHAM stated that the US bombing had destroyed
all North Vietnamese industrial assets and forced much of
their war machinery to be relocated in the mountains.
He also mentioned that the sea lanes of communication had
been effectively cut and that the Chinese rail link was
Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M00467AO02500170004-3
 Approved for Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79MO 7AO02500.170004-3
proving less and less effective, with the Chinese fre-
quently stealing many of the items sent by the USSR.
Also, he stated, at one time a US invasion of the North
was feared as a real possibility. KHAM stressed the
importance of Cuban-North Vietnamese friendship and
said that Fidel Castro's 1972 visit had had a marked
effect on North Vietnamese resolve, adding that Castro
had correctly assessed the US position at the time.
This was not the first time HAI had heard these
statements expressed. During his political indoctri-
nation classes at Binh Thuy, he had been told more than
once by Capt BINH that, had the LINEBACKER raids con-
tinued for one more week, a general retreat and cessation
of hostilities would have been forced. BINH emphasized
to the students that the degree of destruction of North
Vietnamese air defenses and the industrial base was too
extensive to permit prolonged resistance.
Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M00467AO02500170004-3
 Approved For Ree~O$(1,p/:ICZ9pll 0500170004-3
"'Pu 111-pif
Approved For ReIeedf lr : ffiP jgQr 7g O OO170004-3
 Apnc adfor Release 2603/10/01 : CI RDP 11 4 7i4aQ 0170004-3
SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND .BOTTOM
UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL. SECRE'C
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
TO
NAME AND ADDRESS
DATE
'INITIALS
1
4
6
ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL
DISPATCH
RECORN93ENDATION
COMMENT
E
RETURN
CONCURRENCE
INFORMATION
SIGNATURE
Remarks:
FOLD. HERE TO RETURN TCs SENDER
F OM: N ADDRESS AND PHOrirz NO.DATE
L`tiG SI ID I
FORM AA:
1-67 937 Use previous editions
 Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M00467A002500170004-3
12 Jan 77: DCI's Orig w/
booklet was sent to DDO0
Routing Slip attached.
Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M00467A002500170004-3
 Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M00467AO02500170004-3
Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M00467AO02500170004-3