INDOCHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00890A000100060040-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 27, 2000
• Sequence Number: 40
• Publication Date: July 29, 1953
• Content Type: BRIEF

Approved For Release 2000/08, C.
The war in Indochina continues with no real break in sight
on either the political or the military side.
It is apparent that French leaders continue to dispute the
extent of concessions to be granted the Associated States. There
has been no dramatic announcement from Paris of a bold new policy
that might rally Indochinese nationalism to the anti-Communist
fight. In Vietnam, the time may have passed when such an
announcement would be effective.. Suspicion and inertia among
Indochinese leaders continue.
In the military field, the French airborne operations'at
Langson two weeks ago and action at points along the central
Vietnam coast offer evidence of a reinvigoration of the French
High Command under General Navarre. The task of destroying the
Viet Minh, as distinct from harassing attacks, will depend on
the activation of effective Indochinese armies, and progress in
this respect has been far from satisfactory.
In addition, General Navarre's request to Paris for 20,000
more troops to enable him to take the offensive in the fall will
apparently be met only with a limited number of new cadres. The
psychological effect of the Korean truce is not calculated to
bring additional support in France for a larger mi try effort
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Meanwhile, Chinese Communist aid is being delivered to the
Viet Minh at a rate nearly double that of last year and the Viet
Minh is believed to be in a stronger position than ever before
to launch another major offensive in the fall.
So far as the current fighting is concerned, the Langson
operation caught the Viet Minh completely off balance and about
5,000 tons of enemy materiel were destroyed. The operation's
psychological impact on both French and Viet Minh troops in
Indochina probably overshadows its strategic significance.
There are indications of improved morale among French Union
forces, and of Viet Minh efforts to disperse their supply dumps.
Several relatively small-scale amphibious raids against
Viet Minh positions along the central Vietnam coast culminated
on 28 July in an operation involving some 10,000 French Union
troops who landed at a point north of Hue. Their objective
was the destruction of a regular Viet Minh regiment located in
the area. According to latest reports, heavy fighting was
still in progress, but many Viet Minh troops may have escaped
encirclement. The French command is taking advantage of the dry
season in this part of Indochina which ends in September -- about
the same time that the skies start to clear above Tonkin.
The latest information on Chinese Communist aid to the Viet
Minh indicates that it averaged 900 tons monthly during the first
half of 1953. This compares with a monthly average of 500 tons
last year. Deliveries during June, however, are reported to have
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SEC Y INFORMATION
reached 2,600 tons. The cessation of fighting in Korea will
provide China with a greater capability.
There is as yet no positive indication of the major direction
of the Viet Minh's anticipated autumn campaign. The two most
important alternatives are massive attacks in the Tonkin delta
and a renewal of last spring's offensive in Laos, and in fact
both these courses may be pursued simultaneously.
On the political-side, the relations between France and the
Associated States are to be renegotiated in accordance with the
French 3 July policy declaration. This declaration offered to
"perfect" the independence of the states, but evaded the basic
issue of whether the states have the right to withdraw from the
French Union.
The note's vagueness reflects a split in the French cabinet.
Foreign Minister Bidault is at the head of those who would avoid
sharing French control, and who look toward an eventual Far
Eastern conference as the means of solving the Indochina problem.
Vice-premier Reynaud would stress greater Indochinese and perhaps
American responsibility. He has suggested a plan for the phased
withdrawal of French troops.
Public pressures in France for a solution to the Indochina
problem are mounting, and will be further stimulated by the
Korean truce. But parliamentary support for negotiations with
the Viet Minh, which at this stage would amount to virtual sur-
render, has not yet reached serious proportions.
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The latest French note to Cambodia promises eventual
complete independence, and thus goes further than the 3 July
note. Cambodia has insisted on French acknowledgement of the
actual independence of Cambodia, rather than a promise thereof.
The king is apparently willing, however, to accept the note as a
basis for negotiation but insists that his government have the
right to determine the military sectors which should be under
French command and that the negotiations shall take place in
Cambodia rather than France.
He is proceeding with a program to "mobilize the peasants"
ostensibly as a means of refuting the French contention that
Cambodia is not capable of defending itself against the Viet
Minh. The French charge, with some justification, that the
recruiting program is directed against them more than against
the Viet Minh.
Tension in Cambodia remains high, and a favorable outcome
will depend on the king's ability to control the anti-French
feeling he has helped foster, and on the French clarifying
their position toward independence.
Vietnam expressed satisfaction with the French 3 July note
and is preparing to negotiate the transfer of services still
wholly or partly under French control. Vietnam obviously ex-
pects to profit by any concessions won by Cambodia.
In general, much uncertainty and suspicion prevails among
the Indochinese regarding French intentions, and inhibits the
fight against the Viet Minh.
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