INTERAGENCY ASSESSMENT OF THE ETHIOPIAN-SOMALI SITUATION
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79R00603A002900090003-2
Release Decision:
RIFPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
7
Document Creation Date:
December 12, 2016
Document Release Date:
August 9, 2001
Sequence Number:
3
Case Number:
Publication Date:
August 10, 1977
Content Type:
SUMMARY
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CIA-RDP79R00603A002900090003-2.pdf | 382.28 KB |
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S
10 August 1977
INTERAGENCY ASSESSMENT OF THE ETHIOPIAN-SOMALI
SITUATION
I. CURRENT SITUATION ON THE GROUND
1. The Somalis have succeeded beyond our, and very
likely their own, expectations in forcing the Ethiopian
military forces and civil authorities to withdraw from
virtually all the military and administrative centers in
the lowland Ogaden area, except for Jijiga. The Somali
strategy has evolved in three phases: a major step-up
in guerrilla activity in mid-July, preceded by the cut-
ting of the Addis Ababa - Djibouti railway at the be-
ginning of June; the introduction of regular Somali
forces, including armor and aircraft, beginning about 23
July, to overcome the major concentrations of Ethiopian
forces in the flatland area; an assault, which appears
to be starting now, to invest and if possible seize the
major Ethiopian centers in the north--Jijiga first, and,
farther into the hills, Diredawa and Harar. The Somalis
now say they hope to accomplish this within the month,
although their original timetable reportedly did not call
for completion of this phase until October.
2. The Somalis have also built up their guerrilla
forces, with assistance from some regulars, in Bale and
Sidamo provinces of southern Ethiopia (this movement pro-
duced the clashes between Somali and Kenya forces in late
June); it appears that these elements are now increasing
their operations, although regular units have not yet
crossed the border here as far as we know. The regulars
will in all likelihood go into action during the next few
weeks if they are needed.
3. We believe that the Somalis intend to continue
fighting until they are satisfied that they can withstand
a serious counteroffensive in this region and that they
have gained the main political symbols of a Somali Ogaden.
The capture of Jijiga and the neutralization (better yet,
r) lu
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of course, capture) of Diredawa and Harar for military
reasons, and the occupation of Harar and Diredawa for
both military and political reasons, would satisfy this
condition as far as territorial successes are concerned.
Without these bases the Ethiopians would find it extremely
difficult to launch a ground counteroffensive against the
Somalis. The loss or neutralization of the airfield at
Diredawa would also make unlikely a successful airstrike
against Somalia by Ethiopia unless the Ethiopians acquire
more modern longer range aircraft than they now have, al-
though Somali forces in the Ogaden could still be reached
by Ethiopian air strikes.
4. The operations against Jijiga, and particularly
against the large population centers of Diredawa and
Harar, will not be as easy, however, as those against
more outlying garrisons have been. Jijiga is down in the
plain, where Somali armor can operate, with relatively
good access to logistical support. Diredawa is less ex-
posed than Jijiga, but still vulnerable to attack by
armored forces. Harar, on the other hand, lies in the
hills in broken terrain which provides good cover for
guerrilla sabotage and interdiction operations but which
is poor tank country.
5. We do not have precise evidence, but we believe
that while the operations so far have put a substantial
strain on Somalis's logistics, the Somalis feel that their
logistic situation is still superior to that of the
Ethiopians, and that they therefore can carry forward the
operations they are contemplating. We strongly suspect
that the present Somali quest for additional supplies of
weapons and ammunition has behind it a longer term concern
to obtain both equipment and allies against the possibility
of an Ethiopian counteroffensive.
6. From what we have seen of the Ethiopian perform-
ance, we believe that the Ethiopians' morale, logistic,
and command problems are so severe that they will not be
able to use the three remaining major centers in the
Ogaden as bases for a serious counterattack, and are likely
to lose at least Jijiga, probably Diredawa, and possibly
Harar as well. In the light of this, we also believe
that a major Ethiopian counteroffensive to retake the
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Ogaden is not likely before the end of the year. The
Ethiopian Third Division, the unit defending the Ogaden,
probably is no longer an effective force for offensive
purposes. Although the Ethiopians have other major units,
either in training or deployed in northern Ethiopia, we
believe they could affect the situation only marginally
in the months immediately ahead.
II. SOMALI AND ETHIOPIAN OBJECTIVES AND CAPABILITIES
7. The general Somali objective is to establish in
the Ogaden a Somali-dominated administration that will,
at an appropriate time, ''request'' that it become part
of a larger Somali nation. We would expect this evolu-
tion to take place before the end of the year, unless
the military situation is reversed in a way we do not
foresee. We do not believe that the Somalis will wish
to announce any particular geographical line as the border
of the new entity; they will certainly prefer to keep their
options open for the negotiations to which they hope ulti-
mately to bring the Ethiopians. In practice, however, we
would expect the Somalis to establish outposts only a
fairly short distance up into the highlands in the northern
Ogaden region because their ethnic support thins out as
the altitude rises. In the south, guerrilla forces that
include a large number of non-Somali ethnics, especially
the southern Galla who have a long history of resistance
to central government control, are attempting to gain con-
trol of parts of Bale and Sidamo provinces not a part of
the Ogaden. Mogadiscio may be planning to use this terri-
tory as a bargaining chip, should Addis Ababa attempt to
mount a counterattack in the Ogaden.
8. We believe that the Somalis can defend such an
area, stretching from Aysha to Moyale (see map) for at
least several months. Ultimately, however, if Communist
aid is effective in rebuilding Ethiopia's military capaci-
ties, the Somalis' situation will become more vulnerable.
The events we are witnessing have been made possible by
the revolution in Ethiopia and the disarray that has ac-
companied it; time is required both for the recovery of
military morale, especially a recovery of confidence by
field commanders that they will be supported from Addis
Ababa in effective and timely fashion, and for the
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organization, equipment, and political indoctrination
needed to produce a reliable military machine. The
immediate expedient of the levee en masse that Mengistu
has turned to is not likely to be of much use against
as relatively well organized a force as that which the
Somalis have fielded.
9. The Ethiopian strategy, then, is to buy time,
holding as well and as much as possible but fundamentally
looking to a future when the country's superior resources
and manpower reserves can be brought to bear. Diplomatic,
technical, and material assistance are required to support
this strategy, and the recent Ethiopian approaches to the
US, despite the Ethiopians' basic reliance on the Soviets,
are indicative of a sense that all possibilities must be
canvassed.
10. While in a sense this situation and outlook
should call for some kind of negotiation, we doubt that
this will be the course that Ethiopia will follow. For
Ethiopia, meaningful negotiation under present circum-
stances means admitting defeat or at least the legitimacy
of Somali claims. For Somalia, there is no point to
negotiation that involves compromise: the Somalis are in
possession of the territory and are enforcing long-held
claims; it only remains for the Ethiopians to recognize
these claims.
11. Our judgment of these attitudes depends, of
course, on the evolution of the military situation along
the general lines we have sketched. Were the Somalis to
suffer a serious reverse, they would be more amenable to
a cease-fire and possibly serious negotiation. But in
those circumstances, one would lose the Ethiopians because
their hopes would have been revived.
12. Although the ideological bent of both the Ethio-
pian and Somali governments doubtless influenced Moscow's
initial decisions to support them, Soviet policy toward
both countries depends primarily on the need of both
parties for Soviet military supply and resupply. The So-
viets apparently calculate that no Western power will be
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prepared to underwrite Somali efforts to seize the Ogaden
and that as long as they remain willing to arm both sides
in the conflict, they will be unlikely to lose signifi-
cantly in either country regardless of the outcome.
13. Over the long term the Soviets may favor the
kind of vision that Castro conjured up before the Somali
and Ethiopian leaders last spring: a socialist confedera-
tion that would be the central power in Northeast Africa
and would project its influence into southwestern Arabia
and into the Indian Ocean. However, neither the Soviets
nor the Africans concerned consider this to be a near-
term possibility.
14. Presently, the Soviets are worried that the
repercussions of Ethiopia's setbacks in the Ogaden,
coupled with difficulties in Eritrea, may be sufficient
to topple Chairman Mengistu and thus endanger the ''so-
cialist course'' of the Ethiopian revolution. Moscow is
exerting considerable diplomatic pressure on Somalia to
stop fighting and start talking and is urging other Mid-
dle Eastern countries to do the same. The Soviets, how-
ever, are realistic about the prospects for a successful
mediation attempt and they are unwilling to exert the
kind of pressure on Somalia that might force it to the
negotiating table against its own wishes.
15. We believe that the Soviets will continue to
deliver on military supplies they have agreed to send
to Somalia, but that they may stand back from new com-
mitments. We think they will also fulfill the commit-
ments they have made to Ethiopia. If Mengistu's situa-
tion becomes more desperate and he appears in danger of
being toppled, Moscow might be tempted to tilt more ob-
viously in Ethiopia's direction, but we think that in
the end Moscow will acquiesce in Somalia's seizure of
the Ogaden. The Soviets realize that Ethiopia doubtless
will seek to secure the return of the Ogaden as soon as
it is militarily capable, but they may hope that in the
interim they will be able to effect an acceptable com-
promise between the two sides.
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16. The risk in this policy, of course, is that of
underestimating the strength and depth of ethnic/nation-
alist feeling in the two countries. There is already
evidence that Soviet efforts to bring about negotiation
have aroused resentment and suspicion in both Mogadiscio
and Addis Ababa. More fundamentally, Somalia's and
Ethiopia's respective associations with the Soviets are
not bringing the benefits that each government feels it
had a right to expect from the relationship. The Somalis
thought they were buying Soviet support against a US-al-
lied Ethiopia; they did not envision a Soviet-allied
Ethiopia, and this development undercuts the basic
rationale for their ties with Moscow. Similarly, the
Ethiopians had assumed that their relations with the So-
viets would have the effect of restraining, not exciting,
Somalia's activities against the Ogaden, but the opposite
has so far happened.
17. Our best estimate is that over the next year
both
Ethiopia and Somalia will modify their relations
with
the Soviets in recognition of these disappointments,
and
in this situation the US, other Western
countries,
and
in the case of the Somalis, some of the
Arab states,
will
find opportunities to play larger roles
than they
now
do. But we do not believe, on the basis
of the evi-
dence so far and the other developments we can foresee,
that either Ethiopia or Somalia will be led to ''break''
with the Soviets.
18. In particular, despite the Saudi effort to shift
Somalia out of the Soviet relationship, we still doubt any
early move by the Somalis to oust the Soviets from the
facilities at Berbera although we would expect some gradual
constriction on the freedom with which the Soviets make
use of these facilities. Siad is, we think, too good a
poker player and his skepticism of Western (read US) at-
titudes too strong to throw away this card. To oust the
Soviets from Berbera would likely end the relationship
with them; he feels he needs the relationship to keep sup-
plies coming as well as to keep the West interested.
19. On the Ethiopian side, we would expect greater
interest in US, and other Western, economic and technical
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assistance, as a balance to the Soviet/East European/
Cuban presence, but barring a real change of regime the
Ethiopians will continue to look primarily to the East
for help and models in reorganizing and revitalizing
their military and political institutions. Disillusion
with the Soviets is more likely to make them look else-
where among the socialist countries than to the West,
at this stage.
20. We see no fundamental change in the situation
regarding Djibouti as a result of current developments
in the Ethiopian-Somali situation. There is, however,
evidence of growing tension and concern within the
Djibouti government, especially over Ethiopian attitudes.
Ethiopia believes that Djibouti is coming increasingly
under Somali influence, and there is a chance that the
Ethiopians may activate subversive and terrorist assets
in Djibouti. There is little that the Ethiopians can do
directly with regular military forces.
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