CURRENT SITUATION IN INDOCHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00890A000100060042-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 27, 2000
• Sequence Number: 42
• Publication Date: July 29, 1953
• Content Type: OUTLINE

Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R0089OA000100060042-4
Sec? thfoFination
29 July 195
CUi".BE1 T SITUATION IN INDWAINA
d break in sight in Indochina.
French leaders are arguing over political concessions.
A. Thuss $ no dramatic statement has been made
to rally Indochinese nationalism.
Time fur such a statement may nave
passed.
C. Suspicion and inertia of Indochinese
leaders continue.
French airborne operations at Laugson are an encouraging
sign of offensive-mindedness.
A. But defeat of the Viet Minh depends pri-
marily on effective national armies.
B. Progress in developing native forcei- is
unsatisfactory.
Paris appears reluctant to increase the
A. Navarre's request for more troops will
probably not be fully met.
of Korean truce works against a
larger French effort.
The military picture is not bright.
Chinese aid to the Viet Minh has
doubled over last year.
Minh believed stronger than
for an offensive next fall.
French airborne operation at Langson caught the V
off balance.
A. About 5, 000 tons of enemy materiel
destroyed at Langson;
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PcI Information
-
However, operation's psychological
impact on both French and Viet
Minh troops in Indochina over-
shadows strategic significance.
VII. Amphibious raid north of [ue on 28 July culminates
operations along central Vietnam coast.
A. 10,000 French Unio
Intended to destroy 2 V
regular battalions.
French taking advantage o
this area.
involved.
Chinese aid to Viet Minh averaged 000 tons monthly during
first half 1953.
A. compares with monthly average of 500 tons
in 1952.
June deliveries were 2,600 tons.
C. increase possibly temporary, but transport
improvements suggest augmented program.
IX. indications of Viet Minh's autumn campaign plans.
A. Important possible alternatives are:
1. Massive attack on Tonkin delta;
Renewal of last spring's offen-
sive in Laos.
On political side, relations between France and Associated
States to be renegotiated.
A. French declaration of 3 July evaded basic
issue of whether Associated tates have
right to withdraw from French Union.
of French on concessions reflects split in
.et.
Id avoid sharing French control.
Reynaud would stress greater Indochinese
and perhaps American responsibility.
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ii. public pressures in France for solution to
problem mounting.
A. Korea truce stimulates these.
ratarg support for negotiations
with Viet 2mnh not yet very strong.
Latest French note to Cambodia promises eventual complete
independence.
A. woo further than 3 July stste n
D. Cambodia has insisted on. independence
now,, but king seems willing to Accept
note as basis for negotiations.
1. says Cambodia must have
-W.--
Elitary sectors to be under
French command.
Also he insists negotiations
must be in Cambodia
France ..
XIV, King proceeding with "mobilization of peasants..,
A.. French say, with some Justification#
t them
program is directed agains
rather than Viet Minh.
. Tension still high in Cambodia. Favorable outcome depends
on:
A. King's ability to control anti-French
feeling.
Clarification, of French position on
independence.
XVi. Vietnam, outwardly conciliatory, obviously eapee
to Cambor ia.
profit by any cogcesslor-s
rding French intention* con
XVII. Uncertainty rega
Indo~chia-+esC, inhibits fight against Viet min
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA