THE NEXT TWO YEARS: BREZHNEV, OR SUCCESSION? POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR THE US

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00603A003000020007-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 1, 2004
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: August 19, 1977
• Content Type: STUDY

Approved For Release 2004/12/20 : CIA-RDP79R00603AO03000020007-3
SECRET
DRAFT STATE/CIA PAPER: "THE NEXT TWO YEARS:
BREZHNEV, OR SUCCESSION? POLICY IMPLICATIONS
FOR THE US"
19 August 1977
Approved For Release 2004/12/20 : CIA-RDP79R00603AO03000020007-3
 Approved For Release 2J49 : CIA-RDP79R00603AO03000020007-3
Key Questions
1. The possibility that Brezhnev might be
succeeded in the Soviet leadership in the next year
or two raises certain key questions relevant to US
foreign policy:
(1) How would an early succession affect
the character of the Soviet leadership? Would it be
stronger or weaker than the current leadership headed
by Brezhnev?
(2) What are the domestic problems a
successor leadership would confront (say, in the next
five years), and what would be its prospects in dealing
with them? Would the USSR, consequently, be better or
less able than it is now to compete with the US in the
international arena?
(3) How would an early succession to Brezhnev
affect the conduct of Soviet foreign policy, particularly
its relations with the US?
2. The answers to these questions (which of course
are hypothetical, since Brezhnev may continue in power)
necessarily are tentative and contingent, but they-are
supported by a general understanding of the Soviet sys-
tem, a knowledge of what has happened in previous successions,
and an estimate of the present situation in the leadership.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2004/12/20 : CIA-RDP79R00603AO03000020007-3
 Approved For Release 2050/~FIi 9 : CIA-RDP79R00603AO03000020007-3
The Succession Process
3. The highest authority in the USSR is the party
Central Committee, which confers legitimacy on the
actions of the Party and the state. Since the Central
Committee meets for-only a few days each year and has
almost 300 voting members, however, it is too large and
unwieldy to exercise its nominal authority. Higher
Soviet politics is largely the informal and concealed
struggle of political organs and powerful individuals to'
speak in the name of the Central Committee. This is
formally, and frequently in fact, the prerogative of
the Central Committee's chief executive organ, the
Politburo, but the power of its individual members varies
markedly, and strong external influence can be brought to
bear on the Politburo. The chief means of winning in-
fluence in the Politburo has been through control of:
(1) the Secretariat of the Central Committee and its
powerful staff departments, (2) the Government's economic
ministries, (3) the security organs and the military com-
mand, and (4) the Party's territorial organizations in
the cities and the republics. As a result, the Politburo
has at different times been controlled by an individual
(as under the despotic Stalin in his last years), by a
Approved For Release 2064M' : CIA-RDP79R00603AO03000020007-3
 Approved For Release 2 41 0 : CIA-RDP79R00603AO03000020007-3
triumvirate (as in the early twenties under Zinoviev,
Kamenev and Stalin), and by loosely organized factions
(as in the early post-Stalin period,)
4. The most powerful individual in the Politburo
usually has been the General Secretary of the Central
Committee (sometime's called the First Secretary). No
individual or faction since Lenin's time has been able
to make coherent policy in the name of the Central Com-
mittee unless it controlled this office. The General
Secretary's power and authority are neither constitu-
tionally defined nor established by historical precedent,
but vary according to his capacities and ambitions and
to the strength of the forces supporting him, on the
one hand, and those defending collectivity, on the other.
Consequently, his departure from office has initiated a
struggle, first to succeed to his office, then to acquire
sufficient influence in the Politburo to enable the new
General Secretary and his supporters to speak in the
name of the Central Committee. Accordingly, each of the
three successions that have occurred in the USSR, to
Lenin, Stalin, and Khrushchev, have given rise to acute
and relatively prolonged struggle.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2004/12/20 : CIA-RDP79R00603AO03000020007-3
 Approved For Release 20D&/'I ZT2B : CIA-RDP79R00603AO03000020007-3
5. Typically in Soviet history there has been a
two-phased succession: a first crisis when the incum-
bent is replaced as head of the Secretariat; and a second
and longer phase arising from the new senior secretary's
attempts to arrogate the powers of his predecessor, pow-
ers that he believes to be necessary to provide stable
and effective leadership. While he maneuvers to consoli-
date power, policy lines tend to become fouled with poli-
tical ones, and institutions just below the top leadership
temporarily exercise increased influence on policy. If
the party boss fails to consolidate power quickly, the
Secretariat may become an arena of acute conflict, as in
the 1964-67 period, and there may be an increase in the
strength and assertiveness of the government in relation
to the party apparatus, such as occurred in the early post-
Stalin years. The political arena may be widened even
further by the enhanced activity of institutional "interest
groups" in the military, the economic bureaucracy, the
scientific establishment, and the creative intelligentsia.
Unless the leadership becomes considerably more divided over
policy questions than it was in the Khrushchev succession,
however, the party apparatus will probably be able to main-
tain its control over the other institutions and to limit
their participation in higher Soviet politics.
6. The key to success in the succession struggle
until now has been control of the Secretariat and its
powerful staff (the central apparatus). Control of the
Approved For Release 2Qg 44fp : CIA-RDP79R00603AO03000020007-3
 Approved For Release 2054MI M : CIA-RDP79R00603A003000020007-3
Secretariat, in turn, has been converted into varying
degrees of influence over the provincial party apparatus,
the economic ministries, the security apparatus, and the
military command. Only Stalin, after 1937, succeeded
in winning complete control over the regime's entire
machinery. Short of this, a strong and reasonably stable
leadership has been possible when the General Secretary
and his factional supporters had sufficient strength to
dominate the Politburo. This was achieved by Stalin in
the late 'twenties, by Khrushchev in the late 'fifties
and early 'sixties, and, in much more limited measure,
by Brezhnev in the 'seventies.
Effects of Succession on Decision-Making
7. It has taken several years to resolve each of
the three previous succession crises, during which time
divisions in the leadership have complicated decision-
making. Certain distinctions should be kept in view,
however, in , considering' this question. First, a successor
leadership tends to concentrate on urgent matters and to
neglect policy innovations that require long-term plan-
ning and consensus building among diverse groups.
Second, they prefer if possible to concentrate on domestic
rather than foreign affairs.
Successor leaderships have
SECRET
Approved For Release 2004/12/20 : CIA-RDP79R00603A003000020007-3
 Approved For Release 2004/12/20 : CIA-RDP79R00603AO03000020007-3
SECRET
not been precluded from taking decisive measures on
urgent matters. Thus, the Korean War was ended with-
in a few months of Stalin's death, and Soviet involve-
ment in the Vietnam War rose sharply within a few months
of Khrushchev's ouster. If sudden international cri-
ses confront the post-Brezhnev leadership, it will not
be incapable of acting, although it may not be able to
deal with them in optimum fashion. (There is no ques-
tion that a divided leadership bungled the Czechoslovak
crisis in 1968.) It may find it difficult to respond
to early US diplomatic initiatives, but it would res-
pond vigorously to perceived threats to important Soviet
security interests. Finally, factional struggles within
the leadership do make it difficult to initiate basic
reforms or to carry out coherent and effective domestic
programs and this may prove especially damaging in the
Brezhnev succession, when the cost of a .continuing failure
to deal with the USSR's growing economic and political
problems may rise sharply.
Approved For Release 2004/12/20 : CIA-RDP79R00603AO03000020007-3
 Approved For Release 2(M(UW : CIA-RDP79R00603A003000020007-3
Setting of the Brezhnev Succession
8. Our expectations regarding the Soviet succession
are based primarily on our general understanding of the
Soviet system--especially such precedents from the Stalin
and Khrushchev successions as are likely to be most
relevant--plus reasonably good information on key policy
and political issues, and some (but inadequate) data on
men likely to be key players in the Brezhnev succession.
9. Brezhnev himself is unlikely to want or be able
to arrange the succession definitively. Even if he
manages to augment his present authority significantly,
he probably will not share substantial power with a
single heir presumptive. While Brezhnev may strengthen
the position of several of the younger candidates, he
will probably attempt to balance and circumscribe their
power with extreme care to assure that none of them does
to him what he, in similar circumstances, did to Khrushchev.
He is also presumably aware of the risk either that his
other lieutenants might shift their allegiance from the
General Secretary to the heir presumptive, or that a desig-
nated heir becomes the principal target for other contenders
and their patrons among the present leadership seniors.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2004/12/20 : CIA-RDP79R00603A003000020007-3
 Approved For Release 2L%KiW b : CIA-RDP79R00603AO03000020007-3
Domestic Problems to be Confronted by the Successor
Leadership
10. The USSR currently faces serious economic and
political problems, and the economic ones, in particular,
are expected to worsen during the next half-dozen years.
These problems will probably cause considerable division
within the leadership, complicating efforts by Kirilenko
or others to resolve an early Brezhnev succession and
consolidate power. It is thus likely
that the early years of the succession will be more dis-
orderly and troubled, at least within leadership circles.
11. The overriding problem is the slowdown in the
growth of the economy, caused in large part by factors
that will continue to operate: a steady decline in the
output obtained from given increments of capital, in-
creased costs of extracting raw materials, declining oil
production, and reduced growth in the labor force. As
a consequence, we expect annual growth in the early
1980s to decline to about 3 percent. Energy shortfalls
and bad harvests in one or more years might cause negligible
or even negative growth. Tinkering with the administrative
apparatus that directs the country's economic enterprises
is unlikely to solve the problem, but a search for ad-
ministrative solutions may well be made and could prove
SECRET
Approved For Release 2004/12/20 : CIA-RDP79R00603AO03000020007-3
 Approved For Release 2004/12/20 : CIA-RDP79R00603A003000020007-3
SECRET
a contentious issue for the leadership in the early
succession period.
12. Available alternative policy choices are
bound to be contentious. Further seducing the rate of
increase in consumption might adversely affect labor
productivity and contribute to popular disaffection.
Shifting industrial capacity from defense to the pro-
duction of investment goods, or stretching out R&D and
production schedules to slow the rate of expansion of
defense-oriented industrial capacity, would have little
effect in the short run. Moreover, defense
production is what the Soviets do best as well as the
principal engine of Soviet power, and any encroachment
on it would be anathema to many Soviet leaders as well
as to the military establishment. Selective continued
dependence on Western technology, while perhaps improving
growth potential, would be expensive, politically con-
troversial, and subject to Western willingness to co-
operate. Options to augment the labor force retaining
older workers longer, bringing more young workers in by
adjusting education policies, or reducing the armed ser-
vices' term of service--might be somewhat less contro-
versial to a succession leadership, but would have limited
Approved For Release 2004/12/20 : CIA-RDP79R00603A003000020007-3
 Approved For Release 2 SECRET : CIA-RDP79R00603A003000020007-3
impact. Indeed, even a combination of measures--such
as a leveling off of defense production coupled with
measures to obtain additional manpower--would probably
raise economic growth only slightly. In the energy
sector, our estimate is that the longer the leadership
delays adoption of 'a top-priority program of feasible
conservation and increased production, the greater the
overall adverse economic impact. Such delays would be
particularly difficult to avoid in a divided leadership.
13. Political problems that will face Brezhnev's
successors include aging cadres throughout the party and
an erosion of party discipline--a development serious
enough to be noted in Brezhnev's report to the 25th
Congress. Outright political dissent in the USSR will
undoubtedly continue to be a manageable, albeit embar-
rassing, problem. But the detente era and CSCE have set
in motion currents of information and independence that
will continue to prove very troublesome for Brezhnev's
successors, involving repeated choices with contentious
domestic and foreign policy implications. The nation-
alities question is likely to be manageable in the next
half-dozen years since the Slavic leaders, if united,
probably can cope with the non-Slavic quarter of the
Approved For Release 2004/12/20 : CIA-RDP79R00603A003000020007-3
 Approved For Release 2004/12/20 : CIA-RDP79R00603AO03000020007-3
SECRET
Soviet population. Somewhat further down the road,
however, the nationalities problem may well become a
more serious aggravation. The Soviets' East European
empire has moderate to serious economic problems that
will worsen with Soviet energy shortfalls, and which,
combined with the seeds of detente, CSCE, and Euro-
communism, forecast a more unstable than usual Soviet
back yard.
Foreign Policy Implications of an Early Brezhnev
Succession
14. No Kremlin leader has been so closely identi-
fied with detente as Brezhnev. He was a prime mover of
the major Soviet-American accords of 1972-74 and is be-
lieved to have had difficulty on occasion selling these
to associates who took a less conciliatory position on
bilateral issues or preferred other policy priorities.
Any successor will have less personal prestige tied up
in__ the cause of rapprochement with the United States.
Accordingly, political succession will'probably slow
down the pace of relations and tend to a gradual cool-
ing. Selective detente, however, should remain the
framework of Soviet foreign policy after Brezhnev. The
motives for dialogue with the US will be durable so long
as both sides perceive the nuclear arms race to be
Approved For Release 2004/12/20 : CIA-RDP79R00603AO03000020007-3
 Approved For Release 20RAIR/ : CIA-RDP79R00603AO03000020007-3
dangerous, and expensive. At best, however, any
achievable strategic arms limitation agreement at this
stage can only temper the competition for some form of
strategic advantage, primarily through restraining
weapons development programs.
15. Brezhnev's successors will be aware of how
effectively he used summitry to advance his cause at-
home as well as abroad. They, too, may succumb to this
temptation, though they may be inclined to accent the
ceremonial rather than substantive. In any case, sum-
mitry will be awkward until a clear single leader
emerges because of the edge in prestige it affords.
While prospects are that the Sino-Soviet
antagonism will not soon be mollified, within a few
years Peking as well as Moscow could view some easing
of tensions in state relations (though probably not
Party relations) as desirable. The road to such an
easement will be difficult, and Peking's-ability to
initiate new policies or be responsive to Soviet moves
in this direction will be limited by its own succession
struggle.
16. A loss of momentum in the conduct of detente
need not result in an overall destabilization of the
Approved For Release 2004/12/20 : CIA-RDP79R00603AO03000020007-3
 Approved For Release 2
US-Soviet relationship. As it is, a slow-down has
been underway to varying degrees since late 1974 with-
out producing any drastic escalation of trouble to
the point of confrontation. Nevertheless, a lapse of
two to five years in SALT, especially without some
arrangement to extend the Interim Agreement, could
have an unsettling effect insofar as pressures for the
development and deployment of new weapon systems will
mount, and the hazards of a downward spiral in US-
Soviet relations would increase. And other substantive
and atmospheric strains in the bilateral relationship
could sufficiently cumulate and trouble the dialogue that
any top-level decision on either side to resume a spe-
cific search for improved relations would encounter
great difficulty, both in obtaining the support of a
domestic consensus and in interesting the other super
power.
17. In view of the signs of controversy during
Brezhnev's tenure, specific policies of interest to the
US--arms control, the Middle East, and trade--could
easily get tangled in succession politics. Some Soviet
leaders can be expected to urge that higher priority be
given to maintenance of internal self-sufficiency,
Approved For Release 2004/12/20 : CIA-RDP79R00603AO03000020007-3
 Approved For Release 20 L1 : CIA-RDP79R00603A003000020007-3
furthering the common objectives of the socialist
movement, and, perhaps, projection of Moscow's in-
fluence elsewhere abroad, than to limited cooperation
with the US. This tougher outlook is probably well
represented among the ideologues, many provincial
party bosses, in the security forces, and in the higher
officers' corps. The foreign policy influence of these
elements could increase markedly if they come to be-
lieve that the then extant leadership threatens their
perquisites for jeopardizes the security of the
Soviet state. In these circumstances, the potentialities
for Soviet miscalculations in dealing with the non-
Communist world would be considerably higher than in
the recent past.
Coda: The Unexpected
18. More far-reaching complications could arise
from a sharp deterioration in the Soviets' internal or
foreign situation, especially the former. Successive
harvest failures could generate popular unrest on a
scale that would force major policy, if not leadership,
changes. Over the longer term, nationalism among the
minorities could even lead to massive separatist out-
breaks with ramifications in the leadership. This dan-
ger is more imminent in Eastern Europe, where nationalism
SECRET
Approved For Release 2004/12/20 : CIA-RDP79R00603A003000020007-3
 Approved For Release 2
is combined with anti-Sovietism. Also of a more
immediate nature is the possibility of Soviet inter-
ference in post-Tito Yugoslavia. While we expect the
Soviets' China problem to remain intractable, we would
be surprised if large-scale hostilities broke out. But
if they did it would be more likely to be by accident
than design, with both sides striving to limit the con-
flict. In these levels of threatening contingencies,
residual Stalinist orthodoxy would tend to be resurgent,
probably leading to a further stiffening in policy to-
wards the US and to general limitations on contacts with
the outside world as part of a tightening of internal
discipline.
19. On the other hand, there is an outside chance
that reformers-from-above will emerge who would introduce
innovative economic measures, both internally and in
terms of greater economic dependence on the West. These
kinds of policies would be somewhat more congenial for
the US to deal with than policies associated above with
a threatened Soviet Union.
Approved For Release 2004/12/20 : CIA-RDP79R00603A003000020007-3
 Approved For Release 264A2T2; : CIA-RDP79R00603AO03000020007-3
Scenarios for the Brezhnev 'Succession
20. Because Brezhnev has achieved substantial,
though far from complete, influence over the delibera-
tions of the Politburo, his passing from office in the
next year or two would give rise to a succession crisis
with substantial implications for US policy. The man-
ner of Brezhnev's losing power--whether by incapacita-
tion, ouster or relegation to an honorary post--would
influence the succession. Succession brought on by
Brezhnev's incapacitation would provide an opportunity
for a reassessment of Soviet domestic and foreign policy,
although this might have little affect unless the suc-
cession led to the consolidation of power in the hands
of a strong individual leader. (See below.) If that
occurred, the possibility of reaching major agreements
with the US, on the one hand, or of a sharp shift in the
direction of Soviet foreign policy, on the other, would
be enhanced. If Brezhnev were ousted from his office of
General Secretary, presumably by a conspiracy, the con-
sequences for US relations with the USSR might be sub-
stantial. (Whether Brezhnev subsequently was relegated
to a purely honorary position or to political oblivion
probably would matter little, since honorary figures in
Approved For Release 2004/12/20 : CIA-RDP79R00603AO03000020007-3
 Approved For Release 2004/12/20 : CIA-RDP79R00603AO03000020007-3
SECRET
Communist politics--,like Walter Ulbricht in East Ger-
many after 1971--exert slight influence.) Since
Brezhnev's ouster probably could be accomplished only
with the acquiescence of the military, which would
exact a political price, the new leadership might find
it difficult, at least for a time, to make concessions
in negotiations on arms control.
Kirilenko
21. If Brezhnev does not soon take measures to
prepare the way for a chosen heir, and should he leave
the office of General Secretary in the next year or two,
Kirilenko would have by far the best chance to assume
it. As Brezhnev's chief deputy in the Politburo and
party apparatus, with responsibility for internal party
organization and its supervision of the economy, Kirilenko's
superior claim to the requisite experience to be General
Secretary and his current access to the crucial levers
of power strongly favors his candidacy in an early con-
test for the succession to Brezhnev. There is evidence
that Kirilenko has in recent years taken over more of the
daily routine of running the CPSU, but it is not clear
how far this has gone. He also appears to have strengthened
his position within the past year through the appointment
Approved For Release 964 T 0 : CIA-RDP79R00603AO03000020007-3
 Approved For Release 2004/12/20 : CIA-RDP79R00603AO03000020007-3
SECRET
of a former associate, Ryabov, as a secretary of the
Central Committee with the important defense industry
portfolio, and at least partial responsibility for
"administrative organs."* Further, Kirilenko has pub-
licly participated in two meetings of the Council of
Ministers, a break in precedent he shares only with
Brezhnev.
22. ;Whether or not Brezhnev has deliberately
fostered Kirilenko's strong tacit claim to the succession,
he may welcome that claim as giving assurance, to him-
self and others, that the contingency of his own sudden
incapacitation has been provided for. Moreover, given
the long career association between the two men, Brezhnev
may feel more secure with Kirilenko as his heir presump-
tive. In any case, Kirilenko's availability gives Brezhnev
a plausible excuse for not grooming a younger, perhaps
more dangerous, heir. Since Kirilenko's age necessarily
limits how long he can serve a8 a stand-in for Brezhnev,
however, his own impatience to obtain the top Party post
might produce increased tension between them with the
passage of time, particularly if Brezhnev's performance
comes into question. If Kirilenko were deprived of his
*The CPSU's euphemism for the organs of control, "adminis-
trative organs," include the KGB, the uniformed police, the
military and the judiciary.
18
Approved For Release 2004/RET : CIA-RDP79R00603AO03000020007-3
 Approved For Release 2004/12/20 : CIA-RDP79R00603AO03000020007-3
SECRET
superior position, and Brezhnev failed to make new
arrangements favoring a particular candidate, the
prospects for an orderly transfer of Brezhnev's power-
which in any evert are dubious--would be worsened. Apart
from the loss of Brezhnev's favor, Kirilenko must fear
an alliance between Suslov as potential king-maker and
some other candidate for the succession. Moreover, if
the succession were initiated by a successful conspiracy
or political maneuver, Kirilenko's prospects would de-
pend on the part he had played in forcing Brezhnev from
power. All things considered, a reasonable estimate of
the probability that Kirilenko would become General Secre-
tary is about 70 percent.
Implications of Kirilenko's Succession as General
Secretary
23. ; Kirilenko's succession to the office of General
Secretary probably would ease the crisis of leadership
initially and impress the outside world with the leader-
ship's stability, but this might be followed by a tur-
bulent phase involving a contest to determine the full
extent of Kirilenko's powers. Even if Kirilenko were
not simply defeated in this contest and forced from
office, he might be able to hold on to it only by accom-
modating to the pressures of his peers in the Politburo
19
SECRET
Approved For Release 2004/12/20 : CIA-RDP79R00603AO03000020007-3
 Approved For Release 20MQM17: CIA-RDP79R00603AO03000020007-3
and to powerful interest groups, especially the
military, Kirilenko's age and the magnitude of the eco-
nomic and political problems that face the USSR in the
next few years make it doubtful that he could bring
relative stability to Soviet politics as Brezhnev did
in the late 1960s. While it cannot be ruled out that
Kirilenko might consolidate his power and deal vigorously
with the problems facing the USSR, the chance of this
happening seems considerably less than even, say 30
percent. The prospects in the event of a Kirilenko
succession are for a relatively weak leadership, one
unable to deal vigorously with the worsening performance
of the Soviet economy, and incapable of achieving far-
reaching agreements with the United States. Brezhnev's
detente policy probably would be continued in an attenu-
ated form, particularly out of concern to avoid dangerous
encounters in the international arena.
Implications of Succession by a Junior Figure Currently 571 in the Politburo
24. If Kirilenko did not become General Secretary
in a succession occurring in the next two years, Brezhnev's
heir is likely to be a somewhat younger figure in the
current leadership. He would be less experienced in the
Approved For Release 2004/12/20 : CIA-RDP79R00603AO03000020007-3
 Approved For Release 20R4/~2/L2.0 : CIA-RDP79R00603AO03000020007-3
conduct of affairs, especially foreign affairs, and
would have much farther to go to consolidate his
position in the leadership. The best positioned in
this category of candidates is Kulakov, since he al-
ready is in the Secretariat, although Romanov, the
Party Secretary in Leningrad, and Shcherbitsky, an
ethnic Ukrainian who is Party boss in that republic,
have a fair chance to succeed Brezhnev. The urge of
these men to concentrate on domestic affairs and to
e-
conduct n .foreign policy conducive to that end might be
even stronger than Kirilenko's,but their dependence on
the military and reluctance to encroach upon the mili-
tary's interests might be even greater than Kirilenko's,
which would complicate efforts to improve economic
performance. Soviet foreign policy might be subject to
conflicting tendencies as the older Politburo figures
tried to guide the new incumbent along established lines,
while his age peers would perhaps favor more venturesome
policies, particularly to deal with sudden dangers and
attractive opportunities that might appear on the in-
ternational scene.
Approved For Release 2004/12/20 : CIA-RDP79R00603AO03000020007-3
 Approved For Release 26=1M : CIA-RDP79R00603AO03000020007-3
25. If a younger figure rather than Kirilenko
succeeded Brezhnev in the next two years, the initial
crisis of succession might be sharper and the leader-
ship's instability more manifest than under Kirilenko.
The new General Secretary's efforts to consolidate
his position might lead to a further weakening of the
leadership, and perhaps to a new succession. Less
probably, they could lead to a resolution of the suc-
cession crisis on the basis of strong personal leader-
ship by Brezhnev's heir.
Implications of Succession by a Strong and Effective
Ruler
26. The analysis presented previously indicates
that if Brezhnev were succeeded in office in the next
two years, whether by Kirilenko or some other Politburo
figure, this would probably lead to a weakening of the
leadership's capacity to deal with the worsening pro-
blems confronting it. Are there circumstances in which
an early Brezhnev succession might have the opposite
result, that is, lead to a strengthened leadership better
able to cope with these problems? Several of the neces-
sary conditions presently exist which could provide an
able and ambitious candidate for the succession with
large opportunities for aggrandizing personal power:
SECRET
Approved For Release 2004/12/20 : CIA-RDP79R00603AO03000020007-3
 SECRET
Approved For Release 2004/12/20 : CIA-RDP79R00603AO03000020007-3
--There is a manifest need to rejuvenate both
the Politburo and the Central Committee,
which have grown old and complacent during
Brezhnev's reign.
--There is a similar need to purge the middle
levels, where bureaucratic tenure and pro-
motion based on seniority have fostered
stagnation and caused some loss of discipline.
--There is a substantial reserve of able and
relatively young officials whose ambition for
rapid advance has been frustrated by Brezhnev's
conservative personnel policies. If a can-
didate for the succession could mobilize the
support of these men, by rewarding them with
positions in the Central Committee and the
Politburo he might be able to create a
powerful personal machine that could dominate
the Soviet political system.
--The relatively poor performance of the Soviet
system in recent years, which is reflected in
reduced economic growth and in the failure
to fulfill high expectations of foreign policy
successes, could provide the basis for an appeal
Approved For Release 2004/12/20 : CIA-RDP79R00603AO03000020007-3
 Approved For Release 2 120 : CIA-RDP79R00603AO03000020007-3
to patriotic and Communist sentiments
for support in overhauling the political
system in order to compete more effec-
tively on the world scene.
27. Militating against the rapid rise of a powerful
and innovative new General Secretary is the apparent
capacity and determination of bureaucratic groups to
protect their institutional and personal privileges from
reformist measures and arbitrary commands imposed from
above. A leader possessed of a powerful will and superior
cunning would be needed to overcome their resistance. It
is hard to discern such a figure in the current Politburo
or Secretariat, and the chances are strongly against any
outsider attaining the post of General Secretary in the
next several years. Still, it cannot be ruled out that one
of the contenders--a Kulakov, a Romanov, even a Kirilenko--
may possess the requisite qualities but is obliged to
conceal them temporarily so as not to provoke his col-
leagues. The probability that a leader will emerge to
capitalize on the conditions favoring strong personal
rule is a bare 10 percent in the next two years, perhaps
20 to 30 percent in the next five years.
Approved For Release 2004/12/20 : CIA-RDP79R00603AO03000020007-3
 SECRET
Approved For Release 2004/12/20 : CIA-RDP79R00603A003000020007-3
28. If a strong personal ruler did emerge during
the Brezhnev succession, the prospects for Soviet
development in the next decade might change markedly.
Even if he tried seriously to ameliorate the basic pro-
blems of the Soviet regime, of course, he might manifestly
fail, as Khrushchev,did, and his rule might be followed
by a new phase of bureaucratic conservatism and acquies-
cence in the decline of the economy. On the other hand,
he might have some success in reforming the Soviet sys-
tem. His reforms, unlike Khrushchev's,probably would be.
directed at strengthening Party and state discipline,
with the object of achieving increased efficiency in the
economy. At the same time, he would probably find it
necessary to encourage initiative in economic management.
Technocrats might have a greater influence on policy
formulation, although the leader's position would still
depend on his control of the party apparat. Were he to
succeed in his endeavors, the Soviet Union might end up
having greater resources available for competition with
the United States than now seems likely.
29. - In foreign policy, a strong General Secretary
would probably try to focus on internal affairs, and he
might be in a position to negotiate substantial agree-
ments with the United States aimed at liberating the
resources needed to improve the long-term prospects of
SECRET
Approved For Release 2004/12/20 : CIA-RDP79R00603A003000020007-3
 Approved For Release 2004/ / Q : CIA-RDP79R00603A003000020007-3
the Soviet economy. His powers would be far from
absolute, however. He would still find it difficult
to make large concessions in negotiations, and his
position could be jeopardized by sharp reverses on the
international scene, especially in Eastern Europe.
On the Influence of the Military During the Brezhnev
Succession
30. The military command's involvement in higher
politics has been important throughout the post-Stalin
period. Brezhnev's career frequently brought him close
to the military, and he has been careful to win its
acquiesence in arms control negotiations. The military's
influence tends to vary, however, according to its own
cohesion and, inversely, to that of the political leader-
ship. The military's influence has tended to be strongest
at times of succession, as in the early post-Stalin years
and in the post-Khrushchev period, and weakest under a
strong personal leader, as under Khrushchev in the late
'fifties and early 'sixties. Not until Khrushchev had
consolidated his position, for example, was he able, in
1958, to announce military plans that were to lead to
a substantial reduction in Soviet defense spending. Even
so, despite his strong political position, Khrushchev
SECRET
Approved For Release 2004/12/20 : CIA-RDP79R00603A003000020007-3
 Approved For Release 20MMM' : CIA-RDP79R00603A003000020007-3
later found it expedient to withdraw his military plans
in the face of opposition from top military figures.
31. The probable disunity and relative weakness
of the political leadership in the Brezhnev succession
make it likely that the military's influence will be
significantly greater than it has been under Brezhnev.
This will be especially true if Brezhnev is removed by
a conspiracy or if Brezhnev's successor fails to consoli-
date his position. In a contest for Brezhnev's position
contenders will be reluctant to favor measures, par-
ticularly those affecting Soviet security interests,
that the military finds unacceptable. Individual leaders
may actively solicit the military's support for their
candidacy, although they may subsequently harden their
attitude toward the military's concerns if they succeed
in consolidating their position. (This, for example,
was the course Khrushchev followed.) Only if a strong
figure emerges as General Secretary and consolidates
power is the military's influence likely to be reduced,
possibly allowing the political leadership large dis-
cretion in arms control negotiations and in Soviet
defense expenditures.
27
SECRET
Approved For Release 2004/12/20 : CIA-RDP79R00603A003000020007-3