PROBABLE DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET BLOC AND WESTERN POWER POSITIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00890A000100060009-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 27, 2000
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: June 30, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2000/CJQEJJ$4_
RO 9A000160009-1
PROBABLE DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET BLOC AND
WESTERN POWER POSITIONS
To forecast the probable relative development of the Soviet
Bloc and Western power positions over the next 15 years, with a
view to estimating whether or not time is on our side, is
obviously fraught with danger. There are so many accidental
or unpredictable factors which will materially affect the world
situation during the next 15 years that any precise prediction
is likely to be overtaken by events. There is no unequivocal
answer to the question, "Is time on our side?"
However, it is possible to appred.se in general terms our likely
power position with respect to the Bloc if present trends continue
and if various major alternative developments do or do not come
to pass. Moreover, by examining the impact of some of these
alternatives, we can at least establish certain significant
factors which might alter present trends.
Let us consider first the economic factors
Soviet Bloc is far less than that of the Western Powers. In
Approved For Release 2000 ' P79 OR 0890A000100060009-1
The Soviet Bloc The present over-all economic strength of the
 lop SECHF
Approved For Release.Z $812 -RD 000100060009-1
terms of gross national product (GNP), the 1952 output of
the entire Bloc was estimated to have been about one-third
that of the Western states. For some years, assuming a continu-
ation of present policies and programs, the rate of growth. of the
Soviet economy will almost certainly remain higher than that
of any major Western state. The past rapid rate of growth,
which we estimate averaged 7-8 percent in 1948-1952, is already
leveling off, however, and the annual rate toward the end of
the 15-year period is unlikely to exceed 3-4 percent. Even
so, total Soviet GNP will probably almost double within the
next 15 years, while the Bloc GNP as a whole will increase
around 75 percent.
Bloc economic capabilities to wage war are likely to
increase substantially. The bloc will probably continue to
place great emphasis on the development of heavy industry,
and in particular on military production, despite some con-
cessions to internal demands for increased consumer goods
production. Bloc self-sufficiency, already great, will
Approved For Release 200 1
: CTiRDP79R00890A000100060009-1
 Approved For Release 20, 2 : - DP79R0089OA000100060009-1
probably become more nearly complete.
These projections could, of course, be invalidated by
other factors such as a prolonged struggle for power or internal
dissension in the Soviet Bloc, or a relaxation in the forced
pace of heavy industrial development. The difficulty of
rapidly increasing the industrial labor force in the USSR
and the probable lag in agricultural production may also prove
serious limiting factors on general economic growth. On the
other hand, the application of known scientific developments
to Bloc agriculture would permit greater increases in Bloc
agricultural production and the release of agricultural labor
for other uses.
Further, should current efforts to expand trade with the
West be prolonged, growing imports from the West could increase
significantly the Bloc's economic potential. Soviet aims in
this trade effort are apparently those of supplementing bloc
production of industrial commodities still in short supply
and of making available within the USSR a somewhat larger
Approved For Releas ( VQ?RVW-RP ,WQ, 90A000100060009-1
 TOP SF
Approved For Release 24DAWW W CIA-RDP79R0089OA000100060009-1
quantity of consumer goods. More realistic Soviet negotiating
tactics are bringing greater pressure to bear on the US-sponsored
controls on strategic items. How well these controls can weather
prolonged Soviet attack, especially of the type recently noted,
is open to conjecture.
The West It is more difficult to estimate the probable economic
growth of the Western Powers. The freer and less closely
integrated Western economies,are more vulnerable to economic
fluctuations and trends in international trade than are those
of the Bloc. Furthermore, the Western Powers will continue
to face much greater difficulties than the Soviet Bloc in
allocating and directing their resources toward cold war
objectives and peacetime preparations for a shooting war.
Their ability (and desire) to impose peacetime sacrifices will
be less. The problems of agreeing on common objectives and
devising effective policies among nations of different and
sometimes divergent interests will remain difficult to overcome.
While the Bloc GNP will probably increase at a higher
Approved For Release 20qW#pfgr DP7 0089OA000100060009-1
 Approved For Release 20 i@72T`C1A-RDP79R00890A000100060009-1
percentage rate than that of the Western Powers, the GNP of
the West is already so much greater than that of the Bloc that
in spite of its slower rate of growth the absolute gap between
the two will actually widen. Thus the West will remain for the
indefinite future greatly superior to the Soviet Bloc in total
economic strength.
This superiority may to some degree be nullified by the
Bloc's ability to devote a higher percentage of its resources
both to the cold war and to peacetime military preparations
than the West. Moreover, as will be indicated, the continuing
economic superiority of the West, although important, may not
be the ruling factor in determining whether time is on our side.
Next we shall consider the probable scientific capabilities
of the West and the Soviet Bloc:
The over-all scientific assets of the West, including
numbers and quality of trained personnel, facilities, and equipment,
are now far greater than those of the Soviet Bloc, and almost
certainly will remain greater over the next 15 years. However,
-5-
Approved For Release JA-RDP79R00890A000100060009-1
 TOP SAC
: CIA-RDP79ROO89OA000100060009-1
the USSR is expending great efforts to reduce this disparity,
and is likely to narrow the gap. This estimate holds true
even though the Western Powers probably will produce more
basic scientific advances, and will continue, in general, to
be better able to translate prototypes into quantity production
of high quality. Should the Bloc concentrate excessively on
the solution of short-term military and economic problems, the
range of its fundamental research and the probability of basic
scientific advances would be diminished.
The power relationships between the Soviet Bloc and the
West could be changed during the period of this estimate by any
major technological breakthrough by either side, but such a
development is unpredictable. The relatively rapid development
of the atomic bomb by the US in the years following the last
war is an example of such a development.
As regards the military capabilities of the West vis-a-vis
the Bloc, we believe that throughout the next 15 years the
West will maintain a substantial absolute advantage in
Ap b*ddl#3 R$Wa /Gm' a P i't00 / W&ft 0UU9_I ly
 Approved For Releasd*000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R0089OA000100060009-1
reduce this advantage. Before the end of the period of this
estimate both the US and USSR will possess a sufficient stockpile
of atomic and possibly thermonuelear:: weapons to cripple the
other side, if delivered on targets. The US, if it has not
already acquired this number of weapons, will have this
capability before the USSR. We cannot now estimate the time at
which the USSR will attain it.
It is likely that within the period of this estimate each
side will also have the means of delivery with which to cripple
the other, unless developments in defensive weapons and tech-
niques bring about a substantial improvement over present
defensive capabilities. At this point the world will have
entered a period in which both of the great power blocs have
the capacity to cripple the other, though only at grave risk of
crippling blows in return, and in which the disparity between
their offensive atomic capabilities will be much less significant
for strategic bombardment. Unless it attained complete
strategic surprise or achieved an unforeseen technological
Approved For Release 2000!!O~A Z9 : CIA-RDP79R0089OA000100060009-1
 CEPOC
Approved For Rele 00/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R00890A000100060009-1
breakthrough, we believe that neither side would be able to
prevent powerful retaliation in kind. The net result of these
developments is that the US will no longer, as in the past,
have time to mobilize its arms and resources after the initial
assault has been made and will thus lose the inestimable
strategic advantage of relative invulnerability to quick attack.
The continuing superiority of the Western over the Soviet
atomic capabilities will represent a considerable impact on the
relative military capabilities of the two sides, because of the
expanding tactical uses of atomic weapons. The ability to make
tactical use of the bomb will continue to be important to the
West in meeting threats of local cold war aggression. The West
will increase substantially its relative power position in the
cold war if it can develop local military capabilities in key
areas around the Bloc periphery. Moreover, attainment of the
capability to defend Western Europe and Japan against Soviet
attack in the event of general war would significantly improve
the Western position in such a war.
-S-
Approved For Release 2000/08/29: CIA- DP79ROO89OA000100060009-1
lip - SL
 Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R00890A000100060009-1
Probable political trends in the Soviet Bloc Political
and social trends, which are very difficult to estimate over so
long a period as the next fifteen years, will have an important,
and perhaps controlling effect on the relative power positions
of the Bloc and the West. It is possible that a struggle for
control within the Kremlin during this period might cause a
retraction and decay of Soviet power. At present we see no
indications that the economic and military bases of Soviet
power have been affected by Stalin's death.
Nevertheless, the new regime is most certainly not now and
cannot for some years be as firmly established as its pre-
decessor. The present leaders appear to be trying out new
policies not attempted by Stalin. A severe setback to some
of these policies in critical areas (such as the recent German
rioting) could have repercussions in the Kremlin affecting the
top leadership. The Kremlin faces a dilemma in implementing
its new conciliatory policy-over extension of the latter can
result in further difficulties with long-repressed populations.
On the other hand, a -re.mpos:Ltioi of the iron-handed rule
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : cqA-RDP79R00890A000100060009-1
 Approved For Release 2 79R0089OA000100060009-1
characteristic of the Stalin regime can also bring on economic
and political unrest.
In this connection, Beria's absence from a 27 June per-
formance at the Bolshoi Theatre attended by other Presidium
members may be significant. There is speculation that hgfaay
be forced to take the rap for security failures during the East
German riots. His failure to appear with his cohorts is by
no means a conclusive indication that he has lost face or
power. We are, however, watching the situation very closely
for other signs which might clarify his status.
In any case we believe it unsafe to assume that over the
next 10-15 years the Soviet regime will lose its stability or the
Bloc its cohesion. While the more flexible policies of the
post-Stalin regime and the modest relaxation of tight Soviet
controls may permit periodic overt manifestations of discontent
behind the Iron Curtain, over the long run these very policies
may also tend to lengthen the Kremlin's lease on power.
The posbility exists that Communist China may attempt,
to play an increasingly independent role. Should this potential
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CJAd; DP79R00890A000100060009-1
 Approved For Release, & 7Y8Y29" 'CfA-RDP79R00890A000100060009-1
weakness develop into a break between the two chief Communist
states, it would be a major loss to Soviet power.
Trends in the political and social strength and cohesion of
the West Because of the greater diversity of the looser
Western coalition and the variety of forces at play within it,
we find it even more difficult to project probable trends in
Western strength and cohesion as they affect the global balance
of power. However, at no time in the foreseeable future will
the Western Powers be likely to attain the centralized control,
unity of action, and ability to mobilize their resources
characteristic.of the totalitarian Soviet Bloc. In general,
they will probably continue to be more subject to internal
conflict, economic fluctuations, and divisive influences than
the Bloc. Much will depend on the role played by the US as
the acknowledged leader of the Western coalition.
As the only single aggregation of resources outside the
US itself comparable to the Soviet Bloc, Western Europe plays
a major role in the world power balance. Its continued weaknesses,
-11-
Approved For Release / kk- P~9 A890A000100060009-1
 Approved For Release 2000 A--RDP79R00890A000100060009-1
constitute a major vulnerability of the Western Powers. Its
acquisition by the Bloc would be a tremendous increment to
Soviet power. The reappearance of a strong and viable Western
Europe, including Germany, would substantially decrease Western
vulnerability and alter the present power relationship between
the Soviet Bloc and the West to the advantage of the latter.
On the other hand, we see many obstacles to the achievement
of this objective. We believe that a 'primary concern of the
Kremlin over thEoming period will be to frustrate the develop-
ment of a viable andcbfensible Western Europe. In this effort
the Kremlin will almost certainly concentrate on the key to the
European situation, the German problem.
A shift in Soviet policy on Germany might lead the Germans
and our NATO allies to accept a united, armed, and neutral
Germany, and thus introduce a new factor of great significance
into the world power balance. Such a development, if accepted
by NATO, would not necessarily weaken the Western position.
A rearmed and neutral Germany would act as a buffer state, and if
the Germans were to abandon neutrality, we believe that they
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : OIA'RDP79R00890A000100060009-1
 Approved For Release 2001': CIRDP79R00890A000100060009-1
would be more likely to align themselves with the West than
with the Bloc.
In the Far East the emergence of a rearmed, anti-Communist
Japan would be a major asset in restoring the strategic balance.
However, the degree of future Japanese cooperation with the US
will depend largely on the extent to which the Western alignment
not only meets Japan*s needs for security and foreign markets
but also satisfies its expectations for economic and military
aid and for treatment as an equal.
A major difficulty facing the West is represented by the
extreme political and social instability of the underdeveloped
areas of the Middle and Far East and Africa. Profound social
changes in progress in these areas, entailing disorder, in many
cases, render them vulnerable to Communist influences. The
overtones of this political and social revolution are anti-
Western, creating an additional obstacle to our utilization of
the resources of these regions. The consequent danger to the
Western position is acute in some areas of Southeast Asia and
the Middle East.
Approved For Release 20000,$ a _ R00890A000100060009-1
 Approved For Release 20nDiffilIZZI p1 r5T9R0089OA000100060009-1
None of these areas is likely to develop into an important
center of power during the period of :this estimate, but their
loss wouldq`nevertheless be a serious blow to the West. For
example, the loss of Indochina, which is possible, would
probably result in eventual loss of most of mainland Southeast
Asia. This in. turn would lead to worsened prospects for stabili
in the Indian subcontinent, and to greatly increased difficulties
in maintaining the pro-Western orientation of Japan.
A Communist takeover i
:Iran, which is also possible, would
jeopardize the already unstable Western position in the Middle
East. Current Soviet gestures seem aimed at orienting Iran
towards the USSR. Mossadeq, however, aware that the USSR is
a traditional threat, probably considers that continuation of a
neutral policy will best serve Iran's interest. Having success-
fully forced the British out he probably has no fear of being
out-maneuvered in negotiating with the USSR. Mossadeq has
also often insisted that he is fully capable of handling the
Tudeh.
Talks with the USSR which would (1) restore to Iran the
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : ClAXptflP79R0089OA000100060009-1
 Approved For Release 2000/08/29 :CIA-RD P79R0089OA000100060009-1
$12,000,000 worth of gold seized by the USSR during World War II,
(2) ostensibly settle all border disputes, and (3).provide for
increased trade between the two countries would be generally
considered in Iran as an outstanding political victory for
Mossadeq. If these settlements were accompanied by or dependent
upon a: non-aggression pact Mossadeq would probably be willing to
accept. He probably would also be willing to accept Moscow's
minimum price, removal of the American military missions.
On the other hand, the trend toward greater instability
and vulnerability to Communist influence in the underdeveloped
areas is not irreversible. Western control or influence is
still paramount in these areas. Over the next 10-15 years the
US and its allies still have the opportunity to undertake actions
which might arrest this trend and maintain that influence.
Possible effects of a Kremlin shift to soft tactis We
believe that a prolonged Kremlin shift to more moderate tactics
would also present a real challenge to further growth in the
military strength and the cohesion of Western Powers. To
date the US has succeeded in creating and partially rearming
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 ?LRDP79R00890A000100060009-1
 Approved For Release 268CIFZDP79R00890A000100060009-1
defense coalition under the impetus of an acute Soviet threat.
Should this threat spear to diminish, it will be difficult to
maintain the support of Western peoples for continued rearma-
ment, close integration of national policies, and vigorous
anti-Communist efforts. The likelihood of divisions among
the Western Powers, especially if encouraged by skillful Kremlin
action, would markedly increase. It might lead, over the
longer run, to some of our allies adopting more neutral positions,
or even to the creation of a European "Third Force.?' On the
other hand, a decrease of cold war tensions might allow many
Western countries to concentrate on domestic needs and to
devote more resources to meetin their own economic and social
problems. It is possible, however, that a rearmament slow-down
would instead lead to unemployment of manpower and resources,
which would serve Soviet purposes.
A prolonged relaxation of tensions might also have an adverse
effect on the cohesion and vitality of the world Communist
apparatus and hence on the Soviet power position. S M.et leaders
are under some compulsion to pursue an aggressive policy in order
Approved For Release?0 - DP79R00890A000100060009-1
 Approved For Releas I -RDP79R00890A000100060009-1
to preserve the Communist ideology as a vital force. Any
pronounced subduing of the irreconcilable hostility motif
might serve to further soften the rank-and-file of foreign
Communist parties, and to breed restlessness in countries
under Kremlin control. Moreover, without keeping active the
concept of permanent conflict between Communists and non-
Communists Moscow might have difficulty in maintaining voluntary
adherence of "socialist states" (e.g., Communist China and
Viet Minh).
Approved For Release 20 / _ _ 9R0089OA000100060009-1
 Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R0089OA000100060009-1
Is Time On Our Side?
We believe that the Soviet Bloc under present policies and
programs will over the next 10-15 years decrdase the proportion
by which its economic and technological capabilities are inferior
to those of the West and will acquire sufficient atomic capabili-
ties to cripple the US. Therefore, although the West will
probably retain a sizable margin of superiority, we believe that
in these respects time must be said to be on the Soviet side.
In other respects, time may be on the side of the West. The
West's military capabilities will increase during the next fifteen
years if conventional rearmament programs and tactical applica-
tions of unconventional weapons enhance its present defensive
capabilities in overseas areas.
Trends can be identified on both sides which might undermine
each side's political stability and cohesion. We cannot predict,
however, that these trends will have such effects and certainly
we cannot say that they would do so within the period of this
estimate.
(a) Trends now seem to be running against the West
Approved For Release 20 /
C fRDP O89OA000100060009-1
P~r
 Approved For Release 200010A?P7900890A000100060009-1
in the under-developed areas. If these trends cannot be
arrested, the consequent growth of instability and Communist
influence in these areas may eventually have serious effects
on the economic stability and pro-Western orientation of Western
Europe and Japan.
(b) While there is no reason at this time to predict
the Bloc's decay or collapse, the possibility exists of certain
changes adverse to its present strength and stability. In-
ternal rigidity may deprive the USSR of that flexibility and
vitality which contribute to a political system's survival
and growth. Alternatively, the Kremlin may decide to modify
and relax its previous policies, only to find that this re-
laxation adversely affects continuing Soviet economic growth,
satellite stability, and Sino-Soviet cohesion. It would be
unsafe, however, to assume that the problems which are in-
herent in the Soviet system will of themselves reach critical
proportions within the next fifteen years. Unless new strains
appear or result from outside action the totalitarian nature
Approved For Release 200 90A000100060009-1
 '~ Approved For Rele_avgZgM'l'lA RD 97P R00890A000100060009-1
of the Soviet system and the Kremlin's pervasive control or in-
fluence over its Bloc partners will continue to provide it with
many advantages over the less cohesive coalition led by the US.
Approved For Release 2 tItkRDPThROO89OAOOOl 00060009-1