THAILAND

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00890A000100070016-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 18, 2000
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: August 11, 1953
• Content Type: BRIEF

Approved For Release, ?A
NSC BRIEFING 11 August 1953
Thailand is the only country in Southeast Asia that has
been free from Communist insurgency since World War II. Dif-
ferent from its neighbors, it has a long tradition of inde-
pendence. It is the second largest rice exporter in the world
and its location in the center of the peninsula would make it,
in Communist hands, an excellent base for pressures on Burma
and Malaya. Thus it constitutes a prize for the Communists at
least as attractive as Indochina.
The present government's anti-Communist position is well
established. It has consistently followed the US lead in
foreign policy. The internal Communist threat is negligible.
Thai troops have fought in Korea, and American economic and
military aid has been welcomed and appreciated. And Thailand
has not shared the suspicion of such aid which is held in the
neighboring countries of Burma and Indonesia. It must be
noted that it does not exert much influence on its neighbors
who are inclined to view Thailand as an American satellite.
The military clique now in control of the government came
to power by a coup d'etat in 1947. There are no organized
forces within the country which threaten its control. But
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The government is professedly democratic but in fact it
is a military dictatorship. If, under external pressures, the
government suddenly reversed its foreign orientation and domes-
tic policies, there could.be little if any popular resistance.
Potentially serious factionalism exists within the ruling
clique, and could explode at any time. Governmental corruption
is blatant and deep-seated; so far, however, there is no con-
vincing evidence that this applies to its handling of American
aid. This corruption not only provides fuel for political
rivalries but it saps the country's economic strength. More-
over, during the past few months, a falling rice market is
cutting down the high prosperity that Thailand has enjoyed
since the end of the war.
Of Thailand's 20 million inhabitants, three million are
Chinese -- potentially a fifth column. The Thai Communist
movement consists almost entirely of Chinese, but so far it
is believed to have only about 2,000 hard-core members and
about 100,000 sympathizers. In the northeast, just across
the Mekong River from Laos, there are some 50,000 Vietnamese
whose sympathies are largely with the Viet Minh. They would
be a serious security menace if the Viet Minh captures Laos.
The government has already removed several thousand of these
to other parts of the country.
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These weaknesses and soft spots would not be cause for
concern if there were no external threat. But on the north
Communist China is a continuing threat, and to the east last
spring the Viet Minh came close to taking Laos. The Viet
Minh will probably attempt to overrun Laos this fall.
Leaders in Bangkok are already worried by Peiping's
establishment last winter of a Thai Autonomous Government in
southern Yunnan. They are inclined to believe reports that
Pridi, the prime minister they deposed in Bangkok back in
1947, is in China and connected with this new autonomous
state. When the Viet Minh moved into Laos, the Bangkok
government was badly frightened, and was inclined to view
the two events as part of an over-all Communist plan aimed
directly at Thailand.
The government's immediate reaction then was to seek a
greater American commitment, either directly or through the
UN, and it will undoubtedly do so again if confronted by
similar circumstances.
Turning to the future -- the fighting season in Indochina
is again approaching. The Viet Minh is making preparations to
renew its campaign in Laos. Bangkok leaders will then once
again be faced with some very critical decisions.
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In a National Intelligence Estimate dated 25 May it was
stated that if the Communists should consolidate a position on
Thailand's borders and threaten to invade Thailand, the resist-
ance that Thailand would make would depend on whether its
leaders believed sufficient external assistance could be counted
on. Specifically, it was observed, they would demand a US
commitment to support and defend Thailand. If they were given
such a commitment and were convinced that US help would be
immediate and effective, it was thought that the Thai leaders
would stand firm. If, on the other hand, it did not appear
that the necessary amount of US aid would be forthcoming,
they would probably yield to Communist demands.
Nothing has occurred to alter that estimate.
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