RELATIVE SOVIET AND CHINESE INFLUENCE IN NORTH KOREA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00890A000100060034-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 27, 2000
• Sequence Number: 34
• Publication Date: July 29, 1953
• Content Type: BRIEF

Approved For Release 2000/08 k l P79R00890A000100060034-3
29 July 1933
LATIVK SOVIET AND CHINESE INFLCK
IN NORTH KO
e the Chinese Communists have virtually occupied North
Korea militarily for over two years, the Soviet Union retains
nary control of North Korean affairs. There are no indica-
tions that Pyongyang has altered its allegiance to Moscow or
that the Chinese Communists are challenging Soviet authority
in Korea.
Prior to the war, North Korea was a typical Soviet satellite
with Soviet advisers attached to important military, political
and economic posts. Koreans of Soviet citizenship occupied
important government posts, thus insuring the regime*s loyalty
cow and depriving Chinese-trained Korean Communists of any
real power.
Since their intervention in 1950, the Chinese Communists
have increasingly participated in North Korean affairs, but
always within the framework of Soviet control. China's own
economic dependence upon Moscow and its lack of experience and
skilled manpower necessary to control a satellite would have pre-
vented then from supplanting Soviet influence even if they had
so desired.
Various recent developments in Korth Korea Indic
strengthening of the Soviet faction's power. A series of purges
has weakened the authority of the domestic Communist faction and
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the Chinese trained faction has never been strong enough to
challenge the Soviet-trained group. There also has been a
complete reorganization of the local administrations to bring
them more directly under the control of the soviet-dominated
Pyongyang government, a reorganization of the intelligence
system to place it under the control of the Soviet-Korean
faction, and the naming of a Soviet-Korean as a Vice Premier
reportedly to replace a member of the domestic
the armistice, the Soviet Union and t
in Korea have taken the lead In fixing Pyongyang's future course.
Malenkov told Kim II-sung on 27 July that the Soviet Union
stood ready to "grant every possible aid" to North Korea in
organizing its "peaceful life" and Kim has expressed his thanks
to Malenkov for "the unstinting aid of the soviet people."
A Soviet attempt to restore completely its pre-1950 control
however, may now be complicated by the fact that the Chinese
have indicated their readiness to remain in Korea to assist
with "reconstruction." In view of Mao is contributions to
Korean fighting, and to Moscow's probable belief that the Sian
Soviet partnership is more important than a restoration of the
pre-war status in Korea, Moscow may now find it expedient to
grant Peiping a greater role in North Korea than before
October 1950.
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R00890A000100060034-3