MOSCOWS CHANGING ATTITUDE TOWARD IRAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00890A000100060004-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 27, 2000
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: July 1, 1953
• Content Type: BRIEF

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Moscow's Changing Attitude Toward Iran
Moscow's current attempts to improve relations with peripheral
countries is increasingly apparent in the USSR's tactics toward
Iran, where political deterioration increases the Kremlin's op-
portunities to gain greater influence. The USSR appears to be
trying to undermine Mossadeq's attempt to remain neutral in the
East-West struggle. In the long run, the Russians hope to orient
Iran to the USSR. The Soviet leaders probably count on the Tudeh
party to aid these tactics and provide the long-range possibility
for an internal coup.
There are indications that the Kremlin is prepared to settle
some of the outstanding Soviet-Iranian differences at no great
expense to the USSR. The new Soviet regime may even offer Mossa-
deq some form of alliance as an alternative to his isolation and
impasse with Great Britain.
Moscow may already have broached a proposed settlement for
some of these differences during recent meetings with Mossadeq.
These may include: (1) the return of $12,000,000 of Iranian gold
seized by the USSR during World War II, (2) several unsettled
border disputes, (3) some 1,000 Iranian nationals held by the USSR,
and (4) the disposal of the disputed Caspian fisheries property
now under Iranian jurisdiction. The Iranian government has also
frequently complained about the "military interference" clauses in
the 1921 Soviet-Iranian Friendship Treaty. Moscow could agree to
alter these without great sacrifice. The Kremlin can also woo
Mossadeq with additional trade possibilities with the Orbit - a
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particularly attractive idea for Iran in view of its weak eco-
nomic position. Orbit trade with Iran had already increased to
$27,000,000 each way in 1952.
Even partial settlement of these issues would be an out-
standing political victory for Mossadeq. If the settlement were
accompanied by or dependent on a non-aggression pact with Moscow,
Mossadeq would probably be willing to accept, even at the price
of expelling the US military mission. Nonetheless, Mossadeq is
aware that the USSR is a traditional threat, and he will probably
continue his attempts to maintain a neutral policy which J* con-
siders will best serve Iran's interests.
Although Mossadeq's strength in Iran has been increasingly
weakened, he appears to feel that his successful ouster of the
British has increased his capability in negotiations with the
USSR. He has consistently insisted that he is capable of
handling the Tudeh Party which to date has not opposed him.
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I. Soviet Tactics Toward Iran
A. New Soviet regime seeks to better relations with countries
on USSR periphery:
1. Conditions in Iran favorable for Communist influence.
2. Possibility of Communist take-over increases as
political disintegration continues.
3. USSR counts on Tudeh.
B. Soviet "softer" tactics are probably designed to:
1. Undermine Mossadeq's neutral policy.
2. Relieve his isolation by offering him an alternative
to a western alliance.
C. Soviet ambassador to Iran may already have broached
settlement of some issues with Mossadeq:
1. $12,000,000 of Iranian gold held in USSR.
2. "Military interference" provisions of 1921 Soviet-
Iranian Friendship Treaty.
3. Caspian Fisheries property.
4. Unsettled border disputes.
5. Approximate 1,000 Iranian nationals in USSR.
6. Increased trade with Orbit. ($27,000,000 each way in 1952)
D. Mossadeq's position:
1. A settlement with Moscow would be a political victory.
2. Mossadeq might expel American military missions as
a price of a settlement.
3. USSR is traditional threat to Iran.
4. He feels that he can safeguard Iran's interests in
any negotiations.
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