JIM, AND WHOMEVER ELSE IT MAY CONCERN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00603A003000020005-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 1, 2004
• Sequence Number: 5
• Content Type: NOTES

Approved For Release 2004/12/20 : CIA-RDP79R00603AO03000020005-5
4 August
Jim, and whomever else it may concern,
Where to go from here on the Brezhnev succession paper
As I understood the Director's concerns this noon,
He wanted a sense of a how an early succession period collective functions;
He wanted a range of succession scenario options (with % guess likelihood
options attached) beyond our best estimate (a double succession led
by Kirilenko)
Beginning in Section II on p. 12, run through new para 16 as is (para 15 in all
but my master draft, ) re Brezhnev unlikely arrange succession himself.
Spend a para on scenario: Brezhnev becomes too uneven to really run
the country, and is forced by present politburo into figurehead status
in the Presidency; he acquiesces because he has to and its more
fun than quiet retimement; someone becomes party boss (probably
Kirilenko, ) and a collective of present seniors runs thaungs until
they fade enough that the new party boss consolidates power or he
too fades and another "succession" begins.
State the proposition that it is highly likely (9u%? more?) that a cdlective
willxxDiRA4hebe the principal authority for several years after Brezhnev
goes, Someone will have the CPSU boss title, but however greater or
lesser his influence within a collective, it will be more his master
than he its for some time.
Spend several paragraphs describing the dynamics of a collective in early
succession months and years: how power is v x squabbled for, won
and used; what power bases are important, etc. Don Graves at State
is drafting these, and will I DX results over on Tuesday night or
Wednesday morning. Use most of new para 22 as intro to this.
Then pick up the sections describing the SU's policy woes that will confront
the new leadership, with divisive impact these will have mixed with
political poocess. New paras 23-28 (rest of Characteristics of an
Early Brezhnev Succession, Probable Weakening of the Leadership,
Serious Problems to be Confronted)
Then turn to likeliest scenario, Kirilenko section, paras 17-2 , old 16-19,
with 6u% chance he will succeed to title, 3,j% he'll fully consolidate
power.
Then a para (new para 2U, old 19 adapted) on chance someone else would
succeed to title (what are chances,3u`%o? ?) and try to get through a
c onsA VlFI c 1e&se Ab4J112t/120 :' -C4PA-Rd d06 M0Q3b30?20993-6 that
follows, old 2U, new 21. Make clear these chaps are illustrative, not
inclusive.
 Approved For Release 2004/12/20 : CIA-RDP79R00603AO03000020005-5
-2-
be magnitude of SU's problems and extent of stagnation at time. State we
have no idea who he might be. Explore briefly Dick Lehman's idea of
this happening in context of one or more young turks being able to muster
support of Central Committee at some intolerable period of collective
stagnation post Brezhnev, or even of Brezhnev ultimate immobolism.
The Director had one other concern, what difference the nature of the
strugglefor primacy vs collective mixture would make for USG. I
think that the Part III covers this, but maybe the theme needs to be
worked into Part II also.
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/12/20 : CIA-RDP79R00603AO03000020005-5
 ILLEGIB Approved For Release 2004/12/20 : CIA-RDP79R00603AO03000020005-5
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2004/12/20 : CIA-RDP79R00603AO03000020005-5