(Sanitized) OFFSHORE ISLANDS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00890A000400020026-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 12, 2003
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: September 7, 1954
• Content Type: BRIEF

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NSC BRIEFING 7 September 1954
I. Principal conclusions of current special estimate on
Chinese offshore islands are as follows:
A. Chinese Communists have long had sufficient troops,
and means of improvising amphibious lift, to
overwhelm any of Nationalist-held offshore islands,
except the Quemoys, in a few days, against
Nationalist opposition only.
B. Quemoys are well defended, successful assault
would be harder, would take longer, would involve
heavy losses.
C. There is no doubt that Communists intend to take
over all offshore islands at some time.
D. We believe Peiping estimates that all-out effort
to take major Nationalist-held offshore islands
might well involve substantial risk of war with US.
E. Nevertheless, we believe Chinese Communists will
be increasingly willing to undertake probing
actions designed to test US intentions.
F. Such probing actions include raids against defended
islands, occupancy of adjacent islands, increase
in air, naval and artillery activity.
G. If such actions encounter no appreciable US
counteraction, Chinese Communists will probably
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increase scale of their attacks, even to extent
of attempting to seize major offshore islands.
II. Current Communist operations against Quemoys seem good
illustration of probing to test US intentions.
A. Since early July Peiping has been publicly
threatening to "liberate" offshore islands as
well as Formosa.
B. Quemoy is good test case as Nationalist holdings
just off Communist port hard to justify to world
opinion, US support of islands so close to main-
land difficult in practical terms, US intervention
in Quemoys presents considerable risk of mainland
involvement.
D. Afternoon 3 September, Communist artillery bombarded
Quemoys five hours; shelling continued at reduced
level on 4 September.
E. $y 5 September, strong US naval and air forces
had moved into Formosan waters with mission of
conducting air patrol in Formosa Strait and con-
ducting direct defense of Quemoys, if necessary.
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F. US forces in area now include heavy cruiser St.
Paul, three carriers, three destroyer divisions.
III. Communist actions in recent days suggest Communists
have concluded US will defend Quemoys against attack.
A. Intermittent shelling has continued daily, but
at level much below 3 September bombardment.
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No reports to date of activity of any kind by
Communist aircraft in Quemoy area, although
bombers based at Shanghai and Canton could make
air strikes on Quemoy or any other Nationalist base.
IV. Nationalists have been active both defensively and
offensively.
A. Nationalist garrison on Quemoys--43,000 regulars
plus 11,000 guerrillas--has doubled guard in beach
positions, has continued prepare against possible
Communist landings.
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B. Preparations made for possible reinforcement
of Nationalist garrison.
C. Nationalist aircraft have carried out number of
reconnaissance, bombing and strafing missions
aimed at Communist artillery and junks near Amoy;
these junks,which number in hundreds, would. be
used for lifting troops in event of attack.
D. Nationalist naval forces in area, strengthened
by arrival of their three destroyers, took
part in raids of 6 and 7 September
E. Nationalist artillery has fired on Communist
gun positions and has shelled Amoy.
V. Communists remain capable of attempting to invade
Quemoys despite presence of US forces in area.
A. Nationalists estimate most favorable period
for invasion to be 12-22 September.
B. However, an early Communist attempt to invade
Quemoys now appears doubtful.
C. Failure of Communist attempt to take Quemoys
would mean much greater loss of face for
Communists than would postponement of Quemoy
operation.
D. At same time, continuing strong-possibility of
Communist probing operations as regards other
major Nationalist-held offshore islands--Tachens
and atsus~
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E. The appearance of :uriidntified aircraft over
Formosa on 6 ptembeI points up increasing
possibility of Commu fist air, itr kes agAinst
Formo particularAy agakhst ai ^fie1ds used
bylanes supporting tie offshore islands.
ase
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