BACKGROUND ON YOSHIDA'S OUSTER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00890A000400040015-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 30, 2012
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: December 8, 1954
• Content Type: BRIEF

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/30: CIA-RDP79R0089OA000400040015-3
3C BRIE" IG
efforts successful only because of decision of Socialists
to co-'operate with Yoshida 4 s conservative opponents..
A. Proposed no-confidence notion claimed Yoshida
guilty of : "secret diplomacy," erroneous
economic policies, degradation political morals
by scandals, and political confusion resulting
from prime minister `s long stay in power.
8 December 1954
VORIDA' 8 OU $
11. Opgs;
Japanese society. Yoshida claimed Hatoyama's
health barred his taking burden
obligations and duties highly prized in
Hatoyasna in 1952, according to promise made when
gatoyaama. purged in 1946, a violation of system
ure turn over leadership to rival Ichi
nickname of "one-man Yoshida . "
interests, and of agreement by compromise. Led
to charges dictatorship, lack of democracy, and
on of Yoshida cabinet is culmination of efforts
ervative opponents to overthrow prime minister. These
:o Yoshida as a personality developed over several
years; promoted by his methods which violated Japanese
I customs.
A. Yoshida's unilateral decisions, dependence on
inner "palace" guard violated the tra r_
n of wide consultation among influential
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/30: CIA-RDP79R0089OA000400040015-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/30: CIA-RDP79R0089OA000400040015-3
Yoxhida
also thwarted Japanese desires for n
symbolizing end of occupation,
pendence .
:ovsry of iade-
A. Shinsuke gishi, spark plug of anti--yoshi,dss
movement, told embassy officers in August
1934 he considered Yoshida outstanding state;
man, but the Yoshida era (occupation period)
over.
Toahida accused of being too dependent on
od States support; unable and unwilling
up to US demands; result was that
Japan has unequal status under present
treaties and agreements,
IV. These criticisms were secondary factors, however,
A . The basic cause of his downfall to In the
nature of Japanese political parties.
Parties are composed Oi small cliques of
political leaders surrounded by their loyal
followers. These factions loosely federated
C. Yosbid
al parties.
long tenure frustrated the ambitious
other leaders.
D. No faction has been strong enough to
will on the others, none willing to Mahe the
sdsd for uniting the conservatives.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/30: CIA-RDP79R0089OA000400040015-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/30: CIA-RDP79R0089OA000400040015-3
V. Yoshida's role as "bridge" for American aid factor aiding
him continue in power.
A. In MayToshida told Ambassador Allison Japanese
is listened avidly to what "American hot
his to stay in power we should
'log? might say with implication if T33 wanted
formation new party Un
'presents?' might be interpreted as Ud desire
maintain Yoshida in office; hoped US would
wait for new prime minister before extending
economic aid
Significantly anti-Yoshida group held off
age
"presents" for him on his Washington vie
Kishi in August expressed fear possible
a minister
returned relatively empty-handed insofar as
expectations were concerned.
US "presents' could have only
d Yoshida, final course of events
Vt. You
dependent on domestic Japanese conditions.
ith defection Matoyana group, precipitated no-
downfall began when his party broke ranks March
confidence vote, Diet dissolution election April 1953.
the Socialists abstained from supporting
conservative opponent (Shigealtau, of the
Yoshida became prime minister again only because
ida forces won plurality in election, but,
Progressive*.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/30: CIA-RDP79R0089OA000400040015-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/30: CIA-RDP79R0089OA000400040015-3
advantage..
etuate political instability for Socialist
servative to Promote conservative. apl
indicated they will support second
socialists have since become gore sophistic
On 4 November, Japan Democrat
compose: of the former ragr~essive and Japan Liberal
and some 37 dissidents from Yoshida's Liberal
A. Ichiro flatayam.a became head of the Democratic
Party and party's choice fir prime minister.
moving force behind the new party
nsuke Kishi, wartime Tojo cabinet minisster,
of now party, and the Socialist
Yoshi
VIII. Combination of 120 Japan Democrats with 134 Left and
Socialists (chart) gave opposition more than enough votes
to
A.
to :pressure from his own party and from
n to co-operate with it, scaled
doom.
ida had choice of resigning or dissolving
Yoshida government by a no-confidence motion.
the lower house and calling a new election.
Yoshida, in stepping down before vote, bowed
interests who viewed alternative of gen
iection as both costly and likely only to benefit
enter parties.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/30: CIA-RDP79R0089OA000400040015-3