NIE 36.1-1-77: EGYPT -- 1977

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00603A000900040006-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 25, 2012
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: January 1, 1977
• Content Type: OUTLINE

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/25: CIA-RDP79R00603A000900040006-6
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SUBJECT: NIE 36.1-1-77: EGYPT -- 1977
I. The Problem: To assess the pressures and constraints that will
affect Egyptian strategy toward Arab-Israeli negotiations in 1977 --
their timing, their objectives, the manner in which they are con-
ducted, and Egypt's relationship with other nations in pursuing them.
II. The Domestic Setting: Pressure or Constraint?
A. The Economy.
1. State of the economy at the end of 1976.
In what ways does it affect the Sadat government's
strategy toward negotiations?
-- What is the extent of Egypt's dependence on outside
financial aid? What are the principal sources of aid?
-- What is the status of Egypt's efforts to solve its
financial problems in both political and economic terms?
2. Economic outlook for 1977.
-- What economic policies will be necessary? What aid
will be necessary?
What will be the political feasibility of implementing
those policies?
Will implementing those policies make it easier or harder
to make the difficult decisions negotiations with Israel
might require?
B. Outlook for Sadat's internal political leadership.
1. Analysis of support for and opposition to Sadat among
general population and in key groups including the military.
2. Are major demonstrations or other more.serious forms of opposi-
tion likely to develop in 1977 in such a way as to affect Egypt's
ability to negotiate with Israel? How?
3. How will domestic support or opposition affect Egypt's relation-
ships with other Arabs, the US, the USSR?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/25: CIA-RDP79R00603A000900040006-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/25: CIA-RDP79R00603A000900040006-6
SECRET
III.
The Military Situation.
A.
Projected changes in Egypt's military capability in 1977. What
is Egypt's capability to take military action against Israel?
B.
Probable courses of action in regard to procurement of military
supplies and equipment in 1977. Can Western European suppliers
meet Egypt's needs? If not, does Egypt have any alternative
but to turn to the USSR?
C. How serious for Sadat's ability to negotiate with Israel are
the attitudes of Egypt's military leadership?
IV. The International Setting.
A. Regional.
-- What are the pressures on Egypt to maintain the recently
restored "moderate coalition" of Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia
(and Jordan)? What pressures might drive a wedge again
between Syria and Egypt?
-- To what extent is Egypt dependent on Saudi Arabia?
-- Is the cooperation with Iraq and Libya during the Lebanese
civil war likely to be resumed?
Are relations with Libya likely to affect Sadat's freedom
to negotiate?
-- What are Egypt's real foreign policy aims in the Arab world?
Can Egypt cooperate with Syria, or would a new step toward
Jordanian-Syrian federation arouse Egypt's suspicions anew?
-- What is Egypt's real policy toward the Palestinians?
-- How deep is Sadat's animosity toward the USSR? How strong is
the compulsion to redress its balance with the USSR? To
what extent will Sadat feel compelled to include the USSR in
the peace progress? Why? What different policy might a post-
Sadat government follow in 1977?
-- To what extent is Western Europe important to Egypt?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/25: CIA-RDP79R00603A000900040006-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/25: CIA-RDP79R00603A000900040006-6
-- Egypt will stay close to the US as long as the US
plays a leading role in peace negotiations. To what
extent has the Egyptian-US relationship broadened and
deepened economically so as to give Egypt an incentive
to maintain some relationship (like the US-Algerian
relationship, for instance) even if the political relation-
ship cools?
V. Implications for US policy?
A. How long can Sadat wait to determine what US policy toward Arab-
Israeli negotiations will be?
B. Could he participate in negotiation of another interim agreement?
Alone? With Syria?
C. Could he participate in a negotiation with Syria but without the
PLO at the outset?
D. Could he participate in an agreement which led to the full
normalization of relations with Israel? Alone? With Syria?
Without the PLO?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/25: CIA-RDP79R00603A000900040006-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/25: CIA-RDP79R00603A000900040006-6 7"
Mr. Blee
4
Da ve
Attached is a rather drastic revision of
your outline for NIE 3G..l-1-77:. Egypt-1977.-
important to build this perspective into the
INIE. In this way, the NIJ will be of maximum
utility to the policy makers and still deal
with the basic political, economic, and inter"
vrariou policy options,, we t1iink that it is
you ac; too much involvement in an assessment . of'
o'our o;?rn, and Mal took the process several
stops closer to the concerns of the policy
r -akor. Although the new version might strike
u'e ocnt your outline to Hal with. some revision'
to are open to your suggestions, of course.
Phi lip H. Stoddard
INR/RNA
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/25: CIA-RDP79R00603A000900040006-6