INDONESIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00890A000200010002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 19, 1999
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 19, 1953
• Content Type: BRIEF

25X1X
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ININNS IA
The Indonesian government is continuing to cooperate
with the Communists.
25X1X
The chairman of the National party, the party
which dominates the coalition cabinet, has confirmed to the
press that some time ago he secretly ordered local party
branches to cooperate closely with the Communists. :He stated
that since the Communists were supporting the government in
parliament, such instructions were "completely logi^a
The nine-member Central Nlection Committee, appointe=d
5 November, w'hic'h will organize and oversee Indonesia's first
national elections, tentatively scheduled for early 1955, ex-
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goo principal anti-Communist parties
the sJum1
and the Socialists. But it includes a Communist-cotrolled
agrarian organization which can be expected to protect Conmu
nist interests. This move to leave out the chief opposition:
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parties, one of ubic:?A is generally regarded as the larger
party in Indonesia, is considered the first step toward under-
mining the moderate opposition's chances at the polls and
rigging the elections.
The pro-Communist Minister of Defense has completed a
reorganization of his; ministry which considerably decreases
the influence of the chiefs of staff of the three military
services. The post of Chief of Staff of the Armed forces,
occupied by an able and strongly anti-Communist officer,
apparently remains on paper but no duties or authority are
attached to it. The reorganization apparently has a dual
purpose; to reduce the influence of anti-Communis
in the armed forces and to decrease the possibility of a
coup by those elements. The Labor Ministry has been v
taken over by leaders of a Communist-controlled labor federation,
and the Agricultural Minister has shown a marked favoritism
for Communist agrarian organizations.
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Reports continue that anti-Communist army leaders are
planning a coup to take place sometime in the next six months.
The former army chief of staff, who is a staunch anti-Communist,
reportedly is negotiating toward this end with Natsir
chairman of the Mas jumi . Meanwhile,
s to form a
strong political opposition in parliament do not appear to
have progressed.
On, 10 November, President Sukarno accused both , fanatical
Moslems and extreme Communists of awaiting the outbreak of
a third world war to seize power. This was the president's
first critical reference to Communism since the Ali csthitet
assumed office. tat it will he noted that he retorted only
to "extreme" Communists. There is no indication,
the presidev
's views will affect the government's policy
ward the Communist: nor even that he himself is acutely con-?
cerned over the political situation. Both Sukarno and National
Party leaders apparently feel that they can maneuver the
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the Communists in and out of the government as suits their
purpose.
The security situation continues to deteriorate. Govern-
sent efforts to restore order in the three primary dissident
areas have not been effective. These areas are North Sumatra
where the Atjehnese are fighting for an autonomous state;
West and Central Java where Darul Islam terrorism, aimed at
establishing a theocratic state, has increased; and the south
Celebes where the dissidents have established a tie with
the Darul Islam.
The cabinet, like its predecessors, continues to press
the claim to Netherlands New Guinea, known as "Irian"' in
Indonesia. The various Indonesian governments have used
the issue periodically to inflame the population against the
Dutch and have been irritated at American failure to support
their contentions. Moreover, this area remains as an exploitable
target of the Communists who point to it as an example of
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rity f nfc:
The 'oreign Minister recently stated that it the Dutch continue
to regard Irian as colonial territory, Indonesia mill be forced
to use means "other than negotiation" in order to assume
rightful control Over the area.
Previous governments have discussed opening diplomatic
ions with Mosco , but postponed any action. The All
government now plan to open an embassy. in Moscow next montlit
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ISC DAMPING
of National Party, which dominates
coallti.on, confirmed he ordered
aches to cooperate closely with
into.
1. Said such inetructlon were
* .etel7 logical, ?? since
Comptutists w?re supporting
the rvernm*At.
scheduled fo .x,945, exeiu4ed representatives of $as juni. and
cialts, two principal anti-Communist parties.
A.
a.
opposition's chances at polls and
ecttor s.
t-controlled agrarian organi-
ded to protect Communit in-
Carded as first stop toward under-
Pro-Communist Minister of Defense has completed reorgani-
zation of his ministry.
A.
ed.
e of chiefs of staff considerably
abed to it.
as but no duties or authority
chief of staff of armed forces
resently held by able,
:unist officer.
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19' November 1953
tae8lam goverznteat continues its cooperation with the
eunxsts. 25X1X
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virtually taken over by a
rolled Labor Yederatiou.
minister has shown marked
Communist agrarian organi-
continue, that anti- m aumist army leadei
et coup, to take glace Within next six months.
py chief of Staff, staunch
aa.Pt, reportedly negotiating
tsir, chairman of *asiumi.
? X0&414410, efforts to form strong politi-
-Eitiou is parliament apparently
Xing, &0 headway.
. 10 November. Presidet Sukarno accused both Moslem
tics and ezt;ease, Communist& of awaiting a third
-rld star to seize power.
A.
Ali government took
st critical reference to
It will be noted, President referred
to "extreme" Communists.
, ua Indication that Suknrno's
Elect government's policy on
that he is concerned over
,1 situation.
idant and National Party leaders
reel they can maneuver Comatu-
tet 444 out of government as suits
Security situation continues to deteriorate; government
restore order not effective.
A.
1 fighting In North Sumatra.
terrorism in vest and central
acreased.
ideate in sou . Celebes have estab-
d tie with Darul Islas.
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t :icil m?Wxca ..Pdl
,like like Predecessors, continues to press
her,lands, No, Guinea, Lnoen to Indonesians
A. I ssu used Primarily a gaiai- t Latch but
~astirali support of Dutch position
s e IRes cited as unfrieudl ,
Sukarno .has, oltea td that it UAIW wants
to 4eMo Irate its friendship it will
,rt Idi'
nonesas claim.
ro gu Minister stated that it Nether--
us dots 4ot yield, Indonesia will be
`+ eed to us-0 AWAUS "other than ue otia-
t ns" to assume rightful control.
Ali goverAneut now plans to open embassy -- Aowcow
next Month-
A. Previous ;terwmuts have made moves
tbls but have always postponed
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7--, NSC BRIEFING ' November
INDONESIA
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A. This is the essence of his govern-
ment's cooperation with Communism.
Chairman of National Party, which
dominates government coalition, con-
firmed he ordered party's branches to
cooperate closely with Communists.
1. Said such instructions were
"completely logical," since Com-
munists were supporting the
government.
II. Representatives of Masjumi and Socialists,
two principal anti-Communist parties,
excluded from commission appointed to
supervise first national elections,
scheduled for 1955.
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A. But Communist agrarian organization
included to represent Communist
Party interests.
B. Move regarded as first step toward
undermining opposition's chances at
polls and toward rigged elections.
C. Generally believed that Masjumi could.
win an election, if held soon and
was fair.
III. Pro-Communist Minister of Defense has
completed reorganization of his ministry.
A. Influence of moderate chiefs of
staff considerably decreased.
B. Post of chief of staff of armed
forces remains, but no duties or
authority attached to it.
1. Post presently held by able,
anti-Communist officer.
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C. Reor2~anizat ion apparentl\ had dua i.
purpose:
1. To reduce inf1uencc of anti-
Communist element-, in armed
forces.
2. ro decrease possibility of a
coup by those elements.
D. Defense Minister has repoi,t:idly
appointe-+ four Communists to advise
him on management of thes=e service
groups.
IV. Labor ministry virtually taken over by a
Commoani: t-cont-u1led Labor Federation and
agricau to.Yra I minister has shown marked
favor iti.,im for Communist agrarian organi-
zations.
A. Significant personnel changes in
Mini';tries of i,COnomic Affairs and
Fl nna tic e
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V. Reports
normal turnover acc()nml_.)II I! , 1
change of admi.nistr,r;
Effect, however, i
of persons friendly t c, We- t by
persons eager or willing to sup-
On;the surface, these appear ;,
port policies accept;it,]e to
Communists.
continue that anti-Communist
leaders are planning a coup, to take
place within next six months.
A. Former army chief of staff, staunch
anti-Communist, reportedly ner;otiat-
ing with 1atsir, chairman of hlas,jumi.
B. Meanwhile, efforts to form stron,,,
political opposition in parliament
apparently making no headway.
VI. On 10 November, President Sukarno
and extrep~e
Communists of awaiting a third world war
t lease"1e0o0/`UoI
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President's first critical reference
to Communists since All government
took office.
B. But President referred only to
"extreme" Communists.
C. In any case, no indication that
Sukarno's views will affect governl-
ment's policy on Communists nor that
he is concerned over political
situation.
D. Both President and National Party
leaders apparently feel they can
maneuver Communists in and out of
government as suits their purpose.
VII. Security situation continues to deter-
iorate; government efforts to restore
order not effective.
A. Atjehnese still fighting in North
Sumatra.
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Darul Islam terrorism in west and
central Java has increased.
Dissidents in south Celebes have
established tie with Darul Islam.
This cabinet, like predecessors, continues
to press claim for Netherlands New Guinea,
known to Indonesians as Irian.
A. Issue used primarily against Dutch
but Indonesians irritated at
American failure to support their
position.
C. Area is exploitable target for Com-
munists, who cite it as example of
continuing Western colonialism.
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D. Foreign Minister stated that if
Netherlands does not yield, Indonesia
will be forced to use means "other.
than negotiations" to assume rightful
control.
IX. All government now plans to open embassy
in Moscow next month.
A. Previous governments have made moves
toward this but have always postponed
action.
X. Indonesian trade mission arrived in
Peiping few days ago.
A. Its chief told Hong Kong press he
seeks "ties for stimulating and
intensifying economic and commercial
relations between the two countries."
B. On 11 November, however, Prime Minis-
ter said his government had not
decided to send rubber to China.
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XI. Lowered world prices for rubber and for
tin, two of Indonesia's major exports,
figure heavily in propaganda of
Communists.
A. Many Indonesians convinced U.S.
had deliberately forced down price
of rubber.
B. Communists have seized on current'
negotiations for American tin
purchase, under 1952 contract, to
charge U.S. will buy Indonesian tin
only to extent it can extract
political concessions.
XII. Prospect is for continuing Communist
gains behind the facade of an ostensibly
non-Communist government.
A. Communists can avoid bold and risky
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awrl arry
1. Their happy relationship with
government puts them in excellet
position to exploit deterioratiL
security and mounting economic
problems.
B. Infiltration of the ministries and
armed forces at all levels 'will
quietly proceed at an accelerating
pace.
shat is happening.
The grave danger is that the Com-
munists may attain enough power to
seize control before local opposi-
tion or the outside world realizes
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XIII. Between fall of cabinet on 2 June and
formation of present cabinet, five
attempts were made to form a workable
coalition.
A. First was a joint Masjumi-National
Party effort to reconstruct the
former coalition.
B. Next two were National Party
attempts.
1. First of these would have
excluded Masjumi and Socialists
and depended on Communist
support.
a. But at that time, Sukarno
refused to approve.
2. Next attempt was to get Masjumi
in but on terms that latter
obviously would n6t accept.
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C. Fourth attempt was by Masjumi. Con-
cessions offered to gain National Party
adherence, but latter refused.
D. Final attempt was by minor party
representative.
1. He lumped a number of small parties
with National Party, excluding Masjumi
and Socialists. Communist Party also
excluded but three small Communist
front groups included.
2. Sukarno then surprisingly accepted
essentially what he had refused before.
3. No satisfactory explanation for
switch in Sukarno's position.
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