(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00890A000100030002-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 21, 2000
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 8, 1953
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM
8 April 1953
When Stalin died, it was our best guess that his successor,
Malenkov, or the triumvirate of Malenkov, Beria and Molotov
would initially play a waiting and cautious game - sensitive to
any move by the free world to probe the possible weaknesses
of the new regime.
We felt it probable that until the power was firmly in the
hands of one strong man the future line of Soviet policy would
not clearly manifest itself. We also assumed.that the new regime
would start off with the foreign and domestic policies established
by Stalin - including the outward expression of unremitting
hostility to the West.
Recent Soviet moves belie many of these predictions.
State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file
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The new regime has moved quickly and erratically on two
fronts - on the international front with a peace offensive and on
the internal front with an amnesty, a repudiation of the doctors'
plot concocted by the Stalin regime, a re-reorganization of party
and government machinery, and a scrapping of the worship of
Stalin in official and propaganda pronouncements,
On the international front there have been these steps by the
Communist front.
(1) Acceptance of UN proposal for the exchange of sick and
wounded in Korea..
(2) Limited acceptance of the principle of voluntary repatriation
of POWs (delivered four days after Chou En-lai's return from Moscow),
(3) Proposal for discussion of disarmament and atomic controls.
(4) Initiation of four-power discussions regarding air safety in
the Berlin air corridor.
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(5) Release of French and British internees in Korea.
(6) Toning down of anti-Western propaganda attacks in favor
of stressing the possibility of co-existence.
(7) Agreement on a UN Secretary General.
(8) Relaxation of Berlin traffic controls.
(9) Soviet initiative or social fraternization at almost all points
throughout the world where there is contact between Communist offi-
cials and the West.
A Soviet peace offensive has always been considered a possibility,
but this one came sooner than anticipated and it has been pushed with
unexpected vigor. It constitutes a clear departure from the recent
tactics of the Stalin regime.
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WHAT ARE THE PROBABLE OBJECTIVES TO THE SOVIET OF
SUCH A PEACE OFFENSIVE?
(1) To lessen the danger to the Soviet of general war now.
(2) To gain a breathing spell for the new regime.
(3) To stop American rearmament,,
(4) To defeat EDC.
(5) To prepare the way for new proposals on the neutralization
and unification of Germany and Japan, to prevent their rearmament
and force the withdrawal of American troops from Europe and Asia.
(6) To strengthen the Communist parties, in France and Italy
for the coming elections.
All our estimates have been unanimous in the view that the Soviet
Union has no desire to provoke or become involved in a general war
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RITY INFORMATION
at this time. It is not ready with sufficient atomic weapons or adequate
means for delivering such weapons. Also it recognizes its present
industrial inferiority to the West.
The one area where the Soviets may fear that events could lead
them into war is in the Korean theatre.; They have already seen a
stiffening of our own Far Eastern policy and recognize the possibility
that the Korean war, if continued, might be enlarged to the Chinese
theatre. Then the Soviets might have to face the alternative of
deserting their Chinese ally or intervening directly, which might
lead to war. An armistice in Korea would postpone this danger.
Presumably the Soviet leaders view American and NATO
rearmament, American air bases, and a vigorous American foreign
policy as a growing threat. They propose to try to reduce this threat
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SECL20FORMATION
by ending the Korean war and by creating problems for us in Europe.
At the same time the new Moscow regime would get a breathing spell.
Hence a peace offensive is easily explainable within the framework
of the flexible tactics which are so familiar in Soviet policy.
Soviet moves in the internal field are far more difficult to rationalize.
Stalin's program for firmly installing Malenkov as his successor
and for carrying on the Stalinist policy seems to have backfired and
it may be premature to assume that the succession problem is finally
solved. Here is evidence on this points
(1) The governmental machinery established by Stalin at the Party
Congress in October has been scrapped,
(2) Malenkov has resigned as Party Secretary - and thus given
up a position of real power.
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(3) Neither the dead Stalin nor Malenkov is advertised in Soviet
broadcasts - the stress is on the Party.
(4) Malenkov has issued no statement, nor has he appeared in
public, since March 15, the day after he was retired as Party Secretary.
(5) Finally, the doctors' plot concocted under Stalin and Malenkov
has been repudiated, with the remarkable admission that there was no
legal basis whatever for the charges,. and that confessions were obtained
by unpermissible methods of investigation forbidden by Soviet law --
language strong enough to raise doubts, even in the Soviet Union and
satellites, regarding all the purge trials of the past decades. Our
Embassy in Moscow commentso "Doubts may arise as to the stability
of a government in which such fantastic reversals take place."
On the basis of these facts some experts believe that the old
Bolsheviks, Molotov, Bulganin and Krushchev, possibly in alliance
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with the Army, may be moving into a position to take over the real
leadership. It took ten years after Lenin's death for Stalin to become
firmly entrenched in. power. It would be remarkable if Malenkov
could accomplish it overnight.
When Lenin died, Stalin and Trotsky vied with each other to
avoid the honor of making the first great public policy declaration.
The man who did it was later liquidated.
Of course there are more sensational rumors - for instance
that Stalin, who displayed signs of instability in his speech at the
October Party Congress, was liquidated by the second set of doctors,
installed by.Malenkov.
This is pure speculation.
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Imo"
From the point of view of the policy makers, the following is about
all that existing intelligence justifies
(1) It is too early to assume that the succession problem has been
finally solved.
(2) An abrupt change in Soviet tactics, comparable only to that
in 1939, may be impending.
(3) There are. deep and unresolved inner tensions which may
affect Soviet foreign policy.
(4) Soviet leaders may well desire a breathing spell on the
international front in order to consolidate their positions at home
and their control over the satellites.
(5) Finally, while there is no ground for assuming any change
in basic Soviet policy toward the West, they have demonstrated the
capacity for great flexibility of tactics, Stalin's death faced them
with a new emergency. They are adopting new techniques to meet it.
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