THE BERIA PURGE AND SUBSEQUENT SOVIET POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00890A000100060028-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 27, 2000
• Sequence Number: 28
• Publication Date: July 24, 1953
• Content Type: BRIEF

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THE BERIA PURGE AND SUBSEQUENT SOVIET POLICY
In analyzing the possibility that Beria's arrest might have
affected the course of Soviet policy, it is necessary first to
determine the timing of his fall from power and then speculate on
its relation to Soviet policy.
The earliest indication that Beria's power may have been on
the wane weeks before the announcement of his arrest was the un-
explained postponement of the Georgian Party Congress. Called for
25 May, this congress would presumably have ratified the widespread
April reorganization of the Georgian party and government which
appeared to have been engineered by Beria.
Western observers generally consider Beria's absence from the
opera on the evening of 27 June, coupled with the strange movement
of tanks in the vicinity of his house in the late afternoon, as
indicative of his arrest on that day. On this assumption, it is
also generally considered that the developments in East Germany
provided the opportunity and pretext for his N,.~o
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There is some evidence, however, that Beria's fall may have
occurred even prior to the beginning of the German riots on 16 June.
In examining the possible relationship between Beria and Soviet
policies, it is important to consider that whatever position Beria
maintained in policy considerations prior to his fall may have little
relation to the subsequent course of Soviet policy. It would appear
that the most important factor in Beria's purge was the internal
struggle for power with the likelihood, as suggested by the accusations
against him, that he was using the MVD to support a personal bid for
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opposition to his colleagues, of the USSR's "softer" tactics. It
would be more likely that he disagreed with those tactics and thereby
contributed to his downfall.
Inside the USSR, the "liberalization" policy had three parts:
(1) a new emphasis on increasing consumer goods for the people;
a seeming de-emphasis of the government's dependence on the
whole repressive system of forced labor, coupled with a promise to
rewrite the criminal code in favor of increasing civil rights; and
(3) a propaganda campaign which reversed the preferential status of
Great Russians by emphasizing that the minority nationalities were
"equals among equals."
Whether or not Beria was a proponent of the new stress on
consumer goods, it appears to be continuing. The Pravda editorial
of 10 July reporting Beria's arrest appeared to put more emphasis
on heavy industry than on consumer goods. On 8 July, however,
Pravda had announced the existence of reserves of 20 billion rubles
in excess of the envisaged annual plan for consumer goods turnover.
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On 14 July, the USSR concluded a contract for 10,000 tons of Dutch
butter -- at least 8 times as much as that purchased from the
Netherlands in 1952. Earlier it had purchased 6,000 tons of Danish
butter, and the Soviet official who negotiated the contract remarked
that the butter was required in view of the sharp rise in the Soviet
standard of living.
On 15 July, Australian meat exporters reported that for the
first time since the war they had received Soviet orders for
frozen beef, mutton and pork. Butter and meat have been in par-
ticularly short supply in the USSR.
The trend towards emphasis on consumer goods was evident also
in the announcement on /7 July of the Soviet plan fulfillment for
the first half of 1953. According to this announcement, the sale
of consumer goods in the second quarter of this year was 23%
greater than in the same quarter of 1952. Moreover, the only
change revealed in the 1953 yearly plan as compared with last year's
was the addition previously mentioned of 20 billion rubles for
production and distribution of consumer goods.
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There have been no indications since Beria's arrest of reversion
to the repressive forced labor system. However, it is extremely
unlikely that Beria, as MVD chief, would have favored governmental
reorganizations or acts limiting his ministry's functions and
removing trained personnel. Consequently, it is not surprising
that his downfall has apparently not affected this aspect of the
new policy of internal conciliation.
The only element of the internal "liberalization" which since
Beria's announced arrest may have been modified, if not reversed,
is the anti-Russification propaganda campaign. It is quite possible
that Beria was connected with this campaign since it appears to have
been touched off by the April reorganization of the Georgian govern-
ment and party, which has generally been credited to his influence.
The propaganda line that the minority peoples are "equals
among equals" has been dropped and increasing stress has been placed
on the dominant role of the Great Russian in Soviet affairs. Pro-
paganda related to the Beria case has dominated Soviet internal
output during the past week. Meetings convened throughout the USSR
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to approve Beria's dismissal were greatly publicized. Editorials
consistently echoed the speeches and other material from the 19th
Party Congress and from the vigilance campaign at the time of the
"doctors' plot." This vigilance theme reappeared on 21 June for
the first time since 20 April.
Front-page editorials demand "revolutionary vigilance" against
"enemies cleverly masking themselves in the guise of Communists"
sent in by capitalist states or recruited from the "politically and
morally rotten elements" of the Soviet population. Unity in leader-
ship is also stressed. The principle of collectivity, which has
received much attention since Stalin's death, is set forth as a
counter to "arbitrary party work." Furthermore, Beria is held up
as an example to demonstrate the necessity for party control in all
spheres of Soviet life.
It is reported that over the weekend, propaganda coverage of
the Beria case dropped off practically completely. It is too early
to tell whether this is a trend or a passing phenomenon. However,
together with the comparatively quiet removal of Meshik and Bagirov,
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the two most recent prominent purges, it does suggest that there
may not be any great public show trials involving scores of persons.
Rather, the purges may be quietly limited to a few high officials,
perhaps extending over a long period of time. Such a technique
would be consonant with the other moderate tactics of the new
government.
The increasing propaganda charges against the US that the
US controlled Rhee and was trying to prolong the Korean war, that
the US instigated and still supports the disaffection in East
Germany, and, by implication, that Beria was a US agent -- all appear
to have been tailored to specific situations for which the Kremlin
needed an outside scapegoat or a standard explanation. These
charges do not as yet appear to affect the over-all conciliatory
policy which began after Stalin's death.
In the field of foreign policy, Moscow has continued to pur-
sue its policy of reconciliation with countries bordering the Soviet
Orbit. Following its recent efforts to improve relations with
Turkey, Yugoslavia, and Iran, the USSR has now moved to resume
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normal diplomatic relations with Greece. The 20 July announcement
that the USSR and Israel have agreed to resume diplomatic relations,
broken off 12 February after the bombing of the Soviet legation in
Tel Aviv, is the logical culmination of Moscow's reversal of the
anti-Zionist campaign which was vigorously pressed during the last
months of Stalin's life.
Valkov, the new Soviet Ambassador to Yugoslavia arrived in
Belgrade on 20 July. Last week Hungary, following the earlier lead
of Rumania and Bulgaria, agreed to establish a joint border com-
mission with Yugoslavia. Bulgaria and Greece were reported to have
signed an agreement settling long-standing border disputes on 10 July.
The announcement of 15 July that the USSR will grant
$1,000,000 and lend the services of Soviet experts to the UN tech-
nical assistance program was followed two days later by a Polish
offer to contribute $75,000 to this program. This sudden reversal
of the bloc's previous boycott of these activities reflects Moscow's
current interest in expanding its international contacts and is
part of the general policy of conciliation which the new regime
has been elaborating since Stalin's death.
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Two minor gestures in the same trend were the granting on 16 July
of exit visas to two more Russian wives of American citizens and
the gift of $10,000 to Japanese flood relief on 18 July. On
17 July, the USSR and Austria s ,fined an agreement turning over the
Ybbs-Persenberg dam to Austria, under article 35 of the draft state
treaty.
In the field of foreign trade the USSR has within the past
week signed agreements virtually tripling trade with France, doubling
its exchange with Denmark, and greatly expanding that with Greece.
It has also signed a large trade agreement with Argentina, the first
since 1947. These new trade developments, all concluded since
Beria's purge, are primarily the result of the Kremlin's new will-
ingness to export increased quantities of grain and timber, petroleum,
coal, manganese, platinum, and chrome ores.
The Satellite governments continue to follow Moscow's lead
on the Beria affair, denouncing him as an "imperialist agent" and
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citing his treachery as proof of the need for increased vigilance
and unity. Leading editorials have stressed the solidarity of
the Satellite governments with the USSR, and in Hungary factory
workers have held "improvised meetings" to discuss the significance
of the case.
Additional signs of conciliatory policies in the Satellites
since the announcement of Beria's ouster have been noted in Rumania
and Hungary. On 11 July both governments announced new decrees
cancelling certain agricultural debts of private and cooperative
farmers. In addition, the Hungarian government reduced the delivery
quotas of cooperatives
1953 by 10 percent. On the same day,
Premier Nagy announced that decrees providing for an amnesty, the
abolition of labor camps, and provision for deportees were being
prepared and would be promulgated within thirty days.
Despite the speech on 11 July of party leader Rakosi, which
was intended to allay the confusion which the government's "new
economic policy" had aroused among party rank and file, members
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remain discouraged, disunited and frightened. Rakosi retreated
somewhat from the extensively "liberal" program which Nagy out-
lined a week earlier and subsequent editorials suggest that the
government's policies would be slightly moderated.
The 17 July issue of the Cominform Journal, which carries
summaries of the Nagy and Rakosi speeches, omits all the references
in Nagy's speech to the alleviation of strict police measures and
permission for peasants to withdraw from cooperatives. The tone
of the speech was made to conform more closely to Rakosi's July 11
speech which stressed the need for improving production and work
discipline and continuing support for the collectivization program,
as well as plans for improving the standard of living. This watering
down of the "new economic policy" outlined by Nagy is similar to
the treatment his speech has received in the Soviet, Czechoslovak
and Polish press, and suggests that future concessions will be
well circumscribed.
Economic concessions in East Germany continue, with wages
and the food supply being singled out for improvement during the
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past few days. On 16 July the SED Politburo announced scheduled
increases in the wages of lower paid workers and, according to the
East German press, large quantities of food are being brought in
from the Soviet Union to counteract shortages on the retail market.
The consumer received promise of further improvement in the food
supply when the East German government decided on 16 July to permit
peasants to sell their surpluses directly to retailers or individuals.
However, strict security measures and steps to strengthen
the East German communist regime are being carried out simultaneously
with the economic reforms. The ruling communist party is being
purged of some of its socialist elements in a move to strengthen
the hard core of the East German regime.
The post of Justice Minister, heretofore held by an ex-
Socialist, was filled by the appointment of Frau Benjamin, a ruth-
less communist jurist known for her harshness as a judge, and a few
days later the East German press announced that several persons
involved in the 17 June riots had been sentenced to long terms,
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some of them life imprisonment. For adopting a lenient attitude
towards the demonstrators, one communist official was fired and
another censured on 19 July. These measures are indicative of the
intention of the USSR to oppose firmly and ruthlessly any further
attempt by segments of the populace to rebel and its determination to
restore governmental authority.
Speeches by several communist leaders have also indicated that
there may be a trend of reversal in the policy of easing the tempo
of work in East German industry. Since the work norm increases were
cancelled on 16 June communist leaders have announced that an
improvement in the standard of living will be contingent on greater
productivity, and workers were generally admonished not to slacken
their pace in the factories.
The 15 July resolution calling for talks on unity between
representatives of East and West Germany is not expected to change
this picture since the proposal does not contain any elements con-
ducive to agreement and thus was probably not intended to have more
than propaganda value.
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In conclusion, it appears that the purge of Beria has as
yet had little effect on the main stream of conciliatory tactics,
internal and external, which began with the deaths of Stalin and
must have had the support of the dominant members of the new regime.
The future course of Soviet policy is likely to be determined
more by the exigencies of the situation in the areas of its ap-
plication than by Beria's fall. Thus, a return to forceful measures
in Germany, for example, would more probably be governed by the
need to maintain discipline than by the downfall of an alleged pro-
ponent of softness. Furthermore, a shift or reversal of tactics
in one area would not necessarily be followed by an overall policy
change. It seems clear that even now the new tactics are not
being applied with mechanical consistency in all areas; for instance,
no economic concessions have been made in Poland or Bulgaria. The
Kremlin is not making concessions for their own sake butt rather
out of a self-interest which seems somewhat more enlightened than
Stalin's.
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There has never been any indication that the conciliatory
policy would be implemented to the injury of the fundamental
aims of communism. Some of the apparent slackening, of the con-
ciliatory gestures in Germany and Hungary may be attributed to the
desire of the regimes to remind the people and reassure the Party
of this fact.
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