SITUATION IN SOUTH KOREA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00890A000400050002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 23, 2003
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: September 8, 1954
• Content Type: BRIEF

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NSC BRIEFING S September 1954
NSA review completed
I. The next two to three months, because of the pending
troop withdrawal program, may be the most critical to
date in US-South Korean relations.
A. Rhee is resentful and emotionally disturbed over
the failure of his Washington visit.
B. He had hoped to persuade the US to renew the war,
or alternatively, to provide him with greatly
increased military forces.
C. He wanted to redirect American policy away from
a strong Japan as the foundation of the American
position in the Western pacific.
D. He is angry over the withdrawal, which he
characterizes as "abandonment."
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the British and French, officially inspired
rumors allege that he is pro-Japanese, and on
1 September the official Korean press has accused
the Secretary of working to embrace Mao Tse-tung.
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III. Since his return, I3hee has adapted more contentious
and independent policies.
A. He has publicly attacked several American officials,
the US troop deployment program, the military and
economic aid program, and SEAP.
B. Secretary Dulles has been criticized as subservient
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D. Rhee and his ministers have publicly disparaged.
American efforts to form a SEAP which excludes
South Korea and includes Britain and France.
IV. ?fficial statements and. press comments on South Korean-
Japanese differences have recently become so provocative
as to preclude successful negotiations of outstanding
differences.
A. During the last few days, armed Korean occupation
of the Liancourt Rocks, which is also claimed. by
the Japanese, was announced in a deliberately
provocative manner. In order recover lost prestige
at home, it is possible Rhee will seek to provoke
a clash at sea with Japan, in which they have an
advantage because of relative air superiority.
ROK maritime police not under UNC.
~. 4n 1 September, South Korea informed.. the US that Korea
has decided to ask the neutral nations supervisory
commission (NNSC) to leave within one week of notification.
No date set for notification.
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A. Prior to his departure for the US, Rhee instructed
his provost marshal general to take measures to
eject the NNSG. Incipient violence curbed as a
result of American urging'at the time of Rhea's
visit.
B. If the South Korean government now chooses to act
through unofficial patriotic groups, it will be
virtually impossible to insure absolute security
to the commission members.
VI. It remains possible that these threatening developments
are primarily designed for psychological pressure on
the United States government, to gain his objectives.
A. The developments are particularly disturbing,
however, because his present resentful, agitated
woad could result in dangerous and irrational
conduct.
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Approved For Release 2003/07/30 :CIA-RDP79R00890A000400050002-6