Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
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Document Creation Date: 
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date: 
July 27, 2000
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Publication Date: 
July 29, 1953
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79R00890A000100060042-4.pdf184.58 KB
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R0089OA000100060042-4 Sec? thfoFination 29 July 195 CUi".BE1 T SITUATION IN INDWAINA d break in sight in Indochina. French leaders are arguing over political concessions. A. Thuss $ no dramatic statement has been made to rally Indochinese nationalism. Time fur such a statement may nave passed. C. Suspicion and inertia of Indochinese leaders continue. French airborne operations at Laugson are an encouraging sign of offensive-mindedness. A. But defeat of the Viet Minh depends pri- marily on effective national armies. B. Progress in developing native forcei- is unsatisfactory. Paris appears reluctant to increase the A. Navarre's request for more troops will probably not be fully met. of Korean truce works against a larger French effort. The military picture is not bright. Chinese aid to the Viet Minh has doubled over last year. Minh believed stronger than for an offensive next fall. French airborne operation at Langson caught the V off balance. A. About 5, 000 tons of enemy materiel destroyed at Langson; Approved For Release 2000/QE a1 DP79R0089OA000100060042-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/29 79R00890A000100060042-4 PcI Information - However, operation's psychological impact on both French and Viet Minh troops in Indochina over- shadows strategic significance. VII. Amphibious raid north of [ue on 28 July culminates operations along central Vietnam coast. A. 10,000 French Unio Intended to destroy 2 V regular battalions. French taking advantage o this area. involved. Chinese aid to Viet Minh averaged 000 tons monthly during first half 1953. A. compares with monthly average of 500 tons in 1952. June deliveries were 2,600 tons. C. increase possibly temporary, but transport improvements suggest augmented program. IX. indications of Viet Minh's autumn campaign plans. A. Important possible alternatives are: 1. Massive attack on Tonkin delta; Renewal of last spring's offen- sive in Laos. On political side, relations between France and Associated States to be renegotiated. A. French declaration of 3 July evaded basic issue of whether Associated tates have right to withdraw from French Union. of French on concessions reflects split in .et. Id avoid sharing French control. Reynaud would stress greater Indochinese and perhaps American responsibility. Approved For Release 2000/08/ 890A000100060042-4 Approved For Release lad '9R00890A000100060042-4 ii. public pressures in France for solution to problem mounting. A. Korea truce stimulates these. ratarg support for negotiations with Viet 2mnh not yet very strong. Latest French note to Cambodia promises eventual complete independence. A. woo further than 3 July stste n D. Cambodia has insisted on. independence now,, but king seems willing to Accept note as basis for negotiations. 1. says Cambodia must have -W.-- Elitary sectors to be under French command. Also he insists negotiations must be in Cambodia France .. XIV, King proceeding with "mobilization of peasants.., A.. French say, with some Justification# t them program is directed agains rather than Viet Minh. . Tension still high in Cambodia. Favorable outcome depends on: A. King's ability to control anti-French feeling. Clarification, of French position on independence. XVi. Vietnam, outwardly conciliatory, obviously eapee to Cambor ia. profit by any cogcesslor-s rding French intention* con XVII. Uncertainty rega Indo~chia-+esC, inhibits fight against Viet min Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA