CURRENT COMMUNIST POSITION ON A KOREAN ARMISTICE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00890A000100060005-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 27, 2000
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: July 1, 1953
• Content Type: BRIEF

NSC BRIEFING 1 July 1953
CURRENT COMMUNIST POSITION ON A KOREAN ARMISTICE
We believe that Communist acceptance of the 8 June 1953
a? reement on the disposition of POW's, following the Communist
initiative of 30 March for resuming armistice negotiations,
represented an important modification of the previous Communist
position on non-forcible repatriation and reflected a genuine
desire on the part of the Communists for a truce. We cannot
estimate with certainty the considerations motivating the
Communist decision for an armistice. We believe, however, that
the reasons are to be found in the new Soviet regime's assessment
of both the internal and external situation of the Communist
Bloc; in the difficulties for the Communist Bloc in simultaneously
supporting the Korean war, offsetting increased Western strength
outside the Far East, meeting Chinese Communist military and
economic demands, and assisting the launching of an a
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industrialization program within Communist China; and in the
fact that continuation of the Korean war carried with it the
constant danger that it might expand in unwanted fashion.
Soviet and Chinese Communist leadership probably estimates
that a truce in Korea is a necessary part of a world-wide pro-
gram of conciliatory tactics and reduction of East-West tensions.
They probably also believe that a truce would foster a sense of
security in the West tending to undermine rearmament programs,
develop an international climate in which latent differences
among the major Western allies could reach serious proportions,
and cause smaller nations to re-examine their participation in
US-led coalitions. Communist leadership probably considers that,
in addition, a postarmistice_ political conference, by raising
such divisive questions as the future of Korea, the status of
Formosa,,and UN membership for Communist China, would provide
the Communists a great opportunity for splitting the US from
its major allies and discrediting the West in, Asia.
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SEC hORMATIOl
Following the 8 June agreement on POW's, rapid progress
appeared to be being made toward concluding a truce when
Syngman Rhee suddenly released approximately 27,000 anti-
Communist North Korean POW's, 18 June. In reacting to this
unilateral move on the part of Rhee, the Communists at Panmunjom
publicly took the position, in their 19 June letter to the
Command, that they were willing to conclude a truce either
with or without Rhee's acceptance of it, if the UN command
would provide assurances that it could implement the truce.
It is believed that the 19 June letter genuinely represents
the Communist position.
What is in doubt is which kind of truce the Communists
would prefer -- one which Rhee would support or one which Rhee
would oppose. Communist insistence on implementation of the
truce does not make clear whether they genuinely desire a
peaceful implementation.
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General Clark on 29 June proposed to the Communists that the
draft armistice agreement be signed at once, despite the
sand *s inability to recover the 27,000 Korean prisoners released
by flee. Clark promised t
3very effort to obtain the
cooperation" of South Korea in implementing the truce. On 30
the Pyongyang radio unofficially rejected Clark's pro
characterizing it as "insincere" and as providing "no guaran,
conduct.. The broadcast reaffirmed the Communist
demand for recovery of the released prisoners, a demand which,
e letter, the Communists had made a condition
Guth Korea were to be included.
As the Communists probably saw it, they were being asked to
give up their demand for the recovery of the prisoners before
was clear whether the truce would be supported or opposed by
ghee. if they had done so, they would have relinquished one
their principal bargaining points.
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 smunis.ts are aware that the Rhee-Robertson talks
represent an American effort to prevent: a split between the
d and South Korea. They cannot know at this ti
than we can know, whether the talks will succeed.
ppear to be mark.,
g time
g fro*
ng
themselves to any course of action as regards the prisoners or
slue, until they see whether the UN Command and Rhee
o be united in their truce policies.
It is possible that the Communists would prefer a truce
which would be unacceptable to Bhee and would be physically
pposed by South Korean forces. This thesis assumes that the
Communists are willing to accept the risk of the milita.
situation getting out of control and of expanded hostilities.
this view is correct, the Communists would hope that
the Khee-Robertson talks break down as a result of Rhee's
satire demands. In the event of a break down, the Comaunis
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would probably expect Rhee to put additional pressure on the
United States to meet his demands. They would, therefore,
probably wait for ee to take some such incendiary action as
asing additional prisoners, seizing UN supplies and equip--
rent, inciting popular violence against UN personnel, withdraw-
uth Korean troops from the UN Command, or even taking
independent military action against North Korea. Communist
propaganda in this period would reiterate; the Communist desire
for a truce.
ollowing any such action by Rhee, short of operations
North Korea, the Communists would probably wait for the
NN response before taking action themselves. They would probably
to determine whether the United States intended to pers
o repair the breach or intended to conclude a
truce despite South Korean opposition, or intended to withdraw ,
ore..
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e states were to persist in efforts to get Rhee
under control, the Communists would probably continue to wait
developments. Assuming that American-South Korean agree-
is were reached, the issue of the Korean prisoners released
?
by Rhee would immediately arise. Communist propaganda has
uth Korean forces are holding the prisoners
thee, can turn then back if he wishes. Reports frow
American. sources in Korea confirm that ghee could return the
majority if he so desired. The Communists would probably
Rhee, for reasons of face, would be unwilling to
one effort to recover the prisoners.
assuming that the Communist preference is for a truce
to be opposed by Rhee, we believe that, if the ? ommand were
to offer the Communists a truce following a break down
of the Rhee-Robertson talks, the Communists at that tine would
wept it and would await ? American-south Korean conflict on its
on.
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finally, the
nand were to signif
thdraw non-Korean forces from Korea or were actually to
begin the withdrawal, the Communists would probably wait for
the forces to complete the withdrawal. There would be a
Marginal possibility,, in this event, of a Communist attack on
bdrawing forces and a Communist effort to occupy al
-elieve it more likely, however, that the Communists
want an effective armistice and that they are waiting for the
nd to offer adequate assurance that Rhee will respect
mman.d will be abl,
o enforce the
e without letting the situation getout of hand,
in other words, we believe that recent developments In
have not substantially altered the basic situation
which caused the Communists to move toward an armistice.
On this assumption, and if the UN Command were able to
offer adequate assurances, we do not believe that the Communists
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would insist on the recovery of all the prisoners but would
accept a portion of them. This view is supported by a recent
statement by the Soviet Ambassador in Peiping to the Swedish
Ambassador there that the Chinese demand for the recapture of
all non-repatriates should not be taken "literally." The
Soviet Ambassador stated that Rhee's coup had "no military
significance,
that if the US took a more resolute line
ah Rhee it could prevent further sabotage.
any event
to many Aron
Communists are aware that ghee objects
the draft armistice agreement, and they
r~crbably expect that the Rhee-Robertson talks will result in
new agreements which would have to be renegotiated with the
#mmunissts. ghee has publicly called, for example, for
ediate withdrawal of Chinese Communists forces, for a time-
limit on the postarmistice political conference, and for con-
usion of an American-South Korean security pact before a
e is signed.
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right in believing that the Communists
American-South Korean proposal that Chinese Communist
peaceful truce, they would almost certainly
forces withdraw frog Korea before the political conference
begins.
would
the ques
out that the draft armistice agree-
ion of withdrawal of foreign troops
from urea to be discussed at that conference, `here is no
to force the cosaunists to effect sue h a withdrawal, outside or
the conference, without imposing a total military defeat on the
nnunists.
The Communists would also almost certainly reject a cut-off
date on t3
ions" to thee, the first question on the agenda,
who regain unwilling to be repatriated after Communist
conference. Discussion of the fate o
ed to 30 days. However, the two larger questions remain;
the permanent status of Korea, and the withdrawal of foreign
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forces. Beyond these questions, the Communists hope to discuss
China's seat in the 'ON
atus of Formosa, and perhaps other
Far Eastern questions. Moreover, the Communists night regard a
proposal for a cut-off date as evidence of an American-South
Korean intention to resume hostilities at that time.
clusion of an American-South Korean security pact
would not necessarily be a barrier to signing a truce. Commu-
nist prop,
has already denounced a prospective pact as
evidence of American-South. Korean collusion to "wreck" the
ical.conference, "torpedo" a peaceful settlement, and
"launch a new war." The Communists have not suggested, however,
that they would refuse to sign a truce on such grounds.
The Communists would probably not object to the pact it its
terms did not commit the United States to Rhee,s support in the
event of a South Korean attack on North Korea. Where is a
chance, however, that the Communists would regard the pact as
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implying American support for Rhee whether an attack on North
I rea were undertaken with or without American encouragement.
In this event, the Communists sight refuse to sign a truce
1 given assurances that the United States would not
support ghee in violating an armistice.
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