THE SITUATION IN IRAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00890A000100070025-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 16, 2003
• Sequence Number: 25
• Publication Date: August 5, 1953
• Content Type: BRIEF

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BRIEFING NOTES FOR
THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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5 August 1953
THE SITUATION IN IRAN
I. Referendum supports Mossadeq's desire to dissolve Majlis:
A. 161,062 reportedly voted to dissolve Majlis, 105 opposed.
B. Similar results expected on 10 April when referendum is
held elsewhere in Iran.
C. Tudeh sympathizers reportedly formed major source of
Mossadeq's strength.
D. Opposition boycotted election as urged by Kashani.
II. Mossadeq will control the government until election which
may be in several months:
A. The prime minister has promised to hold new elections to
elect a Mau lis.
B. He cannot disavow Tudeh which forms important element in
his strength.
C. He may delay elections.
D. Tudeh may be in a position to secure representation in
the next cabinet.
III. Important changes may develop in Mossadeq's policy:
A. Mossadeq appears to be reconsidering his policy toward
the US.
B. Attempting to minimize Tudeh strength, contrary to
previous actions.
C. May be warning that open anti-American agitation will
take place if aid not forthcoming. tOCUMENTNO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
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D. Negotiations are beginning with the Soviet Union.
E. Iranian-Soviet talks will include border problems,
Iran's claim to $21,000,000 and specified Soviet
counterclaims,
IV. Mossadeq will retain control of the government but Tudeh
.will benefit:
A. Barring violent conservative action, Mossadeq will
retain control of government and attempt to eliminate
his opposition.
B. Tudeh controls the only organized political group in
Iran,
C. Closer association with USSR and weakening of western
influence would increase party's prestige and capa-
bilities.
D. Such a development would advance the Tudeh toward its
goal of winning control of the Iranian government.
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BRIEFING NOTES FOR
THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
THE SITUATION IN IRAN
5 August 1953
Prime Minister Mossadeq has won an overwhelming 161,062
to 105 vote victory in Tehran and suburbs for dissolving the
present Majliso He will probably have little trouble in se-
curing similar support in the balloting scheduled for 10
August in the rest of Iran.
Full Tudeh support appears to have been the major source
of his strength. The party turned out in force and dominated
the scene by assisting in and actually controlling the voting.
The lack of an opposition vote was due in part to its
boycott of the polls, an action which had been urged by Mullah
Kashani, The opposition also feared reprisal by government
and Tudeh forces if it opposed Mossadega Finally, an attitude
of hopelessness favored apathy.
The prime minister has promised elections for a new Majlis
after the referendum, but is now faced with a situation in
which the Tudeh party has become his main source of popular
strengt#. If he disavows the party,, he can hardly survive a
test of strength at the polls; however, if he collaborates
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with it in a Majlis election, the Tudeh will be in a position
to demand representation in the next cabinet. Under power
granted him by the Majlis, Mossadeq can rule by decree until
next January and can thus delay elections while he maneuvers
for position.
Meanwhile, there are indications that Mossadeq may al-
ready be reassessing his policy toward the United States.
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Also indicative of possible changes in policy is the
vitriolic attack on the United States that Mossadeq's son made
to American embassy officials on 1 August. Obviously talking
for his father, Gholam Mossadeq insisted that American "stupid
diplomacy" and "brazen" support of Britain was alienating the
middle class led by his father, heretofore the only pro-
American group in Iran. This diatribe suggests that Mossadeq
may be getting ready to open an anti-American campaign if aid
is not forthcoming soon.
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While Mossadeq is using such tactics against the United
States, he is opening formal talks with the Soviet ambassador
in Tehran aimed at settling frontier disputes and Iran's
claims for approximately $21,000,000. The Soviet Union has
announced that it in turn has counterclaims whose size is not
defined. Arrangements for these discussions are to be made
by the new Soviet ambassador Lavrentiev, who presented his
credentials to Mossadeq on 4 August.
Barring violent and concerted
action by Mossadeq?s oppo-
sition, the next few months will probably show the prime min-
inter in full control of the government apparatus, He may be
expected to continue his efforts to eliminate or neutralize
his opponents.
Progressive deterioration in Iranian-American relations
and a corresponding improvement in Soviet-Iranian relations
may develop, With, the Tudeh controlling the only well-organized
political group in Iran, the party stands to benefit consider-
ably from a situation which will advance it toward its major
objective, control of the Iranian government and orientation of
that government toward Moscow,
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