INDOCHINESE REFUGEE OUTFLOW, 1977-1980

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00603A002900110007-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 6, 2004
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: August 12, 1977
• Content Type: MEMO

CONFIDENTIAL
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INDOCHINESE REFUGEE OUTFLOW, 1977-1980
SUMMARY
Based on recent trends and. likely future
political and economic factors, we believe
that about 60,000 people are likely to flee
Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam between July.l,
1977-December 31, 1980. Unforeseen develop-
ments could significantly alter this estimate.
Estimated Refugee Flight from Indochina
(July 1977 - December 1980)
1. Projection based on, 52,700-62,000
sea;3onal variations
2. Adjustments based on 2,600- 3,100
effects of policies of
other countries
3. Adjustments based upon
factors in each country:
--Laos +(0-4200)
--Cambodia -(1200-900)
--Vietnam - (800- 0)
TOTAL 53,300-68,400
Current surveys of Thai refugee camps indicate
that about 11,000 refugees would meet US parole
criteria during: the period examined. Those
fleeing Vietnam will make up more than half of
this total with nearly all of the remainder from
Laos.
This memorandum was prepared under the auspices of the National
Intelligence Officer for East Asia and the Pacific by Tom
Miller, State/INR. It was coordinated at the working level by
representatives of State/INR, CIA, and DIA. Copies have been
provided NSA and intelligence organizations of the military services
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Some legal immigration from Vietnam is now
taking place; appreciable increases could
result from agreements between the Indochina
countries and third countries (including the
US) on family reunification or liberalization
by the Indochina countries toward legal
emigration.
Seasonal Variations
1. A monthly average of 1200-1500 refugees, principally
from Laos but including a small number from Cambodia, and 500
from Vietnam fled in the first six months of 1977. If one
assumes all major factors influencing flight will remain
constant through 1980, it is still crucial to introduce into
the projection the large influence of seasonal variation. The
monthly average of Lao fleeing to Thailand was about double
during the December-June (1976-1977) dry season compared to the
monthly average of the preceeding rainy season months. Several
explanations account for higher refugee flight during the dry
season. For those fleeing Laos:
--the Mekong River is at lower levels with a
slower current and easier to cross;
-farmers run short of cash and/or barter goods
by the middle of the dry season and they have
less work to do;
--economic activity in the river towns slows down;
--schools are closed during part of the dry season.
2. Vietnamese fleeing by boat find the- hazards of the
typhoon season a major obstacle for their small, ill-equipped
boats on the open seas. Only Cambodian refugees, and some Lao
in southern Laos who must travel through usually dry forests to
escape across the Thai border, would see any benefits at all to
fleeing during the rainy season. However, as will be discussed
later, the future obstacles to flight from Cambodia are so
formidable that covering weather. would play only a minor role.
3. The time period in this projection covers three dry
seasons and four rainy seasons. Therefore, if we assume all
other factors influencing flight to remain constant, we can use
past trends to project flight by Indochinese refugees from
July 1, 1977 to December 31, 1980:
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Country of Origin*
Laos
Cambodia**
Vietnam
Total
Dry
(December-June)
1978
7,560
9,450
840
1,050
3,500
11,900
- 14,000
1979
7,560
- 9,450
840
1,050
3,500
11,900
- 14,000-
7,560
9,450
840
1,050
3,500
11,900
- 14,000
Subtotal
22,680
- 28,350
2520
- 3,150
10,500
35,700
- 42,000
Season
Rainy
(July-November)
1977
2,700
- 3,375
300
- 375
1,250
4,250
- 5,000
.1.978
2,700
- 3,375
300
- 375
1,250
4,250
- 5,000
1979
2,700
- 3,375
300
- 375
1,250
4,250
- 5,000
1980
2,700
- 3,375
300
- 375
1,250
4,250
- 5,000
Subtotal
10,800
-13,500
1,200
-1,500
5,000
17,000
20,000
33,480
-41,850
3,720
-4,650
15,500
52,700
62,000
4. However, the factors influencing flight over the next
three and one-half years will probably not be identical. to those
factors which have. affected refu.gee.flight during the past two
years..
* This analysis treats the country from which the refugee departs
rather than his ethnic background. Thus, Vietnamese, Thai Dam.
and Cambodians fleeing from Laos will be grouped in the totals
from Laos. Cambodians leaving by boat from Vietnam are grouped
in the Vietnam refugee totals. Not surprisingly, there are
few ethnic Lao or Vietnamese who escape from Cambodia.
It is estimated that 90 percent of the Lao-Cambodia refugees
will be from Laos with the remainder from Cambodia.
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Possible Factors Affecting Refugee Flight Through 1980
All of Indochina -- Effect of Policies of Other Countries
5. The numbers of refugees illegally fleeing Indochina can
fluctuate because of policies of other countries. Word of the
US decision to admit 15,000 more refugees, for instance, will
surely give hope to those who are undecided whether to leave
because. they thought they had little chance of eventually reaching
the.US. Similar expanded admission programs by France or other
countries would have a similar multiplier effect on the numbers
of refugees fleeing Indochina.. Also,, with thousands of more
family linkage combinations possible, the number of people
fleeing over the next three and a half years to rejoin their
families will increase.
6. A major change in the policies of Southeast Asian
countries: toward Indochinese refugees could also have a significant
impact on the numbers who flee through 1980. For instance,
Prime Minister Thanin said August 4 that Thailand should think
about repatriating the refugees. Even though such a suggestion
is not presently realistic given the poor relationship Thailand
has with its Indochina neighbors, if it was ever even seriously
considered, many refugees (especially Cambodians) would think
twice before departing. On the other hand, a policy by Thailand
and perhaps even other Southeast Asian nations to permanently
resettle Indochinese refugees would encourage further emigration
from Indochina. Unusual weather conditions may have either
a retardant or stimulative effect on refugee flight.
7. On balance, such factors seem more likely to cause an
increase of about 5% in the numbers of refugees fleeing over the
next three and a half years.-
8a Most of the projected 33,480-41,850 refugees leaving Laos
through 1980 will probably be-Hmong (Meo). tribesmen who in the
past have crossed the Mekong River into the northeast Thai
provinces of Loei and Nongkhai and lowland Lao who have left
from Vientiane and areas as far south as Paksane. A few of the
refugees leaving Laos have been Vietnamese who lived in. Vientiane
and Lao provincial towns along the Mekong and Khmer ex-soldiers,
shopkeepers, and peasants who entered Thailand through southern
Laos.
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9. Factors which may increase flight from Laos over the
next three and a half years include:
-- Food Shortages and the Government's Failure
to Effectively Respond to These Shortages.
Several sources indicate Laos is presently
experiencing severe food shortages in many
parts of the country. Thus far the govern-
ment has been ineffective in dealing with
this problem which is on.ly'partly caused by
the recent drought. Improved weather
conditions may alleviate but will not resolve
the food shortage problems. Moreover, Laos
must-feed the 25,000-man Vietnamese army in
Laos and ship rice and other food to Vietnam
as "repayment" of its war debts.
-- An Increase in Government Control and Repression.
One source indicates-there are presently an
estimated 30,000 people in reeducation camps
(one percent of the total population) in Laos.
Most of the prisoners -- whether they are
released or escape -- must be considered likely
potential candidates for flight. Any new
government efforts to round up large numbers
of opponents to the regime would probably result
in increased flight by those who felt they were
likely targets.
-- Government Defeat of Resistance Forces and Their
Supporters. The Hmong and other groups presently
in armed resistance to the government appear to
be more effective now than a year ago.: However,
because more Vietnamese troops have been in-
troduced into Laos to counter the resistance,
their fortunes could change-overnight and they
and their families could be forced to flee to
Thailand. Moreover, government frustration in
its efforts to quell domestic resistance may
lead it to take repressive action against the
Hmong and other elements of the population it
considers sympathetic to the resistance; those
threatened would opt to flee rather than wait
to be selected for reeducation.
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-- Government Efforts to Speed the Pace of
Socialization in the Agricultural and Non-
Agricultural Sectors. Thus. far the Lao
government has moved cautiously in attempting
to collectivize agriculture. Any precipitous
move -- considered unlikely at this time --
to move toward large-scale collectivization of
agriculture would result in. increased flight..
The government has abolished large elements
of the. capitalist. market system in. Vientiane
and in other larger towns. However, despite
recent attempts to curtail the open market,
it still flourishes. Government attempts
to curtail this market mechanism would result
not only in the flight of those engaged in
open market activities, but also of people
in those towns who are dependent on the open
market to supplement their meager government
rations.
10. In contrast., factors which would decrease the outflow
of refugees from Laos through 1980 include:
--- Security Along Parts of the Mekong River. Most
Lao seeking refuge in Thailand must cross the
Mekong River. In addition to this formidable
natural obstacle, those who flee from the
Vientiane area into Nongkhai Province must also
elude government. security patrols who in the
past have shown no hesitation to open fire on
people crossing the Mekong. The US Consul in
Udorn estimates the Pathet Lao military has
killed or wounded several dozen potential
escapees over the past twelve months.
An improvement in the food situation, decrease
in government control and repression, reduction
in resistance, and/or increase in the popularity
in government administration - all if which are
considered unlikely could lead to reductions
in the rate of flight from Laos.
11. The factors favoring an increase in Lao refugees far
outweigh those limiting flights. Thus, it appears that there will
be a continued high level or even elevation in the number of
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people who flee Laos over the next three and a half years.
Food shortages are already a fact of life and many of the Lao
refugees presently in Thai resettlement camps claim they fled
for economic as well as political reasons. Government political
repression, the prospect of a decline in the armed resistance
in Laos, and government programs to collectivize the economy
are also likely possibilities which could compel. many to flee
over the next three and a half years.
. 12.. While security forces patrolling along the banks of
the Mekong may improve, we estimate that the number fleeing
from Laos through 1980 will be either stable or may increase
by as much as 10 percent.
Summary of Projected Refugee Flight from Laos
(July 1977 - December 1980)
33,500 - 41,900 -- projection based upon
rainy/dry season dichotomy
+(1,700 - 2,100) -- represents Estimated five
percent increase based on
policies of other countries
toward refugees
+(3,300 - 4,200) -- represents 0-10 percent
increase based on factors
affecting refugee flight
within Laos
35,200 48,200
Cambodia
13. Refugee flight from-Cambodia has declined to a trickle.
Reliable information on conditions within Cambodia is extremely
difficult to obtain and little is known of about those factors
which may influence refugee flight through 1980. We do know
that most refugees who left Cambodia fled in 1975 and early 1976.
The downward curve of monthly refugee flight since then has
been quite steep. Despite reports of hardship, various internal
.factors will make refugee flight to Thailand difficult over the
next several years, thus continuing the steep decline:
-- High Risk of Getting Caught and Severely
Punished. The combination of Cambodian
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security patrols along the border, extensive
passive restraints (mines, punji stakes,
etc.), and betrayal by hired guides will
make escape more difficult in the future.
Reports of death as a punishment for
attempted escape will act as a deterrent
to future flight.
Inaccessibility of Large Portions of the
Population to Escape Routes. Most. of the
4,200 Khmer in. the Surin refugee camp in..
Thailand came from the. northwest provinces.
of Oddar Meanchey, Siem Reap, and Phrea
Vihear and crossed into the northeast Thai
provinces of Buriram, Surin, and Sisaket.
As Cambodian security controls over travel
have increased, it has become more difficult
for inhabitants from other regions to travel
undetected through the country on their way
to Thailand. Thus, the population of potential
refugees must essentially be drawn from.a
smaller base in the Northwest. Furthermore,
many sections along the Thai-Cambodia border
have been declared "no-man's" land, making
travel for the last 15-20 kilometers
particularly hazardous. Even if Thai-
Cambodian border tensions decrease, it
appears crossing into Thailand will remain.
difficult.
-.- Physical Weakness of the People. Large segments
of the Khmer population now suffer from disease
and malnutrition and are in a generally weakened
state. If this continues, over time an increasing
number of people who may want to escape will be
physically unable to do so and most will probably
not even make. the attempt..
14, The one factor which could lead to an increase in refugee
flight from Cambodia would be widespread morale problems within
the Cambodian military which could cause a breakdown in border
security and/or defections of the military and their families
to Thailand.. Even though there reportedly have been a few
isolated cases of breakdown in discipline in the military, wide-
spread disaffection is not likely as long as the Cambodian soldier
continues to enjoy living standards above the norm and feels
constrained by the threat of group sanctions.
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15. Based on the above factors, it is estimated refugees
flight from Cambodia will probably decrease by at least one-
fourth over the next three and a half years. Some may opt
to flee to neighboring Laos or Vietnam where they will settle;
only a few of these will subsequently flee to third countries.
Summary of Projected Refugee Flight from Cambodia
(July 1977 - December 1980)
3,700: - 4,700 -- projection based on rainy/
dry season dichotomy
+(Z00) -- represents estimated five
percent increase based on
policies of third countries
-(1,200 - 900)-- represents 25 percent decrease
based on factors affecting
refugee flight within Cambodia
TOTAL 2,700 - 3,800
Vietnam
16. Vietnamese escaping in boats not only risk detection
(one report indicated 80 percent of escape attempts in one
southern province were foiled by SRV authorities) but also
undertake considerable risks by setting out in the open sea in
small,. dilapidated boats with inadequate provisions. Nevertheless,
there are compelling reasons why the current monthly rate of
500 refugees fleeing the southern part of the SRV will remain
stable or decrease slightly through 1.980:
General Economic Conditions are Worsening.
Food shortages, partly induced by a severe
drought, are worse than in previous years.
Many people remain unemployed and basic
necessities become harder to obtain. Because
many "boat cases" in the past left Vietnam
more because of economic hardship than
political repression, it appears likely that
poor economic conditions will become an even
greater reason for flight in the next year.
An improvement in the economy could reduce
the stimulus for flight in 1979-80. However,
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while present economic conditions may induce
more to try to escape, it will also give
potential refugees less of a chance to stock-
pile supplies for a voyage that may take
weeks. Therefore, those Vietnamese who feel
they must flee in the immediate future will
leave with inadequate provisions and increase
the risk of perishing at sea.
-- Government Economic and Security Policies.
Government programs to send hundreds of
thousands of. southern urban dwellers to new
economic zones, quicken the pace of collectiviza-
tion of southern agriculture, complete the
nationalization of the industrial sector,
give all 18-25 year olds the choice of serving
in the military or in new economic zones, and
repress certain religious groups will compel
an increasing number of southerners to flee
Vietnam over the next year. If these programs
eventually succeed in improving conditions for
people in the South., they could have the effect
of reducing the rate of flight in 1979-80.
17. Increased SRV security over travel within the country,
along probable coastal embarkation areas, and at sea will deter
future refugee flight. The SRV has increasingly been effective
at infiltrating escape attempts and rounding up dozens of
potential escapees at once rather than one or two at a time.
Stockpiling of food, fresh water, fuel and other essentials
has become more difficult. Many fishing boats which used to
serve as an escape vehicle have been nationalized and, as an
added precaution, the boats are only allowed to carry enough
fuel for one day of fishing.
18'. Also, a large part of the potential pool of educated,
able-bodied Vietnamese who may have been associated with the
former regime has already fled, leaving those who may be less
willing to risk the effort regardless of the situation.
19.. Based on the factors cited above, it is estimated
refugee flight from Vietnam will remain stable or decrease
slightly (by five percent) through 1980.
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Summary of Projected Refugee Flight From Vietnam
(July 1977 - December 1980)
15,500 -- projection based on rainy/dry season
dichotomy
+(800) -- represents estimated five percent
increase based on policies of other
countries toward refugees
-(800-0) represents five- percent decrease based
on. factors affecting refugee flight
within Vietnam
TOTAL 15,500 - 16,300
Escapees-Who Meet Criteria for Parole
20. Because we have no way to predict the background and
family ties of any future refugee group, one approach to derive
an estimate of the members eligible for parole would be to assume-that
future refugees will be roughly analogous to past escapees.
By juxtaposing the percentage of each ethnic group in the five
refugee camps in Northeast Thailand which fall into one of the
three parole categories against the projected flow of refugees,
one can derive a rough estimate of the quantities of future
refugees from Laos and Cambodia who will meet US criteria for
parole.* The percentage used to calculate those Vietnamese
eligible for parole are derived from surveys of "boat cases"
furnished by D/HA.
Country of Origin
Laos (N=41, 641)
Cambodia (N=3013)
Vietnam (N=16037)
Total
Category
I. Expected % 2..3
1.7
140
Total. Eligible 959,
56
2,198
3,213
II. Expected. % 2.9
0.4
4.0
The obvious problem with this approach is that it assumes
ethnic composition is the same as the country of origin.
Vietnamese and Cambodians fleeing through Laos or Cambodians
going through Vietnam illustrate the problems of operating
under such an assumption. Nevertheless, such a procedure is
acceptable for deriving gross estimates.
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Total Eligible 1,209
III. Expected %
Total Eligible 2,252
Total. Eligible. 4 , 420
Explanation of categories--
services of their homeland brought them in close
association with US policies, programs, and personnel.
Closely related to someone in
628
22.0
3,454
1,838
5,845
III. Those whosepositions in the civil and military
A systematic annual survey of refugee backgrounds in 1978,
1979, and.1980 would allow corrections to be made to the.abbove
estimates.
Legal Emigration
21. We cannot estimate how many people might legally depart
the Indochinese states through 1980. Some legal emigration at
the rate of a few hundred persons per month from Vietnam has
long been taking place, especially to France and Kong Kong- Many
of those permitted to leaveare foreign nationals, but ethnic
Vietnamese. have been permitted to leave, usually on the. basis
of citizenship in another country or a close relationship to a
foreign. national. or in some cases to another ethnic Vietnamese
with-foreign citizenship.
22-. These numbers could grow considerably as the result of
possible agreements between. any of the Indochinese countries and
other foreign states willing to permit the Indochinese to
immigrate. Agreements between the United States and Vietnam
have the most potential impact given ? the large number of Vietnamese.
refugees in the US and the pull that they could exert on family
members in Vietnam
23. Some kind of agreement between the United States and
Vietnam, either specifically for family reunification or
incorporating provisions for family reunification is not im-
probable, considering each country's apparent interest in the
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normalization of relations. Laos may be involved, but to date
there are fewer indicators of possible interest by the Laotian
authorities. Cambodia should be assumed not to liberalize
emigration regardless of its objective circumstances.
24. Last March,
25X1
that Hanoi would be "generous" with regard to Vietnamese
citizens wishing to join relatives in the US, and to those
wanting to return to Vietnam from abroad, providing they follow
the: proper procedures. This implies that Hanoi is aware that
the longing of Vietnamese in the United States to be reunited
with their families could make this a. humanitarian issue in the
United States, and that Hanoi may be willing to cooperate under
certain. conditions. The Vietnamese statement could also imply
that Hanoi would like to get rid of some of these people if a
face saving formula could be found. Food shortages, unemployment,
lack of political trustworthiness, and a desire for enhancement
of its international image are all factors that could play a
part in Vietnamese decisions.
25. The People`s Republic of China apparently relaxed its
security procedures in the past to allow escapes to Hong Bong
of people: considered unproductive. This occurred during food
shortages in China. Food shortages in Vietnam and/or Laos could
provide an impetus to either relax security procedures or to
permit legal emigration. Hanoi would be likely to prefer legal
emigration as part of an agreement from which it derived as many
benefits as possible.
26. On November 6, 1965, the President announced procedures
and means. for the movement of Cuban refugees to the United States-
Castro.let some 260,000 people out of Cuba on the resulting
airlift.. This suggests that normalization of relations with
Vietnam. may not be-a prerequisite for legal emigration. Greater
publicity on the. plight of separated families may generate more
interest in the US.
27. When the airlift started, there were roughly 35&,000
Cuban refugees in the United States. This number served as a
magnet to draw in an additional some 260,000 relatives on the
airliLt. This was in spite of the fact that Castro officially
proscribed persons aged 15 to 26 and certain technicians, and
unofficially harassed others trying to leave,. after the
emigration reached embarrassing dimensions. Although some
130,000 Vietnamese refugees in the US are numerically inferior
to the aforementioned Cuban figures, the Vietnamese would be
drawing from a home population of some 50 million compared with
fewer than 10 million Cubans at the time of the airlift.
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28. There is ample evidence that all of the Indochinese
refugees in the United States put a very high priority on family
reunification. One voluntary agency involved in resettlement
operations, has received some 6,696 written requests from
Vietnamese refugees for assistance in getting relatives out of
Vietnam. Most were men requesting wives both with and without
children. Several hundred were women requesting husbands with
or without children and parents requesting unmarried. children.
29. The Refugee Task Force of the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare has received more requests for information
on family reunification than on any other topic. Furthermore.,
.family reunification continues to be a primary topic of concern
and inquiry among'the some 141 Indochinese Associations in the
United States.
30. Another factor that may bear on the numbers of. refugees
which may come into the United States by 1980 is that many
refugees will soon be able to petition for close relatives to
enter the United States under current immigration law. It
appears that adjustment of status legislation for the Indochinese
refugees to become permanent resident aliens will soon be passed.
The refugees will then be able to petition for spouses and
unmarried sons and daughters. The aforementioned 6,696 requests
received by one voluntary agency for assistance in getting people
in these categories out of Vietnam, probably represent a small
part of the number who could and. would make such requests if
they felt that there was little danger in making such a request
and/or they felt that the request had some realistic chance of
success. Normalization and/or agreements would reduce perceived
danger, and enhance optimism regarding success.
31. Another legal factor which could influence the number
of refugees coming into the United States is whether or not the
20,000 limit per country, per year, for countries in the eastern
hemisphere would be adhered to.
32. In the event that an agreement was worked out between
the US and the SRV and/or Laos-for family reunification, there
is a chance that the term 'immediate relatives' would be as
liberally defined as it was for the Cuban airlift or is now for
the boat-cases. In this case the numbers would be even greater.
33. It seems reasonable to assume that as security
measures limit the ability of people to escape, that legal
emigration may at first supplement and later greatly exceed
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escape as a source of new refugees from Vietnam and possibly
Laos. In the US a sense of humanitarian obligation for the
victims of American policy failure, along with other domestic
and international factors may dispose the United States to
cooperate in a family reunification plan, or even to seek one.
From a humanitarian standpoint, this would be desirable and
in keeping with the President's emphasis on human rights.
Pragmatically, some contingency planning for legal immigration
through. 1980 should take place.
12 August 1977
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